Low level equilibrium trap,unemployment, efficiency of education system,child labour and human capital formation

This paper builds an overlapping generations household economy model to examine the impact of adult unemployment on the human capital formation of a child and on child labour, as viewed through the lens of the adult’s expectations of future employability. The model indicates that the higher the adult unemployment rate in the skilled sector, the lesser is the time allocated by an unskilled adult towards schooling of her child. We also find that an increase in the unskilled adult’s wage may or may not decrease child labour in the presence of unemployment. The model predicts that an increase in child wage increases schooling and human capital growth rate only if the adults in the unskilled sector earn less than subsistence consumption expenditure. As the responsiveness of skilled wage to human capital increases, schooling and human capital growth rates increase. The model dynamics bring out the importance of education efficiency and parental human capital in human capital formation of the child. In the case of an inefficient education system, generations will be trapped into low level equilibrium. Only in the presence of an efficient education system, steady growth of human capital is possible. Suitable policies that may be framed to escape the child labour trap are discussed as well.     

Rural–urban human capital disparity and skilled–unskilled wage inequality in China

This paper builds three‐sector general equilibrium models to investigate how a shrink of rural–urban human capital disparity generates an impact on skilled–unskilled wage inequality in China. In the basic model where the urban skilled sector and the urban unskilled sector have no upstream and downstream linkage, we find that the wage inequality will be narrowed down if the urban skilled sector is more capital intensive than the urban unskilled sector. To capture the characteristic of China's state capitalism, we build an extended model where the urban skilled sector acts as an upstream industry for the urban unskilled sector, and find that the wage inequality will be reduced if the substitution elasticity of unskilled labor and intermediate product in the urban unskilled sector is large enough. When we consider the factual characteristics of the Chinese economy, our models predict that a shrink of rural–urban human capital disparity will be helpful to reduce the skilled–unskilled wage inequality in China.     

Immigration, fertility, and human capital: A model of economic decline of the West

I show how the influences of unskilled immigration, differential fertility between immigrants and the local indigenous population, and incentives for investment in human capital combine to predict the decline of the West. In particular, indigenous low-skilled workers lose from unskilled immigration even if the indigenous low-skilled workers do not finance redistribution, do not compete with immigrants in the labor market, and do not compete with immigrants for publicly financed income transfers. For the economy at large, high-fertility unskilled immigrants and a low-fertility indigenous population result in economic decline through reduced human capital accumulation and reduced growth of per-capita output.     

An analysis of the demand for skill in a growing economy

We construct a trade theoretic model of skill formation with skill as a produced intermediate input. Capital is required for production as well as for education which transforms unskilled labor into skilled. We use this model to reflect analytically on India's rising requirement of skilled manpower. We show that even if growth of capital and supply of skilled manpower match, relative stagnation of unskilled manufacturing sector will magnify the gap between growth in demand and supply of skill. This may happen, for example, if there is a vast pool of workforce who may not have even the basic education to qualify as “unskilled” and excessive capital flows into the skilled sector. Thus a country with lack of education at a very basic level will be forced to import skilled manpower from the rest of the world.     

Urban bias and wage inequality

This paper explores how urban bias affects skilled–unskilled wage inequality through building several general equilibrium models. In the basic model, we find that an increase in the degree of urban bias will widen wage inequality if the unskilled sector is more capital intensive than the skilled sector and reduce wage inequality if the skilled sector is more capital intensive than the unskilled sector. In the extended models, we find that the conclusion obtained in the basic model almost still holds under different conditions.     

Family linkages,social interactions,and investment in human capital: A theoretical analysis

This paper introduces parent–child interactions into the Beckerian model of human capital. The acquisition of human capital, jointly determined by parental investment and child effort, is an equilibrium outcome of the intergenerational interactions, which is Pareto efficient within the family. We show that the equilibrium output of human capital is not affected by the parental authority over child behavior, but it is usually lower than the level that maximizes the instantaneous aggregate family welfare. In a family with more than one child, siblings not only compete for parental investments but also directly interact with each other in their effort choices. Exploring intragenerational connections and their interplay with intergenerational forces, we present a more complete theory of family linkages in human development and its implications for the rise and fall of families. Social interactions among children from different families induce intragenerational feedback effects that are further amplified by intrafamily interactions and accelerate regression toward the mean in the economic status of families.     

Redistribution, fertility, and growth: The effect of the opportunities abroad

This article analyzes the effect of the opportunities abroad on the growth path that a small open economy, in which redistribution policy in favor of less prosperous segments takes place, is expected to follow. The model shows that redistribution policy raises fertility among the unskilled recipients, lowers fertility among the contributing skilled, slows human capital accumulation, and reduces per-capita output growth. The paper demonstrates that the opportunities abroad determine the share of income redistributed and ultimately induce the offspring of the unskilled to invest in human capital and decrease their family size.     

Institutional quality and skilled–unskilled wage inequality

This paper establishes two-sector general equilibrium models in the presence of unproductive activities to investigate how an improvement of the institutional quality influences the skilled–unskilled wage inequality. We find that an improvement of the institutional quality will affect the interest rate, and then the interest rate combining with the capital intensity will generate an impact on the skilled–unskilled wage inequality. Specifically, both the interest rate and comparisons of the capital–labor relative distributive shares between two sectors play an important role in determining the skilled–unskilled wage gap in an economy featured with unproductive activities. The above results are robust even when we extend the basic theoretical model in several different ways.     

Cheap home goods and persistent inequality

There exists a large literature which shows that public education is favorable for growth because it increases the level of human capital and at the same time it tends to produce a more even income distribution. More egalitarian societies are also associated with less social conflicts, and individuals have a lower tendency to report themselves happy when inequality is high. Therefore, it is important to study the reasons why the elite opposes the development of a strong public education system. It might be that education is related to social status and a strong public education system might threaten the elite’s political power. We show that one aspect of social status is the specialization of skilled workers in high-paid jobs and the abundance of unskilled workers in the production of cheap “home goods” in the market, such as painting and cleaning a house, babysitting, and/or cooking. We emphasize the role of general equilibrium price adjustments to show that depending on the level of inequality, the elite might prefer an economy with a positive and “high” cost of education than an economy where skills are freely provided. We show that this result goes through even if the skilled wage is not directly affected by the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers. We also provide empirical evidence consistent with our theory.     

Human Capital, Heterogeneity and Estimated Degrees of Intergenerational Mobility

We study the parental investment model of intergenerational mobility, where heterogeneity in 'innate' earnings ability and parents' altruism rate is explicitly modelled. We show that heterogeneity increases the difficulty of detecting the existence of borrowing constrained families. Conversely, the presence of heterogeneity means that economic and linear statistical models of inheritance generate similar intergenerational data on consumption and earnings. We also suggest that nay cross-country differences in intergenerational earnings mobility are more readily interpreted according to the heterogeneity of inherited ability, rather than optimal family responses to country-specific institutions for accumulating human capital.     

Education, segregation and marital sorting: theory and an application to the UK

This paper presents a model of the intergenerational transmission of education and marital sorting. Parents matter both because of their household income and because their human capital determines the distribution of a child's disutility from making an effort to become skilled. We show that an increase in segregation has potentially ambiguous effects on the proportion of individuals that become skilled in the steady state, and hence on marital sorting, the personal and household income distribution, and welfare. We calibrate the steady state of our model to UK statistics. We find that an increase in the correlation of spouses in their years of education will bring about a small increase in the proportion of skilled individuals when the relative supply of skilled individuals is variable at the family level and a decrease when this supply is fixed. Ex-ante utility (of an unborn individual) increases in the first case and decreases in the second. The welfare effect of increased sorting is negative for unskilled individuals and positive for skilled individuals. Increased segregation always leads to an increase in welfare inequality between skilled and unskilled individuals.     

Entrepreneurs, Professionals, and Growth

We examine the implications for growth and development of the existence of two types of human capital: entrepreneurial and professional. Entrepreneurs accumulate human capital through a work-experience intensive process, whereas professionals human capital accumulation is education-intensive. Moreover, the return to entrepreneurship is uncertain. We show how skill-biased technological progress leads to changes in the composition of aggregate human capital; as technology improves, individuals devote less time to the accumulation of human capital through work experience and more to the accumulation of human capital through professional training. Thus, our model explains why entrepreneurs play a relatively more important role in intermediate-income countries and professionals are relatively more abundant in richer economies. It also shows that those countries that initially have too little of either entrepreneurial or professional human capital may end up in a development trap.     

Parental nurturing and adverse effects of redistribution

This paper suggests that if parental nurturing is a dominating force in human capital formation then income redistribution may not promote economic growth. In particular, if, consistently with empirical evidence, parental human capital complements investment in a child’s education and yields increasing returns in the intergenerational production of human capital, income redistribution may have an adverse impact on the growth rate of average human capital. Redistribution shifts resources towards the less educationally-productive families and thus in the presence of credit markets imperfections and increasing returns, it reduces the aggregate level of investment in human capital. Moreover, if the degree of increasing returns is sufficiently large to produce sustained growth, this adverse effect on human capital formation may outweigh the conventional beneficial effects of redistribution that arises from the interaction between a production technology exhibiting diminishing returns and credit market imperfections.     

Organized crime and wage inequality

This paper stresses the role of industrial organization of crime, and explores how organized crime affects wage inequality. We find that, when only unskilled workers (or both skilled and unskilled workers) engage in organized crime, an increase in the number of criminal groups will increase wage inequality if (1) the skilled sector is more capital intensive than the unskilled sector, and (2) the price elasticity of demand for the skilled product is large enough. However, when there are only skilled workers engaging in organized crime, condition (1) is sufficient to widen wage inequality, irrespective of the price elasticity.     

Free trade, factor returns, and factor accumulation

A model of development is studied in which physical capital and unskilled labor are good substitutes, and skilled labor is complementary to the resulting aggregate. Growth in a closed economy is compared with two open regimes. Inflows of physical capital only reduce the interest rate and raise both wage rates. The skilled wage rises more sharply, however, increasing the skill premium and accelerating human capital accumulation. Full integration with a larger and more developed neighbor also reduces the interest rate and raises both wage rates, but in this case the skill premium falls and human capital accumulation changes very little.     

The combination of two tragedies: commons and anticommons tragedies

This paper studies the relationship between social conflict and skilled–unskilled wage inequality through the three-sector general equilibrium approach. In the basic model without the urban unskilled minimum wage, we find that when the government enhances the degree of controlling social conflict, the skilled–unskilled wage inequality will be narrowed down (resp. widened) if the urban skilled sector is more capital intensive (resp. labor intensive) than the urban unskilled sector. The extended models address the issue under different economic structures or different types of social conflict. In the extended model with the urban unskilled minimum wage, we find that the skilled–unskilled inequality will be widened when the degree of controlling social conflict is increased. In other extended models, we find that the above obtained results are still robust.     

Second‐Best Taxation of Incomes and Non‐Labor Inputs in a Model with Endogenous Wages

This paper considers a Mirrleesian optimal income tax model wherein labor inputs are not perfect substitutes and their wages are determined endogenously. It shows: (i) If skilled and unskilled workers are Edgeworth complements, skilled workers will necessarily face a marginal subsidy and unskilled workers a marginal tax on their incomes (these may not be the case if skilled and unskilled workers are Edgeworth substitutes); and (ii) redistributive concerns call for taxation of those inputs whose elasticity of complementarity with skilled labor is larger than with unskilled labor, and subsidization of those whose elasticity of complementarity is smaller.     

Overcoming environmental scarcity,inequality and structural imbalance in the world economy

The world economy faces two major threats: increasing environmental degradation and a growing gap between rich and poor. The root cause is that natural resources—or natural capital—is underpriced, and hence overly exploited, whereas human capital—the skills embodied in the workforce—is insufficient to meet demand. This outcome has three important consequences. First, all sectors of an economy will use too much natural resources relative to skilled labor. Second, the skilled workers throughout the economy will have higher real incomes and thus will be better off. Third, wealth inequality will increase, as the income gap between skilled and unskilled workers widens. Addressing this structural imbalance requires correcting the two underlying distortions, which are the chronic under-pricing of natural capital and the under-investment in human capital. This must be accompanied by a new suite of policies to provide improved incentives for more balanced wealth creation.     

Unskilled immigration,technical progress,and wages—Role of the household sector

This paper revisits the relationship between unskilled immigration and skilled wage in the context of the BREXIT episode. Our simple general equilibrium model introduces a household sector, the inclusion of which shows that both return to capital and effective skilled wage may increase with a greater inflow of immigrants. This is a novel outcome in the theory of trade and factor flows. In addition, though technical progress in a skill‐intensive sector raises wage inequality, it no longer displaces traditional jobs. Here, the usual negative impact of unskilled immigration on the traditional sector is mitigated by increased returns to the unskilled workers.     

Skilled–unskilled wage inequality,product variety,public input and increasing returns: A static general equilibrium analysis

The paper develops a four sector small open economy model with two traded final good sectors, a public intermediate good producing sector and a nontraded good sector producing varieties of intermediate goods. There are three primary factors: capital, skilled labour and unskilled labour. Industrial sector producing a traded good uses capital, intermediate goods and skilled labour as inputs. Intermediate goods producing sector also uses capital and skilled labour. Public input producing sector and the agricultural sector producing the other traded good use capital and unskilled labour as inputs. It is shown that, if production technologies are the same for the agricultural sector and the public input producing sector and if the scale elasticity of output is very low, then an increase in capital stock (unskilled labour endowment) raises (lowers) the skilled–unskilled wage ratio. However, an increase in skilled labour endowment does not produce any unambiguous effect. On the other hand, an increase in the tax rate on industrial output and/or an increase in the price of the agricultural product, armed with the same set of assumptions, lowers the skilled–unskilled wage ratio.