Export cartel and consumer welfare

The purpose of this paper is to show that export cartels are not necessarily harmful for consumers in the importing countries. Using a strategic trade policy model, we show that, contrary to the harmful effect, product‐market cooperation benefits consumers by affecting the trade policies. We further show that consumers in the importing countries are affected adversely if cooperation is among the governments of the exporting countries, instead of the exporting firms.     

A spatial equilibrium analysis of trade policy reforms on the world wheat market

Since a few countries produce most of the world's wheat, and consumption is widespread across the world, wheat is one of the most commonly traded agricultural commodities. In recent years, the wheat market has been going through difficult phases as wheat prices are depressed. The fall in wheat prices is attributed to a supply glut and restrictive trade barriers. This study develops a large-scale spatial equilibrium trade model for wheat to analyse the effects of removing trade barriers (tariffs and subsidies) on each country's/region's price, supply, demand, trade, welfare, and bilateral trade flows. The results show that trade liberalization leads to an increase (decrease) in prices in the exporting (importing) countries. Production and exports increase in the exporting country, and consumption and imports increase in the importing country. Consequently, the volume of trade also increases. The welfare of most countries rises, and thus, world welfare also rises.     

Wage spillovers across sectors in Eastern Europe

This paper studies the interactions between wages in the public sector and the private traded and non-traded sector in ten transition countries which are members of the European Union, during the period 2000–2011. The theoretical literature on wage spillovers, as well as the Balassa–Samuelson hypothesis, suggests that the internationally traded sector should be the leader in wage setting, with sheltered and public sector wages adjusting. Using a cointegrated VAR approach we show that a large heterogeneity across countries is present, and non-traded and public sector wages are often leaders in wage determination or at least affect traded sector wages in the short run. This result is relevant from a policy perspective since wage spillovers, leading to costs growing faster than productivity, may affect the international cost competitiveness of the traded sector and thus the catching-up process may be accompanied by accumulation of large international imbalances.     

Taylor rules and equilibrium determinacy in a two-country model with non-traded goods

We analyze a relation between interest rate controls and equilibrium determinacy using a two-country model featuring traded and non-traded goods. In addition, parameters of preference and production may differ between the two countries. We find that macroeconomic stability strongly depends on such heterogeneity including monetary policy, and that it is easier to generate determinate equilibrium under perfect liberalization of the economy, but to operate monetary policy in the economy with non-traded goods.     

TOURISM, TAXES AND IMMISERIZATION: A TRADE THEORETIC ANALYSIS

Abstract.   Many countries promote tourism as a device for earning foreign exchange and promoting domestic welfare and growth. In all these countries the non-traded goods (internationally not traded) are consumed by both domestic residents and tourists. It is well known that the relative price of non-traded goods and services is determined in the local market – hence the tourist demand results in monopoly power in trade for the host country. We use a very simple two-country model to demonstrate the specific nature of the offer curve and the trade equilibrium and the difficulties of taxation.     

Monopoly,intermediate goods and the pure theory of international trade

Conclusion In a model with two traded good sectors between which intersectoral flows of intermediate goods are allowed and with a monopolized non-traded good sector, the wage rate in terms of two traded goods increases and the rental of capital in terms of two traded goods decreases when the price of relatively more labor intensive traded good sector increases, though nothing definite can be said about the direction of change in the wage rate and rental in terms of the non-traded good. When prices of traded goods are kept constant and labor and/or capital increase(s), output of the non-traded good sector increases provided that the non-traded good is not inferior, having income elasticity of demand less than unity. The factor intensity condition for the traded goods is in general not sufficient for the validity of the Rybczynski theorem to hold with respect to net outputs of the traded goods. We have derived sufficient conditions for the magnification effect to be observed with respect to net outputs of the traded good sectors. Specifically, we have shown that the factor intensity condition (23) is sufficient for the magnification effect to prevail when only labor increases.     

Persistence of prices in the Eurozone capital cities: Evidence from the Economist Intelligence Unit City Data

Using the Economist Intelligence Unit City Data, this paper studies price differences in the Eurozone by comparing the prices of individual goods between twelve Eurozone countries. To estimate the persistence of prices, I employ a cross-sectionally augmented panel unit root test that accounts for contemporaneous as well as serial correlation. Based on the test, the estimated half-lives are 13 months for traded goods and 16 months for non-traded goods. Price differences for certain traded goods such as food or cars revert to parity much faster than prices for alcohol. To further refine the persistence estimates, I use the sequential panel selection method to determine the stationarity of individual cross-sections for each good that rejects the unit root. The distribution of stationary cross-sections between the Eurozone countries appears fairly balanced. The half-lives based only on stationary-cross-sections are reduced to 6 months for traded goods and 7 months for non-traded goods.     

Geographic price dispersion in retail markets: Evidence from micro-data

Using an extensive micro-price data of 266 retail goods and services across US, EU and OECD cities between 1990 and 2005, we study characteristics of geographic dispersion of deviations from the Law of One Price. We find that the magnitude of price dispersion is a function of the characteristics of both the type of good and set of locations under examination. Higher share of non-traded inputs and lower tradability of goods are both found to contribute to geographic price dispersion, with the former typically dominating in explanatory power. The role of tradability of good in accounting for the price dispersion is more significant as we move beyond an economic geography, while non-traded input level matters relatively more if we move to the interior of this geography. Our evidence suggests that the models of real exchange rates should incorporate the classical distinction between traded inputs and local inputs as well as a role for relative markups and traditional trade costs.     

Uniform Versus Discriminatory Tariffs

We analyze the non‐cooperative interaction between two exporting countries producing differentiated products and one importing country when governments use optimal policies to maximize welfare. The analysis includes product differentiation, asymmetric costs, and Bertrand competition. For identical exporting countries we demonstrate that the importing country always prefers a uniform tariff regime while both exporting countries prefer a discriminatory tariff regime for any degree of product differentiation. If countries are asymmetric in terms of production cost then the higher‐cost exporter always prefers the discriminatory regime but the lower‐cost exporter prefers the uniform regime if there is a significant cost differential. With cost asymmetry the announcement of a uniform tariff regime by the importer is not a credible strategy since there is an incentive to deviate to discrimination. This implies an international body can play a role in ensuring that tariff agreements are respected.     

Endogenous Timing in a Strategic Trade Policy Game: A Two-Country Oligopoly Model with Multiple Firms

This paper examines strategic trade policy games where the number of firms in the importing and exporting countries differs and all firms play as Cournot oligopolies. Under the assumption of linear demand and constant marginal cost, we show that, if the number of firms in the exporting country exceeds that in the importing country by more than three, the government of the exporting country chooses to move as a leader, imposing an export tax on firms. The government of the importing country then becomes a follower and imposes an import tariff. This lies contrary to the previous study, which assumed that there is only one firm in each country.     

Asymmetric Tax Policy Responses in Large Economies With Cross-Border Pollution

We build a model of cross-border pollution between two large open economies, one importing the polluting good and the other exporting it, and derive their non-cooperative trade and environmental tax policies. We show among other things, that (1) in response to a bilateral reduction in trade taxes by both countries, the former country’s optimal policy is to lower its Nash emissions tax while the latter’s is to raise it, and (2) in response to an increase in emissions tax rates by both countries, the former country’s optimal reaction is to raise its Nash import tariff, while the latter’s is to reduce its Nash export tax. That is, in the present context, freer trade leads the exporting country to adopt stricter while the importing country laxer environmental tax policies.     

Fiscal policy,macroeconomic performance and industry structure in a small open economy

We analyse how fiscal policy affects both the macroeconomy and the industry structure, using a multi-sector macroeconomic model of the Norwegian economy with an inflation targeting monetary policy. Our simulations show that the magnitude of the government spending and labour tax cut multipliers, whether monetary policy is active or passive, is comparable to what is found in the literature. A novel finding from our simulations is that the industry structure is substantially affected by an expansionary fiscal policy, as value added in the non-traded goods sector increases at the expense of value added in the traded goods sector. Moreover, expansionary fiscal policy reduces the mark-ups in the traded goods sector, while the mark-ups are roughly unchanged in the non-traded goods sector. The contraction of activity in the traded goods sector increases when monetary tightening accompanies the fiscal stimulus. Hence, we find that such a policy mix is likely to produce significant de-industrialization in a small open economy with inflation targeting.     

Importing exporters and exporting importers: A study of the decision of Chinese firms to engage in international trade

This paper examines the complex and interdependent relationship between importing and exporting for a panel of Chinese manufacturing firms. We estimate the decision to import and export simultaneously within a dynamic random‐effects bivariate probit framework addressing the endogenous initial conditions problem. Results show that decisions to export and import are simultaneously determined and that sunk‐entry costs play a significant role in a firm's decision to enter international markets. Costs are larger for exporting. We also find a substitution effect between the two decisions. The substitutability between exporting and importing is greater for financially constrained private firms.     

Trade liberalization,forward‐looking firms,and welfare

We set up an oligopolistic model with two exporting firms selling to a third market to investigate the welfare implications of trade liberalization when the exporting firms are forward‐looking. The results show that with cost asymmetry trade liberalization encourages the exporting firms to engage in tacit collusion, which may not only be detrimental to the domestic welfare, but also to the consumer surplus of the importing country. Moreover, we find that tacit collusion is less sustainable if the government of the importing country imposes a lower (higher) tariff on the more (less) efficient exporting firm. If a nonforward‐looking or a forward‐looking cost‐efficient domestic firm exists in the importing country, then trade liberalization also encourages tacit collusion.     

Capital market integration and gender inequality

This study explores the effects of globalization on gender inequality. Specifically, we describe how, in terms of capital market integration, globalization alters the gender gap in wage rates through changes in labor demand for capital‐intensive sectors. Consequently, via changes in the bargaining positions of men and women, globalization leads to opposite effects on the couple's labor supply and fertility decisions in capital‐importing and capital‐exporting countries. Moreover, by considering the properties of the industrial structures of capital‐importing and capital‐exporting countries, we show that globalization induces empirically observed declines in fertility rates throughout the world.     

On the International Linkages between Trade and Merger Policies*

In a three‐country model, this paper investigates linkages between merger incentives of exporting firms and the trade policy of an importing country. When exporting firms come from only one country, the tariff response of the importing country reverses the welfare effects of a merger in the exporting country. If there exist two exporting countries, a merger creates two types of conflicting international externalities. First, a merger in one exporting country increases profits of all firms. Secondly, non‐merged firms lose if the importing country is free to raise its tariff in response to a merger of foreign exporters.     

Energy prices,substitution, and optimal borrowing in the short run: An analysis of adjustment in oil importing developing countries

The paper discusses optimal short-term borrowing in response to an increase in the price of imported inputs. The rationale for borrowing lies in the increase in substitution possibilities in production (between imported and domestic inputs) and in consumption (between traded and non-traded goods) as the economy adjusts its structure to the new prices. A typology of LDCs and the oil price increases in the 70's are used to illustrate the results of the model, which are compared with the actual increase in borrowing during the period.     

The demand for traded and non-traded goods in the U.S.

Annual postwar U.S. data are used to estimate the Rotterdam demand model for traded and non-traded goods. The estimated income elasticity is 1.51 for traded and 0.64 for non-traded goods, while the own-price elasticities are both between −0.3 and −0.2.     

Non-Traded Goods and Real Exchange Rate Fluctuations: A Structural VAR Analysis

Real exchange rate variance decompositions indicate that only a small fraction of real exchange rate movements can be attributed to changes in the relative price between traded and non-traded goods. This paper argues that those exercises, by ignoring the nature of the shocks behind real exchange rate changes, may be inadequate to measure the relative importance of non-traded goods prices. Instead, it proposes using a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model to study the effects of shocks to the relative supply and relative demand for non-traded goods on the real exchange rate. The SVAR model is identified via long-run restrictions and is estimated for a group of advanced economies. The results indicate that for some countries, relative supply shocks can be a significant source of real exchange rate fluctuations.     

考虑港口收费管制的进出口贸易竞争研究

考虑港口的收费管制因素,建立了进出口贸易竞争模型。该模型由一个出口国和两个进口国组成,且各国都拥有一个港口,位于出口国的两家公司均向两个进口国销售商品,并在各个进口国展开市场竞争（古诺竞争或伯川德竞争）,各贸易国的港口根据其是否存在价格管制确定港口收费。针对进出口公司的每种竞争模式,得到了不同的港口收费管制组合下各贸易国的港口收费、港口利润和社会福利,并将竞争均衡结果进行了比较。研究发现： （1）在进出口公司古诺竞争模式下,若三个贸易国的港口都无收费管制（有收费管制）且进出口产品的差异较大 （小）时,各贸易国的社会福利和港口利润均更高; （2）在进出口公司伯川德竞争模式下,若进出口产品的差异较大 （小）,则出口国的港口利润主要取决于港口收费 （贸易量）,而进口国恰好相反; （3）当进出口产品的差异较大 （小）时,进出口公司在古诺 （伯川德）竞争模式下各贸易国的社会福利、港口利润以及港口使用费都更高。