信息产业国有企业股权结构与经营业绩相关性研究

本文研究目的是,试图通过实证分析,证明我国信息产业国有控股企业股权结构的集中度与经营业绩发展存在负相关性,即股权集中度越高、第一大股东持股相对越多的信息产业领域国有控股企业,其综合经营业绩越差,从而证明在信息产业国有控股企业,国有股一股独大的情况不利于公司发展,推进混合所有制股权改革十分必要.     

股权结构与上市公司经营业绩关系研究--基于2016年-2018年A股上市公司的数据

企业的股权结构在一定程度上对企业的经营绩效产生影响。文章利用沪深A股上市公司2016年-2018年的面板数据,主要运用回归模型研究了股权集中度和股权制衡度对上市公司经营绩效的影响。研究结果表明股权集中度越高对上市公司经营业绩起到消极作用,股权集中度越分散越有利于公司经营业绩的提升。     

股权制衡与公司业绩：理论与事实

运用中国上市公司2003年度的数据,比较股权制衡的公司与股权集中、股权分散公司经营业绩,得出股权制衡的公司业绩要好于股权分散和股权集的公司,因而股权制衡对上市公司绩效产生正面影响。     

股权结构、公司规模与公司绩效——基于公司成长性的差异化分析

本文将2007年642家上市公司分为股权集中组、股权制衡组和股权分散组，对三组样本进行描述性分析和差异性检验，发现股权集中类公司的经营绩效优于股权分散类公司，股权制衡类公司的经营绩效也优于股权分散类公司．而股权集中类公司与股权制衡类公司的经营绩效没有显著的差别。为了考察股权集中度、股权制衡及公司规模对成长类公司绩效的影响，本文构建三个MMR模型。结果显示，成长类公司可以通过提高股权集中程度和控制公司规模来提高公司经营业绩；成长类公司的经营业绩优于非成长类公司；较高的股权集中度是成长类公司经营绩效较好的原因：通过控制公司规模，成长性公司可以获得更好的经营绩效。同时发现股权集中度与公司经营绩效不存在二次非线性关系．公司规模与公司经营绩效存在倒U型二次关系。     

我国上市公司股权制衡机制存在的问题及改进措施

我国上市公司普遍存在股权高度集中的现象,引起了国有企业"一股独大"和所有者缺位,以及民营企业资金和管理上的问题,从而降低了公司价值。股权分置后,我国企业逐渐开始改善股权结构,采取股权制衡机制以达到提高企业绩效的作用。本文以我国国有企业和民营企业为研究对象,对我国企业股权制衡机制存在的问题进行研究并提出改进措施。     

股权结构与公司绩效的相关性研究——来自我国制造业上市公司的经验证据

以2007年我国沪深两市的677家制造业上市公司为样本的研究发现,在目前中国资本市场的发展阶段,股权集中型的制造业公司比股权制衡和股权分散型的公司更有利于公司绩效的提高,但这种集中不是"一股独大"式的绝对集中,而是一种既有主导力量,又有其他力量加以监督和制约的股权结构.     

股权制衡对上市公司绩效的非线性影响——基于股权制衡度的新测算

测算股权制衡度时不考虑股东间的关联关系可能引致偏差。鉴此,重新测算了股权制衡度,以2003~2013年927家 A 股主板上市公司为样本研究其与公司绩效的关系。结果表明：“新股权制衡度”与公司绩效为非线性的 U 型关系,而“旧股权制衡度”与公司绩效为线性关系;[1,2]为股权制衡度对公司绩效影响的灰色区间;股权制衡度与公司绩效的关系受股东持股模式和外部环境影响。研究结果支持条件有效论,适度的股权制衡才能发挥积极作用。     

董事会独立性、股权制衡与财务信息质量

财务信息作为信息披露的主体,其质量高低直接关系到资本市场的有效运作,引入独立董事制度,彰显董事会的独立性以提高公司的透明度是监管机构改善公司治理结构的重要举措,但在我国一股独大,股权缺乏制衡的制度背景下,独立董事制度的实际运作效果不仅实务界缺乏统一的认识,而且学术界也没有提供可以判断的经验证据。本文利用中国资本市场的数据检验了股权缺乏制衡是否影响财务信息的质量,董事会的独立性是否有助于解决股权制衡的问题,提高公司的透明度。研究结果证实,股权缺乏制衡对财务信息质量有负面影响,董事会独立性在股权缺乏制衡的环境中能发挥监督制约作用,提高财务信息的有用性。     

政治关联、股权集中度与银行绩效——基于我国上市银行业的实证研究

本文利用2006-2013年的数据分析我国上市银行董事长、总经理各自的政治关联以及银行股权集中度对银行业绩的影响。实证结果表明:上市银行董事长和总经理的政治关联对银行业绩的影响各不相同,董事长的政治关联显著提高银行的绩效,而总经理的政治关联则与之相反;上市银行的业绩随着股权集中度的上升而逐步提高,同时,股权集中度在一定程度上抑制了政治关联所起的作用。将银行样本划分为"一股独大"和"股权制衡"两种类型后,上述结论仍然成立。     

建立独立董事制度提高会计信息质量

一、公司治理结构失效影响会计信息质量的提高众所周知，我国上市公司治理结构采用的是“二元制”，即在股东大会下设立董事会和监事会，董事会行使决策权，监事会行使监督权。在完善的公司治理结构中，董事会与监事会实行分权与制衡，形成一套行之有效的权力制衡体制与监督机制。然而，我国的现实情况却并非这样。当前，上市公司股权结构“一股独大”的现象非常普遍。据调查，截至２００１年４月末，我国发行A股的上市公司中，第一大股东控股５０％以上的占上市公司总数的一半以上。而在股权结构“一股独大”的情况下，股东大会、董事会和…     

Why newly listed firms become acquisition targets

We study the operating, financial, and ownership structure characteristics of newly listed firms which become acquisition targets shortly after their initial public offerings. We examine whether such firms get acquired because of their successful performance or as an alternative to delisting. We find that firms, which do relatively well in terms of operating as well as stock performance and attract institutional investor interest, draw the attention of acquirers. Furthermore, we observe that investments made by newly listed target firms do not destroy shareholder value and have comparable profitability to investments made by newly listed firms which grow by acquisitions. Overall, firms acquired shortly after listing are on a growth trajectory similar to that of surviving firms.     

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BOARD STRUCTURE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE IN THE UK

This study examines the relationship between board structure with firm performance in the UK by employing data from 250 publicly traded firms. Consistent with general findings from the USA, the tests as a whole do not discern a significant link between board structure (director affiliation and ownership, chairman affiliation, and committee composition) with firm performance. These results are robust to alternative measures of performance, outlier definitions, various model specifications, and statistical estimation techniques. The most significant determinants of corporate performance are the level of R&D spending and current operating performance. These results are consistent with governance needs varying across firms, and contrast the notion that uniform board structures should be mandated.     

Can CEO dismissals be proactive?

We find significant variation in the prior stock returns of firms that dismiss their CEOs between 1996 and 2008. 49% of firms that dismiss their CEOs do so in the absence of negative industry-adjusted stock returns prior to dismissal (37% dismiss in the absence of negative raw returns). We find evidence for two reasons why boards may dismiss CEOs early, i.e., in the absence of significant poor prior stock performance. First, we find that early dismissals are more likely to be associated with corporate scandals, suggesting that CEOs that are found to engage in unethical or illegal activities are dismissed although their actions may not have a significant adverse impact on firm value. Second, we find support for the argument that early dismissals are proactive actions by boards to dismiss low ability CEOs. We find that firms with more equity-based compensation for directors and higher independent director ownership are more likely to dismiss their CEOs early. Boards with strong incentives are more likely to be proactive and act on their private information about the CEO than boards with poor incentives. Early dismissal firms experience a short-lived decline in operating performance around the date of CEO dismissal, and their operating performance recovers immediately after the CEO is replaced. On the other hand, the operating performance of late dismissal firms declines significantly prior to dismissal and improves substantially after dismissal. We also find that CEOs that are dismissed early are not more likely to find new CEO positions than CEOs that are dismissed late, supporting the idea that early dismissal CEOs may not have different ability than late dismissal CEOs.     

Corporate governance, insider ownership and operating performance of Australian initial public offerings

We examine ownership structures and corporate governance attributes of 313 Australian initial public offerings (IPOs) between 1976 and 1993 and their relation with up to 5 years of post‐listing operating performance, adjusted for similar (non‐IPO) firms. Consistent with prior share price‐based evidence, we find that the operating performance of Australian IPOs typically deteriorates over the first 4 post‐listing years. Any evidence of a positive association between insider ownership and firm performance is confined to the fourth and fifth years after the IPO. Evidence of a positive relation between institutional ownership and performance is restricted to the latter part of our 5‐year post‐listing window. Board composition (i.e. outsider versus insider control) is not associated with operating performance, although there is some evidence that independent board leadership is associated with better operating performance.     

Family ownership and performance in Korean conglomerates

We review the ownership structure of 15 Korean chaebols (conglomerates) using data from published combined financial statements to determine whether, as commonly believed, controlling family ownership in private firms is higher compared with public firms within the same chaebol. We then examine whether firms with high family ownership and lower outside investor participation shift wealth from firms with lower family ownership, which would support the assumption that private firms outperform public firms. Our results do not support either assumption. First, we show that the simple average of family ownership is lower for the private firms than the public firms within the same chaebol. Second, we find no relation between controlling family ownership and the performance of a firm.     

The initial private placement of equity and changes in operating performance in Taiwan

We propose the corporate governance hypothesis which suggests that the outside blockholders arising from the private placement of equity are more likely to have a significantly positive effect on firms with poor corporate governance. Using a sample of Taiwan‐listed firms with initial private placements of equity, our study’s results indicate that an improvement in operating performance is more likely to be seen after a private placement for those firms that are without independent directors, are controlled by a family, have lower insider shareholdings or are characterized by a pyramidal ownership structure. These findings are consistent with our hypothesis.     

Governance Structure and Firm Performance in Private Family Firms

Although a large proportion of firms are family owned and most family firms are private, our understanding of private family firms is limited. Using confidential information on family relationships between board members, CEOs, and shareholders, this is the first study to provide large‐scale evidence on the association between governance structure and firm performance in family‐controlled private firms. Our sample is unique as it covers almost all private limited liability firms in Norway, spans 11 years, traces firm ownership to ultimate owners, and identifies family relationship using data on kinship, marriage, and adoption. The results show a U‐shaped relationship between family ownership and firm performance. Higher ownership of the second largest owner, higher percentage of family members on the board, stronger family power, and smaller boards are associated with higher firm performance. In addition, the positive association between the ownership of the second largest owner and firm performance also occurs when the second largest owner is a member of the controlling family, but the association is stronger when the second largest owner is a non‐family member. We further test the relative importance of these test variables and find that ownership structure is more associated with firm performance than board structure.     

Determinants of state equity ownership,and its effect on value/performance: China's privatized firms

Evidence on the relationship between state ownership and performance in China's privatized firms is convex, concave and linear. Hence, the nature of this relationship is not resolved. This study examines this relationship for a larger, more recent sample of 4315 firm year observations of privatized Chinese firms during 1996–2003. Results support the hypothesis of a convex relationship between state ownership and performance showing benefits from strong privatization and state control. Not only is ownership structure found to affect performance, but also ownership concentration and balance of power jointly affect performance. Chinese firms with mixed control show significantly poorer performance than state or private controlled firms affirming the problem of ambiguity of ownership control, property rights, agency issues, profits and welfare objectives. New determinants of state ownership in China's firms are strategic importance, legal ownership, profitability, and market performance. Privatization benefits because there is a causal relation between ownership and performance.     

Long term changes in voting power and control structure following the unification of dual class shares

We study the effects of a regulatory change that induced the unification of most dual class shares in Israel in the 1990s. Specifically, we follow the evolution of ownership structure in a sample of 80 companies that unified their dual-class shares, and compare it with a control sample of firms that maintained their dual share structure at least until 2000. Our main findings are as follows. First, controlling shareholders offset the dilution of voting rights they incurred upon unification by: 1) increasing their holdings prior to the unification (ex-ante preparation), and 2) by buying shares afterwards; by the end of the sample period their voting power was only marginally lower than in the control sample. This offsetting result suggests that marginal voting rights may be important to controlling shareholders even beyond the 50% threshold. Second, share unifications were not associated with much change in the identity of controlling shareholders. Third, the proportion of firms affiliated with pyramidal business groups in the sample of unifying firms was lower than in the population of listed firms as a whole and not different from that in the control sample, suggesting that pyramidal ownership structures did not replace dual class shares. Finally, unifying firms did not exhibit a substantial improvement in their performance and valuation in comparison with the control sample.     

私募股权投资特征、IPO抑价与经营绩效——基于我国创业板的实证研究

论文从私募股权投资的特征出发,研究私募的特征对企业IPO抑价和经营绩效影响的差异。研究发现：在我国创业板市场上,私募的参与显著提高了企业的IPO抑价,私募未起到认证作用。成立时间长的私募、高声誉私募、民营私募和私募投资持续时间长、联合投资以及阶段性投资能降低企业的IPO抑价,但作用不显著。在企业经营绩效方面,私募参与的企业没有更好的经营绩效,私募未起到提供增值服务的作用。私募投资持续时间、持股比例以及阶段性投资与经营绩效显著负相关;成立时间长的私募、高声誉私募、民营私募参与以及私募联合投资的企业也没有更好的经营绩效。私募的特征对企业经营绩效影响的差异与基于国外市场的研究发现显著不同。