The Infusion of Relational Market Obligations into the Austrian Agenda—Some Lessons Learned from Economic Sociology

Given its dictum of market equilibrium, economics in general obviously does poorly in shouldering market dynamics. Pervading obligatory traits of the market (other than mere dyadic contracting) is yet another area where not much attention is devoted. Whereas the Austrian agenda fills the first of these voids in a most sophisticated manner, its current discourse appears as oblivious concerning the manner in which market exchange transforms into relational interconnected obligations. That is to say, exchange is hardly understood as an indispensable facet of durable market obligations such as relationships 'constituting the market', but exclusively as immediate entrepreneurial arbitrage. Apart from an outright peculiar failure to recognize some of its own roots in this regard this omission unnecessarily delimits the manner in which Austrians can proceed and deepen their market analysis. The principal idea of this paper is to scrutinize the manner in which relational market obligations can be introduced into Austrian reasoning by drawing on ideas from within economic sociology. Max Weber's dictum on market openness takes on a particular role in this regard. An adjacent contribution strived for is to let this scrutiny foreshadow the manner in which such a partial reconciliation of market ideas from within economic sociology and Austrian economics could proceed.     

Economic Synthesis: A Review of the Work of Boris Ischboldin

Current research on efficiency wages and transaction costs utilizes models of economic behavior that require a theory of market institutions. Yet the institutional structure of market exchange appears at odds with the neoclassical theory of markets under perfect competition. Both Samuel Bowles/Herbert Gintis and David Levine recognize this as a problem for traditional economic theory. Bowles and Gintis suggest that market power is a prerequisite for the effective utilization of resources within the capitalist enterprise. Levine identifies market exchange with the need for individuals to define for themselves a distinct way of life in order to secure the recognition of others and preserve the integrity of the self. The middle ground between a theory of market power and individual personality formation lies in the inherent social relations governing market exchange. By exploring this middle ground, market exchange can be presented as a set of communicative practices through which individual needs are shaped and power is either challenged or maintained.     

The Czechoslovak Reform Movement, 1963–1968, A Study in the Theory of Socialism

This paper examines a fundamental issue in the theory of economic organization: the optimal level of market competition. Answers in neoclassical and new institutional economics are identified and critiqued. The analysis shows that selective assumptions in both fields produce distinctly market-favoring and "more competition is better than less" conclusions. The paper generalizes these assumptions and demonstrates organization-favoring and "less competition is better" positions are equally plausible. The paper also argues that part of the market-favoring bias in these fields stems from failure to distinguish between conditions of market failure and organizational success. Given these problems in extant theory, this paper develops an alternative institutional theory of economic organization, drawing principally on ideas of Walton Hamilton and John Commons. This proposed alternative shows that the optimal level of competition occurs at an intermediate level in the competition/cooperation spectrum (a mixed economy) and varies with five key determinants of the economic order.     

Discovery and social learning in non-priced environments: An Austrian view of social network theory

Our purpose here is to engage in a cross-disciplinary discussion between Austrian economics and social network theory. In particular, we ask what role social networks play in the extended order in regard to both individual discovery and whether social networks can be the source of widespread unintended cooperation among individuals unknown to one another. Although Austrians have examined the function that market prices play in generating social cooperation, such discussions tend to steer clear of non-priced environments, such as interaction within social networks. We seek to explore this gap. While we acknowledge that non-price information feedback mechanisms such as status and reputation lack the calculability so crucial to market coordination, we argue that they can nonetheless mimic other important qualities of market prices and generate widespread unintended social cooperation among people unknown to one another. After a general discussion, we apply these ideas to online philanthropic communities.     

Interpersonal Interaction and Economic Theory: The Case of Public Goods

Interpersonal interaction in public goods contexts is very different in character to its depiction in economic theory, despite the fact that the standard model is based on a small number of apparently plausible assumptions. Approaches to the problem are reviewed both from within and outside economics. It is argued that quick fixes such as a taste for giving do not provide a way forward. An improved understanding of why people contribute to such goods seems to require a different picture of the relationships between individuals than obtains in standard microeconomic theory, where they are usually depicted as asocial. No single economic model at present is consistent with all the relevant field and laboratory data. It is argued that there are defensible ideas from outside the discipline which ought to be explored, relying on different conceptions of rationality and/or more radically social agents. Three such suggestions are considered, one concerning the expressive/communicative aspect of behaviour, a second the possibility of a part-whole relationship between interacting agents and the third a version of conformism.     

A concentration index for differentiated products: the case of religious competition

In the past, scholars have used a Herfindahl–Hirschman Index using denominational market shares to measure the competitiveness of religious markets. However, this approach ignores both the imperfect substitutability between denominations and the degree of competition within denominations. These two shortcomings make the current index a suspect measure of religious competition; it often falsely identifies which market micro-economists would generally consider the more competitive one. We develop a new religious competition index that incorporates intra-denominational competition and creates a ‘substitutability parameter’ to better specify the appropriate degree of inter-denominational competition. While the model developed in this article applies specifically to religious markets, our index of competition could be expanded to other economic markets where such a substitutability parameter is meaningful.     

The purpose of competition policy

Conclusion We believe that the Commission attributes too great a significance, almost magical powers, to business rivalry as a force in economic life. There are no grounds for this either in the Treaty or in actual experience. While not wishing to deny that business rivalry may entail great benefits, we would insist that its drawbacks should not be ignored and that competition policy should turn mainly on market performance.In fact, the Commission is not pursuing a liberal competition policy but has adopted a case-by-case, noneconomic, legal approach that takes no account of performance.Monopoly is generally condemned. But monopoly, no more than oligopoly, which is usually coordinated, should not be condemnedper se. Monopoly may even result in better market performance than oligopoly.Competition policy must not therefore be considered an end in itself but must be seen in the light of general economic policy and, more specifically, of price policy. It must be regarded in fact as a component part of price policy.     

Adam Smith and Noneconomic Objectives

This note looks at Smith's critiques of bounties (read “subsidies”) on exports. Smith's analysis of bounties foreshadowed the basic trade policy framework of distortions and noneconomic objectives. While Smith did not develop the theory of distortions, he captured the logic of the theory of noneconomic objectives and actually ranked policy alternatives based upon their relative social costs. Corden (1957 ) first ranked tariffs versus production subsidies within a noneconomic objectives framework, and Johnson (1960 ) first used the term in its modern sense, but the formulation of the general framework lies with Smith.     

Left luggage: finding the relevant context of Austrian Economics

Recently a number of scholars, including Tony Judt and Corey Robin, have attempted to discredit Austrian economics by emphasizing the (cultural) distance between the context in which the Austrians made their contributions and our current society. This article argues that the cultural and social context is indeed relevant for how we understand the contribution of the Austrians, but that the critics fundamentally misunderstand or misrepresent the Austrian and Habsburg context. It is argued that the relevant context, particularly for the interwar contributions of Mises, Schumpeter, Hayek and Popper is the despair about the breakdown of their civilization, which includes the rise of mass political movements such as socialism and fascism. It is only against this background that we can understand the intent of their work, and the problems which they sought to address. It is further argued, in contrast with earlier work which has tended to emphasize the philosophical and methodological context in which they operated, that this cultural and social context is at least as relevant to understand the meaning of their work.     

Does the quality of political institutions affect intra-industry trade within trade blocs? The ASEAN perspective

There has been a renewed resolve for deeper integration and cooperation within ASEAN. Intra-industry trade (IIT) is often viewed as a way of achieving economic as well as political integration. This article tests for the effect that political regime and governance may have on the intensity of IIT. We particularly examine if quality of political institutions which includes corruption and democracy indices as well as economic factors comprising corporate tax rate, regional FDI flow, flexibility of exchange rate regime, size of the market, economic distance affect the intensity of horizontal and vertical IIT. The study finds that control of corruption and good governance both increase the vertical IIT but not the horizontal IIT. The study further finds that intra-economy FDI flow, stable exchange rate regime, market size and proximity positively affect IIT within the trade bloc. However the negative effect of corporate tax rate suggests that if countries were to coordinate their tax policies, they could avoid harmful tax competition and promote IIT across their borders. The findings regarding the effect those economic and political factors have on the intensity of IIT certainly warrants the attention of policy makers and researchers alike.     

Markets wanted: expectation overshooting in transition economies

This paper analyzes and compares individual beliefs about the effects of competition and the evolution of those beliefs over time in transition economies and experienced market economies. At the onset of transition, competition beliefs in transition countries are far more positive than in experienced market economies. Over time, this difference vanishes and competition beliefs converge. It is argued that overly optimistic competition beliefs in transition countries contributed to the possibility of implementing far-reaching pro-market reforms. It is shown that competition beliefs positively affect support for economic reform.     

Economic Competition and Evolution: Are There Lessons from Ecology?

After generally discussing models in ecology and economics that combine competition, optimization, and evolution, this article concentrates on models of intraspecific competition. It demonstrates the importance of diversity/inequalities within populations of species and other environments for the sustainability of their populations, given the occurrence of environmental change. This is demonstrated both for scramble (open-access) and contest competition. Implications are drawn for human populations and industrial organization. The possibility is raised that within-industry competition may not always exist between firms in all stages of the development of a new industry. Policy implications are considered. For example, it is argued that policies designed to encourage intense business competition and maximum economic efficiency have the drawback of eventually making industries highly vulnerable to exogenous economic changes. (JEL L100 , J100 , Q150 )     

Exchange rate pass-through in the U.S. automobile market: A cointegration approach

This study analyzes exchange rate pass-through in the presence of monopolistic competition in the U.S. automobile market. Using cointegration techniques, we investigate how foreign competing firms' prices interact following an exchange rate-shock. The results generally indicate price interdependence (competition) among the rival firms. In one case where we did not find any price interdependence, the extent of exchange rate pass-through was higher. This validates the economic intuition that a low degree of price competition corresponds with a high degree of exchange rate pass-through.     

Heterogeneity vs. externalities in technological competition: A tale of possible technological landscapes

The article presents a stochastic interaction model based on Gibbs random fields to analyze technological competition in a population of heterogeneous adopters with local or global externalities. The relationships between both heterogeneity and externalities and imperfect and asymmetric information are first emphasized. When local externalities and heterogeneity coexist, the technological landscapes of the industry are then shown to depend on the relative influence of these two parameters, with a phase transition: technologies coexist either in approximately equal market shares when heterogeneity is high enough or with one of the technologies only surviving in technological niches when local externalities dominate. Niches do also spontaneously appear: technological options survive in economic space due to the existence of some amount of heterogeneity among agents. On the contrary, when global externalities are added, pure standardization almost always occurs. We finally argue that different public policies should be designed so as to fit with different technological landscapes.     

Competition as market progress: An Austrian rationale for agent-based modeling

Economists recognize competition as fundamental to economic science. General equilibrium is not competition; Austrians, like other economists, have sometimes confused the two. The socialist calculation debate and the elimination of competition by socialists in the Soviet Union offer insight into danger of using an equilibrium framework to study competition. Current policy models are based on a general equilibrium framework, but heterogeneous interactive agent-based models are rising to challenge them. Austrian economists should embrace this new direction and guide the creation of agent-based models of the economy.     

Oligopsony Distortions and Welfare Implications of Trade*

While imperfect competition in the output market has garnered extensive focus in the new trade theory literature, input market imperfection has received considerably less attention. Since market power in input purchase has been growing in recent years, it is worth examining the welfare implications of trade arising from oligopsony power. We develop a model consisting of two final goods, one intermediate good, and two primary factors (capital and labor). One final good and the intermediate good employ primary factors, whereas the other final good uses labor and the intermediate input. All markets operate under perfect competition except for the intermediate input, which is oligopsonistic. Using this model, we show that oligopsony can lead to some anomalies such as an increase in the oligopsony output, reward to the intensive‐factor in the oligopsony sector, national welfare, and deterioration of terms of trade, but it always decreases the reward to the intermediate input.     

证券交易税的经济效应分析

正确分析证券交易税的经济效应是制定合理的证券交易税税收政策的前提，本分析了证券交易税对证券市场运行、社会资本的配置以及政府财政收入等方面的经济影响，比较了不同观点的分歧所在。本认为，无论如何评价证券交易税的经济效应，都不能脱离具体的证券市场环境，在特定的国家、特定的时期、特定的经济背景下，要综合进行权衡。     

Profit Expectations and Confidence: Some unresolved issues in the Austrian/Post-Keynesian debate

Austrian and Post-Keynesian economists both continue to make important contributions to subjectivism in economics. Yet, as the ongoing debate between members of the two schools demonstrates, Austrians and Post-Keynesians have very different views about the possibility of intertemporal coordination in a market economy. This paper returns to the debate between Hayek and Keynes in order to respond to a contemporary Austrian critique of Keynes's theory of expectations. The paper shows that the fundamental difference between the two schools ultimately boils down to the nature of conventional expectations and the question of confidence. If the conventional expectation holds to assume the future will look enough like the present to give investors confidence in their decisions, Hayek's arguments about the possibility of intertemporal coordination merit attention. If, however, this convention does not hold, as Keynes thought was sometimes likely, the self-regulating potential of a market economy is called into question.     

Jacob Mincer: A Founding Father of Modern Labour Economics

Dennis Robertson's cycle theory, particularly as developed in A Sludy of Industrial Fluclualions (1915) and Bankins Policy and the Price Lcucl (1926) is described, and the affinity between his treatment of forced saving and that of Hayek and Robbins is noted. Robertson's theoretical eclecticism and policy pragmatism are contrasted with the more rigid positions of the Austrians. It is argued that the similarities between their work stem from the common influence of English classical economics. Finally, it is suggested that Robertson, and by implication Keynes, had little to learn from the Austrians in the early 1930s.