企业集团统一审计与审计质量

企业集团是新兴市场国家非常普遍的企业组织方式。审计质量问题研究的已有文献通常关注的是单个公司,本文则关注在同一实际控制人控制下的企业集团中,多家上市公司选择同一家会计师事务所审计,即集团统一审计是否会影响审计质量。研究发现,较小规模事务所进行的集团统一审计,其审计质量更差;而较大规模事务所进行的集团统一审计,则未发现其对审计质量产生显著影响。     

股权结构代理成本与外部审计需求

本文基于一个两时点大股东掠夺模型,考察了股权结构、代理成本与外部审计需求之间的关系。我们的模型分析结果表明,第一大股东持股比例与企业价值成U型曲线关系,而与外部审计需求成倒U型曲线关系。即:代理成本较高的上市公司更有可能聘请高质量的外部审计师,以降低代理成本,提高公司市场价值。我们以中国A股上市公司2001和2002年的数据,对上述结论进行了实证检验并得到支持,本文分析还表明,债务融资与外部审计在降低代理成本方面具有相互替代性。     

审计师声誉与银行信贷资源配置——基于银行信用借款决策的经验证据

本文以2001至2006年沪深A股上市公司为样本,从银行信用借款决策的视角,研究了审计师声誉对银行信贷资源配置的影响。研究发现,聘请高声誉审计师的上市公司更可能获得银行信用借款(即存在门槛效应)且信用借款的比例更高(即存在约束效应);在区分产权性质后发现,国有控股公司中审计师声誉机制主要体现为约束效应,其原因在于政治关系是一种更可靠的替代机制;非国有控股公司中仅存在审计师声誉机制的门槛效应,主要归因于我国司法体系不健全,银行将寻求其他更可靠的替代机制。研究结果表明审计师声誉是一种有效的资源配置机制,但其有效性受制度环境的制约。     

Government and managerial influence on auditor switching under partial privatization

We investigate how auditor switching is affected by government influence, misalignment between type of auditor (government vs. private) and type of controlling shareholder (government vs. private), and misalignment between an incumbent auditor and imputed preferences of managers in a market characterized by continued substantial government ownership in listed entities. We exploit a natural policy and regulatory experiment in Iran that allows us to investigate what happens when previously government-owned entities are partially privatized as listed entities where, in many cases, the government retains significant ownership interests. At the same time, there were significant changes in the audit market, resulting in large increases in the number of private sector auditors competing for previously state-administered audits. We find the likelihood of auditor switches is strongly associated with measures of misalignment between type of auditor and type of controlling shareholder and auditor–managerial misalignment, but these associations are constrained by significant government influence. Exposing the constraining effect of significant government influence on auditor switching is an important contribution to our understanding of privatizations, government shareholder influence and auditor choice. These results have implications for policy development in other emerging and transition economies where privatization remains largely partial, and competition among private sector auditors is still emergent.     

Company takeovers and the auditor choice decision

There is a growing literature on how companies select their auditors. This literature emphasizes both theoretical development and empirical testing. Anderson, Stokes, and Zimmer (1993) recently identified corporate takeovers as events that generate auditor selection decisions; the acquiring company (the acquirer) has to choose whether to retain the new subsidiary’s (the acquiree) incumbent auditor or switch to its own auditor. To date, this is the only reported study that examines auditor changes following corporate acquisitions. Anderson et al. (1993) speculated that if the business activities of the acquirer and the acquiree are different, then the acquiree’s incumbent auditor is more likely to be retained. They used takeover type (horizontal, vertical, conglomerate) as a proxy for differences in activities. Their empirical results, however, were contrary to these expectations.The purpose of this paper is to test the robustness of Anderson et al.’s findings in a different national setting (Britain instead of Australia). Further, it modifies Anderson et al.’s test procedures by introducing new variables that are also hypothesized to affect auditor choice in acquired companies. The results show that proxies for differences in activities between acquirers and acquirees, namely takeover type and industry, are associated with the retention of the acquiree’s incumbent auditor. The takeover type finding therefore differs from the findings of Anderson et al. (1993).Other factors associated with the decision to retain auditors include audit opinions, contested takeover bids, changes in top management, restructuring and integration of businesses, and relative audit fees. Some of these factors have also been identified in other, non-takeover contexts. Finally, audit switches to Big Eight firms are found to be more likely than switches away from the Big Eight.     

Does cross-listing facilitate changes in corporate ownership and control?

This paper examines whether controlling shareholders of foreign firms use a US cross-listing to facilitate changes in ownership and control. Prior to listing, about three quarters of the firms in our sample have a controlling shareholder. After listing, about half of the controlling shareholders’ voting rights decrease, with an average decrease of 24% points that differs significantly from that of the controlling shareholders of benchmark firms that do not cross-list. Large decreases in voting rights are associated with controlling shareholder characteristics, domestic market constraints, and better stock market performance and liquidity. In addition, there is control change in 22% of the firms. Controlling shareholders are more likely to sell control, and are more likely to do so to a foreign buyer, than controlling shareholders of benchmark firms. The results suggest that controlling shareholders who want to sell shares or their control stake can use a US cross-listing to decrease the cost of transferring ownership.     

Voluntary disclosure of reasons for auditor changes and the capital market reaction to information disclosure

This study examines the association between firm attributes and management’s voluntary disclosure of the reason(s) for auditor changes and evaluates the capital market reaction to information disclosure of the auditor change events accompanied by preexisting red flag and non-red flag issues. We find that managers are more likely to disclose the reason(s) for auditor changes when those changes occurred because of benign business reasons or if the reasons do not indicate the presence of any underlying operating or financial reporting problem. On the other hand, managers are less likely to disclose the reason(s) for auditor changes when those changes are preceded by red-flag situations. Furthermore, auditor changes accompanied by preexisting red-flag situations are viewed negatively by the capital market, implying that the full disclosure of reasons for auditor changes is informative to investors. This observation is supported further by our market-based analyses, which consistently show that auditor changes accompanied by prevailing red flag issues are valued incrementally in the market above and beyond the reportable events (under FRR No. 31) and auditor-initiated changes. The study contributes to the recent policy debate related to mandating the disclosure of the reason(s) for auditor switches. Specifically, the results support the recent debates that the current voluntary disclosure regime results in selective disclosure practices that are likely to contribute to the general lack of transparency with respect to auditor changes.     

Audit fees around dismissals and resignations: Additional evidence

This paper offers new findings about how audit fees vary around auditor dismissals and resignations. For dismissals, we find evidence of lower than normal fees before and after an auditor change, consistent with the view that both incumbent and successor auditors adjust fees downward to retain the client. Our evidence also shows that incumbent and successor auditors charge unusually high fees before and after a resignation. We interpret the higher than normal incumbent fees as an indication that resignation companies reflect unusual levels of audit effort or risk, which the incumbent auditor captures as additional fees. Eventually, however, the additional fees are insufficient, inducing the incumbent to resign. A fee premium by the successor auditor after resignation also supports this view.     

审计师变更与盈余管理关系的实证研究--来自中国A股市场的经验证据

通过对2001～2003年A股上市公司的实证研究发现:审计师变更与公司可操纵应计利润的增长具有显著正相关关系,且两者关系在不同年度、不同前期审计意见的情况下有所不同.这表明,一方面审计师变更影响到后任审计师的独立性,即公司能够通过更换审计师实现盈余管理的目标;另一方面,对前期非标审计意见的公司,审计师采取了较为谨慎的做法,且伴随着监管政策的逐渐强化,后任审计师的独立性逐年提高.     

Does auditor ratification matter to bondholders? Evidence from new bond issues

We investigate the relation between shareholder votes on auditor ratification and the client’s credit risk, using both parametric and nonparametric regression techniques. Using data from 2006 to 2016, we show that the proportion of shareholder disapproval for auditors heterogeneously impacts credit risk, as shown by bond spread and bond rating. The results suggest that higher shareholder disapproval of the auditor has an adverse effect on yield spread and bond ratings after controlling for firm characteristics associated with audit quality, such as auditor size and tenure.     

Does Opinion Shopping Impair Auditor Independence and Audit Quality?

This study investigates how companies' threats to dismiss auditors and their engagement in opinion shopping influence auditor independence and audit quality, which in turn affect misstatements in financial statements. It also examines how outsiders' reactions to auditor switching influence opinion shopping. The results indicate that neither the predecessor auditor's nor the successor auditor's independence is compromised by dismissal threats and opinion shopping. Further, the successor auditor's audit quality exceeds the predecessor auditor's audit quality. In addition, auditor switching decreases potential understatements and increases potential overstatements in financial statements, and the capital market's and the successor auditor's reactions to auditor switching reduce the benefits of opinion shopping to companies. Additionally, the study sheds some light on the potential effects of both the Sarbanes‐Oxley's restriction on non‐audit services and mandatory auditor rotation or retention. The paper also derives a rich set of empirical implications.     

公司治理结构与多元化经营

2003年我国721家A股上市公司的多元化和相关财务数据表明,近一半的企业选择或维持多元化经营.经研究发现:股权结构对公司多元化经营决策和多元化绩效有显著影响:非国有控股公司较多实行多元化经营并且多元化绩效较好;控股股东持股比例越高,越不可能实行多元化经营,多元化绩效也越好.董事会特征、管理层持股对多元化经营决策和多元化绩效基本没有影响.公司负债率越高,实行多元化经营的可能性越大,多元化绩效越好.研究结果支持代理理论,多元化经营是控股股东谋取私利的方式.     

Determinants of auditor changes for non-accelerated filers

Significant accounting scandals and the imminent collapse of Arthur Andersen in 2001 precipitated a period of heightened regulatory response, most notably the enactment of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002. In the years that followed, the Securities and Exchange Commission created a separate class of non-accelerated filers (companies with public float of up to $75 million) and provided these companies with significant regulatory relief from certain financial reporting disclosure and auditing requirements, including the extension of scaled disclosure to these companies in 2007. Over the period of 2001 through 2007, as non-accelerated clients anticipated and responded to their different and evolving regulatory regime, audit firms were adjusting to the increased concentration in their market, a new monitoring structure, and significant changes to the scope of their work. We examine whether auditor–client misalignment is a significant determinant of auditor change during this period, particularly for non-accelerated filers, as large auditors sought to rebalance their client portfolios. We find evidence that auditor–client misalignment increases the likelihood of auditor change (resignation and dismissal) for non-accelerated, but not accelerated, filers. We also find that auditor–client misalignment increases the likelihood of downward changes to third-tier auditors for non-accelerated, but not accelerated, filers.     

Corporate director liability and monitoring preferences

An important issue in the regulation of corporate behavior is its impact on the monitoring configuration selected by top management. In this article, we provide evidence consistent with the notion that the recent trend toward audit committee formation, and the movement toward Big-Eight auditors, are responses to increased legal exposure of the board of directors, notably stemming from the passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977. The costs associated with changes in monitoring configurations are also considered. In particular, it is argued that auditor assistance can substantially reduce the cost of audit committee formation. Because external auditors may have differential incentives to support audit committee formation, a hypothesis linking auditor identity and audit committee formation is offered. Recent auditor changes and audit committee formations of American Stock Exchange companies are examined to provide positive evidence for the theory. The data reveal a clear trend to form audit committees, and a movement to Big-Eight auditors. Underscoring the importance of auditor involvement, it is shown that audit committees were more likely to be formed given recent selection of a new Big-Eight auditor.     

保险公司控股股东和实际控制人监管的合理性基础与制度设计

监管保险公司控股股东和实际控制人,不仅是防范保险公司控制权被滥用的现实需要,而且有其深刻的制度背景、思想条件和法律基础.在导入保险公司控股股东和实际控制人监管制度时,应遵循维护被保险人利益、区别对待、循序渐进、借鉴国际经验与中国国情相结合的原则,并将之落实在具体内容的构建之中.     

股权控制链、代理冲突与审计师选择

本文利用2002—2003年我国A股市场数据,从上市公司至其最终控制人之间的股权控制链①的视角,考察了上市公司控制性股东与中小股东之间的代理冲突,并在此基础上研究了其与高质量外部审计需求之间的关系。结果表明,控制链越长,控制性股东与中小股东之间的代理冲突就越严重。研究发现,控制性股东的控制权结构所产生的代理冲突越严重,上市公司越有可能聘请审计质量较高的"四大"审计;而聘请"四大",能够降低控制性股东的资金侵占程度,减缓公司的代理冲突。这说明在我国现阶段,高质量外部审计具有一定的治理作用。     

Audit committee quality,auditor independence,and internal control weaknesses

In this paper we investigate the relation between audit committee quality, auditor independence, and the disclosure of internal control weaknesses after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. We begin with a sample of firms with internal control weaknesses and, based on industry, size, and performance, match these firms to a sample of control firms without internal control weaknesses. Our conditional logit analyses indicate that a relation exists between audit committee quality, auditor independence, and internal control weaknesses. Firms are more likely to be identified with an internal control weakness, if their audit committees have less financial expertise or, more specifically, have less accounting financial expertise and non-accounting financial expertise. They are also more likely to be identified with an internal control weakness, if their auditors are more independent. In addition, firms with recent auditor changes are more likely to have internal control weaknesses.     

大股东变更与高级管理人员更换:经营业绩的作用

本文分析了经营业绩在控股股东变更与高级管理人员更换之间关系中的作用。通过统计检验发现 ,高管人员的更换与控股股东的更换密切相关 ,但是不同经营业绩水平的公司在更换高管人员上有很大的差异 ,具体表现为经营业绩低劣的公司更容易更换高管人员。然而大股东的更换以及高管人员的更换并没有根本上改变公司的经营业绩 ,仅给企业带来了较为严重的盈余管理。     

大股东控制、市场化程度与公司现金持有水平

运用2003～2008年我国所有非金融类A股上市公司的样本数据,从大股东控制视角出发,重点关注第一大股东持股比例、实际控制人性质和公司所在地区市场化程度对于公司现金持有水平的共同作用。结果表明,第一大股东持股比例与公司现金持有量水平正相关,实际控制人为国有的比非国有的上市公司的现金持有量高;公司外部治理环境的改善,有助于减轻由第一大股东持股比例以及实际控制人性质对公司现金持有量造成的负面影响。