政府公共项目成本补偿机制研究——基于合同理论的分析

针对政府公共项目成本补偿问题,从激励企业降低政府公共项目的运营成本的角度,探讨了政府公共项目的最优成本补偿以及相应的激励合同设计问题。借助合同理论和激励理论的方法,通过对不同类型技术参数企业的分析,探讨了不同技术参数类型企业的最优成本补偿方案,对相应方案实施的合同机制进行了设计,并探讨了企业技术参数对公共项目成本补偿合同激励强度的影响,指出不对称信息降低了合同激励方案的强度,对合同的激励作用存在着负效应。从政府角度而言,对抽租问题的考虑降低了激励方案的强度,使激励方案由固定价格合同向成本加成合同转变。     

不完全合同理论视角下渐进性创新的逆向研发外包组织模式、技术溢出与创新能力研究

既有研发外包组织理论主要基于技术优势企业视角，关注如何治理技术溢出等交易成本，忽视了缺少专利和隐性知识的企业进行渐进性创新时最优研发外包组织选择。基于不完全合同视角，从企业对研发中激励代理方努力与降低渐进性创新的不完全替代性成本之间的权衡出发，分析委托方如何合作、并购、委托以及新建研发等组织最优选择。结果表明，当委托方技术水平较低时，最优组织将需要给代理方更多控制权以激励其努力，相反，委托方则保留更多控制权以降低不完全替代性成本。委托方市场规模通过影响代理方的私人收益降低不完全替代性成本，使得委托方愿意放弃控制权以激励代理方努力。新建研发可以看作是委托方通过承担更多时间和风险成本，从而降低不完全替代性成本。在不同组织形式中，委托方对研发投入的积极性是不同的，这决定了委托方通过研发外包获得的技术溢出效应和企业创新能力。     

不完全合同、创新与联合投资

本文结合美国硅谷的实际情况,基于不完全合同理论从联合投资和创新激励二者之间的关系展开研究.通过建立两期模型研究认为,合同不完全正是导致创业资本家发生窃取行为的客观原因.这种情况下,企业家和创业资本家双方的努力投入是不足的;而通过联合投资可以使得投资双方的努力投入达到最优,并给出了最优的联合投资规模.     

对企业认同感的思考

德国著名管理学家赫茨伯格通过对工人进行问卷,提出了“动力保健”理论。他认为,企业员工在工作中存有两类激励因素。一类是激励员工工作和生产的积极性因素,包括成就、赞誉、工作本身、责     

技术差距、后发陷阱和创新激励— 一个纵向差异模型

本文在纵向差异的模型框架下考察了两个厂商的技术选择和创新激励。最终的均衡结果不但依赖于他们之间的技术差距,也可能与他们的行动顺序密切相关。技术后进者面临一个技术提升的后发陷阱,其中后发者的利润并不会随着其技术水平的提升而增加。在此基础上,我们分析了“市场换技术”策略的可行性,发现该策略存在一个实施上的悖论：如果让FDI生产技术水平更高的产品,则当地厂商提升技术水平的激励会减弱甚至没有;反过来,如果要让当地厂商具有更大的提升技术水平的激励,则引入的FDI就必须生产技术水平更低的产品。我们的分析表明,发展中国家在引入FDI时,其真正面临的可能是在“技术前沿”与“创新激励”上的一个权衡。由此,若从提升当地技术水平的角度看,发展中国家应该采取当地企业先动的产业政策,以尽可能维护他们提升技术水平的激励。     

煤矿企业技工队伍建设途径的思考

国家“十二五”人才规划明确提出，树立尊重知识、尊重人才的思想，着眼于企业发展，创新用人机制，抓好高技能人才队伍建设。企业快速发展出现的人才奇缺瓶颈以及“用工荒”、“技工荒”困境，以国投新集能源股份有限公司为例，在分析职工队伍素质现状基础上，提出建立健全技术工人的培养、使用与考核规划，落实培训、培养责任和激励约束机制，明确技术工人的职业化塑造的途径，不断满足企业发展对高素质、专业型人才的需求。     

基于共同代理理论的研究型高校R＆D活动激励研究

研究产学合作关系下研究型高校科研人员R＆D活动的最优激励机制设计问题。应用共同代理理论．在考虑高校R＆D活动具有多任务代理及存在客观绩效评价扭曲等特征的基础上，分别就激励合同中不存在固定工资和存在固定工资的情形进行了激励机制设计，并深入探讨了规模效应、客观绩效评价以及由共同代理引起的高校和企业之间的“搭便车”效应对于最优激励合同的影响。     

战略性新兴产业创新投入驱动因素研究——基于组织冗余与管理层激励交互作用视角

文章以2013—2016年战略性新兴上市企业为研究对象,以创新投入为切入点,考察战略性新兴上市企业组织冗余、管理层激励对创新投入的影响和两者的交互效应对创新投入的影响。研究发现,战略性新兴产业组织冗余对企业创新投入有显著正向影响;管理层激励中,管理层持股水平整体偏低时,管理层持股负向影响企业创新投入,管理层短期薪酬激励正向影响企业创新投入;从交互效应来看,低流动性冗余与管理层持股的交互项对创新投入有正向影响,高流动性冗余与管理层短期薪酬的交互项对创新投入有负向影响。     

浅谈激励补偿合同中的约束条件

激励补偿机制已然成为现代企业健康有序发展的条件之一。本文从委托代理制度入手,深入浅出的探讨激励补偿合同的形成环境,阐述了合同中“个人理性约束”和“激励相容约束”两个约束条件的具体内容和重要意义,并且对其合理化改善提出了建议。以期我国企业能够建立良好的激励补偿合同,促进企业进一步高效发展。     

浅谈激励补偿合同中的约束条件

激励补偿机制已然成为现代企业健康有序发展的条件之一.本文从委托代理制度入手,深入浅出的探讨激励补偿合同的形成环境,阐述了合同中“个人理性约束”和“激励相容约束”两个约束条件的具体内容和重要意义,并且对其合理化改善提出了建议.以期我国企业能够建立良好的激励补偿合同,促进企业进一步高效发展     

Optimal Forestry Contracts under Asymmetry of Information

In this paper, I analyze optimal royalty contracts in forestry when the harvesting firm has private information on the cost of harvesting. This infinite horizon forest rotation model with asymmetry of information on the cost parameter results in a dynamic incentive problem. Depending on whether the costs are correlated over time or not, the firm either receives rent or receives no rent, associated with the continuation part of the rotation choice. I characterize the optimal contract explicitly in both cases. I also examine the loss in expected welfare surplus resulting from the use of a linear contract instead of the more general non‐linear contract.     

Unions and Efficient Training

The paper examines the optimal level of training investment when trained workers are mobile, wage contracts are time-consistent, and training comprises both specific and general skills. The firm has ex post monopsonistic power that drives trained workers' wages below the social optimum. The emergence of a trade union bargaining at the firm-level can increase social welfare, by counterbalancing the firm's ex post monopsonistic power in wage determination. Local union-firm wage bargaining ensures that the post-training wage is set sufficiently high to deter at least some quits, so that the number of workers the firm trains is nearer the social optimum     

Contracts,incentives and organizations: Hart and Holmström Nobel Laureates

This article reviews the contribution of Hart and Holmström, the 2016 Nobel Laureates in economics. Holmström's work on the principal-agent problem answered questions as to what should (and should not) be included in an incentive contract. His work helped explain the simple structure of incentive contracts we typically observe in the real world. The models he developed have been used to address questions of CEO compensation, organizational design and optimal regulation. A key element of Hart's research focused on the question of what are the optimal boundaries of a firm (and indeed, what a firm actually is). In doing so he developed the incomplete-contracts framework, which has subsequently been used to explain many economic phenomena whenever renegotiation is important, including authority and decision-making structures in firms, why financial contracts look the way they do, and various questions in international trade and public policy.     

Optimal employment contracts with bankruptcy constraints

Consider the optimal incentive compatible contract offered by a firm with private information to its risk-averse employees. If the firm is subject to a binding limited liability or bankruptcy constraint then the contract will yield underemployment in low productivity states (relative to full-information efficiency). Such contracts either yield underemployment in all states, or excessively high variability in employment.     

Competition, human capital and income inequality with limited commitment

We develop a dynamic model with two-sided limited commitment to study how barriers to competition, such as restrictions to business start-up and non-competitive covenants, affect the incentive to accumulate human capital. When contracts are not enforceable, high barriers lower the outside value of ‘skilled workers’ and reduce the incentive to accumulate human capital. In contrast, low barriers can result in over-accumulation of human capital. This can be socially optimal if there are positive spillovers. A calibration exercise shows that this mechanism can account for a sizable portion of cross-country income inequality.     

Incentive Regulation and The Cost Structure of The Local Telephone Exchange Network

This paper combines an engineering process model of the cost of local exchange telecommunications firms with an analytical model of optimal incentive regulation (with ex post cost observability), to study empirically the properties of the optimal regulatory mechanism. Relying on detailed properties of the cost function, we examine three issues: (i) the extent of natural monopoly when informational rents associated with regulation are taken into account; (ii) the extent of incentive correction, which expresses the divergence of pricing under the optimal mechanism from optimal pricing under complete information; (iii) the implementation of optimal regulation through a menu of linear contracts. Our findings are that, for fixed territory, strong economies of scale allow local exchange telecommunications to retain monopoly characteristics even when the (informational) costs of regulation are properly accounted for, the incentive correction term is small in magnitude, and that optimal regulation can be well approximated through relatively simple linear contracts.     

基于企业生命周期的高管 激励契约最优动态配置* ——价值分配的视角

本文基于生命周期和委托代理理论，在价值分配视角下，阐释了生命周期演进过程中高管效用敏感性变化规律以及不同高管激励机制运行特征，构建了高管激励契约最优动态配置方案，并利用中国高科技上市公司2010-2013年的面板数据，对高管激励契约体系对企业价值分配的影响进行了实证检验。研究结果表明，在企业成长期和蜕变期，高管薪酬激励能够有效抑制代理成本；而高管声誉激励机制仅在企业成熟期表现出对代理成本的抑制效应；生命周期各阶段内，控制权激励均未发挥显著的治理作用，相反在蜕变期，控制权沦为高管挖掘私人利益的工具。因此，改善薪酬激励期限结构，提升声誉激励和高管市场约束的持续性，构建高管控制权管理制度体系是实现高管激励契约最优动态配置的必经之路。     

LONG‐TERM AND SHORT‐TERM CONTRACT IN A MIXED MARKET*

With a two‐period mixed oligopolistic framework, this paper analyses the interaction between the length of incentive contracts and market behaviour. Assuming an environment in which firms choose either a long‐term or short‐term contract, we examine how contracts differ between public and private firms. The results show that the contracts would differ completely among firms; public firm prefers to make a short‐term contract while private firm makes a long‐term contract.     

ON EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS WITH ENDOGENOUS ON-THE-JOB SEARCH

We consider an equilibrium search model and employment contracts when workers have endogenous on-the-job search. When a firm tries to retain an employee by matching outside offers, variable search intensity leads to a moral hazard problem. We first consider workers with identical productivities. We derive an equilibrium where firms commit not to respond to outside offers and workers search less. Second, we investigate the case with heterogeneous workers and asymmetric information. Assuming that firms can commit to retain all workers irrespective of their ability, we establish conditions under which it is optimal to do so. This policy again reduces the incentive for active on-the-job search. We discuss an equilibrium where all firms use these so-called ‘pooling’ contracts.     

Operating efficiency and output insensitive employment contracts for capital management

Summary This paper considers a problem in which an agent is hired to manage a capital investment and subsequently receives private information regarding the productivity of the capital investment. The capital manager must decide whether to invest capital supplied by the firm (the principal), or to divert these investment funds to perquisite consumption. If the manager decides to invest, the manager must then select the level of operating efficiency (productivity) of the capital investment, this latter choice being unobservable and constrained by the (maximal) productivity of the investment. In this setting we demonstrate that the optimal employment contract, from the perspective of the firm hiring the manager, is the contract whichminimizes the dependence of the manager's compensation on firm output. This contract pays the manager a fixed wage whenever output from the investment exceeds the wage and provides the manager with all of the projects rents whenever output falls below this level. Thus, we provide a setting in which fixed wage contracts are the optimal incentive contract even when agents are risk neutral and contracts can be costlessly written on future output.We would like to thank the participants in the Princeton Economics and Finance Workshop and the Ohio State University Finance Workshop for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. The second author gratefully acknowledges the research support of the Georgia State College of Business Administration Research Council.