Airline Schedule Competition and the Entry Route Choices of Low‐Cost Carriers

This study investigates the entry route choices of low‐cost carriers (LCCs). A LCC considers whether to enter a spoke route or a rim route of a major carrier's hub‐spoke network. Under a Cournot schedule competition model, we demonstrate that rim entry is more profitable for LCCs if connecting passengers' hub‐through additional travel time cost is large, and spoke entry is more profitable if this time cost is small. Welfare analysis shows that rim entry is socially preferable when the time cost is large and that spoke entry is socially preferable when the time cost is small. In a certain range of time costs, however, LCCs choose spoke entry even though it is not socially preferable.     

INSUFFICIENT ENTRY OF EMPLOYEE‐CONTROLLED FIRMS IN A FREE‐ENTRY OLIGOPOLY

This study is a theoretical examination of whether employee‐controlled firms (ECFs) enter a free‐entry oligopolistic market excessively or insufficiently, from the viewpoint of welfare maximization. The excess entry theorem is well known in oligopoly theory. According to this theorem, a greater number of profit‐maximizing firms enter a free‐entry oligopolistic market than is optimal for welfare maximization. We demonstrate the possibility that insufficient entry arises when ECFs compete in a free‐entry market. In particular, we show that if both the demand and cost functions are convex, insufficient ECF entry necessarily occurs. Our results suggest that competition among firms seeking purposes other than profit might lead to insufficient entry because differences in competing firms’ objectives affect the intensity of market competition.     

Exporting and Productivity: The Effects of Multi‐Product and Multi‐Market Export Entry

Empirical studies on the micro‐level effects of exporting on productivity pay usually little attention to the potentially heterogeneous effects of the different modes of export market entry. We show that multi‐product export entry is associated with higher post‐entry productivity compared to other firms. This can imply significant benefits from experimentation with different products. Our analysis is based on detailed export data from full population of firms in Estonia, disaggregated for each firm by export markets and individual products.     

GRADUAL NETWORK EXPANSION AND UNIVERSAL SERVICE OBLIGATIONS

ABSTRACT 1 : Universal service obligations are usually not competitively neutral as they modify the way firms compete in the market. In this paper, we consider a continuum of local markets in a dynamic setting with a stochastically growing demand. The incumbent must serve all markets (ubiquity) possibly at a uniform price and an entrant decides on its market coverage before firms compete in prices. Connecting a market involves a sunk cost. We show that the imposition of a uniform price constraint modifies the timing of entry: for low connection cost markets, entry occurs earlier while for high connection cost markets, entry occurs later.     

ENTRY REGULATIONS,WELFARE, AND DETERMINANTS OF MARKET STRUCTURE

Welfare effects of entry regulations are theoretically ambiguous in differentiated product markets. We use a dynamic oligopoly model of entry and exit with store‐type differentiation and static price setting to evaluate how entry regulations affect long‐run profitability, market structure, and welfare. Based on unique data for all retail food stores in Sweden, we estimate demand, recover variable profits, and estimate entry costs and fixed costs by store type. Counterfactual policy experiments show that welfare increases when competition is enhanced by lower entry costs. Protecting small stores by imposing licensing fees on large stores is not welfare enhancing.     

Investment Liberalization and Cross‐Border Acquisitions: The Effect of Partial Foreign Ownership

This paper investigates the optimal strategy for a multinational to conduct FDI. We find that the incentives to use acquisition rather than greenfield investment change significantly if the multinational is allowed to have already an ownership interest in the target local firm before the market is fully liberalized. Interestingly, when investment costs are sufficiently high, the multinational prefers not entering the market at all with partial ownership in place, whereas a cross‐border takeover would be the optimal entry mode otherwise. For intermediate levels of entry costs, holding a stake in the local producer reverses positively the profitability of a full acquisition compared to greenfield investment.     

A Model of Trade Liberalization in Services*

This paper develops an intra‐industry service trade model taking into account important features of services. We find that service trade liberalization between identical economies is welfare enhancing when the pre‐trade domestic market liberalization is limited. This holds regardless of the degree of trade liberalization and of the mode of supply. However, if the pre‐trade environment is characterized by a free‐entry equilibrium, then service trade liberalization is not necessarily welfare improving. It is welfare enhancing if the trade liberalization is full and the mode of supply is cross‐border. The gain from trade in our model comes from the improvement in service quality—better matching between consumers’ ideal varieties and firms’ product specificity. The implications for the mode of supply in service trade are also explored.     

Trade and Investment Linkages and Stock Market Long‐Run Relationship

This paper aims to examine whether the intensity of trade and investment linkages among the countries matter for their stock market long‐run relationship. To achieve this, we classify Australia's bilateral trade and investment partners into major, medium and minor. Empirical findings of an asymmetric generalised dynamic conditional correlation generalised autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity model show that correlations are time varying and increased significantly during the global financial crisis (GFC). Results of multivariate cointegration test confirm the long‐run equilibrium relationship between the stock markets of Australia and its major partners in the pre‐GFC and during GFC. Based on the full‐sample results, it indicates that the GFC has segmented the stock markets from the long‐run equilibrium relationship. Granger non‐causality test results on full sample show that Australian stock market causes only the New Zealand market while the USA, the UK, Germany, Canada, Switzerland and Italy drives the Australian market. Our results therefore suggest that the intensity of bilateral trade and investment linkages among the countries matter for their stock markets' long‐term relationship.     

CREDIT RATIONING,RISK AVERSION,AND INDUSTRIAL EVOLUTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Relative to their counterparts in high‐income regions, entrepreneurs in developing countries face less efficient financial markets, more volatile macroeconomic conditions, and higher entry costs. This article develops a dynamic empirical model that links these features of the business environment to cross‐firm productivity distributions, entrepreneurs’ welfare, and patterns of industrial evolution. Fit to panel data on Colombian apparel producers, the model yields estimates of a credit market imperfection index, the sunk costs of creating a new business, and various technology parameters. Model‐based counterfactual experiments suggest that improved intermediation could dramatically increase the return on assets for entrepreneurial households with modest wealth.     

The Second Welfare Theorem in Economies with Non‐Walrasian Markets

The standard version of the second welfare theorem assumes that market operations produce Walrasian outcomes. Therefore, if there are individuals who can manipulate prices, the conclusion of the second welfare theorem is questionable. In this paper, we address the decentralization of a Pareto‐optimal allocation, when markets are non‐Walrasian. Our objective in this paper is to develop a game which can implement Pareto‐optimal allocations as Nash equilibria of strategic exchange in markets. In this way, we develop a version of the second welfare theorem for economies where markets are strategic.     

Monetary policy and efficiency in over‐the‐counter financial trade

We develop a monetary model that incorporates over‐the‐counter (OTC) asset trade. After agents have made their money holding decisions, they receive an idiosyncratic shock that affects their valuation for consumption and, hence, for the unique liquid asset, namely money. Subsequently, agents can choose whether they want to enter the OTC market in order to sell assets and thus boost their liquidity or to buy assets and thus provide liquidity to other agents. In our model, inflation affects not only the money holding decisions of agents, as is standard in monetary theory, but also the entry decision of these agents in the financial market. We use our framework to study the effect of inflation on welfare, asset prices and OTC trade volume. In contrast to most monetary models, which predict a negative relationship between inflation and welfare, we find that inflation can be welfare improving within a certain range, because it mitigates a search externality that agents impose on one another when they make their OTC market entry decision. Also, an increase in the holding cost of money will lead to a decrease in asset prices, a regularity that is well documented in the data and often considered anomalous.     

FREE VERSUS SECOND‐BEST ENTRY IN COURNOT OLIGOPOLIES WITH FIRM‐SPECIFIC NETWORKS

This paper endogenizes the number of firms in an industry with positive network effects, complete incompatibility, and firms that compete in quantity. To this end, we compare two possibilities: free entry and second‐best number of firms (the one that maximizes social welfare). We show that with business‐stealing competition, free entry yields, in general, more firms than the socially optimal solution. In addition, we find that by the nature of the industry with firm‐specific networks, total production may be greater or lower under free entry than with a regulator; moreover, some industries attain their maximum social welfare with a monopoly.     

The Entry‐Deterring Effects of Inflexible Regulation

This paper investigates the signalling role of tax policy in promoting, or hindering, the ability of a monopolist to practise entry deterrence. We show that environmental policy can facilitate the incumbent firm's concealment of information from potential entrants, thus deterring entry, and yet entail welfare improvements. Furthermore, we demonstrate that entry deterrence is more likely to arise when environmental regulation cannot be rapidly revised across time if market conditions change (inflexible regimes) than when regulatory agencies can adjust environmental policy over time.     

An Analysis of the Welfare Effects of Long-Distance Market Entry by an Integrated Access and Long-Distance Provider

This paper discusses the welfare effects of entry by a vertically integrated access and long-distance service provider into the long-distance market. Using a stylized model of these markets, we conclude that substantial net consumer benefits arise when a vertically integrated firm is created by the entry of a LEC into the long-distance market, and these gains are mostly achieved from declines in supra-competitive profits received by long-distance incumbents. We find that these gains dominate losses in producer surplus that could arise even if integrated firm entry were to displace more efficient long-distance providers.     

Global Investment Environment of the Post‐Quantitative Easing World: The ‘new‐old’ and ‘new‐new’ Normal

Global markets since late 2007 are not ‘normal’, where normal means market conditions we would expect to observe going forward in the absence of any new economic shocks. Financial markets have been dominated by extraordinary central bank policies that were created to deal with challenging market conditions reflecting heightened risk aversion and illiquidity. Markets in the future will have some characteristics that look more like the market conditions observed in the pre‐crisis period, which I call the ‘new‐old normal’ and other conditions that differ from the past, which I call the ‘new‐new normal’. I first review what happened during the financial crisis in terms of developments in three asset classes, equities, fixed income and currencies, to place the forward‐looking view in proper context. Then the transition period from the quantitative easing (QE) era of exceptional monetary policy to post‐QE markets is discussed. Post‐transition, we will see some features of the post‐QE world that will resemble pre‐crisis market conditions, the ‘new‐old normal’ with higher policy interest rates, wider cross‐country interest differentials, lower cross‐asset return correlations and a resurgence of the importance of cross‐country differences in fundamentals in international investing. However, some features of the post‐QE investment environment will be unlike anything observed in the past: the ‘new‐new normal’ with reduced liquidity and more days of exceptionally large volatility and asset price moves due to regulatory effects resulting in a reduced ability of market‐makers to provide inventory buffers for counterparties and electronic trading venues that shut down trading in high volatility periods; low inflation; flatter yield curves; and emerging markets providing less opportunity for diversification gains as they converge to developed financial market characteristics.     

AN OVER‐THE‐COUNTER APPROACH TO THE FOREX MARKET

The foreign exchange (FOREX) market is an over‐the‐counter market characterized by intermediation and significant bid–ask spreads. However, most of the existing international macroeconomics literature models the FOREX as a standard Walrasian market. This article constructs a dynamic general equilibrium model of intermediation in the FOREX market. We use our framework to compute standard measures of FOREX liquidity, such as bid–ask spreads and trade volume, and study how they are affected by macroeconomic fundamentals and market microstructure. We also study how FOREX market microstructure affects the volume of international trade and, consequently, welfare. Our empirical exercise offers support to the models' main predictions.     

Self‐Fulfilling Early‐Contracting Rush*

In markets for entry‐level professionals, the insurance motive drives some participants to sign early contracts. The rush to early contracting can be self‐fulfilling, as both its effect on expectations about demand–supply balance in the subsequent spot market and the effect on it from changes in the demand–supply balance can be nonmonotone. Matching markets with more risk‐averse participants, a greater uncertainty regarding relative supply of positions, or a more polarized distribution of applicant qualities are more vulnerable to self‐fulfilling early‐contracting rushes. Employers can have a collective interest in preventing early offers to a few promising applicants from starting the rushes.     

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT UNDER ALTERNATIVE TRADE REGIMES*

How does openness affect economic development? This question is answered in the context of a dynamic general equilibrium model of the world economy, where countries have technological differences that are both sector neutral and specific to the investment goods sector. Relative to a benchmark case of trade in credit markets only, consider (i) a complete restriction of trade and (ii) a full liberalization of trade. The first change decreases the cross‐sectional dispersion of incomes only slightly, and produces a relatively small welfare loss. The second change, instead, decreases dispersion by a significant amount, and produces a very large welfare gain.     

Do Consumers Purchase Too Much Health Insurance? The Role of Market Power in Health‐Care Markets

Several authors have suggested that consumers purchase too much health insurance in private markets. We readdress this issue within a model that combines excess health‐care demand due to health insurance with market power due to monopolistic production of health‐care services. We evaluate the market equilibrium in terms of consumer welfare and social welfare. The consumer welfare criterion suggests that in the market equilibrium consumers in fact purchase too much health insurance coverage. The social welfare criterion, in contrast, suggests that because profits of the health‐care industry are properly accounted for, consumers should purchase more insurance coverage than they choose to do in the market equilibrium.     

ANTIDUMPING,INTRA‐INDUSTRY TRADE,AND QUALITY REVERSALS

We examine an export game where two (home and foreign) firms produce vertically differentiated products. The foreign firm is more R&D efficient and is based in a larger and richer market. The unique (risk‐dominant) Nash equilibrium exhibits intra‐industry trade, and the foreign producer manufactures a higher‐quality product. When transport costs are low, unilateral dumping by the foreign firm arises; otherwise, reciprocal dumping occurs. For some parameters, a domestic antidumping policy leads to a quality reversal in the international market whereby the home firm becomes the quality leader. This policy is desirable for the implementing country, though world welfare decreases.