实物期权方法在BOT公路投资项目中的应用

投资项目具有多种期权特性,传统的DCF评价方法无法评估多个不确定性对投资项目的影响。实物期权方法为决策者提供了一个有效管理不确定性因素的工具。国内外学者就BOT公路投资项目中的增长期权、延迟期权、投资扩张、政府保证、特许权期限调整、通行费率调整、投资成本和车流量不确定性等多个问题进行了大量的讨论。本文首先对实物期权理论在BOT公路投资项目方面的应用研究进行文献回顾,然后详细的分析了国内BOT公路投资项目收益的不确定性、项目投资的可延迟性、项目的可扩建性、政府的保证以及项目特有的土地开发及广告收益等多个特点具有的期权价值。并对这些期权的定价模型进行了简要的介绍。文章最后对运用实物期权理论应用过程中的难点进行了分析,并在此基础上总结实物期权理论在BOT公路投资项目中应用的研究方向。     

RENEGOTIATION OF INFRASTRUCTURE CONCESSIONS: AN OVERVIEW

ABSTRACT ** :  Numerous renegotiations have plagued Latin American infrastructure concession contracts in the 1990s, to the point that private sector involvement is being questioned in some countries. This issue has been analyzed in a series of papers by Guasch et al. (2003, 2006a, 2006b) . After putting these contributions in the context of the theoretical and empirical literature on contract renegotiation, this note surveys the existing evidence on the determinants of these renegotiations and discusses the main policy implications regarding the necessity of efficient regulatory institutions and the adequate type of price regulation.     

Regulation,renegotiation and capital structure: theory and evidence from Latin American transport concessions

We examine the capital structure of regulated infrastructure firms. We develop a model showing that leverage, the ratio of liabilities to assets, is lower under high-powered regulation and that firms operating under high-powered regulation make proportionally larger reductions in leverage when the cost of debt increases. We test the predictions of the model using an original panel dataset of 124 transport concessions in Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru over 1992–2011. For each concession we have data on the regulatory regime, annual financial performance and contract renegotiations. We begin by demonstrating that, although pervasive, contract renegotiations do not fundamentally alter the regulatory regime. Importantly, firms are not systematically able to renegotiate when in financial difficulty, implying that price cap contracts remain high-powered in practice. We use this result for our main empirical work, where we find broad support for our theoretical predictions: when the cost of debt increases, firms operating under high-powered regulation make proportionally larger reductions in leverage.     

On intrabrand and interbrand competition: The strategic role of fees and royalties

We examine oligopolistic markets with both intrabrand and interbrand competition. We characterize equilibrium contracts involving a royalty (or wholesale price) and a fee when each upstream firm contracts with multiple downstream firms. Royalties control competition between own downstream firms at the expense of making them passive against rivals. When the number of downstream firms is endogenous, each upstream firm chooses to have only one downstream firm. This result is in sharp contrast to previous literature where competitors benefit by having a larger number of independent downstream firms under only fixed fee payments. We discuss why allowing upstream firms to charge per-unit payments in addition to fixed fees dramatically alters their strategic incentives.     

Consumer poaching,brand switching,and price transparency

This paper addresses price transparency on the consumer side in markets with behavioral price discrimination which feature welfare reducing brand switching. When long-term contracts are not available, an increase in transparency intensifies competition, lowers prices and profits, reduces brand switching and benefits consumers and welfare. With long-term contracts, an increase in transparency reduces the use of long-term contracts, leading to more brand switching and a welfare loss. Otherwise, the results are the same as without long-term contracts.     

上市公司股价与经理人薪酬合同设计

在成熟规范市场,由于股票价格长期看能比较准确地反映企业的市场价值,所以股票价格可作为经理人的长期和综合的业绩度量指标。股票价格的主要激励工具为经理人期权和限制性股权,期权作为股票价格的非线性合同,能够带来更强的激励效率,适用于能力较高的经理人和质量较差的项目。     

Evidence of a modest price decline in US broadband services

In this paper, we construct a consumer price index for broadband services in the United States using over 1500 service contracts offered by DSL and cable providers from 2004 through 2009. This exercise frames a range of open questions about measuring price changes in a manner that informs policy discussions about US broadband services. We employ approaches used commonly for constructing a consumer price index by using a mix of matched-model methods and hedonic price index estimations to adjust for qualitative improvements. We find a quality-adjusted price decline, but the evidence points towards a modest decline at most. Our estimates of the price decline range from 3% to 10% in quality-adjusted terms for the 5-years period, which is faster than the BLS estimates for the last 3 years. In contrast to other innovative industries that experience rapid price declines, such as computers or integrated circuits, the modest price decline for broadband services raises many questions.     

逆向选择条件下技术许可中非排他性价格契约研究

通过经典的委托代理理论的应用,文章揭示了一类逆向选择条件下的技术许可中非排他性价格契约理论的内在机理。文章认为,通过针对差的类型的技术使用者的包含可变费用的契约和对好的类型的技术使用者的纯固定费用的契约,可以达到有效的排他性技术许可的目的;但为了有效的激励,技术所有者事前要对好的类型的技术使用者转移一定的信息租。     

Commitment in regulation: Defense contracting and extensions to price caps

Department of Defense regulation of weapons contracting uses incentive devices common to public utility regulation. This paper examines parallels between fixed-price contracts in weapons acquisition and the use of price caps to motivate public utilities. It uses defense contracting experience to identify limits to the efficiency and administrability benefits one can expect adoption of a price caps regime to produce in practice.     

中国国家公园特许制度的框架建构

国家公园特许经营的本质是社会资本方获得相关特许权利用国家公园的资源提供公共产品或服务。美国国家公园系统通过特许权合同授权个人、公司或其他实体为访客提供的“必需且适宜的”商业性服务便属于此类。“Concession”的原意是特许权，也指授权这种行为。特许经营是特许制度的组成部分而非全部。特许权合同、授权、许可证、租约、地役权契约等授权形式构成美国国家公园的资源利用制度。联合国开发计划署提出的自然保护地特许权包括许可证、租约、地役权、执照等形式。中国国家公园保护第一、公益至上，应建立科学的资源利用特许制度为资源保护管理提供制度保障。签订特许权合同、发放许可证(这2种形式在必要时附以租赁合同)、签订地役权合同为主要授权形式是符合我国国情的国家公园特许制度的基本框架。     

Designing price caps for gas distribution systems

We examine the applicability of price-cap mechanisms to the regulation of gas distribution company rates for gas supply and transportation services. Although distribution companies will continue to be regulated for the foreseeable future, we argue that a hybrid of price and profit regulation of transportation rates will increase allocative efficiency and provide greater incentives for productive efficiency. The design of incentives for cost minimization in long-term gas supply contracts is more challenging, but an index cap, based on the cost of gas acquired by other distribution companies, merits attention.     

BOT项目竞标的最终谈判的重点和难点

对一个BOT（Build,OperateandTransfer即建造,运营及转让）基础设施建设项目的竞标的终谈集中在与特许协议及财政一揽子事宜有关的财政和合同要素上的谈判上。本文介绍了终谈中对政府及项目发起人都重要而难谈的谈判要点,尤其是那些涉及收费的条款。为在BOT项目的招投标中政府和项目发起人间有一个共同的理解并促成终谈。为此竞标和谈判模式的确定十分重要。     

Endogenous Choice of Strategic Contracts in a Mixed Duopoly with Bargaining Over Managerial Delegation Contracts

We revisit the endogenous choice problem of strategic contracts for the public firm and the private firm in a managerial mixed duopoly with differentiated goods. We consider the situation wherein the managerial delegation contracts are determined by maximising social welfare within the public firm, which is equal to the objective function of its owner, and through bargaining over the content of managerial delegation contracts between the owner and manager within the private firm. We show that, in equilibrium, when the manager of the private firm has high bargaining power relative to that of the owner, the public firm chooses a price contract, while the private firm chooses a quantity contract. However, there is no equilibrium market structure under the pure strategic contract class when the manager has sufficiently low bargaining power relative to that of the owner.     

The impact of license regulation on the number of recreation trips: is it worth considering?

A two-stage nonlinear least-squares model (2NLS) with an endogenous treatment effect on recreation trips describes the behavior of recreationists with and without a fishing/hunting license. The proposed 2NLS is applied to the derivation of the policy-relevant average gains in the presence of an endogeneity bias to a license fee implementation program regulated by states. Recreationists who purchased a license are likely to recreate more than are the nonlicensed holders because the regulation may reduce congestions at sites where licensee visit often. The license regulation has a greater impact on the use of natural resources after controlling observed and unobserved confounders which might be correlated with the probability of being a license holder and with the final outcome, the number of recreation trips. We confirm that the individual without a permit regards the recreation trip as less valuable than does the individual having a license permit. We also found that the likelihood of purchasing a license among young adult recreationists is not at the level the states may desire. In addition, the number of trips demanded is more responsive to the nontransportation-related implicit travel cost than to the transportation-related implicit travel cost, although travel implicit costs are price inelastic.      

Tariff induced licensing contracts,consumers’ surplus and welfare

We construct a duopolistic trade model with technology transfer and consider two-part tariff licensing contracts. We show that a tariff on foreign products can influence the licensing strategy of the foreign firm. There is a trade-off between a tariff and a royalty license in affecting the product price. We show in particular that a tariff can be chosen so as to induce fee licensing and maximize both consumers’ surplus and domestic welfare. This resolves the so-called conflict between these two objectives in respect of the choice of a tariff. The paper provides a number of testable hypothesis.     

Regulation of network infrastructure investments: an experimental evaluation

This paper reports the results of an experiment evaluating three regulatory schemes for network infrastructure, in terms of their ability to generate efficient levels of capacity investment. We compare the performance of (1) price cap regulation, (2) a regulatory holiday for new capacity, and (3) price cap regulation with long term contracts combined with a secondary market. The setting is one in which network users can benefit from acting strategically, and are better informed than the network operator about demand growth. We find that the regulatory holiday creates an incentive to underinvest relative to optimal levels. Long term contracts also fail to improve on single price-cap regulation, and may reduce investment by providing noisier signals about future demand.     

Exclusion via Non‐Exclusive Contracts

We establish that non‐linear vertical contracts can allow an incumbent to exclude an upstream rival in a setting that does not rely on the exclusivity of the incumbent's contracts with downstream firms or any limits on distribution channels available to the incumbent or rival. The optimal contract we describe is a three‐part quantity discounting contract that involves the payment of an allowance to a downstream distributor and a marginal wholesale price below the incumbent's marginal cost for sufficiently large quantities. The optimal contract is robust to allowing parties to renegotiate contracts in case of entry.     

Efficiency and performance in gas distribution. Evidence from Brazil

This article analyses the current state of the gas distribution industry in Brazil, by identifying the main factors that determine its efficiency. In order to test the performance of the industry, we have calculated the firms’ technical efficiency during the period 2001–2009. We analyse whether some economic and technological factors as consumer density, load factor or regulation, among others, have affected the performance of this industry. We show that companies serving markets with different customer characteristics (diversification) have reached higher levels of efficiency and evolved faster. Moreover, the private ownership and price cap regulation are more efficient in relation to public ownership and cost of service regulation. These findings are important to support the improvement of the regulation of gas distribution in the Brazilian states.     

农业基础设施建设中企业运用“建设-经营-转让”模式的博弈策略研究

从企业角度,针对农业基础设施建设项目中的"建设-经营-转让"模式,利用博弈论的相关理论和方法,分析企业实现其利润最大化的特许权期博弈、成本博弈以及两者之间关系的博弈。     

SHORT-TERM CONTRACTS REGULATIONS AND DYNAMIC LABOUR DEMAND: THEORY AND EVIDENCE

We present a dynamic labour demand model where we evaluate the impact of employment regulations on permanent and temporary employment. We consider three different kinds of regulations, namely firing costs, hiring costs and a constraint on temporary contracts. These regulations differently affect the size and composition of employment. The theoretical results are interpreted and questioned on the basis of empirical evidence on the employment effects of the regulation reforms that occurred in the major European countries in the period 1983–1999. The empirical analysis is based on a new set of time‐varying indicators on permanent employment protection, fixed‐term contracts and temporary agency work regulations. We find evidence in support of the hypothesis that fixed‐term contracts have been effective stepping‐stones to permanent jobs during the period under observation. On the contrary, flexible temporary agency work regulations seem to induce a substitution of permanent with temporary contracts.