机构投资者持股与企业可持续发展：基于公司治理视角的研究

机构投资者能否有效监督并参与公司治理,进而有效促进持股企业的可持续发展,仍是备受关注的议题。基于公司治理的视角,选取2010—2021年3526家A股上市公司的25625个年度观测值,针对机构投资者持股对持股企业可持续发展的影响及其影响路径展开大样本分析。结果表明：机构投资者持股可通过缓解代理问题,优化内部控制,有效发挥公司治理作用,促进持股企业的可持续发展;同时,与压力敏感型机构投资者持股相比,压力抵制型机构投资者持股对持股企业可持续发展的积极影响更为显著,经内生性检验和稳健性检验后,研究结论依然成立。通过进一步分析发现,机构投资者在国有企业和重污染企业持有股份,对其可持续发展的积极影响更为显著。研究结论为有效发挥机构投资者的外部监督作用、促进企业可持续发展提供了来自微观层面的经验证据。     

机构投资者对企业业绩影响的实证研究——来自于我国中小板企业的证据北大核心CSSCI

实证研究机构投资者对企业业绩的影响,发现机构投资者持股比例与企业业绩正相关,机构投资者持股越多,对于企业的监督管理作用就越明显,企业业绩越好。而对不同类别机构投资者的研究发现,基金类机构投资者发挥了最主要的作用,其他类机构投资者作用不明显。机构投资者持股比例制衡度与企业业绩没有显著的相关关系。为了推动我国资本市场的良性发展,应加快发展机构投资者,改善市场结构,让机构投资者能够更积极地参与到公司治理当中。同时,应在根本上解决"一股独大"的问题,使机构投资者从"价值的发现者"转变为"价值的创造者",成为企业业绩提升的重要力量。     

机构投资者、信息披露与盈余管理

本文以反映公司治理效率的信息披露与盈余管理作为关注要点,深入研究了机构投资者持股的治理效果问题.本文研究表明,机构投资者持股公司的盈余管理程度显著低于无机构投资者持股公司,并且盈余管理程度随着机构投资者持股的增加而显著降低.本文还检验了机构投资者持股能否有效提高公司信息披露的质量,发现机构投资者持股公司的信息披露质量显著高于无机构投资者持股公司,而且信息披露质量随着机构投资者持股的增加而提高.本文还发现,机构投资者持股公司信息披露对于盈余管理的监控作用更为显著,并且随着机构投资者持股的增加促进作用更为明显.以上发现意味着目前我国机构投资者已经参与到公司治理中,并在一定程度上发挥了积极的治理作用.     

机构投资者对企业业绩影响的实证研究——来自于我国中小板企业的证据

实证研究机构投资者对企业业绩的影响,发现机构投资者持股比例与企业业绩正相关,机构投资者持股越多,对于企业的监督管理作用就越明显,企业业绩越好.而对不同类别机构投资者的研究发现,基金类机构投资者发挥了最主要的作用,其他类机构投资者作用不明显.机构投资者持股比例制衡度与企业业绩没有显著的相关关系.为了推动我国资本市场的良性发展,应加快发展机构投资者,改善市场结构,让机构投资者能够更积极地参与到公司治理当中.同时,应在根本上解决“一股独大”的问题,使机构投资者从“价值的发现者”转变为“价值的创造者”,成为企业业绩提升的重要力量.     

机构投资者异质性、环境规制与企业环保投资

在建设美丽中国的背景下,机构投资者作为资本市场的重要力量,逐渐重视企业的绿色发展。本文研究了机构投资者异质性对企业环保投资的具体效应及影响机制。研究发现:机构投资者整体持股能够促进企业环保投资,具体而言,压力抵制型机构投资者持股能够显著促进企业环保投资,而压力敏感型机构投资者持股比例对环保投资的影响不显著。进一步分析发现:环境规制会促进压力抵制型机构投资者增加环保投资。本文不仅有利于丰富现有关于机构投资者和环保投资的文献,还对拓展机构投资者队伍、制定环境规制政策以助推绿色发展具有重要的参考价值。     

风险提示信息、分析师跟进与机构投资者持股

与先前主要研究机构投资者持股的影响因素及经济后果的文献不同,基于机构投资者群体的异质性,考察分析师跟进对机构投资者持股决策的影响及其企业风险提示信息的调节作用.研究发现:机构投资者整体持股比例随分析师跟进数量的增加而增加,但增加的程度因机构投资者类型的不同而产生差异,风险提示信息的加入会减弱分析师跟进的促进效应;进一步研究发现,风险提示信息产生的持股减弱效应显著改善了异质性机构投资者持股的公司治理效果.研究结果表明:机构投资者持股决策是否采纳分析师的跟进意见,既与机构投资者的不同类型有关,也与风险提示信息的决策价值相关,对风险信息的考量有助于异质性机构投资者持股的公司治理效果的改善.     

机构投资者对创业板公司治理及价值表现之影响研究

本文以创业板上市公司和机构投资者为研究对象,研究机构投资者与上市公司治理和价值的双向影响。研究表明,创业板上市公司治理和机构投资者之间是良性循环,即机构投资者能改善上市公司的治理水平和价值表现,同时被改善治理水平和价值的上市公司会吸引更多的机构投资者持股。该研究不仅在理论上对创业板机构投资者的作用进行了肯定,也为我国监管机构如何促进机构投资者的发展提出相应的政策建议。     

机构投资者持股与企业创新：抑制还是促进？

本文采用2009－2019年中国A股上市公司面板数据作为研究样本,使用双向固定效应模型实证探究了机构投资者持股对企业创新的影响。研究结果表明：机构投资者持股对企业创新的影响作用存在异质性,其中公募基金持股对企业创新数量和创新质量均存在显著抑制作用,信托持股对企业创新数量和创新质量存在正向激励作用,而合格境外机构投资者持股仅对企业创新数量存在正向促进作用。进一步采用中介效应模型检验公募基金持股对企业创新数量产生抑制作用的影响机制,发现企业研发人员数量变化是其作用途径。研究结论为差异化引导机构投资者服务企业创新提供有益的实证证据和政策启示。     

机构投资者、异质性与上市公司税务激进

本文以2009～2016年沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,实证研究了中国机构投资者总体及异质机构投资者持股对上市公司税务激进的影响。研究发现,机构投资者持股比例与上市公司税务激进程度显著正相关,即机构投资者持股比例越高,上市公司税务行为越激进。对机构投资者进行划分比较后发现,压力敏感型机构投资者对上市公司税务激进行为的影响力较弱,不能有效发挥治理作用,而压力抵制型机构投资者持股会对被投资企业的税收活动带来有利影响,增加上市公司税收激进程度,发挥了重要的治理作用。将样本按照最终控制人进行划分后发现,压力抵制型机构投资者对被投资公司税务激进程度的促进作用在非国有企业中更明显。     

机构投资者、税收征管与企业避税

本文研究机构投资者对企业避税的因果关系影响。有鉴于机构投资者和企业避税之间的内生性问题,本文选择机构投资者与被投资上市公司之间的空间距离作为机构持股的工具变量,我们发现在控制内生性之后,机构投资者对企业避税行为仍然存在明显的制约作用;进一步研究发现机构投资者与税收征管在避税上存在互为补充的关系,同时机构投资者能通过抑制企业避税提升公司价值,而这一效应在税收征管强的地区更为明显。本文提供了机构投资者对企业避税影响的因果关系证据,从而拓展了机构投资者公司治理作用的文献,对于抑制管理层的机会主义倾向和治理企业避税也有重要的实践意义。     

Split Share Structure Reform,corporate governance,and the foreign share discount puzzle in China

We examine the impact of the Split Share Structure Reform on the well-known foreign share discount puzzle in China. Existing literature confirms that foreign investors are more concerned about insider expropriation because of their information disadvantage relative to domestic investors. The split share structure of the ownership of Chinese listed firms created a conflict of interests between state and private shareholders. Since, before the reform, state shareholders held restricted shares that denied them any wealth effect from share price movements, they had a limited incentive to work with private shareholders to ensure that managers maximized the stock market value of the firm. By abolishing the trading restrictions for state shareholders, this reform has increased the incentive alignment between state and private shareholders, encouraging them to monitor managers. If foreign investors’ concerns over the corporate governance implications of the split share structure at least partly contributed to their discounting of Chinese listed firms, then this discount should be reduced following the reform. Indeed, our evidence confirms this prediction, especially among Chinese listed firms with more state ownership or restricted shares. Our findings imply that this significant institutional reform of the Chinese stock market has benefitted minority investors.     

机构投资者能改进上市公司高管的薪酬激励吗?

次贷危机爆发以来,公司高管的巨额薪酬成为众矢之的。随着我国机构投资者的迅速崛起,市场对机构投资者改进上市公司治理寄予了厚望。我国的机构投资者能否对上市公司高管的薪酬激励和股权激励产生积极影响是本文关注的重点。本文选取2004~2008年度的上市公司作为样本,运用线性概率模型、Probit、Logit、Tobit以及OLS等回归方法对机构持股和上市公司高管薪酬激励,特别是股权激励的关系进行实证检验。实证结果表明中国的机构投资者并未有效限制高管股权激励和固定薪酬的增长,对于薪酬设计的改善作用也有待加强,机构股东积极主义在中国还有待加强。     

Institutional Investors and Firm Efficiency of Real Estate Investment Trusts

This study investigates the effect of institutional ownership on improving firm efficiency of equity Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), using a stochastic frontier approach. Firm inefficiency is estimated by comparing a benchmark Tobin??s Q of a hypothetical value-maximizing firm to the firm??s actual Q. We find that the average inefficiency of equity REITs is around 45.5%, and that institutional ownership can improve the firm??s corporate governance, and hence reduce firm inefficiency. Moreover, we highlight the importance of heterogeneity in institutional investors??certain types of institutional investors such as long-term, active, and top-five institutional investors, and investment advisors are more effective institutional investors in reducing firm inefficiency; whereas hedge funds and pension funds seem to aggravate the problem. In sub-sample analysis, we find that these effective institutional investors can reduce inefficiency more effectively for distressed REITs, and for REITs with high information asymmetry, and with longer term lease contracts. Lastly, we find that the negative impact of institutional ownership (except for long-term institutional investors) on firm inefficiency reduces over time, possibly due to strengthened corporate governance and regulatory environment in the REIT industry.     

Labor protection,information disclosure and analyst forecasts: Evidence from China’s Labor Contract Law

Labor protection increases employees’ stability and strengthens their monitoring role, improving firms’ information environment and increasing analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy. Using the implementation of China’s Labor Contract Law as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that labor protection significantly improves analyst forecasts. This positive impact is stronger when agency problems are weaker, board independence is greater, corporate reputation is better and industry competition is more intense. Enhanced labor protection significantly reduces firms’ business risk and accrual-based earnings management, decreases stock price synchronicity and increases market pricing efficiency. Our findings of significant impacts of China’s Labor Contract Law on analysts’ forecasting behaviors offer important guidance for promoting the development of the Chinese capital market and policy making in labor protection.     

内部控制与异质机构持股的治理效应

本文实证检验了不同内部控制水平下,异质机构持股在抑制管理层盈余操纵方面的公司治理效应。研究发现,相比外地或短期机构持股,本地或长期机构持股更有助于提升应计质量和降低盈余噪音;当公司存在实质性内部控制缺陷时,本地或长期机构持股在抑制管理层盈余操纵方面的治理效应显著降低;相比国有控股,异质机构持股治理效应的发挥在非国有控股公司中受内部控制的影响更大;当公司存在财务报告实质性内控缺陷时,异质机构持股发挥的治理效应明显更弱。这些结果表明,异质机构持股治理效应的发挥离不开公司内部控制机制,二者之间是互补而非替代关系,这种互补关系主要由财务报告内部控制缺陷驱动。本研究有助于深化理解异质机构持股影响公司治理的具体作用机理,为实务界和监管机构改善公司治理、加强投资者保护提供经验参考。     

Investors as Stewards of the Commons?

The author makes the case that business generally, not just government, should assume responsibility for social and environmental problems. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) formally recognize the role of the private sector in addressing some of the world's most pressing environmental and social challenges. What started as a corporate social responsibility movement now a focuses on integrating positive social impact into the core mission of the organization. Encouragingly, studies document that improving firm performance on business‐relevant ESG issues has a positive association with future financial performance. Investors can enable better societal outcomes by exercising ‘voice’ and voting rights in corporate governance. He acknowledges that competitive businesses face a “commons” or “free‐rider” problem where a defector avoids the full cost of his actions. Overcoming this problem requires legally sanctioned collaboration between business enterprises and large institutional shareholders, particularly pension funds. He also acknowledges that the corporate level free‐rider problem has a counterpart that at the investor level. Investor engagement with companies involves resources, money and time. It is no simple matter to justify increased costs in the context of asset managers that compete on the basis of low management fees, such as index funds. Collaboration between companies can mitigate some of these free riding problems. Large institutional investors with long time horizons and significant common ownership across different companies may have the best opportunities for collaboration. But, smaller activist funds and retail investors also have an important role in pushing large institutional investors to engage. While it is unlikely that investors will be able to solve all of the pressing societal problems, progress can be made.     

机构投资者能抑制上市公司商誉减值风险吗？——基于中国A股市场的经验证据

巨额商誉减值风险是资本市场系统性风险的重要诱因之一。本文以2011—2018年中国A股上市公司为样本,检验机构投资者持股对上市公司商誉减值风险的影响。研究发现,机构投资者持股能够显著抑制上市公司计提商誉减值的风险。分类来看,相比非独立机构投资者,以证券投资基金、社保基金及QFII为代表的独立性机构投资者持股对商誉减值风险的抑制作用更显著。机制检验发现,机构投资者通过提供并购前咨询服务和改善公司并购后绩效来抑制商誉减值风险。本文研究揭示了机构投资者发挥了有效的监督治理功能,对防范商誉减值风险具有一定的启示意义。     

Institutional ownership and firm performance: The case of bidder returns

We employ corporate takeover decisions to investigate the impact of institutional ownership on corporate performance. The OLS regressions of bidder gains on institutional ownership indicate a positive relation between the two. However, we find institutional ownership to be significantly determined by firm size, insider ownership and the firm's presence in the S&P 500 index. Thus, when bidder gains are regressed on the predicted values of institutional ownership in two-stage regressions, the recursive estimates do not confirm the relationship shown by the OLS regressions. Furthermore, we do not find any evidence that active institutional investors (e.g., CalPERS) as a group enhance efficiency in the market for corporate control. These findings cast doubt on the superior selection/monitoring abilities of institutional investors.     

How Do Institutional Investors Affect Corporate Performance? Evidence from Private Placements in China

Using data on private placements in China from 2007 to 2014, we show that abnormal returns of issuing companies’ stocks are significantly positive on the announcement day, but they become significantly negative during the event window [?20, +20]. Participation by institutional investors has a significant and negative impact on the short-term stock returns. This negative effect is also present in issuing companies’ long-term stock returns and profitability. Furthermore, we find that participation by institutional investors reduces dividend payments after private placements. Overall, our findings do not support the monitoring hypothesis of institutional investors’ role in corporate finance but are consistent with the management entrenchment hypothesis and shareholder pessimism hypothesis.     

银行市值的重要性与中国银行业估值偏低的讨论

中国大型银行股改上市后的规模和利润增长很快,核心指标也基本上与国际银行比肩,但估值水平却低于美国的银行同业。虽然业界对于银行的评价方法一直备受争议,越来越多的人已经意识到,资产规模、盈利能力、资产质量等评价指标只能反映银行某一方面的能力,不能全面反映银行的综合实力和竞争力;相对而言,市值指标是一种长期趋势性判断,隐含了不同银行在盈利能力、产品定价、风险管控以及公司治理等可持续核心竞争能力方面的差异,代表着市场对一家银行发展前景的综合认知。我们在理论分析和实践观察中深切感到:投资者和银行管理层都必须正确理解市值,了解即期市值形成机制,不应该被短期银行市值波动所困惑,更不应该被左右,但必须重视银行市值变化发出的信号,理性判断银行价值,有针对性地提升银行管理能力。