Auditor changes following big eight mergers with non-big eight audit firms

This paper examines the reaction of clients of “non-Big Eight” audit firms to mergers of their auditors with “Big Eight” firms. We postulate that a non-Big Eight audit firm's clients will retain a Big Eight acquirer following a merger if they benefit from the Big Eight firm's specialized services and/or reputation. Clients that do not have these economic incentives to retain the Big Eight firm are more likely to change to another non-Big Eight audit firm following the merger. Empirical tests of the characteristics of clients that remain with a Big Eight acquirer or change to another smaller auditor following an audit merger generally support our hypotheses.     

Using machine learning to predict auditor switches: How the likelihood of switching affects audit quality among non-switching clients

In this paper, we utilize machine learning techniques to identify the likelihood that a company switches auditors and examine whether increased likelihood of switching is associated with audit quality. Building on research that finds a deterioration in audit quality associated with clients that engage in audit opinion shopping, we predict and find lower audit quality among companies that are more likely to switch auditors but remain with their incumbent auditor. Specifically, we find that companies more likely to switch auditors have a higher likelihood of misstatement and larger abnormal accruals. These results are consistent with auditors sacrificing audit quality to retain clients that might otherwise switch. Our findings are especially concerning because there is no public signal of this behavior, such as an auditor switch. Our methodology is designed such that it could be implemented by investors, audit firms and regulators to identify companies with a higher probability of switching auditors and preemptively address the deterioration in audit quality.     

Audit fees around dismissals and resignations: Additional evidence

This paper offers new findings about how audit fees vary around auditor dismissals and resignations. For dismissals, we find evidence of lower than normal fees before and after an auditor change, consistent with the view that both incumbent and successor auditors adjust fees downward to retain the client. Our evidence also shows that incumbent and successor auditors charge unusually high fees before and after a resignation. We interpret the higher than normal incumbent fees as an indication that resignation companies reflect unusual levels of audit effort or risk, which the incumbent auditor captures as additional fees. Eventually, however, the additional fees are insufficient, inducing the incumbent to resign. A fee premium by the successor auditor after resignation also supports this view.     

Auditor independence, ‘low balling’, and disclosure regulation

This paper investigates the allegations of the Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities and the Securities and Exchange Commission that ‘low balling’ on initial audit engagements impairs auditor independence. We demonstrate that, contrary to these claims, ‘low balling’ does not impair independence; rather it is a competitive response to the expectation of future quasi-rents to incumbent auditors (due, e.g., to technological advantages of incumbency). ‘Low balling’ in the initial period is the process by which auditors compete for these advantages. Critically, initial fee reductions are sunk in future periods and therefore do not impair auditor independence. The implications for current regulation governing changes of auditor (Accounting Series Release No. 165 et al.) and audit fees (Accounting Series Release No. 250) are also discussed.     

The Importance of Audit Firm Characteristics and the Drivers of Auditor Change in UK Listed Companies

This paper explores the importance of audit firm characteristics and the factors motivating auditor change based on questionnaire responses from 210 listed UK companies (a response rate of 70%). Twenty-nine potentially desirable auditor characteristics are identified from the extant literature and their importance elicited. Exploratory factor analysis reduces these variables to eight uncorrelated underlying dimensions: reputation/quality; acceptability to third parties: value for money: ability to provide non-audit services: small audit firm: specialist industry knowledge; non-Big Six large audit firm: and geographical proximity. Insights into the nature of ‘the Big Six factor’ emerge. Two thirds of companies had recently considered changing auditors; the main reasons cited being audit Ice level, dissatisfaction with audit quality and changes in top management. Of those companies that considered change. 73% did not actually do so. the main reasons cited being fee reduction by the incumbent and avoidance of disruption. Thus audit fee levels are both a key precipitator of change and a key factor in retaining the status quo.     

Determinants and consequences of voluntary switches to Chinese auditors in Hong Kong

Hong Kong market regulators have permitted 12 large Chinese accounting firms to audit the financial statements of Chinese firms that cross list in Hong Kong (i.e., H-share firms) since 2010. This paper examines the characteristics of H-share firms that voluntarily replaced their Hong Kong (HK) auditors with Chinese auditors, and the market reaction to auditor switches following this policy. We find that 38 out of 147 H-share firms voluntarily switched to Chinese auditors during 2011–2013. Switching firms are larger in size and are less likely to use Big4; they also have less need for external financing, a longer cross listing history, and a lower percentage of foreign revenue. We also find that investors negatively react to the auditor switches from HK non-Big4 to China non-Big4, but do not react to the auditor switches from HK Big4 to China Big4. This suggests that investors perceived lower audit quality for China non-Big4.     

Takeover premiums and the perception of auditor independence and reputation

This study investigates if there is a positive association between takeover premiums and the bidder’s perception of target firm auditor reputation and independence. Using auditor size as a proxy for auditor reputation, the results indicate that in hostile takeovers target shareholders receive a higher takeover premium when a Big 4 auditor audits the target firm prior to the takeover. This result is only significant, however, in the period prior to the highly publicised audit failures. The impact of perceived auditor independence on takeover premiums is studied using the levels and size of non-audit service (NAS) fees provided by the target firm auditor. Using three proxies for auditor independence, the results show no association between perceived auditor independence and takeover premiums. This finding is robust to partitioning the sample by auditor size, takeover hostility and splitting the sample into takeovers pre- and post- the corporate scandals that occurred in 2002.     

Note on Self‐Selection of Auditors in the Municipal Sector*

The objective of this article is to revisit the literature on Big‐N audit fee premiums in the municipal setting using a methodology that controls for self‐selection bias. Because auditor choices can be predicted based on certain client characteristics, using standard one‐stage ordinary least squares regressions to draw inferences about the presence or absence of such a premium in the extant public‐sector audit fee studies may not be appropriate. Results indicate that, after controlling for a self‐selection bias, Big‐6 (non‐Big‐6) municipal clients on average pay a fee premium, compared to the case if they were to retain a non‐Big‐6 (Big‐6) auditor. Results continue to hold when we conduct further analyses on a subset of municipalities with access to both Big‐6 and non‐Big‐6 auditors in a local market defined by a 60‐km radius, rather than over a province‐wide audit market. The existence of non‐Big‐6 audit fee premiums has not been documented previously in the private‐ or public‐sector audit fee literature. We surmise that it may be caused by the dominance (79.4 percent) of non‐Big‐6 auditors in the Ontario municipal market, compared to most private‐sector audit markets where their market share generally does not exceed 20 percent. The strong market position of non‐Big‐6 firms in turn may have allowed these auditors to command a fee premium for the subset of municipalities that self‐selects to be audited by them. An implication from our study is that Ontario municipalities often choose to be audited by more costly auditors, even though they could have paid lower audit fees by switching to an alternative auditor type. These results do not support those reported by Chaney et al. (2004) , who find that U.K. private firms are audited by the least costly auditor type. The conflicting findings may be attributable to the fact that the Ontario municipal audit market is subject to regulation by not just the audit profession but also the Ontario government and that, unlike business corporations, municipalities receive funding from provincial governments to fulfil much of their financial requirements. Thus, municipal clients may be relatively more willing to accept higher audit fees provided their chosen auditor (or auditor type) matches their needs.     

Auditor quality,corporate risk,and the valuation of new issues

This paper tests two hypotheses derived from the Data et al. (1991) theoretical model of auditor choice by companies newly listing on the stock exchange. The results offer support to their predictions of the demand for auditor quality. In particular, higher-risk companies are associated with the selection of a high-quality auditor, as proxied by a Big Eight firm of accountants. Additionally, companies who employed Big Eight firms had higher market valuations of their stock at the time of listing.     

Non-audit services, auditor quality and the value relevance of earnings

This paper tests the hypothesis that there is an inverse relation between non‐audit services (NAS) provided by a firm auditor and the value relevance of earnings (measured as the earnings response coefficient) and that this relation is weaker for firms with Big 6 auditors. The hypothesis is based on anecdotal evidence and previous research that suggests that the provision of NAS by the external auditor is likely to adversely affect investors’ perceptions of the credibility of financial reports, and that Big 6 auditors, because of reputational capital and litigation costs, are likely to mitigate the adverse effects of NAS. Results using 840 firm‐year observations of Australian companies document a statistically significant inverse relationship between NAS and the value relevance of earnings, and this inverse relationship is weaker for Big 6 auditors, therefore supporting the hypothesis.     

制度环境、审计供求与审计治理——基于我国证券市场中审计师变更问题的实证分析

本文基于我国证券市场中审计师变更问题这一动态视角考察了制度环境对外部审计治理的影响。通过研究,我们发现:首先,在制度环境发展相对落后的地区,上市公司频繁更换审计师的现象更严重;其次,在制度环境发展相对较好的地区,上市公司更可能发生审计师升级变更,表明其对高质量审计服务的需求;第三,在制度环境发展较差的地区,由于诉讼风险和诉讼成本较低,继任审计师为了获得审计客户更容易发生变通审计意见的行为,说明审计师难以发挥其外部治理的功能进而弥补制度环境的缺陷。本文的研究发现说明制度环境同时影响审计需求和审计供给两方面的行为表现,并支持了制度环境与外部审计治理是相互促进的关系。     

An Empirical Investigation of the Interface Between Internal and External Auditors

Professional standards place specific responsibilities on auditors for the discovery of material mis-statements in reports of corporate financial performance. Certain factors have been shown to increase the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting. One warning sign is the potentially pervasive effect of a weak internal control environment consistent with a weak internal audit group. This study investigates the impact of internal audit department quality differences on auditors ‘willingness to place reliance on the work performed by internal auditors. The study also gives consideration to auditors’ recent experiences with material errors and irregularities and examines the influence of two previously untested individual auditor differences on audit judgment decisions: (1) conflict management style and (2) perception of internal/external auditor communication barriers. The results indicate that auditors attend to internal audit department quality differences and that individual auditor differences exhibit significant influence over auditor judgments. Implications for audit practice are considered and directions for future research are suggested.     

企业集团统一审计能降低审计收费吗

审计收费是审计研究的重要问题。已有审计研究文献通常关注的是对单个公司的审计收费,本文则关注在同一实际控制人控制下的企业集团中,多家上市公司选择同一家会计师事务所审计,即集团统一审计对审计收费的影响。研究发现,集团统一审计不但不能降低审计收费,反而会增加审计收费;选择大所进行统一审计可以降低审计费用,而小所执行统一审计则可能存在牺牲独立性以获得更多审计收费的情形。此外,事务所尤其是小规模事务所,在招揽集团客户时存在激烈的低价竞争。     

Is the effect of shared auditors driven by shared audit partners? The case of M&As

Recent research suggests that shared auditors impact firm outcomes by facilitating information flows across clients and increasing financial statement comparability. This study argues that since client specific knowledge resides with audit partners the effects of shared auditors on corporate outcomes is primarily driven by client engagements with shared audit partners. We test this argument using Australian merger and acquisitions, where there is a longstanding requirement for the disclosure of audit partner details. We find: (i) a positive association between shared audit partners and the likelihood of a friendly acquisition, (ii) a negative association between shared audit partners and takeover premiums, and (iii) a positive (negative) association between shared audit partners and acquirer (target) and total cumulative abnormal returns. We also document that the significant effect of shared auditors is restricted to takeovers with shared audit partners.     

Effects of audit partners on clients’ business risk disclosure

We empirically investigate audit engagement partners’ involvement in business risk disclosure. Specifically, we examine whether the quality of business risk disclosure is influenced by engagement partner tenure and knowledge. We also examine whether the effects of partner tenure and knowledge are similar for Big 4 audit firms and non-Big 4 firms. Since fiscal year 2003, listed companies in Japan have been required to disclose business risk information. Although the business risk information is not audited, auditors concerned about their audit quality may seek to influence clients’ business risk disclosure practices. Giving advice to management on the narrative business risk disclosure can contribute to improving the perceived value of the auditor’s services which can be a competitive advantage. Using a sample of Japanese listed companies from 2003 to 2010, we find that if the engagement partners’ tenure is shorter, a company discloses more business risk information and the disclosure is more detailed. Furthermore, companies with audit partners who have a larger number of client engagements disclose larger amounts of business risk information in more detail. However, the engagement partner effects are mitigated if they belong to a Big 4 firm.     

Does size matter? The influence of large clients on office-level auditor reporting decisions

Large clients create an economic dependence that may cause auditors to compromise their independence and report favorably to retain valuable clients. Economic dependence is measured as a client's size relative to the size of the office that contracts for the audit and issues the audit report. We find no evidence economic dependence causes Big Five auditors to report more favorably for larger clients in their offices. However, larger clients also pose greater litigation risk, and we do find that Big 5 auditors report more conservatively for larger clients, suggesting that reputation protection dominates auditor behavior.     

Switching due diligence auditor in Chinese mergers and acquisitions

The routine financial reporting auditor (FR auditor) of an acquiring firm has the advantage of knowing the acquirer very well, however, a large portion of acquirers in China do not use their FR auditor to continue serve as their due diligence auditor (DD auditor) in the takeover process. Using a sample of 818 takeover transactions from 2004 to 2014, we find that the acquiring firms are more likely to appoint a new DD auditor for M&A, instead of using the incumbent one, when the FR auditor is not an industry specialist and the acquiring firms’ financial reporting quality is low. For low financial reporting quality acquiring firms, changing to a new DD auditor can prevent negative market reactions when firms make the M&A announcement, but firms have to pay a higher premium. Our results remain robust when using alternative definitions of industry specialisation and measures of financial reporting quality.     

UK Auditor Concentration: A Descriptive Note

This note describes supplier concentration in the UK market for audit services. It extends previous research, which has focused on listed markets, by examining auditor concentration ratios across all corporate (quoted, unquoted plc and private) sub-markets. Individual and combined Big Six supplier concentration (CR6) ratios are calculated with reference to the number of clients audited, corporate size and disclosed audit fees. Compared with previous studies, the analysis is based on a larger number (171,799) of corporate audits, and indicates that, inter alia, corporate size (across different sub-markets) is a key determinant of supplier concentration. However, variations are reported in relation to individual auditors, auditee size and corporate sub-sectors. Other key findings are that the CR6 ratio in the quoted market has continued to rise in recent years, from 72.3% in 1991 (Beattie and Fearnley, 1994) to 78.4% in 1994/95, and that the Big Six currently audit a substantial proportion (58.2%) of companies in the UK middle market, which they appear to be targeting, as the large auditee sub-sector becomes saturated, to increase market share.     

Conservative Reporting and the Incremental Effect of Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation Policy: A Comparative Analysis of Audit Partner Rotation vs Audit Firm Rotation in South Korea

In this paper, we take advantage of Korea's unique experiment with mandatory audit firm rotation (MAFR) and mandatory audit partner rotation (MAPR) to ascertain their influence on audit quality, proxied by conditional conservatism. Overall, we find that the implementation of MAFR did not have the desired effect. Firms that adopted MAFR demonstrate higher levels of conservatism in previous periods under MAPR (or compared to voluntary adopters). Furthermore, we find that audit tenure increases conservatism levels consistent with the auditor expertise hypothesis. However, whilst evidence suggests MAFR decreases audit quality on the whole, we find that firms that switch from non‐Big 4 to Big 4 auditors demonstrate higher conservatism because Big 4 auditors are more likely to demand conservative accounting practices, consistent with Big 4 audit firm knowledge superiority. Overall, the results suggest that MAFR's negative effect on audit quality can be mitigated by Big 4 auditor supervision.     

Responses by Australian auditors to the global financial crisis

We examine the impact of the global financial crisis (GFC) on auditor behaviour in Australia. Using a sample of listed companies, we examine whether the GFC impacted the propensity of auditors to issue going concern modifications and increased audit effort as reflected in audit fees and audit reporting lag. Controlling for client characteristics, we find an increase in the propensity to issue going concern opinions during the period 2008–2009 compared with the period 2005–2007 and that Big N auditors responded to the GFC earlier than non‐Big N auditors. In relation to audit effort, we find evidence of increased audit fees during the period 2008–2009 compared with the period 2005–2007. There is, however, no evidence of increased audit reporting lags during the GFC.