The changing landscape of Indian agriculture

In tracking the revolutionary changes in the Indian agricultural sector, it is quite clear that technology, institutions, and markets have had a very important role to play. Of course, the public sector played a pivotal and catalytic role when India ushered in the Green Revolution in late 1960s and early 1970s. The public sector imported new seeds, organized their distribution and demonstration, and provided price and market support, all “not‐for‐profit.” The cooperative sector, supported and facilitated by the government, again with the spirit of “not‐for‐profit,” helped bring in the White Revolution in milk through Operation Flood in 1970s and 1980s. This spirit is now being gradually replaced by “for‐profit” objective driven by the private sector, as is demonstrated in the revolutionary changes brought about by the introduction of Bacillus thuringiensis technology in the cotton sector during 2002–2007. On top of this, the corporate sector is also changing the complexion of the Indian agrisystem through notable changes in organized food processing and retailing. This change in spirit from “not‐for‐profit” to “for‐profit” in the growth process of Indian agriculture has significant implications for the concept of CISS, i.e., competitiveness, inclusiveness, sustainability, and scalability, which needs to be studied carefully and in detail. Accordingly, this article traces some of these dynamic changes and their likely implications.     

Price premiums,payment delays,and default risk: understanding developing country farmers’ decisions to market through a cooperative or a private trader

Smallholder farmers in developing countries face a competitive disadvantage in modern agricultural supply chains. Joint marketing through cooperatives is a potential tool to mitigate these disadvantages; yet cooperatives’ success in these settings is uneven at best. We develop an analytical model to study a farmer's choice of selling to a private trader who pays cash on delivery but may exercise market power or a cooperative that promises a price premium but delays payment and carries a concomitant risk of default. In the presence of impatient and risk‐averse farmers, we show that these factors can severely limit smallholder patronage of a cooperative, despite a promised price premium. We then construct and parameterize a simulation model to fit a profile of heterogeneous farmers within a prototype developing‐country village, and study the optimal decisions of farmers regarding marketing through a cooperative versus a private trader. Results suggest that modest improvements in either timeliness of payment or probability of default can induce a substantial increase in a cooperative's market share and economic viability. Extending the simulation analysis to a dynamic setting shows how implementing reasonable policies to improve a cooperative's payment timeliness and default probability can markedly improve its growth trajectory.     

Cooperative pricing and scale efficiency: The case of Korean rice processing complexes

Unlike most investor‐owned enterprises, cooperatives often have freedom to choose among a variety of firm objectives. Using 2002–2008 plant‐ and province‐level data, we ask in the present article which of several alternative maximands a Korean cooperative rice processing firm pursues. In contrast to earlier studies, farmer‐member supply functions are incorporated into the cooperative's optimization framework. We show that only large cooperative firms have operated at efficient scale, while small and medium‐sized ones have been scale‐inefficient. Because the latter operate where scale returns are increasing, mergers of small and medium‐sized cooperatives likely would be cost‐reducing and member‐return‐enhancing.     

Spatial determinants of productivity growth on agri‐food Spanish firms: a comparison between cooperatives and investor‐owned firms

This study analyses the effect of the spatial factor, location, and interaction effects among peer companies, on the productivity growth of agri‐food companies in Spain. With this aim, we build a productivity growth index and apply a multiequational Seemingly Unrelated Regression on a sample of 344 Spanish cooperatives and investor‐owned firms for the period 2010–2012. Our findings show that agri‐food firms are influenced by spatial factors finding interesting differences between cooperatives and investor‐owned firms. With regard to the geographical location, cooperatives in the western of Spain show higher productivity growth rates, whereas investor‐owned firms in the northeast of Spain present better results. The interaction effect among closer peer companies is also a relevant factor to determine the productivity growth in agri‐food companies. This factor is more relevant for cooperatives than for investor‐owned firms.     

Screening,Competition and the Choice of the Cooperative as an Organisational Form

Cooperatives are distinguished from investor-owned firms by different decision-making processes. A model is developed in which more cumbersome decision making by cooperatives may be compensated for by improved decision making. Conditions are derived under which cooperatives become efficient organisational forms. It is also shown that circumstances exist in which investor-owned firms and cooperatives can coexist in equilibrium. Finally, circumstances are identified in which competition results in a prisoners dilemma which comprises investor-owned firms only. Favourable public policy treatment of cooperatives may prevent this equilibrium outcome from occurring.     

Analysis of a supply-control program under uncertainty and imperfect competition: Chinese cabbage in Taiwan

Researchers have often attributed the farm–wholesale price spread, after adjusting for marketing costs, as compensation for marketing firms' risk bearing. However, price spreads in excess of marketing costs can also be due to marketing firms' exercise of market power. In settings where both imperfect competition and marketer risk aversion are plausible, a modeling framework must be sufficiently general to accommodate both types of behavior. This article develops and estimates such a model in the context of fresh produce marketing and develops the implications for analysis of supply‐control programs. The model is applied to the production and marketing of Chinese cabbage in Taiwan and specifically to the analysis of supply‐control programs implemented in this industry by the Taiwanese government. The empirical results provide little support for the hypothesis that marketing firms exhibit risk averse behavior, but they do show that marketing firms exercise oligopsony power in procurement of the product from farmers, and that this power is positively related to the quantity supplied in each market period. This provides a heretofore unexplored impetus for supply controls intended to raise producer incomes. However, such controls are also rendered less effective by imperfect competition because marketing firms capture part of the benefits from supply reduction.     

Differences in agricultural returns: an empirical test of efficiency in factor input allocation using Vietnamese data

We study whether rural households in Vietnam allocate their factor inputs efficiently. Factor returns and technical rates of substitution (TRS) between production activities are compared. We estimate two translog production functions and conduct three tests: First we test the equality of bootstrapped returns. Second, we use a bootstrapped t -test comparing the equality of TRS. Finally, we derive a set of nonlinear restrictions on our estimated parameters, which, if held, would imply that we cannot reject efficiency. The article concentrates on the allocation of factors between the cultivation of the two most important agricultural crops—sugar cane and rice. We cannot reject the possibility that households are efficient in their input allocation. These results are consistent and stable over different estimation techniques and support the assumption of profit maximization.     

Is public investment complementary to private investment in Indian agriculture? Evidence from NARDL approach

The issue of complementarity between public farm investment and private farm investment in Indian agriculture is an unsettled empirical question in the literature, which has not been studied adequately. Few studies analyzing the trends of both types of investments have produced contradictory results. Thus, this study attempts to bridge that gap, by examining the hypothesis of crowding‐in/crowding‐out effect of public sector investment on private investment. Time series data for a period of 45 years from 1971 to 2015 has been used. Adopting a ‘nonlinear auto‐regressive distributive lag’ (NARDL) model the study confirms a strong crowding‐in effect of public investment on private investment in short run, but relatively a weak complementarity between the two over long‐run. Moreover, the public canal intensity as a major component of public investment has been observed to have much stronger effect on private investment than the public investment itself. It is also found that private investment is constrained by its own lagged values, institutional credit and terms of trade during both short‐run and long‐run. The policy suggestion of this study calls for an immediate arrest of declining trend of public investment.     

Evaluating the impact of agricultural extension on farms' performance in Crete: a nonneutral stochastic frontier approach

This article attempts to integrate the production‐ and the efficiency‐based approaches for evaluating the impact of extension on farms' performance. For this purpose the nonneutral production frontier model is used, and the empirical analysis refers to a sample of farms from Crete, Greece. The empirical results support the proposed formulation instead of either the production‐ or the efficiency‐based formulations as extension was found to have a statistically significant effect on closing both the technology and management gaps. Public and private extension services were found to be competitive in the production function and complementary in the technical inefficiency effect function. In addition, farms using both public and private extension services achieved a higher degree of technical efficiency than those using either public or private extension services, and farms with no extension services were found to be the least efficient.     

Does acquisition of a cooperative generate profits for the buyer? The Dairyworld case

This article examines the takeover of a cooperative (Dairyworld) by an investor‐owned firm (Saputo) that was not previously present in the industry, determines if this takeover generates greater returns for the investor‐owned firms (IOF), and on the basis of this evidence makes some inferences about the behavior and performance of cooperatives and IOFs. The empirical evidence strongly supports the conclusion that Saputo's stock price rose with its takeover announcement. This outcome is consistent with a number of explanations, including that Saputo was unaffected by hubris, a factor often suggested as the reason that many firms overbid when they undertake acquisitions. Dairyworld's poor liquidity and capital shortage problems, as well as a limited number of suitors, may have weakened its bargaining position in its dealings with Saputo. The observed increase in Saputo's stock price is also consistent with the possibility that, by taking over a cooperative, Saputo was able to decrease competition and thus increase its profits. A fruitful area for future research would be a rigorous theoretical and empirical determination of the impact that these various factors have on acquisition profitability. Such analysis is required before inferences about the behavior and performance of cooperatives and IOFs can be fully answered.     

Multinationals vs. Cooperatives: The Income and Efficiency Effects of Supply Chain Governance in India

The impact of multinational firms on the domestic agricultural sector in developing countries is controversial, in particular in India. Relying on a unique set of household‐level data from the state of Punjab, we study the biggest dairy company in the world (Nestlé) in India and compare its vertical spillover effects on upstream suppliers to other market channels (informal sector and cooperatives). We find that farmers that supply informal channels are less efficient and earn lower profits per dairy animal than farmers supplying the cooperative and the multinational sector. Furthermore, we find that farmers using the multinational channel are more efficient than farmers in the cooperative channel, but equally profitable. Hence, we do not find that supplying the cooperative channel is more beneficial for local dairy farmers than supplying the multinational channel. Overall, however, dairy productivity and profitability levels are still dramatically low, with substantial scope for dairy development.     

Do subsidies cause a less competitive milk market in China?

After 2008, China dairy industry has experienced a consolidation supported by the government mainly for the reason of food safety. Subsidies are one of the tools to shape a concentrated market with goals of reducing regulation cost and accomplishing quality control. This gives a serious concern that subsidies would generate a less competitive dairy industry. We construct a parametric model and use the firm‐level panel data, specifically the top eight dairy firms, to test if government subsidies strengthen the market power in the dairy industry. Our empirical results indicate government subsidies have a negative impact on the Lerner index for the top privately owned firms, but no significant effect on state‐controlled ones after controlling for advertising, time trend, and proprietorship. It is possible that the subsidies give more room for private firms to increase the scale or suppress the price, which eventually reduces the market power and benefits dairy customers in the downstream.     

Efficiency of Cooperatives and Investor Owned Firms Revisited

The objectives of dairy processing cooperatives differ from those of investor‐owned firms (IOFs). However, the literature usually assumes the same performance measures for cooperatives vis‐a‐vis IOFs. This study compares the performance of dairy cooperatives and IOFs in major European dairy producing countries. A traditional input oriented approach is used and two alternative approaches are used to account for the differential objectives of cooperatives. Cooperatives’ performance differs across the two approaches from being outperformed by IOFs using the input oriented approach to outperforming them when using an approach that is more in line with cooperatives’ objectives.     

The impact of coffee certification on small‐scale producers’ livelihoods: a case study from the Jimma Zone,Ethiopia

What is the impact of product certification on small‐scale farmers’ livelihoods? To what extent does the participation of Ethiopian small‐scale coffee farmers in certified local cooperative structures improve their socioeconomic situation? To answer these questions, this article employs household data of 249 coffee farmers from six different cooperatives collected in the Jimma zone of Southwestern Ethiopia in 2009. Findings show that the certification of coffee cooperatives has in total a low impact on small‐scale coffee producers’ livelihoods mainly due to (1) low productivity, (2) insignificant price premium, and (3) poor access to credit and information from the cooperative. Differences in production and organizational capacities between the local cooperatives are mirrored in the extent of the certification benefits for the smallholders. “Good” cooperatives have reaped the benefits of certification, whereas “bad” ones did not fare well. In this regard the “cooperative effect” overlies the “certification effect.”     

Efficient income redistribution for a small country using optimal combined instruments

In this paper I improve Gardner's surplus transformation curve framework by assuming that governments are able to vary many policy instruments simultaneously instead of only one. I use my framework to find the combination of the currently used instruments which provides the most efficient income redistribution for the Austrian bread grains market. Comparing the most efficient policy with the actual policy reveals that 464 × 10⁶ Austrian shillings were wasted. I theoretically compare for a small country the transfer efficiency of every possible pair of the four major agricultural policy instruments: floor price, (production) quota, co-responsibility levy, and deficiency payments. Without considering the marginal cost of public funds (MCF), deficiency payments cum quota (equal to a fully decoupled direct income support) is the most efficient policy, succeeded by floor price cum quota, and floor price cum deficiency payments. If the MCF is taken into account, the ranking crucially depends on the market parameters, the transfer level, and the value of the MCF. For the Austrian bread grains market, I empirically demonstrate that given the present support level, a fully decoupled direct income support redistributes income most efficiently as long as the MCF is lower than 1.17. Beyond this value a floor price cum quota policy becomes more efficient. A floor price cum deficiency payments policy is never superior to the floor price cum quota.     

The fourth industrial revolution,agricultural and rural innovation,and implications for public policy and investments: a case of India

The Indian Government and public–private partnerships are developing and disseminating a dizzying number of innovative, networked solutions, broadly known as the Digital India initiative, to increase the efficiency of safety nets and worker productivity and to improve life. Yet, challenges to turn the power of information and other technologies into a farmer‐friendly technological revolution for India's 156 million rural households are considerable, including: (1) reliable, up‐to‐date, location‐specific message content for a diverse agriculture to help stratified households shift to productive, knowledge‐intensive agriculture as a business—government, private sector, and civil society have big roles to play; (2) digital literacy, i.e., teaching farmers how to choose and use apps, even where the digital divide is absent; apps are, or soon to be, in regional languages; and (3) monitoring actual use and impacts on users’ lives by understanding the adoption and adaptation processes. These challenges call for bottom‐up, complementary investments in physical, human, and institutional capital, and farmer‐friendly e‐platforms, while forging ahead with many top‐down policy and institutional reforms currently underway, in which progress is real and constraints holding back greater success are better understood.     

A model of shifting cultivation: can soil conservation reduce deforestation?

Shifting cultivators manage soil not only by adjusting soil use on already‐cleared lands, as in continuous cultivation, but also by clearing forests to obtain new fertile soils. This study examines the crucial link between on‐farm soil conservation and deforestation in shifting cultivation by modeling forest clearing as an investment in soil for a private farmer. More generally, by doing so the study attempts to integrate deforestation and soil conservation models which have been separately developed in the literature. Our policy goal is to arrest tropical deforestation—as destruction of global commons—caused by land degradation in shifting cultivation while improving the well‐being of poor shifting cultivators. Our integrated approach enables joint policy analyses of deforestation and land degradation. Three welfare‐enhancing policies are considered. The first is agricultural and nonagricultural subsidies affecting farm and nonfarm income opportunities. The second is fiscal and tenure policies affecting discount rates. Our question is whether the link between forest clearing and soil fertility alters the outcomes of these two standard macroeconomic policies commonly found in the literature. The third policy (or program) is various soil conservation measures affecting soil regeneration and erosivity on already‐cleared lands. This article examines a very important question which has received little attention in previous theoretical works: can soil conservation reduce deforestation? This study confirms anti‐deforestation effects of the promotion of nonfarming activities—a common and often emphasized finding in previous works—among shifting cultivators. More importantly, it also demonstrates that improving various soil conservation measures not only discourages forest clearing among shifting cultivators but also tends to have greater effects on forest protection than promoting nonfarming activities. Contrarily, agricultural price subsidy or technological progress gives rise to the opposite outcome, and lowering the farmer's discount rate or improving tenure security encourages him/her to clear more forests just to accumulate soil.     

The role of retail market power and state regulations in the heterogeneity of farm‐retail price transmission of private label and branded products

Given the leading role of private label brands in the fluid milk market, it is of special interest to focus on possible differences in farm‐retail price transmission between private label and branded milk as well as the causes of heterogeneity. This article examines the heterogeneous effects of private label and branded products on price transmission in the fluid milk market using a panel threshold asymmetric error correction model. Results indicate that upward retail‐price adjustment is faster than the downward price adjustment for both private label and branded milk. The speed of adjustment of private label products is significantly faster than branded products in three different price regimes. We further investigate the reasons of heterogeneity in farm‐retail price transmission of private label milk. We find that both retailer market power and state pricing regulations contribute to the heterogeneity in asymmetric price transmission. Higher retailer market power causes retail prices of private label milk to rise faster and to fall slower. The existence of a state pricing regulation slows down the adjustment speed of retail prices of private labels back to the long‐run equilibrium, regardless of whether the retail price is low or high.     

The Impact of Seed Policy Reforms and Intellectual Property Rights on Crop Productivity in India

The growth of private investment in developing‐country agriculture, new advances in the biological sciences, and rapid integration of developing countries into the global trading system has heightened interest in the topic of seed market and intellectual property rights’ (IPRs) policies among public policy‐makers, corporate decision‐makers and other actors in the agricultural sector. But there are still unanswered questions about whether emerging and evolving seed policy reforms and IPR regimes in developing countries will contribute to increasing crop productivity and improving food security. This paper attempts to answer some of these questions by focusing specifically on the case of India, the regional leader in implementing seed policy reforms and IPRs in agriculture. Findings indicate that maize and pearl millet yields grew significantly during the last two decades due partly to the combination of (1) public policies that encouraged private investment in India’s seed industry during the 1980s, and (2) biological IPRs conferred by hybridisation that conveniently married the private sector’s need for appropriability with the nation’s need for productivity growth. Although past lessons are not an indication of future success, this convergence of policy solutions and technology opportunities can be replicated for other crops that are vital to India’s food security.     

Supply response in Ethiopia: accounting for technical inefficiency

Few empirical studies of supply response using the profit function have accounted for technical inefficiency. Using farm‐level panel data from Ethiopia, this study examines the effect of incorporating technical inefficiency in estimating the supply response of peasant farmers. Two systems of output supply and input demand equations are estimated and compared: the conventional model in which technical efficiency is assumed and another in which technical inefficiency is explicitly incorporated. The model with technical inefficiency is preferred on grounds of theoretical consistency and improved estimates, although model comparison tests are not conclusive. Incorporation of inefficiency generally increases the magnitudes and the statistical significance of own price elasticities, substantially so in the case of fertilizer and fertilizer‐intensive crops, and alters the priority attached to nonprice factors. An important result is that only the specification with inefficiency reveals a significant effect of access to extension services on output. Only this specification finds that output increases with household size, which one expects as the farms in the sample are largely subsistence and producing for own consumption. Furthermore, the results demonstrate that farmers' response to incentives is considerably restricted by inefficiency, suggesting that the traditional model would overstate response by excluding the efficiency variable.