我国土地承包经营权现状及展望

我国农村土地承包经营权,自实行以来对我国经济建设产生巨大的推动作用,但也存在诸多尚需解决的问题.本文时现行农村集体所有权下农民承包经营权进行分析,认为农村集体土地所有权下,存在主体错位、权能不全、主体的权利得不到法律的有效保护等弊端.将农村集体改变为农村专业合作组织,其不再享有农村土地所有权人的主体资格,通过不同环节确保农民对土地的保障权利和土地上的物权均得以各就其位,各自按照不同规则运行,以实现土地保障和土地交换价值.这是未来农村土地发展必经之路.     

中国家族企业家族所有权配置效应研究

本文研究中国家族企业家族所有权的配置效应,从家族整体、家族成员个体以及两者之间关系的视角研究家族所有权的配置方式对公司业绩的影响。研究发现,我国家族企业中家族持股会显著影响公司业绩,家族利益与公司业绩正相关;但是,家族所有权在家族成员之间的配置集中度与公司业绩呈U型关系,且单人持股家族企业比多人持股家族企业的业绩更好。最后,本文还检验了家族企业传承过程中以家族亲缘关系为基础的家族冲突对家族所有权配置效应的影响,发现传承冲突越高的家族企业业绩越差、家族所有权配置效应被削弱。本文的研究结果表明,我国家族企业需要在家族整体和家族成员个体层面同时合理配置家族所有权,以避免家族内部冲突对企业的不良影响。     

企业治理中外部法人所有权发挥作用的产权环境探析

通过对我国607家企业样本数据的统计分析,发现外部法人的所有权会影响经营者所有权及政府所有权对企业治理的作用;进而认为,外部法人的所有权要对企业治理产生良性作用,需要以一定的企业产权环境为条件,即外部法人所有权的份额应当与其它所有者的所有权份额相适应。     

企业融资模式与企业治理结构的关系分析

融资模式是资本流动的制度安排,决定了企业治理结构的生成环境,融资模式的不同意味着企业面临的资本市场、产品市场和经理市场的不同,从而影响着企业的融资结构的选择、形成、运行及效率,也影响着企业治理结构的所有权、控制权和经营权在不同权益主体之间的分布和配置。企业融资模式与企业治理结构实质上是外部治理与内部治理的关系。     

劳资合作制：公有制的“改革版”——生产关系改革是建立内部有效机制的关键

凭劳动享有所有权是社会主义生产关系的本质特征。初级特征社会主义生产关系既不应是劳资合一的公有制又不应取消劳动所有权，而应实行以劳动产权制为基础的劳资合作制，即劳资合作、企业共有、获利同享、风险共担，并贯彻到现代企业制度建设的各方面。如此才能建立起有效的企业内部机制，并使我国经济走上素质经济轨道。     

基于代理假说的所有权与债务期限结构关系初探

债务融资是企业重要的财务决策行为,企业债务融资重要的决策是如何选择债务期限结构。债务的期限结构是指企业长期债务和短期债务之间的构成比例关系。不同的债务期限结构代表了不同利益相关主体的意志,它体现在上市公司进行债务选择的倾向性上;不同的债务期限结构将产生不同的融资效应,其变化直接影响公司各利益相关主体的利益。所有权结构与公司治理中的内部监督机制直接发生作用的同时,在很大程度上受公司外部治理机制的影响,并且也对外部治理机制产生间接作用。企业所有权影响债务期限结构的选择。     

建立中国会计原则的相关环境分析

本文围绕建立我国会计原则问题,从不同方面论述了影响会计工作的若干环境因素,主要包括社会因素、政治制度、经济政策、法律要求等。重点阐述了不同的经济模式、所有权与经营权的关系、国际环境等因素的影响。提出建立我国会计原则必须从分析各相关环境因素出发,使会计原则的运用与其相关环境相适应。     

上市公司所有权和控制权配置模式与治理效率

公司所有权的核心是股东收益权，分为私人所有权和共同所有权；控制权是影响企业决策的能力，主要有经理的经营控制权和董事会的剩余控制权。公司治理的目的是最大化全体股东的利益。不同的股权结构形成不同的所有权和控制权配置状态。故应根据所有权和控制权配置的状态、公司技术特征和外部市场竞争程度来设计合理的治理机制以激励和约束控制权主体，实现有效的公司治理。     

对尽快提高我国企业技术创新能力的思考

我国企业由于长期缺乏技术创新的激励机制、活力、经费和人才,自我开发和自主创新能力普遍低下,致使企业陷入经营困境。影响我国企业技术能力提高的主要原因是：科技与经济相分离;缺乏技术创新的机制;缺乏技术资源;科技人员缺乏创新素质等。建议采取优化配置资源;制定相关政策和法规;建立风险投资基金;加强对技术引进和对外技术合作的管理等措施。     

FDI企业与我国企业建立R & D合作联盟可能性研究——基于知识溢出企业知识共享的博弈分析

短期来看,我国企业和FDI企业建立R&D合作存在“囚徒困境”现象,并且合作与否与知识共享的协同价值以及成本大小有关,而与企业对知识溢出接受能力大小无关;长期来看,企业规模是影响R&D合作的重要变量,企业规模越大,合作的可能性也越大,从而验证了我国企业和FDI企业建立R&D合作联盟的可能性。最后提出相关政策建议。     

Bargaining externalities in a privatization programme

In privatization programmes, the state commonly keeps a minority ownership stake in firms. We provide an explanation based on the externality that privatization of one firm has on the profitability of others. If this externality is negative, as with oligopolistic firms, the government can gain a strategic advantage in bargaining over the sale of one firm if it keeps an ownership share in another. We consider both the simultaneous and the sequential sale of firms. The results apply to the period in which privatization takes place, and are consistent with the delayed sale of minority ownership often observed in practice.     

Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: Evidence from Vietnamese Listed Firms

We examine the effect of ownership structure on firm performance, for firms listed on Vietnamese stock exchanges, using 2744 firm‐year observations over the period from 2007 to 2012. We find a non‐linear relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. State ownership has a convex relationship with firm performance. This paper finds that firm performance increases beyond 28.67 percent level of state ownership. Foreign ownership has a concave relationship with firm performance. We find that firm performance increases with an increase of foreign ownership up to a level of 43 percent and then decreases. Policy makers should encourage foreign ownership and widely dispersed state ownership in firms, which can help improve firm performance.     

开放式创新平台中共同发明问题研究

当前,针对开放式创新平台的研究主要集中在市场战略和模型构建等领域,但很少从知识产权角度研究平台中合作研发产生的共同发明的权利归属、分配和行使等问题。事实上,解决好平台中知识产权（专利和商业秘密等）共有问题,将直接决定平台用户间开放式创新的最终成效,从而影响整个平台的运营。以提升共同发明的法律确定性与透明度为评判标准,现阶段国内外相关立法（包括国际条约）都存在一定缺陷,必要时须在知识产权法和合同之间作出选择。因此,在“大众创业、万众创新”背景下,在平台用户、平台商和政府多方合作下综合规制共同发明,也许是一条出路。     

Quid pro quo

This paper attempts to shed some new light on two puzzles about Chinese economy: Rapid economic growth despite pandemic corruption; dramatic development of the private sector despite ‘ownership discrimination' in financial resource allocation. In our model, the productive bribe facilitates the more efficient private firm to obtain the scarce financial resource, either from the bank or from the state-owned enterprise, and corrects the initial allocation distortion. Meanwhile, our model also generates the distortionary and the predatory bribes which hurt the economy.     

创业企业控制权配置对创业投资机构退出方式影响研究

创业企业控制权配置是创业投资机构有效退出的重要保证,对投资机构退出方式具有重要影响。从IPO和并购这两种退出方式视角,选取CVSource数据库2000—2014年大样本数据,使用多变量回归模型,研究创业企业控制权不同配置对创业投资机构退出方式的影响。研究发现,创业企业家拥有的控制权比例与IPO退出方式显著正相关,企业家拥有的控制权越多,对其产生的期权激励作用越大,越会促使创业投资机构通过IPO方式退出;而创业投资机构拥有的控制权比例与并购退出方式存在显著正相关关系,创业投资机构拥有的控制权越多,为了尽早收回投资,保护自身利益,实现较高投资收益,其越会选择通过并购方式退出。     

How does ownership structure affect capital structure and firm value?Recent evidence from East Asia1

The present paper examines the effects of ownership structures on capital structure and firm valuation. It argues that the effects of separation of control from cash flow rights on capital structure and firm value also depend on the separation of control from management as well as on legal rules and enforcement defining investors’ protection. We obtain firm‐level panel data (three stage least squares, 3SLS) estimates from four of the East Asian countries worst affected by the last crisis. There is evidence that the general wisdom that higher control than cash flow rights may lower firm value may be reversed among owner‐managed family firms in the sample countries.     

What deters labor-owned firm creation? Evidence from Italian manufacturing sectors

We analyze the determinants of labor-owned versus capital-owned firm creation. We match firm-level information on a large sample of new manufacturing firms with available industry-level proxies of the main determinants of ownership structures according to existing economic theories. We estimate a logit model and quantify the empirical contribution of each argument to explain labor-owned versus capital-owned firm entry. Our results show that human capital specificity and workers heterogeneity largely explain labor-owned firm entry, while other dimensions, such as limited worker wealth, have a weaker statistical relevance. These findings are robust to different estimation methods and are unlikely to be affected by endogeneity concerns. Our results contribute to the general understanding of the endogenous dynamics of ownership rights distribution in manufacturing firms and to the elaboration of policy initiatives aimed at supporting cooperative modes of firm organization.     

OBSERVABLE REPUTATION TRADING*

Is the reputation of a firm tradable when the change in ownership is observable? We consider a competitive market in which a share of owners must retire in each period. New owners bid for the firms that are for sale. Customers learn the owner's type, which reflects the quality of the good or service provided, through experience. After observing an ownership change they may want to switch firms. However, in equilibrium, good new owners buy from good old owners and retain high‐value customers. Hence reputation is a tradable intangible asset, although ownership change is observable.     

所有制、制度环境与公司治理效率

资本所有制作为资本所有权的制度安排是企业有效治理的前提条件。企业治理制度的形成具有路径依赖的特性 ,是与各个国家和企业所处的环境因素分不开的。在既定的经济技术和制度环境下 ,只要企业所有权安排得当 ,任何与其经济技术和制度环境相适应的资本所有制形式都是可以有效的。衡量治理效率的标准是治理成本的最小化或治理主体收益的最大化。为了提高治理效率 ,我国应根据不同企业的情况适时进行治理制度的改革和创新 ,并努力创造适于企业生存的制度环境。     

OWNERSHIP,CONTROL, AGENCY AND RESIDUAL CLAIMS IN HEALTHCARE: INSIGHTS ON COOPERATIVES AND NON‐PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS

Many issues surrounding healthcare entities’ performance can be traced to their governance and ownership. Increasingly, public services are being provided by non‐profit organizations and/or cooperatives, particularly in the healthcare sector. This is not unproblematic. We draw on the conceptual separation of ownership and control, and the notion of firm ownership to derive a taxonomy of dimensions along which a contractual‐ and property rights theory of the firm can be structured, in order to determine the nature of firms’ differences. We utilize the taxonomy to illustrate important distinctions between non‐profit and cooperative firms in the primary healthcare sector and propose testable hypotheses. Funders and regulators must recognise the differences between these firms, if public funding of healthcare is to achieve the expected outcomes.