Changes in income distribution and welfare from greater immigration of unskilled workers

This paper considers the consequences of greater immigration of unskilled labor on income distribution and welfare in the receiving country. To address these issues, both the sending and receiving countries are represented in a static general equilibrium model which distinguishes between skilled and unskilled labor and which allows prices to be determined endogenously. In this framework an inflow of unskilled labor is likely to reduce wages of unskilled labor, but whether capital or skilled labor benefits depends upon demand elasticities, elasticities of substitution in production, and differences across countries in the productivity of unskilled labor. National welfare in the receiving country is likely to rise, to the extent that the relative price of importable goods falls, non-residents already in the country receive lower wages, immigrants receive lower wages than those paid to domestic workers, and immigrants cause little increased demand for public services and transfer programs.     

Capital–skill complementarity and the immigration surplus

We build a neoclassical growth model with overlapping dynasties and capital–skill complementarities to evaluate changes in immigration policy. Calibrating the model using US data, we quantify the differential effects of skilled and unskilled immigration on factor returns and on the welfare of different sectors of the population. An influx of high-skilled immigrants lowers the wages of skilled workers, raises the wages of unskilled workers, and because of the relative complementarity between capital and skilled labor, substantially raises the rate of return to native-owned capital. By contrast, an influx of unskilled immigrants produces an opposite effect on wages, and has only a negligible effect on the return to capital. Because of capital–skill complementarity, an increase in the number of skilled immigrants generates an immigration surplus—the overall welfare benefit accruing to the native population—that is approximately ten times larger than the immigration surplus generated by an identical increase in the number of unskilled immigrants. This differential welfare effect is far higher than can be accounted for by the disparity between the productivities of each type of worker.     

A SEARCH‐EQUILIBRIUM APPROACH TO THE EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION ON LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES

We analyze the impact of the U.S. skill‐biased immigration influx that took place between 2000 and 2009 within a search and matching model that allows for skill heterogeneity, differential search cost, and capital‐skill complementarity. We find that although the skill‐biased immigration raised the overall net income to natives, it had distributional effects. Specifically, unskilled native workers gained in terms of both employment and wages. Skilled native workers, however, gained in terms of employment but lost in terms of wages. Nevertheless, in an extension where skilled natives and immigrants are imperfect substitutes, even the skilled wage rises.     

The immigration surplus and the substitutability of immigrant and native labor: evidence from Spain

How immigration affects the labor market of the host country is a topic of major concern for many immigrant-receiving nations. Spain is no exception, as a consequence of the rapid increase in immigrant flows experienced over the past few decades. We assess the impact of immigration on Spanish natives’ incomes by estimating the net immigration surplus (IS) under the assumption of perfect and imperfect substitutabilities between immigrant and native labor of similar educational attainment. To address the imperfect substitutability between immigrant and native labor, we use information on the occupational distribution of immigrants and natives of similar educational attainment to learn about the equivalency of skilled immigrants to skilled and unskilled natives. The results show that the magnitude of the IS significantly rises with the degree of imperfect substitutability between immigrant and native labor.     

Employment effects of stabilization policies

This paper studies the effects of a stabilization program based on a reduction in the devaluation rate in an optimizing model with capital controls, minimum wages for unskilled labor, an informal sector, and public production of intermediate inputs. Perfect mobility across sectors of the unskilled labor force prevents the emergence of unemployment for that category of labor, but skilled unemployment prevails in equilibrium. The analysis highlights the role of endogenous labor market segmentation in assessing the wage and employment effects of stabilization policies.     

Nutritional efficiency wages and child labor

This paper formally analyzes the incidence of child labor by employing an overlapping-generations general-equilibrium model of a small open economy. An individual's ability determines whether or not he/she becomes a skilled worker. The supply side of the economy is composed of two sectors: a modern sector that produces a homogeneous good using skilled labor and physical capital; and an agrarian sector that produces a traditional good using unskilled adult labor, child labor, and land. An increase in foreign direct investment and improvements in education reduce the incidence of child labor. Emigration of skilled (unskilled) workers reduces (raises) the supply of child labor, while trade sanctions reduce the demand for child labor. Child wage subsidies have an ambiguous effect on the incidence of child labor while education subsidies are effective in reducing the incidence of child labor. Simulation analysis is used to investigate the welfare effects of the aforementioned policies.     

Anti‐immigration policy in the destination country and skilled–unskilled wage inequality in a source economy with or without unemployment

This paper is aimed at theoretically examining the consequence of the anti‐immigration policy adopted in the destination country on the skilled–unskilled wage inequality in a source nation using a couple of two‐sector, specific‐factor general equilibrium models in both the presence and absence of unemployment. Emigration requires incurring some capital cost for professional skill formation on the part of every prospective emigrant that adds to the opportunity cost of emigration. The authority of the destination country determines the number of visas to be granted and hence directly controls the magnitude of skilled emigration from the source country. In the migration equilibrium, the expected skilled wage income abroad is equal to the opportunity cost of emigration. In both the presence and absence of unemployment of unskilled labor, the outcome of the policy on the wage inequality crucially hinges on both the magnitude of the fixed cost of emigration and the technological factors. In the specific‐factor Harris–Todaro model, the degree of imperfection in the unskilled labor market is an additional factor. Finally, some policy recommendations have been made for protecting the interest of the poor unskilled workforce.     

Consequences of a tax on the brain drain for unemployment and income inequality in less developed countries

Welfare implications of an income tax paid by emigrant skilled workers are analyzed in a model which assumes international capital mobility and allows for unemployed labor in the modern sector of a developing country. The tax discourages overinvestment in education and also contributes to the welfare of those remaining through the direct revenue effect. However, expected earnings of unskilled workers decline as a result of the tax, while those of non-migrant skilled workers rise. The tax may thus exacerbate domestic income inequality. In addition, modern sector employment, output, and capital stock may fall.     

Immigration, Unemployment and Pensions

This paper examines the impact of immigration on a host country with welfare state arrangements that support both the unemployed and the elderly. It is shown that low‐skilled immigration increases the unemployment rate. Furthermore, it harms the low‐skilled native population and benefits the high‐skilled natives and pensioners. Nevertheless, as under competitive labor markets, immigration generates an unambiguous gain for the native population as a whole. However, in contrast to the findings under full employment, this gain can be dampened by an expansion of the pension system.     

外包与要素价格:从特定要素模型角度的分析

本文通过建立两种商品多种投入要素的特定要素小国模型来分析外包对要素价格的影响。如果将土地和熟练劳动视为特定要素,本文发现通过生产率效应和要素供给效应的传导机制,外包有利于特定要素所有者,不利于非熟练劳动,扩大了熟练劳动与非熟练劳动的相对工资,该结论与外包中间品的要素密集度、均衡状态时是否为完全专业化外包和资本的国际流动无关。即使非熟练劳动通过培训可以向熟练劳动升级,但并不一定会缓和本国的相对工资差距。     

Labour mobility and the redistributive effects of trade integration

This paper addresses the role of mobility costs in shaping the effects of trade integration on wage inequality and welfare. We present a three-factor, two-sector model in which the production technology exhibits capital-skill complementarity and the cost of moving across sectors differs between unskilled and skilled workers. Results show that trade integration increases aggregate welfare, but it also raises wage inequality, both within and across skill categories. We also model a public re-training program, financed by a proportional tax levied on skilled workers, which reduces the mobility cost of unskilled workers. We show that even if the re-training programme entails some welfare losses, it can reduce both within and between wage inequality, while still making free trade Pareto superior with respect to the no-trade regime.     

International immigration and economic welfare in an efficiency wage model: The co-existence case of both legal and illegal foreign workers

Abstract. In the developed countries some native workers are unemployed while there exist illegal unskilled (legal skilled) foreign workers who are complementary to (substitutable for) natives and their wages are usually lower than (equal to) that of natives. Reflecting this situation, we introduce two types of immigrant in an efficiency wage model. It is shown that domestic government should exclude illegal foreign workers but welcome legal ones if the total number of illegal immigrants is small enough and well controlled. On the other hand, legal immigration should be restricted if the flood of illegal immigration is out of control.     

Eastern Enlargement of the EU: How Much Is It Worth for Austria?

For present member countries, eastern EU enlargement entails gains from integration as well as fiscal costs. The authors use a calibrated model to quantify the dynamic effects of discriminatory trade liberalization and immigration from eastern applicants. It is found that enlargement is expansionary and yields a remarkable fiscal dividend. Surprisingly, integration compresses the wage spread between skilled and unskilled labor. Overall, the (dynamic) gains from integration clearly outweigh the fiscal cost. While ambiguous a priori , enlargement is found to hold a remarkable net welfare gain for Austria.     

Factor‐biased public infrastructure and wage inequality

This paper analyzes how factor‐biased public infrastructure affects the skilled–unskilled wage inequality. In the basic model with a full employment economy, we find that when the weighted dependence of skilled labor and capital in the urban skilled sector on public infrastructure is large enough relatively to that of unskilled labor and capital in the urban unskilled sector, the wage inequality will be expanded. We also discuss labor‐biased and capital‐biased public infrastructure in our framework, and find that the relative dependences of relevant labor or capital on public infrastructure are important determinants of wage inequality. In the extended models, we analyze separately the issue of wage inequality in the economy with unemployment and the totally open capital market, and find the results of the basic model almost still hold.     

Selective immigration policy and its impacts on Canada's native‐born population: A general equilibrium analysis

This paper analyzes the effects of skilled immigration on the wage inequality between different education groups and the welfare of the incumbent population. I use a heterogenous agent overlapping generations model with endogenous discrete college education choice and calibrate it to match the features of 1981 Canadian economy. My quantitative analysis suggests that reducing the skilled immigration rate generates a rise in the growth rate of the wage inequality between college‐educated and non‐college workers. As skilled immigrants are admitted at a lower rate, more natives opt for college education in the economy. My welfare analysis shows that the incumbent young and college‐educated population benefits more from a reduction in the skilled immigration rate. On the other hand, young generations with below college education face welfare losses. My results suggest that skilled immigration contributes positively to the overall welfare in the economy.     

Can International Factor Mobility Reduce Wage Inequality in a Dual Economy?*

This paper analyzes the consequences of international factor movements on the skilled–unskilled wage inequality in a dual‐economy set‐up that includes unemployment and three intersectorally mobile factors of production—unskilled labor, skilled labor, and capital. Thus far, theoretical literature on this subject has adopted the full‐employment framework and hence ignored the problem of unemployment. The analysis in this paper reveals that the results crucially depend on the difference in the intersectoral factor intensities between skilled labor and capital. In particular, it demonstrates the existence of a possibility of deterioration in wage inequality following foreign unskilled‐labor inflow.     

Economic Development, Trade and Wages

We present models that allow the use of unskilled and skilled labor as well as capital and land. Thus agriculture, important in developing countries, can be included as well as two types of labor and a single (or two) type(s) of physical capital. The models are related to the simple 3×2 specific factors structure by means of what is called the linear neighborhood structure, wherein no activity uses more than two factors, and the two types of labor work in separated sectors, using in common a type of physical capital. We discuss how wage rate changes are related when endowments change, when agriculture becomes traded and prices rise, and when unskilled labor becomes educated and joins the ranks of skilled workers.     

An Australian Model: Nontraded Goods, Real Exchange Rates and Unemployment

A popular model for considering many international trade and macroeconomic questions is the 'Australian model' of Wilson, Swan and Salter. This paper develops a general equilibrium trade version of the 'Australian model' where unemployment comes from a specified factor market distortion, and considers the effects of immigration, transfers, changes in wage fixing arrangements, terms of trade shocks, tariffs and devaluations. Debates over policies for external and internal balance are revisited, with the advantage that the general equilibrium specification allows welfare consequences of various alternatives to be explicitly considered. In the model external balance is achieved through a flexible exchange rate and the most attractive policies for achieving internal balance are encouraging skilled immigration and skill augmenting technical change, training, and unskilled wage cuts (accompanied by redistribution to affected workers). Foreign borrowing, import tariffs and currency devaluation are problematic policies from a welfare point of view.     

Would a North-South Free Trade Agreement Hurt Unskilled Labor in the North?

I present a simple model to examine the impact of international outsourcing on the welfare of skilled and unskilled labor. In this model, specialized business services are to facilitate manufacturing production, creating additional welfare gains in the presence of positive production externalities. Policies that favor the business service sector contribute to the development of a larger bundle of specialized business services, generating more welfare gains to not only skilled but also unskilled labor. Thus, a country’s unskilled labor is not necessarily worse off with open trade if the country is prosperous in business service provisions.     

The combination of two tragedies: commons and anticommons tragedies

This paper studies the relationship between social conflict and skilled–unskilled wage inequality through the three-sector general equilibrium approach. In the basic model without the urban unskilled minimum wage, we find that when the government enhances the degree of controlling social conflict, the skilled–unskilled wage inequality will be narrowed down (resp. widened) if the urban skilled sector is more capital intensive (resp. labor intensive) than the urban unskilled sector. The extended models address the issue under different economic structures or different types of social conflict. In the extended model with the urban unskilled minimum wage, we find that the skilled–unskilled inequality will be widened when the degree of controlling social conflict is increased. In other extended models, we find that the above obtained results are still robust.