我国中小会计师事务所发展问题的探讨

随着我国中小企业的发展，中小型会计师事务所也不断增多。中小型会计师事务所在发展过程中具有相对优势，也存在着一些问题。本文在阐述中小型会计师事务所发展优势的基础上，分析了目前我国中小型会计师事务所发展存在的问题，据以提出了促进中小型会计师事务所可持续发展的有效对策。     

会计师事务所做大做强战略研究——基于陕西省省内外会计师事务所的调查与分析

文章通过对陕西省省内外会计师事务所的调查,对陕西省省内外会计师事务所在做大做强方面存在的诸多问题进行了总结,对陕西省省内会计师事务所做大做强进行了战略性分析,分析其可能面临的问题,并提出解决的对策,旨在为我国中小型会计师事务所做大做强提供改革的建议。     

论我国小型会计师事务所发展过程中的问题与对策

随着会计师事务所数量的不断增加，小型会计师事务所在审计市场上的竞争越来越激烈，本文分析了小型会计师事务所发展中存在的问题，提出了可持续发展的思路。     

关于推进广西区内会计师事务所计算机辅助审计应用建议

广西在会计师事务所审计实务过程中推广计算机辅助审计已经走过了二十多个年头,注册会计师协会近些年也在积极推进审计信息化进程.会计师事务所在审计中应用信息技术的水平参差不齐.本文通过调查分析了广西区内会计师事务所计算机辅助审计应用中存在的问题,针对这些问题提出相应的解决方法,为广西区内各个会计师事务所不断推进和深化计算机辅助审计应用提供相应的参考.     

云南省会计师事务所审计质量浅析

随着经济的发展，市场化进程的加快，会计师事务所作为维护市场经济秩序，鉴别会计信息真实性，保证公众利益的第三方独立主体在市场经济中起着越来越重要的作用。但是云南省由于执业环境、会计师事务所规模、执业人员素质等多方面存在问题，会计师事务所的审计质量并不高。对审计质量的衡量问题进行阐述，结合云南省会计师事务所的审计现状，提出提高云南省会计师事务所审计质量的应对策略。     

会计师事务所内部控制研究——基于吉林省行业调研信息

建立科学有效的会计师事务所内部控制制度，有效防范经营风险，以及如何做大做强会计师事务所已经成为当前业界十分关注的问题。本文以2010年吉林省会计师事务所执业质量检查信息为依据，对会计师事务所内控现况、存在问题及相关影响因素进行研究，提出了如何建立并实施有效的内部控制，保障事务所健康发展的前瞻性建议。     

合伙制会计师事务所组织形式的探讨

注册会计师在大量的造假面前没能承担起应有的独立、客观、公正的职责有一个重要的原因是会计师事务所的组织形式问题,而“合伙制”是最为有效的解决这一问题的方法。文章阐述了合伙制在我国会计师事务所推行的利与弊,并提出目前在我国全面推行合伙制的具体措施。     

我国中小会计师事务所发展问题的探讨

随着我国中小企业的发展,中小型会计师事务所也不断增多.中小型会计师事务所在发展过程中具有相对优势,也存在着一些问题.本文在阐述中小型会计师事务所发展优势的基础上,分析了目前我国中小型会计师事务所发展存在的问题,据以提出了促进中小型会计师事务所可持续发展的有效对策.     

会计师事务所内部管理问题分析

会计师事务所内部管理问题重重，“保牌式”合并以及缺乏有效的外部监管、法律风险较低等都是造成这些问题的原因。鉴于此，从加快《注册会计师法》的修订以及严格法律责任、提高内部管理效率等方面入手，方可解决会计师事务所内部管理混乱的问题。     

论会计师事务所文化资源的开发

会计师事务所文化是一种资源，其文化资源对于会计师事务所发展具有重大意义。应充分认识会计师事务所文化资源的内涵，并结合我国会计师事务所文化资源开发中存在的问题，制定开发会计师事务所文化资源的具体措施，并指出会计师事务所文化资源开发的重点。     

再议基于利益冲突下审计独立性

独立性对于审计尤其是注册会计师审计而言是其核心基础。注册会计师的审计业务作为一种经营行为,难免要受到利益指针的指引,而其工作的立足点即是超然的不受影响的第三方独立。在经营利益和品质独立的博弈中,在所有的审计人一步步前行、发展的同时仍然面临独立性的挑战。进入本世纪后,财务造假案频发,且人们发现在企业经营失败的后面总伴随着审计失败,究其本质原因依然是注册会计师在审计各方的利益冲突中迷失了自我,丧失了基本的独立性。文章就注册会计师如何在利益冲突中保持独立性等相关问题进行一些必要的探讨。     

对网络环境下我国会计信息质量监管的理论与方法的思考

"我国在网络环境下应该建立一个由企业内部、社会和国家组成的三位一体的会计信息质量监管体系,这个体系应该是首尾一致、不可分割的整体".会计信息质量的单位内部监管、社会监管、国家监管三者之间的联系为:单位内部监管是基础,是对会计信息生成的直接监督,应该突出内部控制、内部约束机制的健全并且强化单位负责人的会计责任和对会计人员的职业道德约束;社会监管是持第三立场的注册会计师及其事务所对会计信息质量的辅助监督,社会监管必须以内部监管为基础,必须体现社会公众的意志;国家监管是以财政部门为主体,并且体现国家意志的一种政府监督,这种监督是对内部监管和社会监管的再监督.三者之间是一个完整的体系,不可分割.     

中国注册会计师审计风险的成因与对策

注册会计师审计风险是社会发展到一定阶段的产物,它与一定的审计环境相联系。为提高审计质量和审计工作效率,保护审计人员正当权益,更好地发挥审计的作用,必须研究审计风险产生的原因,寻求控制审计风险的对策。     

Why do firms choose zero-leverage policy? Evidence from China

In recent years, firms choosing zero-leverage policy have largely increased around the world. However, few studies have focused on why Chinese firms choose zero-leverage policy. In this article, we investigate the motivations for firms choosing zero-leverage policy from the perspective of financing needs. Using a sample of public firms listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock market in China from 2007 to 2014, we find that firms without external financing needs are more likely to become zero-leverage firms, and that financial constraints and financial flexibility also may be the motivations for firms choosing zero-leverage policy.     

Is firm-sponsored training a palliative? A common agency approach

We analyse the issue of firm-sponsored training under product market imperfections. In this setting, qualification becomes a public good for firms when their profits are increasing in the stock of skilled workers but remains a private good to students/workers. Students have to pay a tuition fee but at the same time firms sponsor education: universities sell training to both. We prove that the proportion of skilled workers is larger in more competitive economies/industries while the share of firms in the financing of training is a monotonically decreasing function of the degree of competition. An increase of the latter indeed increases the equilibrium skilled wage while reducing its sensitivity to an increase of the supply of skilled workers. The firms’ aggregate expenditures on training per worker are nevertheless a nonmonotonic function of the competitiveness of the economy.     

Chinese overseas M&A performance and the Go Global policy1

It is well known that government plays an important role in the business activities of Chinese firms. Less certain is the effect this influence has on the wealth of those firms’ shareholders. We contribute to the literature by analysing stock market reactions to announcements by Chinese firms of overseas mergers and acquisitions (OMAs). OMAs are of particular interest because there can exist a conflict between the interests of the public sector in acquiring overseas assets, and the interests of the private sector in maximizing shareholder wealth. Our main dataset consists of 213 observations of 157 OMA events that occurred between 1994 and 2009, using share market returns from the Shanghai, Shenzhen, Hong Kong and US markets. The aggregation of share price data across multiple markets, and the listing of firms in multiple exchanges, raise econometric issues for the standard event‐study methodology. To address these, we use a new, feasible generalized least squares (GLS) procedure developed by Gu and Reed (2012) . On the basis of an analysis using both aggregated and disaggregated samples, and of daily and cumulative abnormal returns, we find consistent evidence that (i) Chinese OMAs have not lowered the wealth of shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms, and (ii) shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms have not fared worse under under China's ‘Go Global’ policy of encouraging outward investment by Chinese firms.     

Restrictions on Foreign Investments and the Relocation of Firms

We analyse why the Chinese government sets restrictions on foreign direct investment (FDI). We focus our analysis on the percentage of shares in relocated firms that the government allows to be foreign‐owned. The government's decision on this percentage depends on the entry cost, the number of firms that relocate and the weight of the consumer surplus in the objective function of the government. We show that by its choice of this percentage, the Chinese government may restrict or encourage FDI to its country. We also find that if the government may subsidise the fixed entry cost, it provides a subsidy only when the producer surplus has a greater weight than the consumer surplus in weighted welfare. In that case, the subsidy encourages relocation by both firms and permits the government to allow a lower percentage of shares to be foreign‐owned in relocated firms.     

HOW TO COMPLY WITH ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS? THE ROLE OF INFORMATION

The effectiveness of environmental regulation can be viewed as conditioned by the action of two main agents: regulated firms and public agency. Using a questionnaire on the pulp and paper industry in Portugal, this article finds that firms' decision to comply with environmental regulations is strongly influenced by firms' information on its legal obligations; this effect is stronger for smaller firms. Moreover larger/younger firms are less likely to comply with environmental regulations than smaller/older firms. Regarding the public agency's behavior, the authors find that greater monitoring efforts are directed toward larger/younger firms and toward those firms most likely to cause higher pollution levels. (JEL K32, Q28 )     

调节收入分配的福利支出政策研究综述 ——基于支出“运作机制”视角

调节收入分配是现代政府的一项重要职能,而公共财政的“福利支出政策”则是政府发挥这一职能的有效手段之一。对此,本文从理论上综述了调节收入分配的福利支出政策,包括前沿的公共产品内在分配效应研究、标签分配政策、定向政策、实物补助政策和“付劳收益”政策研究。通过理论综述和比较研究,本文探析了这些政策对于中国公共福利政策的借鉴意义,提出了完善我国公共财政福利支出项目、提高福利支出效率的政策建议。     

Entrenched Board in New Public Firms： An Empirical Study of Chinese IPOs

This study empirically investigates the impact of managerial entrenchment on firm financial performance of Chinese firms initial public offerings （IPOs）. Using 142 firms listed in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange （SZSE）, which was collected from the Guotaian Research Service Center （GTA-RSC） databases, this study uses two proxies to measure firm performance and three proxies to measure managerial entrenchment. The two proxies for firm performance are Tobins＇ Q and return on assets （ROA）, and the three proxies for managerial entrenchment are entrenchment 1, entrenchment 2, and entrenchment 3. These three entrenchment proxies are derived from the principal component analysis （PCA）. Though previous studies of managerial entrenchment and firm performance variables suffer from endogeneity, with respect to the corporate governance it is unclear as to which variables are endogenous and which are exogenous. This study confirms that the data are linear and no endogeneity issue should be address in this study, but only heteroskedasticity, non-normality for Tobins＇ Q are a problem, therefore, the regression method employed for Tobins＇ Q is the generalised least square （GLS） and the ordinary least square （OLS） between estimators for ROA. The regression result for Tobins＇ Q reveals that managerial entrenchment is negatively impact on firm performance. The results are in contradiction to the stewardship theory for new firms whereas the managerial entrenchment for new firms is positive. Furthermore, only one entrenchment proxy yields a significant coefficient. In conclusion, the negative results of entrenchment proxies were caused by the different institutional structures and legal systems which are the Chinese corporations that are still largely owned and controlled by a state and hence the centralised state controlled was responsible for all managerial actions.