Reexamination of Economic Growth, Tax Policy, and Distributive Politics

The paper examines the relationship between economic growth, tax policy, and distribution of capital and labor ownership in a one‐sector political‐economy model of endogenous growth with productive government spending financed by a proportional tax on capital income. The analysis shows that inequality in wealth and income can be positively or negatively related to the optimal tax rate. In either environment, higher inequality leads to a lower after‐tax return to capital, thereby reducing the economy's growth rate.     

Income inequality and inflation: the cross-country evidence

Different strands of the political economy approach to macroeconomic policy imply a link between income inequality and inflation. This article tests this proposition using a newly assembled data set on income distribution. The results show that income inequality is associated with higher inflation. This association, although not economically large, holds for democracies as well as nondemocracies. Sensitivity analysis suggests that the results are not due to measurement error, reverse causation, or omitted variables.     

INEQUALITY, REDISTRIBUTION, AND RENT-SEEKING

This paper presents a non-median voter model of redistribution in which greater inequality leads to lower redistribution. Bargaining between interest groups and politicians over exemptions implies that individuals with sufficiently high income will not pay taxes in equilibrium. Therefore, voters will set tax rates low enough so as to control the incentives for rent-seeking. An increase in inequality, by putting more income in the hands of individuals that can buy exemptions, will lead to lower equilibrium redistribution. The model can be used to account for a negative relationship between inequality and growth and provides a new explanation of why the poor do not expropriate the rich in democracies.     

Domestic institutions and the ratification of international agreements in a panel of democracies

A recent literature explores how domestic institutions affect politicians’ incentives to enter into international agreements (IAs). We contribute to this field by systematically testing the impact of a broad set of domestic institutional design features. This allows us to compare new and established political economy explanations of IA entry. For this purpose, 99 democracies are analyzed over the period 1975–2010. We find that domestic institutions determine countries’ disposition to enter into IAs, as predicted by political economic theory. For example, democracies with majoritarian electoral institutions are less likely to conclude IAs than other democracies. Countries also conclude more IAs when their democratic institutions are long-lived and they lack an independent judiciary. However, programmatic parties and the number of domestic veto players are not associated with IA-making. The key take-away of this study is that specific domestic institutions matter for how frequently states make formal deals with each other.     

The effect of income inequality on political polarization: Evidence from European regions, 2002–2014

This article investigates whether income inequality leads to political polarization and provides new evidence that an increase in the Gini coefficient at the local level increases the probability of supporting a political party at the extreme left and right of the ideological distribution. Using individual data for 25 European countries from 2002 to 2014, I find that increasing inequality leads on average to more support for left‐wing parties. I also find that increasing inequality leads to more support for far‐right parties among older individuals. Support for far‐right parties seems to be driven by rising anti‐immigrant sentiments. The results are robust to different specifications, including an instrumental variable that addresses the endogeneity of income inequality.     

Democracy,inequality and the environment when citizens can mitigate health consequences of pollution privately or act collectively

We study the political economy of the environment in autocratic, weak and strong democracies when individuals can mitigate the health consequences of domestic pollution privately as well as control pollution collectively through public policies. We consider a small open economy with comparative advantage in dirty goods. With costly private mitigation, income inequality leads to an unequal distribution of the burdens of pollution (in accordance with the evidence). We show that the eco-friendliness ranking of political regime types varies with the cost of private mitigation and that increased inequality has non-monotonous effects on equilibrium pollution levels. In weak democracies, the political equilibrium may be characterized by low environmental standards but highly restricted trade, thus leading to ambiguous outcomes regarding pollution levels.     

Young democracies and government debt: evidence from South America

I test the hypothesis that when democracies are young, or still fragile and unconsolidated, government debt tends to increase, presumably because of increased demand for redistribution, or to buy out the electorate, so that democracy becomes acceptable and “the only game in town”. I use a sample of all South American young democracies during the 1970–2007 period and the results, based on dynamic panel time-series analysis, suggest that those young democracies are indeed associated with larger government debt. Furthermore, I test the hypothesis that the outgoing dictatorships of the day bequeathed the young democracies with large government debt. This hypothesis is not confirmed by the analysis. Lastly, there is no evidence that, as those democracies mature over time, government debt tends to decrease. Given how I conduct the exercise, that is, the nature of the sample, the methodology I use and the counterfactuals I run, and also that there are always new episodes of democratisation being experienced by different countries around the world, with some being economically successful and others less so, the results I report are informative of what to expect in terms of government debt during political transitions into democracy when particular institutions are still not in place.     

THE VANISHING BEQUEST TAX: THE COMPARATIVE EVOLUTION OF BEQUEST TAXATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Bequest tax revenues have been declining in OECD countries for at least 70 years. We propose an explanation that is based on a dynamic politico‐economic model where the evolution of bequest taxation is determined by wealth inequality. Since economic development induces a growing role of labor income and thus a reduction of wealth inequality, bequest taxation is reduced over time. The model also embeds a process of structural reallocation from agriculture to manufacturing and a consequent shift of the tax base from easy‐to‐tax land to hard‐to‐tax capital. This process implies a lower tax level and slower equalization‐induced tax reduction, the higher is the tax avoidance rate and the less developed is the economy. The introduction of franchise restrictions which are gradually lifted over time allows the hump‐shaped long‐term evolution of bequest taxation to be reproduced starting from the nineteenth century for those countries that are now modern industrial democracies. The evolution of political institutions also helps to explain the discrepancies currently observed between tax systems in developed and underdeveloped countries.     

Immigration,Conflict, and Redistribution

In this paper, we analyze how the possibility of conflict between natives and immigrants shapes income redistribution in developed democracies. This possibility can generate income redistribution towards immigrants even if they have no voting rights. We show that the threat of conflict between natives and immigrants lowers vertical income redistribution (from the rich to the poor) as the level of immigration increases. The opposite holds for horizontal income redistribution (from natives to immigrants), which increases with the level of immigration. Income inequality weakens the negative effect of immigration on vertical redistribution, but it also reduces horizontal redistribution. These theoretical predictions are consistent with the results of our empirical analysis on data from 29 European countries: larger immigrant populations are associated with more redistribution towards immigrants and lower vertical redistribution.     

Do dictatorships redistribute more?

This paper examines the effect of political institutions on fiscal redistribution for a country-level panel from 1960–2010. Using data on Gini coefficients before and after government intervention, we apply a measure of effective fiscal redistribution that reflects the effect of taxes and transfers on income inequality. Our findings clearly indicate that non-democratic regimes demonstrate significantly greater direct fiscal redistribution. Subsequently, we employ fiscal data in an attempt to enlighten this puzzling empirical finding. We find that dictatorial regimes rely more heavily on cash transfers that exhibit a direct impact on net inequality and consequently on the difference between market and net inequality (i.e., effective fiscal redistribution), whereas democratic regimes devote a larger amount of resources to public inputs (health and education) that may influence market inequality but not the difference between market and net inequality per se. We argue that the driving force behind the observed differences within the pattern on government spending and effective fiscal redistribution is that democratic institutions lead survival-oriented leaders to care more for the private market, and thus to follow policies that enhance the productivity of the whole economy.     

Minorities and Democratization

We analyze the process of democratization in a polity with groups that are divided along ethnic as well as economic lines. We show that: (i) the presence of ethnic minorities, in general, makes peaceful democratic transitions less likely; (ii) minorities suffer from discriminatory policies less in democracies with intermediate levels of income inequality; and (iii) in new democracies with low levels of income inequality, politics is divided along ethnic lines, and at greater levels of inequality economic cleavages predominate.     

Economic downturns,inequality, and democratic improvements

This paper explores the extent to which discrete improvements in the democratic quality of political institutions can be explained by income inequality. Empirical tests of this relationship have generally yielded null results, though typically test an unconditional relationship. Guided by a theoretical nuance of the “new economic view” of democratization and using an instrumental variable strategy, we re-examine the relationship conditional on the state of the macroeconomy. We demonstrate that the more unequal are societies, the higher the probability of experiencing democratic improvements following economic downturns. Following growth periods, higher income inequality has a slight negative or null effect on the likelihood of democratic improvement. The conditional result provides a simple explanation for why previous literature has found largely null results concerning inequality and democratization and offers additional evidence in support of the new economic view.     

Political capitalism: The interaction between income inequality,economic freedom and democracy

We study the relationship between income inequality and economic freedom for a panel of 100 countries for the 1971–2010 period. Using a panel Granger non-causality approach, we reject the null hypothesis of Granger non-causality running from income inequality to economic freedom, but not vice versa. From a series of dynamic panel estimations we show that the effect of income inequality on economic freedom is negative and robust to the inclusion of additional controls. In particular, inequality is negatively associated with those components of economic freedom related to international trade, domestic market regulation as well as the rule of law and property rights protection. We argue that the negative effect of inequality on economic freedom is due to the economic elite converting its economic power into de facto political power to defend its economic interests; these interests run counter to economic freedom, discouraging innovation and competition as well as protecting the elite's rents. Finally, we show that economic freedom decreases with income inequality even in democratic countries, suggesting that democratic institutions do not prevent economic freedom from eroding. We argue that the latter finding corresponds to a system of political capitalism or captured democracy, where a powerful economic elite can nevertheless exercise de facto political power by cooperating with politicians and other decision-makers for their mutual benefit.     

Income distribution and tax structure: Empirical test of the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis

The Meltzer-Richard hypothesis that more unequal income distribution will create a majority for more redistribution has generated much research, but little empirical support. The empirical literature has concentrated on cross-country studies and the size of the public sector, and the results broadly do not indicate more redistribution with more inequality. This analysis suggests that the hypothesis should be investigated in a more homogenous setting with comparable institutions and with an explicit decision about redistribution (here tax structure). New data on poll tax and property tax in decentralized government in Norway are exploited. We show how the multi-dimensional decision can be analyzed as majority rule assuming intermediate preferences. In the econometric analysis, instruments are used to account for endogeneity of income level and income distribution. The estimated model supports the understanding that more unequal income distribution implies a shift in the tax burden from poll tax to property taxes and thereby gives more redistribution.     

Income inequality and income bias in voter turnout

In the era of growing income inequality around the world, it remains inconclusive how higher income inequality affects income bias in turnout (i.e., high-income citizens vote more likely than low-income citizens). Using large-scale cross-national survey data, we show that (1) strong income bias in turnout exists in many parts of the world, (2) higher income inequality is related to lower income bias in turnout by demobilizing high-income citizens and mobilizing low-income citizens, and (3) this relationship is partly explained by the pattern that vote buying is more common in societies with higher income inequality and thus mobilizes low-income citizens but decreases political efficacy among high-income citizens. Ultimately, this study suggests that growing income inequality may not exaggerate political inequality, but may challenge the legitimacy of democratic elections.     

Politico-economic inequality and the comovement of government purchases

This paper explores the implications of economic and political inequality for the comovement of government purchases with macroeconomic fluctuations. We set up and compute a heterogeneous-agent neoclassical growth model, where households value government purchases which are financed by income taxes. A key feature of the model is a wealth bias in the political aggregation process. When calibrated to U.S. wealth inequality and exposed to aggregate productivity shocks, such a model is able to generate weaker positive comovement of government purchases than models with no political wealth bias. The wealth bias that matches the cross-sectional campaign contribution distribution by income is consistent with the mild positive comovement of government purchases in the aggregate data. We thus provide an empirically relevant example where economic and political heterogeneity matter for aggregate dynamics.     

Inequality and happiness: are Europeans and Americans different?

We study the effect of the level of inequality in society on individual well-being using a total of 123,668 answers to a survey question about “happiness”. We find that individuals have a lower tendency to report themselves happy when inequality is high, even after controlling for individual income, a large set of personal characteristics, and year and country (or, in the case of the US, state) dummies. The effect, however, is more precisely defined statistically in Europe than in the US. In addition, we find striking differences across groups. In Europe, the poor and those on the left of the political spectrum are unhappy about inequality; whereas in the US the happiness of the poor and of those on the left is uncorrelated with inequality. Interestingly, in the US, the rich are bothered by inequality. Comparing across continents, we find that left-wingers in Europe are more hurt by inequality than left-wingers in the US. And the poor in Europe are more concerned with inequality than the poor in America, an effect that is large in terms of size but is only significant at the 10% level. We argue that these findings are consistent with the perception (not necessarily the reality) that Americans have been living in a mobile society, where individual effort can move people up and down the income ladder, while Europeans believe that they live in less mobile societies.     

Ethnicity, Politics and Economic Performance

The paper investigates the effects of ethnic diversity on economic performance. Previous studies have found that diversity has various detrimental microeconomic effects, tending to reduce public sector performance, and has large detrimental effects on the overall growth rate. I develop a simple model of the effect of ethnic diversity on a government decision problem in which there is a tradeoff between growth and distribution, in the contexts of democracy and dictatorship. I find that in democracy ethnic diversity has no effect upon the decision, whereas in dictatorship ethnic diversity leads to a government choice which reduces the growth rate. I then test these propositions on two data sets. The first is for 94 countries over the period 1960–1990. I find that whether diversity adversely affects overall economic growth depends upon the political environment. Diversity is highly damaging to growth in the context of limited political rights, but is not damaging in democracies. The second is for World Bank projects in 89 countries. I find that the same relationship between diversity and democracy affects the proportion of projects which are successful.     

Income,inequality, and the stability of democracy — Another look at the Lipset hypothesis

This paper studies the endogenous emergence of political regimes, in particular democracy, oligarchy and mass dictatorship, in societies in which productive resources are distributed unequally and institutions do not ensure political commitments. The political regime is shown to depend not only on income levels, but also, in particular, on resource inequality. The main results imply that under any economic environment a distribution of resources exists such that democracy is the political outcome. This distribution is independent of the particular income level if the income share generated by the poor is sufficiently large. On the other hand, there are distributions of resources for which democracy is infeasible in equilibrium regardless of the level of economic development. The model also delivers results on the stability of democracy. Variations in inequality across several dimensions due to unbalanced technological change, immigration or changes in the demographic structure affect the scope for democracy or may even lead to its breakdown. Among other historical examples, the results are consistent with the different political regimes that emerged in Germany after its unification in 1871.     

The distributive effects of institutional quality when government stability is endogenous

Redistribution is the strategic response of the incumbent to a decrease in its survival probability resulting from weak institutions and growing income inequalities. The purpose of the paper is to test empirically the validity of this conjecture. System and single equation estimations provide a consistent picture: (i) bad institutions increase income inequality, while more redistribution reduces income inequality; (ii) greater inequality increases the probability of government termination; and (iii) a higher probability of termination increases the extent of redistribution. Overall, there is strong evidence in support of the proposed conjecture.