Valuation of ecosystem services from rural landscapes using agricultural land prices

Agricultural lands, primarily managed for crops and livestock production, provide various ecosystem services (ES) to people. In theory, the economic value of the service flows that can be captured privately is capitalized into land prices. This study proposes an integrative framework to characterize the ecosystem services associated with agricultural lands. Using that framework, we demonstrate how hedonic analysis of agricultural land prices can be used to estimate the private values of land-based ES. The model is estimated with data from southwestern Michigan, USA. Results suggest that ES values are associated with lakes, rivers, wetlands, forests and conservation lands in rural landscapes. Ecosystem services that support direct use values, such as recreational and aesthetic services, are likely to be perceived by land owners and capitalized in land prices. Some regulating services that provide indirect use values may be partially capitalized in a land parcel's relationship to natural resources and landscapes. Other ES from the land parcel and its surroundings are unlikely to be capitalized due to lack of private incentives, unawareness, or small perceived value. The private ES values measured in this study highlight opportunities to design cost-effective public policies that factor in the value of private benefits from agricultural lands.     

Mountain-to-sea ecological-resource management: Forested watersheds,coastal aquifers,and groundwater dependent ecosystems

Improving the understanding of connections spanning from mountain to sea and integrating those connections into decision models have been increasingly recognized as key to effective coastal resource management. In this paper, we aim to improve our understanding of the relative importance of linkages between a forested watershed, a coastal groundwater aquifer, and a nearshore marine groundwater-dependent ecosystem (GDE) using a dynamic groundwater optimization framework and simple ecosystem equations. Data from the Kīholo aquifer on the Kona Coast of Hawai‘i Island are used to numerically illustrate optimal joint management strategies and test the sensitivity of those strategies to variations in physical and behavioral parameter values. We find that for a plausible range of watershed management costs, protecting part of the recharge capture area is always optimal. Without watershed protection, maintaining a safe minimum standard growth rate for a GDE-dependent marine indicator species, reduces net present value non-trivially, but optimal investment in watershed conservation offsets that potential reduction by 75 %. In general, we find that optimal watershed management and groundwater pumping are most sensitive to changes in water demand growth and parameters that describe nearshore salinity.     

Public pricing of final and intermediate goods in the presence of externalities

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of externalities on pricing decisions by a public or a private regulated firm selling both final and intermediate goods. The externalities generate feedbacks in demand that affect both consumers and producers. The model is very general in that it does not impose constant returns to scale on private production, allows for distributional effects of both the publicly determined prices and private sector profits, and captures the general equilibrium effects of public pricing. Socially optimal pricing rules are derived, and the relation of the results with previous models of pricing in the presence of externalities is investigated.     

“Do Fiscal Deficits Influence Current Accounts? A Case Study of India”

This paper examines the effects of fiscal deficits on the current account deficits in the Indian economy. In many developing countries, fiscal deficits are mostly financed through monetization, causing crowding out of private investment expenditures. However, fiscal deficits in India are mostly financed through official borrowings from various external sources, leading to higher interest payments and outgoings on the external account. Such a policy could eventually precipitate balance of payments crises despite favorable trade account and real exchange rate. Data over three decades for the Indian economy show that, in addition to the real exchange rate and the ratio of private investment to GDP, fiscal deficits significantly contribute to the current account deficits.     

Payments for agrobiodiversity conservation services for sustained on-farm utilization of plant and animal genetic resources

This paper discusses the potential application of Payment for Ecosystem Services-like schemes to tackle market failures associated with the public good characteristics of agrobiodiversity conservation services. So called payments for agrobiodiversity conservation services (PACS) would increase the private benefits from utilizing local plant and animal genetic resources on-farm through voluntary reward mechanisms, so as to sustain their on-farm conservation. Theoretical and applied insights about PACS are discussed and attention drawn to some of the challenges to be overcome in implementing PACS. In particular, these relate to the identification of potential buyers, the complex institutional setting in which PACS might operate and the articulation of a meaningful conservation goal based on a safe minimum standard approach. The latter is urgently needed, so as to ensure that additional agrobiodiversity services are generated. Relative to a fixed pricing approach, PACS schemes that seek to overcome information asymmetries through the use of conservation auctions may be associated with significant efficiency gains. However, potential trade-offs between ecological effectiveness, economic efficiency, and social equity considerations need to be carefully evaluated.     

Transfer Pricing Rules,OECD Guidelines,and Market Distortions

We study the impact of transfer pricing rules on prices, firms' organizational structure, and consumers' utility in a two‐country monopolistic competition model with source‐based profit taxes. Firms can either be multinationals and serve the foreign market through a fully controlled affiliate, or be exporters and serve the foreign market by contracting with an independent distributor. The use of the OECD's comparable uncontrolled transfer price (CUP) rule distorts firms' output and pricing decisions, because the comparable arm's length transactions between exporters and distributors—which serve as the benchmark—are not efficient. We show that the CUP rule is detrimental to consumers in the low‐tax country, yet benefits consumers in the high‐tax country when compared to the benchmark of unconstrained profit shifting. Using the OECD rule increases tax revenue at the expense of consumer surplus. Those results also hold under the alternative cost‐plus transfer pricing rule.     

Envy and pricing of quality in adverse selection

The paper analyzes the optimal pricing of quality when consumers feel envious of other purchase deals. The influence of envy on the optimal pricing of quality varies depending on whether consumers are concerned about envy in payments or in rents. If consumers compare their payments with those of other consumers, the firm has an incentive to produce lower quality than the first-best level for the high valuation consumer and higher quality than the second-best level for the low valuation consumer. Conversely, when consumers’ disutility from envy arises from envy in rents, the trade-off between efficiency and rent extraction becomes more serious than in the situation where there is no envy.     

Additionality When REDD Contracts Must be Self-Enforcing

This paper examines self-enforcing contracts as a financial mechanism for reducing carbon emissions from deforestation and forest degradation when the opportunity cost of the land (i.e., landholder type) is private information and is imperfectly correlated over time (i.e., partially persistent types). Because self-enforcement limits the feasible incentives, the conservation levels are constrained by the surplus created. Regardless of the degree of persistence of such opportunity costs across contracting periods, a first-best self-enforcing contract can deliver “additional” carbon sequestration beyond the business as usual scenario only if the value of forest conservation is sufficiently high. Otherwise, self-enforcing contracts can induce some, suboptimal level of carbon sequestration. The degree of persistence of opportunity costs across periods does not affect the amount of total payments provided in the optimal menu of contracts, but greater persistence of opportunity cost types leads to contracts that feature more of the total payment as a bonus in contracts for landholders with a high opportunity cost for their land and more of the total payment as an upfront fixed payment for landholders with a low opportunity cost.     

A proposal for social pricing of water supply in Côte d'Ivoire

We consider the design of a nonlinear social tariff for residential water in Côte d'Ivoire, which is a case of a monopolistic private operator supplying a population of heterogeneous consumers. The proposed optimal tariff includes an initial “social” block with a low unit price, and higher consumption blocks with a monopoly pricing rule. This optimal nonlinear tariff is calibrated using econometric estimates of a panel-data residential water demand equation. Welfare changes associated with moving from the actual tariff to approximations of the optimal pricing system are computed under different tariff scenarios. We find that gains in consumer welfare would outweigh losses in producer surplus in a majority of Ivorian local communities.     

Alternative Land-Price Indexes for Commercial Properties in Tokyo

The System of National Accounts (SNA) requires separate estimates for the land and structure components of a commercial property. Using transactions data for the sales of office buildings in Tokyo, a hedonic regression model (the “builder’s model”) was estimated and this model generated an overall property price index as well as subindexes for the land and structure components of the office buildings. The builder’s model was also estimated using appraisal data on office building real estate investment trusts (REITs) for Tokyo. These hedonic regression models also generated estimates for net depreciation rates, which can be compared. Finally, the Japanese government constructs annual official land prices for commercial properties based on appraised values. The paper compares these official land prices with the land prices generated by the hedonic regression models based on transactions data and on REIT data. The results reveal that commercial property indexes based on appraisal and assessment prices lag behind the indexes based on transaction prices.     

PRICING IN PUBLIC ENTERPRISES

The pricing in private and public enterprise differs primarily on the supply side. In the long run, private enterprises must cover total costs and provide an adequate return necessary to attract venture capital. In contrast, extra-commercial considerations may influence pricing in public enterprises. They may incur losses in the public interest under explicit directives from the government. A number of theories of pricing in public enterprises have been put forward. Most important of these are: (1) marginal cost of production theory; (2) no profit, no loss theory; (3) average cost of production theory; (4) theory of making profits. All these theories suffer from a number of weaknesses and none of them taken individually is a satisfactory guide for determining the prices of the products of public enterprises. There however exists a strong case for public enterprises, particularly in developing countries, to earn reasonable profits in pricing their products. Public enterprises fostered on public revenues must yield surpluses which can be used either for their own expansion or for financing the general development plans of the country. The profits which a public enterprise can earn are an important indication of the justification for the use of economic resources in that economic activity. Upholding the test of profit not only lessens possibilities of the investment decisions being subjected to political pressures but also safeguards against inefficiency in management. A policy of profits is essential for attaining the goal of building a socialist society. The amount of profits expected from different enterprises, however, cannot be uniform because of diverse objectives sought in the setting up of public enterprises, degree of essentiality of their products, nature of the services provided by them, size of their market, class of their consumers and their paying capacity, conditions of market under which they operate, their role in stimulating growth and social benefits conferred by them.     

消费者寻求多样化与企业定价竞争

消费者寻求多样化的购买行为会对寡头企业之间的价格竞争和经济效率产生重要影响。文章研究发现,针对消费者寻求多样化的购买行为,企业会对忠诚的消费者给予价格优惠,而对新顾客索取高价;消费者寻求多样化购买行为弱化了企业两期价格竞争,导致"默契合谋";而以两期统一定价为基准的经济效率分析显示,歧视定价机制促进了企业间竞争,导致消费者剩余增加,企业利润减少。     

The Broadband Access Market: Competition,Uniform Pricing and Geographical Coverage

In this paper we analyze the market for broadband access. A key feature of this market is that it is considerably more expensive to connect consumers in rural locations than in urban locations. We show that while competition increases welfare compared to monopoly when prices are free to differ across locations, the opposite may be true if there is a requirement of uniform pricing across locations. Furthermore, we show that given uniform pricing, the regulator may increase consumer surplus as well as profit by requiring a higher regional coverage than the market outcome.     

Patterns of multi-agent land conservation: Crowding in/out,agglomeration, and policy

Private agents make large contributions to networks of conserved land, but little is known about how private agents’ decisions might be altered by government actions. This paper explores the impact of public conservation and public policy on the quantity and configuration of private land conservation and the extent to which the social optimum is reached. Because land conservation benefits often have thresholds and spatial characteristics, we consider the impact of different land conservation benefit functions on the patterns of conservation created by the interaction of private and public agents. We find that public conservation crowds private conservation in or out depending on whether marginal conservation benefits increase or decrease with total acreage, and crowding out is mitigated by the presence of budget constraints. We show how land conservation agents might interact strategically in space depending on preferences over fragmentation, and we explore that spatial strategic interaction in a case with a regional land trust and a case with hot-spot parcels. We identify when government policies, such as agglomeration bonuses and mitigating coordination costs, are most likely to increase the social benefits provided by private land conservation agents.     

Optimal pricing of public lotteries and comparison of competing mechanisms

This article establishes optimal pricing rules for rationing indivisible units of rival and otherwise nonexcludable goods by lottery or a hybrid of a lottery and outright sale by posted price. Given the distributional objective of maximizing expected consumer surplus, the solutions to unconstrained and constrained versions of the pricing problem may be expressed in classic inverse elasticity form, with the lottery price appearing as an entry fee, user fee or a combination of the two. Numerical analysis of a rich class of private value distributions indicates that sizable gains in expected consumer surplus can be realized over competitive pricing and zero pricing.     

Nonlinear pricing with self-control preferences

A basic assumption of economics is that consumers choose what they want. However, many consumers find it difficult to stop overeating, overspending, smoking, procrastinating, etc, even though they want to. In reality, consumers have temptation and it is psychologically costly to exercise self-control. To clarify the implications of the existence of temptation and self-control costs, this paper studies a firm's optimal selling strategy exploiting the behavioral features of consumers. We characterize optimal nonlinear pricing schemes for a monopoly when self-control is costly for consumers. Since consumers have a preference for commitment, the firm faces a trade-off between offering a small menu that makes the consumers’ self-control easier and offering a large menu that achieves better price discrimination. We show that the optimal menu resembles the one in the standard nonlinear pricing problem with a price ceiling, where the upper bound on prices is determined endogenously by a participation constraint. The ceiling motivates the firm to offer a relatively flat and compact price schedule, serving more consumers with low demand. The characterization also shows that the firm may earn less if consumers have temptation.     

Consumer Information and Firm Pricing: Negative Externalities from Improved Information

We analyze the effect of consumer information on firm pricing in a model where consumers search for prices and matches with products. We consider two types of consumers. Uninformed consumers do not know in advance their match values with firms, whereas informed consumers do. Prices are lower the greater the proportion of uninformed consumers. Hence uninformed consumers exert a positive externality on the others, in contrast to standard results. This leads to socially excessive investment in gathering prior information when aggregate demand is price-sensitive.     

Electricity provision with intermittent sources of energy

We analyze the interaction between a reliable source of electricity production and intermittent sources such as wind or solar power. We first characterize the optimal energy mix, emphasizing the availability of the intermittent source as a major parameter for the optimal investment in capacity. We then analyze decentralization through competitive market mechanisms. We show that decentralizing the efficient energy mix requires electricity to be priced contingently on the availability of the intermittent source. By contrast, traditional meters impose uniform pricing, which distorts the optimal mix of energy sources. Decentralizing the efficient energy mix with uniform prices requires either cross-subsidies from the intermittent source to the reliable source of energy or structural integration of the two types of technology.     

Getting help from abroad: The macroeconomics of foreign direct investment in infrastructure in low‐income countries

Infrastructure financing needs in most low‐income countries are substantial, but funding for such needs is only partly covered by national governments and aid donors. This paper introduces foreign direct investment (FDI) through public–private partnerships as a source of infrastructure financing in low‐income countries. A two‐sector open economy model is developed to assess the macroeconomic performance of FDI in infrastructure. With efficient foreign investment, an increase in revenue‐generating infrastructure investment boosts productivity and spurs private investment while stabilizing domestic prices. A direct comparison between infrastructure financed by domestic versus foreign investment shows that foreign investment creates higher output growth and welfare gains and is preferable to domestically sourced investment, irrespective of the underlying financing instrument the domestic economy is employing. FDI in non‐revenue‐generating infrastructure is also analyzed and discussed.     

Explaining tractorization in Nepal: An alternative to the ‘consequences approach’

The debate on whether or not agricultural mechanization should be subsidized in developing countries usually focuses on the employment and yield effects of mechanization. This paper takes the alternative tack that designing mechanization policy requires understanding the determinants of the mechanization choice. A model of investment and factor use is developed and applied to the land preparation decision of 99 farmers in the Terai region of Nepal. Farmers' ownership and use of tractors are accurately predicted by the hypothesis that farmers maximize expected accounting profits. Since farmers are privately efficient, tractor subsidies, which increase the wedge between the private and social shadow prices of mechanical power, will decrease economic effiency.