Rank based cointegration testing for dynamic panels with fixed <Emphasis Type="Italic">T</Emphasis>

In this paper, we show that the cointegration testing procedure of Binder et al. (Econom Theory 21:795–837, 2005) for Panel Vector Autoregressive model of order 1, PVAR(1) is not valid due to the singularity of the hessian matrix. As an alternative we propose a method of moments based procedure using the rank test of Kleibergen and Paap (J Econom 133:97–126, 2006) for a fixed number of time series observations. The test is shown to be applicable in situations with time-series heteroscedasticity and unbalanced data. The novelty of our approach is that in the construction of the test we exploit the “weakness” of the Anderson and Hsiao (J Econom 18:47–82, 1982) moment conditions. The finite-sample performance of the proposed test statistic is investigated using simulated data. The results indicate that for most scenarios the method has good statistical properties. The proposed test provides little statistical evidence of cointegration in the employment data of Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (J Bus Econ Stat 17:36–49, 1999).     

The role of the German Historical School in the development of Mises’s thought

Hülsmann (2007) and Hayek ([1922] 1981) have argued that Mises’s first book The Development of the Relationship between Lords of Manor and Peasants in Galicia, 1772–1848 (1902) is written in the tradition of the German Historical School. Historicist contemporaries of Mises also considered his first academic work a continuation of the Knapp-Grünberg tradition (Kaser Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reich, 28(1), 374–79, 1904; Wimbersky, 1906). We argue that von Mises (1902) does not represent the younger German Historical School. First, Mises provides a rationalization of the history rather than ethical and cultural explanation of historical events. Second, he does not support the Knapp-Grünberg argument about the historical development of serfdom under a Slavic rule. Finally, von Mises (1902) does not adhere to the ideology of the Historical School regarding the virtues of the Prussian bureaucracy.     

Austrian theories of entrepreneurship: Insights from complexity theory

This paper examines various Austrian theories of entrepreneurship through the lens of complexity theory, more specifically via the concept of a dancing fitness landscape. Problems in many fields (including economics) can be characterized as attempting to find the highest peak on a fitness landscape (which corresponds to an efficient or optimal resource allocation). A rugged fitness landscape is one characterized by many peaks and troughs, while a dancing fitness landscape is one where the peaks and troughs change over time due either to exogenous or endogenous activity. I argue that several key disagreements among Austrian economists can be better understood through the metaphor of a fitness landscape. The implications of this insight for various branches of Austrian economics are also considered. This study is timely as radical Austrian views are starting to percolate into business schools leading to increased debate among management scholars about the precise nature of the entrepreneurial process (Chiles et al. 2007; Sarasvathy and Dew 2008; Alvarez et al. 2010).     

Accounting Price of an Exhaustible Resource: Response and Extensions

Wei (Environ Resour Econ 60:579–581, 2015) presents a novel derivation of the accounting price for an exhaustible resource in a non-optimal economy subject to an allocation mechanism. We show that Wei (2015) and Hamilton and Ruta (Environ Resour Econ 42:53–64, 2009) are in fact employing different and mutually exclusive allocation mechanisms for the economy, and this explains the differences between the respective accounting prices. Because accounting prices must be defined subject to the allocation mechanism for the economy, the prices derived in the two papers are equally valid within their respective allocation domains. Further analysis shows that if there is declining marginal product of factors, a ‘Hartwick investment rule’ for the model economy (set investment just equal to depletion, valued at the accounting price) will lead to declining consumption for the Wei (2015) accounting price, and increasing consumption for the Hamilton and Ruta (2009) accounting price. This result is extended to consider the accounting standards recommended in the UN SEEA (System of environmental-economic accounting 2012: central framework. United Nations, European Commission, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, World Bank, 2012), as well as accounting for environmental externalities from resource use.     

A Monte Carlo comparison of estimating the number of dynamic factors

Based on a Monte Carlo simulation, this study compares the finite sample performance of five of the most widely used methods for estimating the number of dynamic factors. The simulation results show that although the performance is affected by the data generating process, the methods proposed by Hallin and Li?ka (J Am Stat Assoc 102(478):603–617, 2007) and Bai and Ng (Bus Econ Stat 25(1):52–60, 2007) generally outperform the others. Specifically, Amengual and Watson’s (J Bus Econ Stat 25(1):91–96, 2007) method is sensitive to cross-sectional correlation, and Breitung and Pigorsch’s (Oxf Bull Econ Stat 75(1):23–36, 2013) estimator is sensitive to the overestimation of the number of static factors. The results of this study are further supported by an empirical application to a Chinese macroeconomic dataset.     

Why should Austrian economists be pluralists?

Peter Boettke (2007) argues that economists need not act pluralistically in order for pluralism to thrive in the marketplace of economic ideas. From a market process perspective, Boettke sees intellectual diversity and openness as catallactic outputs, not inputs—emergent by-products of academic specialization and trade. To expect individual scholars to behave in a pluralistic manner is unnecessary and “completely inappropriate” since it detracts from their central task: “to commit themselves to an approach and pursue it doggedly, even in the face of great doubt and resistance by one’s peers” (Boettke 2007). This paper proposes a Smithian revision of Boettke’s position. The author argues that scholarly pluralism is best understood as a constitutional rule of academic life—a virtue ethic that promotes learning and intellectual freedom by mitigating tyranny and autarky in the republic of science. Drawing from the writings of Adam Smith, Friedrich Hayek, Deirdre McCloskey, Bruce Caldwell, James Buchanan, Don Lavoie, and Boettke himself, the author argues that scholarly pluralism has been, and continues to be, a necessary condition for the flourishing of Austrian economists as free, responsible, efficacious thinkers.     

The perils of copyright regulation

The most robust framework for understanding the evolution and consequences of copyright statutes in the United States is the dynamics of interventionism. I apply the framework of Kirzner’s (1985) perils of regulation to the general revision of copyright law in 1976, and explore its effects on entrepreneurship and discovery processes. Critics of copyright commonly recognize the distortions of rent-seeking, but I emphasize the utility of interventionism to explain the “unsimulated” and the “stifled” discovery processes set in motion by copyright interventions, which use legal processes to allocate resources, and deter future discovery by raising transaction costs.     

Evolution and correlated equilibrium

Given a normal form game and a signal generating process, we construct an expanded game in the spirit of Aumann (Econometrica 55(1):1–18, 1987) in which agents condition their strategic choices on perceived signals. We collect results on evolutionary selection dynamics of Ritzberger and Weibull (Econometrica 63(6):1371–1399, 1995), Swinkels (J Econ Theory 57(2):306–332, 1992b) and Samuelson and Zhang (J Econ Theory 57:363–391, 1992) to apply them to normal form games with payoff irrelevant signals. We suggest a selection dynamic for the evolution of signals and characterize the set of signal distributions and induced payoffs for sets that are asymptotically stable with respect to this evolutionary selection on signals.     

On the extraordinary scholarly life and times of Gordon Tullock

Gordon Tullock, who passed away at the age of 92 on November 3, 2014, ranks justly near the top of the list of the “founding fathers” of the public choice research program. Most widely known in the academy as coauthor of The Calculus of Consent (Buchanan and Tullock 1962), Professor Tullock was not named, unfairly in our joint opinion, as co-recipient of James Buchanan’s 1986 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences. A good case nevertheless can be made that Gordon earned Nobel laurels on his own account for groundbreaking contributions to the literatures on, among other topics of scholarly study, rent seeking, autocracy, bureaucracy, war and revolution, law and economics and bio-economics. This essay celebrates Gordon Tullock’s major influences on the field of public choice, including his launching of Public Choice, the journal for which both of us have served as editors, and his impacts on scholars working at the many and obviously fruitful intersections of economics and political science.     

Malaysia-EU trade at the industry level: Is there an asymmetric response to exchange rate volatility?

Aftab et al. (Empirica 43:461–485, 2016) in this journal assessed the impact of exchange rate volatility on Malaysia-EU trade at commodity level using the linear ARDL approach of Pesaran et al. (J Appl Econom 16:289–326, 2001) and did not find significant effects in most of the 81 Malaysian exporting and 66 importing industries. In this paper, we argue for asymmetric effects of exchange rate volatility on the same industries’ trades which implies using Shin et al.’s (Festschrift in Honor of Peter Schmidt, Springer, New York, 2014) nonlinear ARDL approach. While we find short-run asymmetric effects of volatility in almost all industries, we find evidence of adjustment asymmetry in 17 exporting and nine importing industries. We also find significant impact or short-run cumulative asymmetry in 12 exporting and six importing industries. The most important finding is significant long-run asymmetric effects in 36 Malaysian exporting industries and 25 Malaysian importing industries. Clearly, trade flows react to an increased exchange rate volatility differently than to a decreased volatility.     

Surplus measures and luenberger Hicks–Moorsteen productivity indicator

This paper extends to production theory some notions of compensated and equivalent variation analyzed in Luenberger (Econ Theory 7:445–462, 1996) in a consumer context. Along this line the Luenberger–Hicks–Moorsteen productivity indicator introduced in Briec and Kerstens (Econ Theory 23:925–939, 2004) is derived from these concepts for multi-output production technologies. The dual properties of this productivity indicator are analyzed and an aggregate indicator is introduced inspired from the resource function proposed in Luenberger (1996). A connection to a suitable Slutsky matrix is established.     

The impact of personal beliefs on climate change: the “battle of perspectives” revisited

The paper proposes a multi-agent climate-economic model, the “battle of perspectives 2.0”. It is an updated and improved version of the original “battle of perspectives” model, described in Janssen (1996) and Janssen/de Vries (1998). The model integrates agents with differing beliefs about economic growth and the sensitivity of the climate system and places them in environments corresponding or non-corresponding to their beliefs. In a second step, different agent types are ruling the world conjointly. Using a learning procedure based on some operators known from Genetic Algorithms, the model shows how they adapt wrong beliefs over time. It is thus an evolutionary model of climate protection decisions. The paper argues that such models may help in analyzing why cost-minimizing protection paths, derived from integrated assessment models à la Nordhaus/Sztorc (2013), are not followed. Although this view is supported by numerous authors, few such models exist. With the “battle of perspectives 2.0” the paper offers a contribution to their development. Compared to the former version, more agent types are considered and more aspects have been endogenized.     

When less information is good enough: experiments with global stag hunt games

There is mixed evidence on whether subjects coordinate on the efficient equilibrium in experimental stag hunt games under complete information. A design that generates an anomalously high level of coordination, Rankin et al. (Games Econo Behav 32(2):315–337, 2000), varies payoffs each period in repeated play rather than holding them constant. These payoff “perturbations” are eerily similar to those used to motivate the theory of global games, except the theory operates under incomplete information. Interestingly, that equilibrium selection concept is known to coincide with risk dominance, rather than payoff dominance. Thus, in theory, a small change in experimental design should produce a different equilibrium outcome. We examine this prediction in two treatments. In one, we use public signals to match Rankin et al. (2000)’s design; in the other, we use private signals to match the canonical example of global games theory. We find little difference between treatments, in both cases, subject play approaches payoff dominance. Our literature review reveals this result may have more to do with the idiosyncrasies of our complete information framework than the superiority of payoff dominance as an equilibrium selection principle.     

Driving economic fluctuations in Peru: the role of the terms of trade

This paper uses a common trend model, following King et al. (Am Econ Rev 81:819–840, 1991), Mellander et al. (J Appl Econ 7(4):369–394, 1992), and Warne (A common trends model: identification, estimation and inference. Seminar Paper 555, Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, 1993), to evaluate, for 1994–2015, the role of the terms of trade vis-à-vis domestic productivity in explaining macroeconomic fluctuations in Peru. Our results show that Peru’s macroeconomic aggregates share two common trends: an external one, associated with the evolution of the terms of trade; and a domestic one, linked to the evolution of domestic productivity. The external common trend has a larger impact on private investment and public expenditure than on consumption and output, a result consistent with the role of investment in absorbing income volatility. The permanent terms of trade (foreign) shocks account for most of the volatility in output, consumption, private investment, and public expenditure. This result appears more pronounced as the time horizon approaches the long term.     

Tullock on the organization of scientific inquiry

In (Tullock, The organization of inquiry, Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 1966), Gordon Tullock sets out to establish how knowledge is developed and dispersed in science, to such a high degree of reliability, despite the lack of formal organizational structure. He contrasts this against the unreliability of the “non-sciences”. In this essay, I review his perspective and consider the validity of his proposed reforms.     

Modeling Financial Integration,Intra-EMU and Asian-US External Imbalances

Intra-EMU external imbalances in the pre-crisis period up to 2008 are traditionally explained by EMU-oriented factors, e.g. euro-related financial integration. Chen et al. (2013) also emphasize external trade shocks, such as the competitive challenge of emerging Asia and oil exporters to EMU-periphery’s exports. Moreover, Asian-U.S. external imbalances are attributed to financial integration between East Asia and the USA in the aftermath of the East-Asian currency crises in the late 1990s (Angeletos and Panoussi 2011). Acknowledging these empirical facts this paper develops a Buiter (1981) three-country (EMU, Asia, US), two-region (EMU core, EMU periphery) OLG model to investigate the effects of both intra-EMU and Asian-U.S. financial integration on intra-EMU, Asian and U.S. external imbalances. We find that the widening of the intra-EMU external imbalances, in particular of trade imbalances, is related to the growth in Asian-U.S. imbalances and the dynamic inefficiency of the world economy, caused by excessive saving in Asia.     

An expected utility analysis of k-majority rules

Buchanan and Tullok (The calculus of consent: logical foundations of constitutional democracy. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1962) argued that the optimal k-majority rule should minimize the sum of external costs and decision costs. Dougherty et al. (Public Choice, 163(1–2):31–52, 2015) formalized their approach using various groups of voters. In this study, we analyze the optimal k-majority rule in terms of expected utility and compare our results to Dougherty et al. (2015), which focuses on costs alone. Specifically, we replace Buchanan and Tullock’s external cost function with an external utility function that accounts for both the benefits and costs of enacting proposals. We find that analyzing k-majority rules in terms of utility, rather than costs, affects the optima. Furthermore, in terms of utility, the optimal k-majority rule can vary depending on the group one expects to be in during a vote. With some interesting exceptions, individuals from groups that favor the proposal often find small k-majority rules optimal. Individuals from groups that oppose the proposal often find large k-majority rules optimal.     

The Impact of Environmental Policy Stringency on Industrial R&amp;D Conditional on Pollution Intensity and Relocation Costs

Stringent environmental regulations may encourage industrial innovation, as technological advancements lower the cost of pollution abatement (Popp et al. in Handbook of the economics of innovation, vol II. Academic Press, Burlington, pp 873–938, 2010). The pollution-havens hypothesis, on the other hand, indicates that, rather than innovating, dirty industries may relocate to countries with less stringent environmental regulations (Copeland and Taylor in J Econ Lit 42(1):7–71, 2004). Thus, more stringent environmental regulations may increase or decrease innovative activities. This paper examines empirically the impact of environmental regulations on R&D intensities and R&D expenditures in 21 manufacturing industries in 28 OECD countries from 2000 to 2007. I consider pollution intensity and the relative ease of relocation (immobility) as industry characteristics that determine the optimal industry response to increased environmental policy stringency. I find that more pollution intensive industries innovate less as regulatory environments become more restrictive relative to less pollution intensive industries. At the same time, more immobile industries innovate more than more mobile industries as environmental regulations become more stringent, illustrating innovation as an alternative to relocation.     

Entrepreneurship,search costs,and ecological rationality in an agent-based economy

Since Coase’s paper on the firm, transaction costs have occupied much attention as a field of economic inquiry. Yet, with few exceptions, neoclassical theory has failed to integrate transaction costs into its core. The dominant mode of theorizing depends upon Brouwer fixed points which cannot integrate transaction costs in more than a superficial manner. Agent-based modeling presents an opportunity for researchers to investigate the nature of transaction costs and integrate them into the core of economic theory. To the extent that transaction costs reduce economic efficiency, they provide opportunities for entrepreneurs to earn a profit by reducing these costs. We employ an extension of Epstein and Axtell’s (1996) Sugarscape to demonstrate this point one type of transaction costs: search costs. When agents do not face the cost of finding a trading partner, the system quickly reaches a steady state with tightly constrained prices regardless of agent production strategies. When search costs are present, entrepreneurs may use competing strategies for production and exchange that allow them to earn higher revenues than they would earn otherwise. These cost reducing innovations tend to promote concatenate coordination (Klein 2012). The agent’s production strategies represent technology in the form of mental models (Denzau and North 1994) that shape agent action with regard to the agent’s environment. The success of these are dependent on their ability to overcome search costs. The average profit, market rate of return, earned by each of these mental structures tends to equalize as a result of competition.     

Infinitely repeated games in the laboratory: four perspectives on discounting and random termination

This paper compares behavior under four different implementations of infinitely repeated games in the laboratory: the standard random termination method [proposed by Roth and Murnighan (J Math Psychol 17:189–198, 1978)] and three other methods that de-couple the expected number of rounds and the discount factor. Two of these methods involve a fixed number of repetitions with payoff discounting, followed by random termination [proposed by Sabater-Grande and Georgantzis (J Econ Behav Organ 48:37–50, 2002)] or followed by a coordination game [proposed in (Andersson and Wengström in J Econ Behav Organ 81:207–219, 2012; Cooper and Kuhn in Am Econ J Microecon 6:247–278, 2014a)]. We also propose a new method—block random termination—in which subjects receive feedback about termination in blocks of rounds. We find that behavior is consistent with the presence of dynamic incentives only with methods using random termination, with the standard method generating the highest level of cooperation. Subject behavior in the other two methods display two features: a higher level of stability in cooperation rates and less dependence on past experience. Estimates of the strategies used by subjects reveal that across implementations, even when the discount rate is the same, if interactions are expected to be longer defection increases and the use of the Grim strategy decreases.