基于公司治理监督职能的财务舞弊防范——一个分析框架及其应用

世界范围内上市公司财务舞弊案的爆发将公司治理问题推上了风口浪尖。文章之目的在于将公司治理引入财务舞弊研究范畴,提供一个基于公司治理监督职能角度的舞弊治理分析框架。文章首先从公司治理模式、所有权状态依存与公司治理功能三方面剖析公司治理的监督职能,在此基础上试图勾勒出基于公司治理之监督职能的财务舞弊治理框架,并以财务报告生产与呈报过程为例具体说明公司治理监督职能的运用。结合目前的研究文献简要讨论基于公司治理监督职能的舞弊治理未来研究思路与方向。     

公司治理与财务舞弊关系的经验分析

以财务舞弊上市公司为研究对象，以董事会构成和所有权结构作为公司治理变量，研究公司治理和财务舞弊之间的可能关系。研究发现，发生财务舞弊与未发生财务舞弊上市公司董事会中外部董事比例不存在显著差异；股权集中度越高的上市公司越容易发生财务舞弊；控股股东性质与财务舞弊行为不存在显著相关性。研究还发现，上市公司配股活动与财务舞弊显著负相关、公司规模与财务舞弊显著负相关、董事会规模与财务舞弊显著正相关。     

公司治理与财务报告舞弊关系的研究——以西安达尔曼实业股份有限公司为例

财务报告作为会计信息的重要载体,主要反映企业的财务状况、现金流量和经营成果等有关的信息.财务报告的信息与公司治理有密切的关系.20世纪70年代后期开始上市公司舞弊案件大量发生.近年来我国上市公司财务报告舞弊也屡见不鲜.而且根据调查报告显示发生财务报告舞弊的公司很大程度上存在公司治理结构的问题.本文运用理论与实际相结合的方法,分析我国上市公司治理结构的现状,深入研究了我国上市公司治理结构的缺陷对会计信息质量的影响,就如何完善上市公司治理结构和提高会计信息披露质量提出若干政策建议.     

论对公司财务报告舞弊的治理

财务治理与财务报告舞弊之间存在密切关系，公司的内、外部财务治理结构包括管理当局、董事会、监事会、注册会计师等各方面，他们都对财务报告的生成与披露产生影响。因此，防范财务报告舞弊的措施应从分析公司相关财务治理结构对财务信息的监督与制衡功能出发，改变其中的薄弱环节，强化相关的治理功能。     

上市公司财务舞弊及其治理对策研究

上市公司财务舞弊及其治理问题已成为世界各国学者研究的一项重要课题.本文依据国外有关财务舞弊动因理论的研究成果,结合我国资本市场的实际情况,分析了上市公司财务舞弊的动因,并有针对性地提出了一些防范治理对策.本文认为,造成我国上市公司财务舞弊的动因是多方面的,既有会计信息不对称、公司治理结构失效等内部动因,也有会计准则存在缺陷、审计独立性缺失等外部动因.为此,本文建议通过完善公司治理结构、加强外部审计独立性、推行法务会计、强化职业道德教育和改进反舞弊审计机制等途径来治理上市公司财务舞弊问题.     

上市公司财务舞弊报告的实证研究

在证券市场日益发达的今天，无论是资本市场相当发达的美国，还是资本市场起步不久的我国，上市公司出现的财务报告舞弊行为，都给社会经济生活造成重大的影响。本文以1996年至2006年期间受到中国证监会（或财政部）公开处罚的94家A股上市公司为研究对象，从公司治理角度实证分析了我国上市公司财务报告舞弊存在的压力、机会、借口及其相关影响因素。据此，提出了治理舞弊的“四不为”对策。     

关于上市公司财务舞弊识别的文献综述

在当今的资本市场中,财务舞弊状况愈演愈烈,如何更好的识别上市公司财务报告舞弊成为各国监管部门最为关心的问题。本文首先分析了上市公司财务舞弊的现状,继而介绍了国内外相关文献以及所采用的主要研究方法,并对上市公司财务舞弊识别的研究现状进行了简单的评述。     

上市公司财务报告舞弊的防范与治理

上市公司财务报告舞弊是资本市场和会计学的一个重要而又复杂的研究领域,一直受到资本市场监管部门和学术界的广泛关注。本文借鉴企业舞弊三角理论,结合我国特殊的制度背景,发展了经典的企业舞弊三角论,解释了中国上市公司财务报告舞弊的形成机理,试图为我国财务报告舞弊的综合防范与治理提供有益的政策建议。     

我国上市公司财务报告舞弊特征分析

上市公司财务报告舞弊是我国资本市场的一大顽疾,其长期存在不仅严重损害了投资者的利益,也阻碍了我国资本市场的良性发展.选择2000～2011年因财务报告舞弊被处罚的主板A股非金融类上市公司122家,共计237个统计样本,从行业特征、舞弊类型、舞弊并发性和持续性方面对上市公司财务报告舞弊特征进行统计分析,发现进行财务舞弊的上市公司在行业分布上多集中于制造业,在舞弊类型上以推迟披露为主并具有并发性,在舞弊时间上具有持续性.     

浅议上市公司大股东行为治理

大股东控制上市公司,通过对上市公司的利益侵占获取私人利益,财务报告舞弊是隐瞒大股东行为的手段。本文从大股东损害上市公司利益的现象着手,研究股权结构与舞弊之间的相关性,从股权制衡与培育大股东诚信义务方面提出了治理大股东行为的建议。     

Ownership,two-tier board structure,and the informativeness of earnings – Evidence from China

This study extends previous research by empirically examining how ownership, two-tier board structure, and auditor affect the informativeness of earnings for companies listed in China. We measure the informativeness of earnings by the earnings–returns relation, discretionary accruals, and audit opinion. The results show that ownership concentration, the presence of foreign shareholders, the percentage of tradable shares, the type of dominant shareholder, the supervisory board, and independent directors affect the earnings response coefficients and discretionary accruals. We also find that the type of dominant shareholder, the size of the supervisory board, and the percentage of independent directors have an impact on the frequency of modified audit opinions. Our research has implications for China’s regulators who are striving to improve accounting information, transparency, and corporate governance.     

企业会计机构与董事会或最高管理层关系研究——企业会计内部相对独立性问题

本文在界定企业董事会或最高管理层关系的基础上,分别从会计本质特征、公司治理结构、内部控制实施要求等方面进行相应基本理论分析与考察,提出企业会计内部相对独立性观点。本文的研究对于正确处理企业会计机构与董事会或最高管理层关系、充分发挥会计职能作用、保证会计准则等法规制度贯彻执行、提高会计信息质量、制约会计舞弊等方面有重要的理论与实践意义。     

ESG框架下财会背景独立董事履职能否改善会计信息质量? ——基于内部控制有效性的视角

基于内部控制有效性视角,运用人力资本和公司治理理论,结合ESG(环境、社会、公司治理)框架,依据2010-2019年沪、深主板上市公司数据,考量财会背景独立董事履职的三大维度与会计信息质量的关系.结果发现:财会背景独立董事占比越大,兼职同行业、同类型公司越多,年龄性别为非大龄女性,亲自与会次数越多,会计信息质量相对较高;而在任期和薪酬回归结果与稳健性检验则出现了背离.进一步研究表明,与国有上市公司相比,非国有上市公司财会背景独立董事履职在薪酬、任期和亲自与会次数三方面对会计信息质量有更好的促进作用.     

Corporate Governance and the Prediction of the Impact of AIFRS Adoption

This study examines whether a firm's corporate governance system, particularly with respect to the characteristics of the board of directors and senior management, affects how accurately the impact of accounting changes is reported to shareholders. We concentrate on the relation between corporate governance measures and accounting forecast errors that arise with adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards by listed Australian firms. Evidence reveals that corporate governance mechanisms are associated with the likelihood and magnitude of managerial forecast errors.     

The structure of corporate boards and private benefits of control: Evidence from the Russian stock exchange

This paper revisits the role of board size and composition in corporate governance, employing a measure of private benefits of control (PBC) as an indicator of governance problems in firms. We calculate PBC using the voting premium approach for a sample of dual class stock companies traded on the Russian stock exchange between 1998 and 2009. Using fixed-effects regressions, we find a quadratic relationship between PBC and board size, implying the optimality of medium-sized (about 11 directors) supervisory boards. This result is substantially stronger for PBC than traditional measures of corporate performance. There is also some evidence that director ownership helps to mitigate governance problems. Most remarkably, we find that non-executive/independent directors are associated with larger PBC and thus do not seem to help improve corporate governance. In contrast, regressions with accounting performance measures as dependent variables tend to suggest a positive role of these directors in corporate governance.     

The impact of corporate governance on Internet financial reporting

This study examines the association between corporate governance mechanisms and disclosure transparency measured by the level of Internet financial reporting (IFR) behavior. We measure corporate governance by shareholder rights, ownership structure, board composition, and audit committee characteristics. We develop a disclosure index to measure the extent of each sample firm’s IFR by presentation format, information content, and corporate governance disclosures. Results indicate that firms with weak shareholder rights, a lower percentage of blockholder ownership, a higher percentage of independent directors, a more diligent audit committee, and a higher percentage of audit committee members that are considered financial experts are more likely to engage in IFR. The findings suggest that corporate governance mechanisms influence a firm’s Internet disclosure behavior, presumably in response to the information asymmetry between management and investors and the resulting agency costs. Additional exploratory analysis indicates that the association between corporate governance and IFR varies with firm size. Our results suggest that new regulatory guidance in corporate governance leads to improved disclosure transparency via IFR.     

Culture, Corporate Governance and Disclosure in Malaysian Corporations

Evidence from research conducted on corporate accounting indicates that the interaction of environmental factors in fluences disclosure practices. The purpose of this study is to examine the importance of various corporate governance and cultural (race and education) characteristics, in addition to firm–specific factors, as possible determinants of voluntary (non–mandatory accounting and non–accounting information) disclosures in the annual reports of Malaysian listed corporations. The results of the regression analysis indicate significant associations (at the 5 per cent level) between two corporate governance variables ( viz . chair who is a non–executive director and domination of family members on boards) and the extent of voluntary disclosure. This finding has implications for corporate governance policy formulation by the Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance (MISG). One cultural factor (proportion of Malay directors on the board) is significantly associated (at the 5 per cent level) with the extent of voluntary disclosure suggesting that governmental focus on culture may solicit a response to secrecy from those who feel threatened.     

Increasing the role of auditing in corporate governance

While critical accounting research has long been vitally interested in relationships between accounting, auditing and control of business organizations, mainstream research in accounting, finance and management has only recently displayed an increased interest in questions of corporate governance. The notion of corporate governance typically employed in mainstream research focus on enhancing benefits to shareholders. The structure and the functioning of boards of directors, and audit committees of such boards, are primary concerns within this line of research. This paper presents an alternative view of corporate governance and the role of auditing within corporate governance. We argue that the role of auditing should be increased in order to enhance the control of corporations for the benefit of all stakeholders and society generally.     

内部控制框架的构建

内部控制的嬗变告诉我们 :保证会计信息的真实性是内部控制发展的主线 ,会计控制是企业内部控制的核心 ,内部控制目标随公司治理机制的完善呈多元化趋势。内部控制框架与公司治理机制的关系是内部管理监控系统与制度环境的关系。内部控制框架在公司制度安排中担任内部管理监控的角色 ,成为公司管理中不可缺少的部分。在内部控制框架的构建中 ,应采取双管齐下和分步走的战略。内部控制框架构建中应抓住的关键问题是 ,健全管理机构 ,厘清管理权责 ;确立董事会在内部控制框架构建中的核心地位 ;内部审计机构设置与科学定位 ;强化预算管理 ;建立具有操作性的道德规范与行为准则。     

Qualidade da informação contábil em empresas familiares: influência dos níveis diferenciados de governança da BM&FBovespa,tamanho e independência do conselho de administração

The study aimed to analyze between families of different economic sectors of the BM&FBovespa Brazilian companies are those listed in different levels of governance, boards of smaller and independent directors had a better quality of accounting information. Quantitative research conducted with 96 family companies. To analyze the quality of information, we used four characteristics: (Bushman et al., 2004) persistence of the results and cash flow (Dechow e Schrand, 2004), conservatism (Ball e Shivakumar, 2005) and opportunity; relevance (Ohlson, 1995). In relation to corporate governance, it is concluded that the adoption of different levels of governance BM&FBovespa and greater independence of the board influence to greater persistence, conservatism, opportunism and relevance of accounting information occurs. However, it was not possible to conclude that the size of the board influences the quality of accounting information.