自然垄断管制的理论与实践

通过对自然垄断的含义及技术经济特征的阐述和对发达国家自然垄断实践的研究,得出结论：发达国家对自然垄断的管制,放松管制与重新管制是不断重复的;管制或国有制是发达国家对付自然垄断产业的两种制度选择;自然垄断产业的反垄断不要轻易动用分拆措施;应注意管制方法的科学性和创新性,防止“管制失效”。     

传统自然垄断理论与现代自然垄断理论的比较及其启示

自然垄断产业具有特殊性质,在国民经济中具有举足轻重的作用。传统自然垄断理论和现代自然垄断理论对自然垄断产业有着不同的看法,两者判断自然垄断的标准分别是规模经济和成本弱增性。自然垄断理论的演进过程表明自然垄断产业的运作方式已经发生了改变。为了适应中国自然垄断产业的进一步发展,政府必须转变职能并实行政企分开,积极引入民间资本以推动自然垄断行业发展。     

浅析规模经济与自然垄断的关系

随着自然垄断产业放松管制和引进竞争机制改革的深化,传统自然垄断理论的可解释性越来越差.自然垄断理论在理论上存在过于抽象化、缺乏动态性、片面追求产出成本最低等不足之处;在实践上存在操作性和解释力不强等缺陷.回顾建立在规模经济层面上的自然垄断理论,得出结论:规模经济不是自然垄断的成因,但是自然垄断一定具有规模经济性.     

国家社会科学基金项目中国自然垄断产业民营化改革与政府管制政策

进入20世纪80年代以来，许多经济发达国家对自然垄断产业实行了民营化改革，把原有单一的国有企业改造成为股份制民营企业，并对自然垄断产业实行放松进人管制政策，允许民营企业进人自然垄断产业，形成了多家企业竞争性经营的格局。其结果提高了自然垄断产业的经济效率。但即使在经济发达国家，对自然垄断产业的民营化改革及改革后如何对市场进人、价格、质量等方面实行有效管制，不仅存在理论上的分歧，而     

自然垄断产业改革的理论分析

随着经济社会的发展，自然垄断产业的理论在不断变化，自然垄断产业也在不断的改革。从自然垄断理论产生与发展的理论角度讲，自然垄断产业健康发展的关键是引入竞争机制和放松政府管制，使其符合市场经济发展的规律。     

自然垄断的"三位一体"理论

传统自然垄断理论是建立在规模经济、范围经济和成本劣加性基础之上的，本文认为社会总价值或总效用和社会净收益的优加性是比成本劣加性更好地定义自然垄断的概念，并在对规模经济、范围经济和网络经济重新定义的基础上，从规模经济、范围经济、网络经济“三位一体”角度重新解释了自然垄断概念，提出了自然垄断的“三位一体”理论，为自然垄断产业规制及其改革奠定理论和实证基础。     

评《中国自然垄断产业民营化改革与政府管制政策》

20世纪80年代以来,许多经济发达国家对自然垄断产业实行了民营化改革,其结果是提高了自然垄断产业的经济效率.中国加入WTO后,自然垄断产业必须对外开放,允许国内民营企业进入,这必然也使中国自然垄断产业的民营化改革成为一种客观趋势.由王俊豪、周小梅著的<中国自然垄断产业民营化改革与政府管制政策>(经济管理出版社2004年版)一书,对我国自然垄断产业的民营化改革问题进行了深入探讨,为我国自然垄断产业的民营化改革提供了理论依据与实证资料,对政府制定民营化改革与政府管制政策具有重要的应用价值.该书至少具有以下几个特点:     

自然垄断产业价格管制法律问题探讨

现代经济学对自然垄断的认识逐步深入,以经济学理论为基础,法律学者也逐步深入探讨自然垄断产业价格管制法律问题。我国对自然垄断产业进行价格管制存在的主要问题是:(1)价格功能弱化;(2)价格构成不合理;(3)价格管制机构职能单一,还存在政企不分的问题;(4)价格管制机构缺乏约束;(5)自然垄断产业价格垄断行为缺乏约束。文章认为完善自然垄断企业价格垄断行为管制的法律措施主要有四点:(1)确定对自然垄断产业价格管制的基本理论;(2)完善自然垄断产业价格管制的基本法;(3)遵循反垄断法和价格法各司其责互有配合的原则,确立协调的法律规范;(4)设定专门的管制机构,对不同性质的自然垄断区分管制。     

论自然垄断产业的有效竞争

论自然垄断产业的有效竞争王俊豪（杭州商学院３１００３５）近几年来,我国在一些具有自然垄断性质的基础设施产业中,通过改革政府管制体制,日益重视运用市场竞争机制的积极作用,以提高经济效率。本文在讨论自然垄断产业经济特征的基础上,分析自然垄断与竞争的比较...     

自然垄断产业风险与风险管制

自然垄断产业是影响经济发展的重要基础性产业。早期基于自然垄断性和安全性之考虑，各国政府对自然垄断产业一向采取严格的管制措施。然而，自1970年代起，沿着自由化与国际化的发展方向，自然垄断产业广泛放松管制、引入竞争，促使了自然垄断产业内部环境较以往大幅变动，外部环境的不确定性也愈来愈高，加剧了自然垄断产业的运行风险。     

Monopolistic competition and non-neighboring-goods

Summary This paper studies price games played by a continuum of differentiated producers who face demands generated by additively separable preferences exhibiting a non-neighboring goods property. The examples of exact equilibria show that an asymmetric Chamberlian outcome is compatible with nonzero profits for nonmarginal firms and also with constant average costs, contrary to long sustained views. The paper tries also to short out the structure behind this class of examples and identify as general features the presence of nonperfectly elastic demands facing individual firms and the existence of an approximate Chamberlinian equilibrium.I am indebted to J. Ostroy for very helpful comments and to L. Jones, P. Romer and W. Zame for several conversations.     

Monopolistic equilibrium and involuntary unemployment

This note provides a simple example of an economy in which involuntary unemployment may be the consequence of monopolistic behavior on the product market.     

Monopolistic competition and income dispersion

We develop a model of monopolistic competition that accounts for consumers’ heterogeneity in both incomes and preferences. This model makes it possible to study the implications of income redistribution on the toughness of competition. We show how the market outcome depends on the joint distribution of consumers’ tastes and incomes and obtain a closed-form solution for a symmetric equilibrium. Competition toughness is measured by the weighted average elasticity of substitution. Income redistribution generically affects the market outcome, even when incomes are redistributed across consumers with different tastes in a way such that the overall income distribution remains the same.     

Monopolistic screening and uninformed buyers

In the standard monopolistic screening problem, buyers obtain information rent as a result of possessing private information; if a contract can be offered before the buyer knows his valuation, the seller can extract the full (expected) surplus. I consider a situation where the buyer may or may not have private information about his valuation at the time the contract is offered. Is the seller (strictly) better off as compared to the standard situation? The answer depends crucially on the specific model. In the 2-types model, unless the probability (that the buyer is uninformed) reaches a critical threshold, the seller is unable to benefit from the buyer's ignorance. In the continuum-types model, on the other hand, optimal expected profit is strictly higher than in the standard model whenever this probability is positive.     

Ecological Dumping under Monopolistic Competition

The competitive choice of emission taxes by two governments is analysed in a model of monopolostic competition with capital mobility where pollution externalities are regional. Assuming that governments have no other policy instrument apart from emission taxes at their disposal, I show that governments choose inefficiently low (high) taxes if the importance of emissions in production is small (large) relative to transport costs and the mark-up. In contrast to the previous literature, the marginal disutility of pollution is not among the parameters which separate the non-cooperative choice of emission taxes from the social planner's choice.
JEL classification : F 1; H 7; Q 2     

Public Information Quality with Monopolistic Sellers

We show that in markets with asymmetric information, even if there is full agreement on the choice of optimal information quality, entrusting the choice of (unverifiable) public information quality to traders who benefit from such information leads to inefficiencies. However, delegation of information quality choice to an independent agent who is precluded from sharing in trading profits results in efficient implementation. This result provides a game-theoretic rationale for current institutional arrangements where a private organization that is independent of market traders, the Financial Accounting Standards Board, determines the standards for public disclosures.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D41, D42, D82.     

International Commodity Taxation under Monopolistic Competition

We analyze non‐cooperative commodity taxation in a two‐country trade model characterized by monopolistic competition and international firm and capital mobility. In this setting, taxes in one country affect foreign welfare through the relocation of mobile firms and through changes in the rents accruing to capital owners. With consumption‐based taxation, these fiscal externalities exactly offset each other and the non‐cooperative tax equilibrium is Pareto efficient. With production‐based taxation, however, there are additional externalities on the foreign tax base and the foreign price level that lead non‐cooperative tax rates to exceed their Pareto efficient levels.