中美资本市场财富效应比较研究

本文从股利支付和资本利得的角度对比分析了中美资本市场财富效应水平,并对其影响因素展开分析。研究发现,我国资本市场财富效应不够显著,A股上市公司虽然具有较高的股利支付倾向,但股利支付率和资本利得属性较弱;股利支付行为迎合监管动机较强,融资分红特征明显,股票股利支付行为具有高送转特征;资本市场估值中枢下移,指数波动性较高,资本利得属性较差。美股上市公司虽然股利支付意愿不及A股,但股利支付率和资本利得属性较强,且上市公司不存在明显的融资分红倾向。基于此,本文从控股股东属性、企业生命周期、管理层侵占行为、宏观经济和资本市场环境四个维度对A股市场财富效应水平展开深入探讨,并从提升公司质量、改善盈利能力、调整投资者结构、加强市场建设、优化股利监管制度五方面提出了改善我国资本市场财富效应的政策建议。     

Share repurchases,catering, and dividend substitution

We first extend Baker and Wurgler's (2004a) catering theory of dividends to share repurchases. Consistent with the notion that firms cater to investor demand for share repurchases, we report evidence that the market's time-varying repurchase premium positively affects firms' choice to repurchase shares. Next, we use the catering behavior as a novel framework for testing the dividend substitution hypothesis. Consistent with the notion that managers consider dividends and share repurchases to be substitute payout mechanisms, we find that the dividend premium negatively affects the repurchase choice, whereas the repurchase premium negatively affects the choice to pay dividends.     

Executive Financial Incentives and Payout Policy: Firm Responses to the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut

We test whether executive stock ownership affects firm payouts using the 2003 dividend tax cut to identify an exogenous change in the after‐tax value of dividends. We find that executives with higher ownership were more likely to increase dividends after the tax cut in 2003, whereas no relation is found in periods when the dividend tax rate was higher. Relative to previous years, firms that initiated dividends in 2003 were more likely to reduce repurchases. The stock price reaction to the tax cut suggests that the substitution of dividends for repurchases may have been anticipated, consistent with agency conflicts.     

Payout policy in the 21st century

We survey 384 financial executives and conduct in-depth interviews with an additional 23 to determine the factors that drive dividend and share repurchase decisions. Our findings indicate that maintaining the dividend level is on par with investment decisions, while repurchases are made out of the residual cash flow after investment spending. Perceived stability of future earnings still affects dividend policy as in Lintner (1956. American Economic Review 46, 97–113). However, 50 years later, we find that the link between dividends and earnings has weakened. Many managers now favor repurchases because they are viewed as being more flexible than dividends and can be used in an attempt to time the equity market or to increase earnings per share. Executives believe that institutions are indifferent between dividends and repurchases and that payout policies have little impact on their investor clientele. In general, management views provide little support for agency, signaling, and clientele hypotheses of payout policy. Tax considerations play a secondary role.     

A Time-Series Analysis of Corporate Payout Policies

I conduct a time-series analysis of corporate payout policies that accounts for the dynamic nature of these decisions and for the interaction among investment decisions and payout policies. The estimation is done with a VAR model of investments, earnings, total payout, and the split of the total payout between dividends and share repurchases. I control for changes in the legal treatment of share repurchases in 1982 and for changes in the relative taxation of dividends and capital gains. I find that: (i) an increase in the taxation of capital gains relative to dividends shifts the split of total payout away from share repurchase and toward dividends; (ii) corporate investment decisions lead payout policies and not the other way around; (iii) increases in corporate total payout are associated with long-term subsequent increases in earnings; (iv) changes in the composition of corporate payout away from share repurchases and toward dividends are associated with subsequent increases in earnings.     

The Dividend Puzzle: An Australian Solution?

In the latter half of the 1980s, Australia made changes to its taxation law which affected the economics of asset ownership, particularly share ownership. The first of these changes was the introduction in September 1985 of a general tax on capital gains. The second was the virtual abolition of company tax through the introduction of tax imputation. In this changed tax environment it is argued that where the payment of franked dividends is concerned, there is an optimal dividend policy: companies should pay dividends to the limit of their franking account balances. In the case of unfranked dividends it is argued that there is no optimal policy and that Miller and Modigliani's clientele theory applies. The paper describes an analysis of the dividend payout ratios of the top 422 listed Australian companies from 1982 to 1990.     

Shareholder taxation and aggregate dividend payout: Evidence from the tax reform act of 1986

The effect of shareholder taxation on corporate dividend policy is a major controversy in financial economics. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 eliminated the statutory tax disadvantage of dividends versus long-term capital gains for individual shareholders. Using aggregate time series data I find evidence that corporate dividend payout has become more generous in the period after tax reform.     

Ownership structure and tax-friendly dividends

The paper examines the existence of tax-based dividend clienteles using the novel environment of Australia, which has operated a full dividend imputation system since 1987. The analysis jointly focuses on the tax-based preferences of five categories of shareholders, including both domestic and foreign-domiciled shareholder classes. Incorporating the dividend franking percentage as a direct measure of the degree of tax benefit associated with dividends, strong evidence supporting the existence of tax-based dividend clienteles is present for both domestic and foreign shareholder categories. This includes domestic corporate blockholders and company directors, and local institutional investors following tax reforms in 2000, and foreign institutional shareholders which, alternatively, demand lower dividends and dividend franking. These findings persist after considering the effect of share repurchases, and under various model specifications controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity and potential endogeneity between ownership structure and dividend payout policy.     

Institutional Holdings and Payout Policy

We examine the relation between institutional holdings and payout policy in U.S. public firms. We find that payout policy affects institutional holdings. Institutions avoid firms that do not pay dividends. However, among dividend‐paying firms they prefer firms that pay fewer dividends. Our evidence indicates that institutions prefer firms that repurchase shares, and regular repurchasers over nonregular repurchasers. Higher institutional holdings or a concentration of holdings do not cause firms to increase their dividends, their repurchases, or their total payout. Our results do not support models that predict that high dividends attract institutional clientele, or models that predict that institutions cause firms to increase payout.     

World dividends and tax shocks

For a sample of 28,895 firms across 30 countries and 29 years, there is a negative relation between dividend tax rates and dividend payout. Firms increase dividend payout in response to both absolute and relative (to capital gains tax rates) decreases in dividend tax rates. This negative relation is robust to both increases and decreases and both shocks and continuous variation in dividend tax rates and affects both dividend payer status and dividend payout level. However, dividend payers do not increase dividend payout levels following decreases in dividend tax rates. The negative relation between dividend tax rates and dividend payout is stronger in countries and firms with better governance and suggests a dividend taxation elasticity of −0.45.     

On the Importance of Measuring Payout Yield: Implications for Empirical Asset Pricing

We investigate the empirical implications of using various measures of payout yield rather than dividend yield for asset pricing models. We find statistically and economically significant predictability in the time series when payout (dividends plus repurchases) and net payout (dividends plus repurchases minus issuances) yields are used instead of the dividend yield. Similarly, we find that payout (net payout) yields contains information about the cross section of expected stock returns exceeding that of dividend yields, and that the high minus low payout yield portfolio is a priced factor.     

Direct evidence of dividend tax clienteles

The paper is the first to evaluate the dividend tax clientele hypothesis using a data set of all domestic stock portfolios in the market. We find that investment funds that face a higher effective tax rate on dividend income than on capital gains tilt their portfolios away from dividend-paying stocks. These investors consequently earn a dividend yield that is about 35 basis points lower than that of investors who are tax neutral between dividends and capital gains (pension funds, unit-linked insurance, life insurance). Consistent with tax rules and charter provisions, we also find that private corporations prefer growth stocks, that foundations exhibit strong dividend preferences, and that partnerships rarely hold stocks portfolios.     

Executive stock-based compensation and firms’ cash payout: the role of shareholders’ tax-related payout preferences

We hypothesize that the structure of executive stock-based compensation helps to align managers’ payout choices with shareholders’ tax-related payout preferences. Specifically, stock options, which are not dividend-protected, can deter self-interested executives from using dividends as a form of payout. In contrast, restricted stock, which is dividend-protected, is more likely to induce the use of dividends. Relatedly, shareholders’ preferences for dividends, which are taxed as ordinary income, can depend on the income tax consequences of dividends relative to those of long-term capital gains. To test our hypothesis, we investigate whether the exogenous changes in shareholders’ tax-related payout preferences following the 2003 dividend tax rate reduction result in predictable shifts in executive stock-based compensation and in managers’ payout choices. Consistent with our prediction, we find a positive relation between the increased use of dividends in firms’ payouts and the increased (decreased) use of restricted stock (stock options) in executive compensation, particularly for firms with a greater percentage ownership by individual investors and with lower costs associated with modifying the structure of their compensation plans. Our investigation of the role of shareholders’ tax-related payout preferences in the design of executive stock-based compensation extends the prior literature that has largely focused on the role of incentive contracts in inducing managerial effort, risk taking, and retention.     

Dividends and share repurchases during the COVID-19 economic crisis

In this article, we examine dividends and share repurchases of S&P 1500 firms during the COVID-19 crisis characterized by the stock market crash and a relatively quick stock price recovery propelled by technology stocks. We find that the great majority of firms either maintain or increase the level of dividends during the crisis period. Yet, the relation between the dividend payout and reported earnings is negative and significant. This relation also holds for other types of payouts, including share repurchases and special dividends. Moreover, we find that both forecasted and realized earnings of up to 1 year into the future are negatively associated with current dividends, implying that existing payout policies are unsustainable in the longer term. Surprisingly, the difference-in-differences test shows that firms strongly affected by the COVID-19 crisis have higher dividend payouts (relative to net earnings) compared to unaffected firms. The same test indicates that strongly affected firms significantly reduce repurchases.     

Social capital and payout policies

In this paper, we investigate the relationship between regional social capital and corporate payout policies. Using a large sample of US data, we find a positive relationship between regional social capital and both the likelihood and the amount of cash dividend payouts. However, we find that social capital has no bearing on the likelihood and amount of stock repurchases. The results from additional analyses show that the relationship between social capital and dividends is more pronounced for less geographically dispersed firms. We also find that the network component of social capital has a greater effect on dividends than the social norm component. Our results are robust to alternative specifications of dividends and social capital and to the use of a two-stage least squares (2SLS) analysis to alleviate endogeneity concerns. Overall, we document that regional social capital plays an important role in influencing cash dividend payout policies.     

Personal Taxation in Firm Market Valuation: Theory and Test*

In this paper, I extend Ohlson's 1995 firm market valuation model to incorporate personal taxes: the taxes on dividends and the taxes on capital gains. Without personal taxes, firm market value can be expressed as the present value of future benefits received by the shareholders (dividends, in this case). With personal taxes, the benefits received by the shareholders should be classified into three categories (due to their different tax treatments): dividends, share repurchases, and new share issues (i.e., contributed capital). The extended model shows the effects of personal taxation on firm market valuation: retained earnings are valued less than contributed stocks, both dividends taxes and capital gains taxes affect retained earnings valuation and firm market value, and firms choose cash distribution methods (paying dividends and repurchasing shares) to increase their retained earnings valuation, therefore increasing their market value. An empirical test using a sample from the Disclosure Select Canada and Financial Post Card data bases for the years 1995‐98 supports these personal tax effects.     

Taxes and dividend clientele: Evidence from trading and ownership structure

Although dividend clientele have been studied over several decades, their existence remains controversial. We study the interaction of dividends and taxes by exploiting a unique dataset from Taiwan, where the capital gains tax is zero. We find strong evidence of a clientele effect. Agents subject to high rates of taxation on dividends tend to hold stocks with lower dividends and sell (buy) stocks that raise (lower) dividends. Agents in lower tax brackets behave in the opposite manner. After legalization of repurchases in 2000, firms with higher concentrations of more heavily taxed shareholders were more apt to begin repurchase programs.     

Payout flexibility and capital expenditure

Over the past two decades or so, repurchases have become an appealing method for disbursing cash to shareholders compared to the traditional dividends. Managerial perception as well as empirical evidence suggests that repurchases are inherently more flexible than dividends, which may account for their increasing popularity. The rigidity of dividends and the apparent flexibility of share repurchases could impact firm investments. Firms may forego profitable investment opportunities to maintain their dividend levels, while repurchases could be easily scaled back to fund profitable investment projects without fear of an adverse market reaction. We test the flexibility hypothesis of repurchases by regressing capital expenditures on repurchases and dividends in addition to other control variables. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find an inverse relationship between capital expenditures and repurchases but an insignificant relationship with dividends. Further, we find that the flexibility associated with repurchases is especially evident for firms that are financially constrained, and during the recent financial crisis period when external capital constraints were severe. Finally, we find that flexibility of repurchases with respect to capital expenditures is stronger in the more recent time period during which regulatory changes made repurchases more attractive as a mechanism to disburse cash back to shareholders.     

WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT STOCK REPURCHASES?

Stock repurchases by U.S. companies experienced a remarkable surge in the 1980s and ‘90s. Indeed, in 1998, the total value of all stock repurchased by U.S. companies exceeded for the first time the total amount paid out as cash dividends. And the U.S. repurchase movement has gone global in the past few years, spreading not only to Canada and the U.K., but also to countries like Japan and Germany, where such transactions were prohibited until recently. Why are companies buying back their stock in such amounts? After dismissing the popular argument that stock repurchases boost earnings per share, the authors argue that repurchases serve to add value in two main ways: (1) they provide managers with a tax‐efficient means of returning excess capital to shareholders and (2) they allow managers to “signal” to investors their view that the firm is undervalued. Returning excess capital is value‐adding for two reasons: First, it helps prevent companies from pursuing growth and size at the expense of profitability and value. Second, by returning capital to investors, repurchases (like dividends) play the critically important economic function of allowing investors to channel their investment from mature or declining sectors of the economy to more promising ones. But if stock repurchases and dividends serve the same basic economic function, why are repurchases growing more rapidly? Part of the explanation is that, because repurchases are taxed as capital gains and dividends as ordinary income, repurchases are a more tax‐efficient way of distributing excess capital. But perhaps even more important than their tax treatment is the flexibility that (at least) open market repurchases provide corporate managers‐flexibility to make small adjustments in capital structure, to exploit (or correct) perceived undervaluation of the firm's shares, and possibly even to increase the liquidity of the stock, which could be particularly valuable in bear markets. For U.S. regulators, the growth in open market stock repurchases raises some interesting issues. Perhaps most important, companies are not required to (and rarely do) furnish their investors with details about a given program's structure, execution method, number of shares repurchased, or even its duration. Policy regulators (and corporate executives as well) should consider some of the benefits provided by other systems, notably Canada's, which provide greater transparency and more guidelines for the repurchase process.     

How Does Asymmetric Information Affect Catering Behavior?

This study examines the association between information asymmetry and payout policy, and how asymmetric information affects catering behavior. Using forecast error and forecast dispersion as information asymmetry variables, this study finds that the more information asymmetry the firms face, the less likely they will increase dividends. Meanwhile, the effects of information asymmetry dominate over those of catering incentives for managers to decide dividend policy. Finally, our empirical results demonstrate that the signaling theory holds when dividend yield is high or market underestimates the EPS of firms. In addition, companies use share repurchases as a substitute for dividend increases, and take retained earnings into account when making dividend policies.