Why Did NASDAQ Market Makers Stop Avoiding Odd-Eighth Quotes?

On May 26 and 27, 1994 several national newspapers reported the findings of Christie and Schultz (1994) who cannot reject the hypothesis that market makers of active NASDAQ stocks implicitly colluded to maintain spreads of at least $0.25 by avoiding odd-eighth quotes. On May 27, dealers in Amgen, Cisco Systems, and Microsoft sharply increased their use of odd-eighth quotes, and mean inside and effective spreads fell nearly 50 percent. This pattern was repeated for Apple Computer the following trading day. Using individual dealer quotes for Apple and Microsoft, we find that virtually all dealers moved in unison to adopt odd-eighth quotes.     

Why do NASDAQ Market Makers Avoid Odd-Eighth Quotes?

The NASDAQ multiple dealer market is designed to produce narrow bid-ask spreads through the competition for order flow among individual dealers. However, we find that odd-eighth quotes are virtually nonexistent for 70 of 100 actively traded NASDAQ securities, including Apple Computer and Lotus Development. The lack of odd-eighth quotes cannot be explained by the negotiation hypothesis of Harris (1991) , trading activity, or other variables thought to impact spreads. This result implies that the inside spread for a large number of NASDAQ stocks is at least $0.25 and raises the question of whether NASDAQ dealers implicitly collude to maintain wide spreads.     

DO DEALERS INFER INFORMATION FROM ORDER FLOW?

I examine strategic behavior among dealers in the NASDAQ market and document that there is a lead quote‐setting dealer in each security and that the quotes posted by this leader are informative. Other dealers free‐ride this information by following the lead quote‐setting dealer. The lead dealer can be identified by two information signals: (1) percentage of time spent on the inside market (i.e., posting inside quotes), and (2) trade volume transacted. Dealers that free‐ride the leader's quotes quickly update their posted quotes in the same direction as the leader's quote change. My findings suggest that directing trade to the lead dealer may be more advantageous than randomly routing trade.     

Making a Market with Spreads and Depths

Abstract:   In this paper we study the quote revision behavior of NASDAQ market makers by analyzing inter‐temporal changes in their spread and depth quotes. Using individual dealer quote and trade data for a sample of 2,319 stocks, we find that NASDAQ dealers make more frequent revisions in depths than in spreads and the extent of liquidity management is greater for stocks of smaller companies, lower‐priced stocks, and stocks with larger trade sizes and fewer number of transactions. We show that intraday variation in the number of quote revisions follows the U‐shaped pattern, indicating that the extent of liquidity management is greater during the early and late hours of trading than during midday.     

Intra‐Dealer Integration

This paper examines the quotation behaviour of dealers who made markets in the same stocks on both NASDAQ and either EASDAQ or the LSE. Whereas previous studies examine international integration at the market level, we examine integration at the dealer level. In other words, do dealers within the same market‐making firm use information from their arm on the opposite side of the Atlantic in forming their own quotes? We find that while there is some evidence of integration at the market level, integration is hard to detect at the dealer level. The results are largely unaffected by differences in fungibility between our two samples.     

The Quality of ECN and Nasdaq Market Maker Quotes

This paper compares the quality of quotes submitted by electronic communication networks (ECNs) and by traditional market makers to the Nasdaq quote montage. An analysis of the most active Nasdaq stocks shows that ECNs not only post informative quotes, but also, compared to market makers, ECNs post quotes rapidly and are more often at the inside. Additionally, ECN quoted spreads are smaller than dealer quoted spreads. The evidence suggests that the proliferation of alternative trading venues, such as ECNs, may promote quote quality rather than fragmenting markets. Moreover, the results suggest that a more open book contributes to quote quality.     

Dealer attention,the speed of quote adjustment to information,and net dealer revenue

Using trade and quote data from the NYSE, we examine the relation between dealer attention, dealer revenue, and the probability of informed trade. We find that dealer revenue net of losses to better-informed traders in NYSE stocks is positively related to the speed at which quotes adjust to full information levels. The speed of quote adjustment is faster for stocks with greater dealer attention, as measured by a stock’s relative prominence at its post and panel location on the NYSE floor. The level of dealer attention in turn is positively related to a stock’s probability of information-based trading. The results are consistent with a theoretical model we derive in which dealers trade multiple securities and must optimally allocate their limited attention to monitoring order flow to minimize losses to better-informed traders.     

The Making of a Dealer Market: From Entry to Equilibrium in the Trading of Nasdaq Stocks

This paper provides an analysis of the nature and evolution of a dealer market for Nasdaq stocks. Despite size differences in sample stocks, there is a surprising consistency to their trading. One dealer tends to dominate trading in a stock. Markets are concentrated and spreads are increasing in the volume and market share of the dominant dealer. Entry and exit are ubiquitous. Exiting dealers are those with very low profits and trading volume. Entering market makers fail to capture a meaningful share of trading or profits. Thus, free entry does little to improve the competitive nature of the market as entering dealers have little impact. We find, however, that for small stocks, the Nasdaq dealer market is being more competitive than the specialist market.     

THE DEALERS' PRICE/SIZE QUOTE AND MARKET LIQUIDITY

We model trading in a competitive securities market where informed traders and liquidity traders transact with dealers. The dealers' entire published quote is modeled: bid-ask prices and the number of shares the dealer is willing to buy/sell at these prices (i.e., size quotes). We argue that size quotes are a more informative indicator of market liquidity than the bid-ask spread's adverse-selection component. Moreover, the size quotes reveal several market characteristics that cannot be inferred from the bid-ask spread's adverse-selection component alone. The model generates a number of empirically testable predictions that clarify certain key elements of market liquidity.     

Determinants of Trading Profits: The Liquidity Provision Decision

Theories show that liquidity provision implies negative contemporaneous correlation between trades and returns. Dealers on the Taiwan Stock Exchange are granted typical dealer trading advantages without obligations to provide liquidity and, thus, are ideal to test whether these advantages lead to voluntary liquidity provision (earning bid-ask spreads) or information trading (trading in the direction of the market). We find a strong positive correlation in aggregate, implying that these unrestricted dealers prefer information trading. We also find that smaller dealers are more likely to provide liquidity and that small-cap stocks (with larger bid-ask spreads) are more profitable for liquidity provision.     

ANALYST REPUTATION,DEALER AFFILIATION,AND MARKET MAKING

We investigate the effects of analysts' affiliation and reputation on dealers' market making activities. We find that for a given stock, dealers who have affiliated analysts covering the stock quote and trade more aggressively than those who do not have any affiliated analysts. More important, the reputation of affiliated analysts plays an additional role in the affiliated dealer's quote and trade behavior. Dealers with affiliated star analysts post more aggressive quotes and have larger market shares than dealers with affiliated nonstar analysts. Although dealers who post more aggressive quotes also induce affiliated star analysts to cover the stocks, the positive effect of analyst reputation on the affiliated dealers' quote aggressiveness remains significant and robust after controlling for potential endogenous and simultaneous problems.     

Does internalization diminish the impact of quote aggressiveness on dealer market share?

We analyze data provided by NASDAQ to examine how quote aggressiveness affects dealer market share and whether the practice of internalization mitigates the impact of quote aggressiveness. Our empirical results show that although internalization does not reduce the impact of price aggressiveness on dealer market share, it mitigates the impact of size aggressiveness. This result suggests that although internalization may not affect the dealer's incentive to post aggressive prices, it may reduce the incentive to post large depths. We find that aggressive quotes are more effective in raising dealer market share in stocks with a less competitive (more concentrated) market structure. Our results also show that the effective spread is wider (narrower) for stocks with a smaller price (size) elasticity of dealer market share.     

Inferring Public and Private Information from Trades and Quotes

We propose a new model that uses nonsynchronous, ultra‐high frequency data to analyze the sequential impact of trades and quotes on the price process. Private information is related to the impact of trades and public information to the impact of quotes. The model is extended to include various other factors that affect public and private information. For 20 active Nasdaq stocks, private information causes, on average, 9.43% of daily stock price movements. Additionally, quotes are more informative when (1) many dealers set the best price and (2) traditional market makers rather than Electronic Communication Networks set the best price.     

Cournot model of brokered FX trading

This paper develops a Cournot model of rival dealers placing limit orders with a broker, who in turn makes a market by acting as a liaison between dealers. The broker's limit-book lists the various prices and quantities at which dealers are willing to exchange currency vis-à-vis electronic broking. The size and volatility of the inside spread is simulated relative to dealer entry–exit and the price elasticity of linear order arrival functions. Our simulations reveal non-linear price dynamics from dealer participation in market development, with an additional rival narrowing the inside spread by 1.82% while diminishing its volatility. These findings may shed some light on the “excess volatility puzzle” raised by Killeen, Lyons and Moore (forthcoming) as to why price behavior under flexible exchange rate regimes is significantly more volatile than macro fundamentals would suggest.     

Who makes markets

A dealer needs access to order flow and information to make a market profitably in a Nasdaq stock. Several variables that proxy for the stocks that an individual market maker's brokerage customers trade, including volume, location, underwriting participation and analyst coverage, are significant determinants of market making activity. Informational advantages may also factor in the market making decision as evidenced by dealers specializing in industries. These findings suggest that individual dealers have competitive advantages in making markets in specific stocks, and that potential market making competition comes from the dealers who share those advantages rather than all Nasdaq market makers.     

Intermediaries and product quality in used car markets

We present empirical evidence supporting that used cars sold by dealers have higher quality: (i) dealer transaction prices are higher than unmediated market prices, and this dealer premium increases in the age of the car as a ratio and is hump-shaped in dollar value, and (ii) used cars purchased from dealers are less likely to be resold. In a model, we show that these empirical facts can be rationalized either when dealers alleviate information asymmetry, or when dealers facilitate assortative matching. The model predictions allow us to distinguish these two theories in the data, and we find evidence for both.     

Market structure and dealers’ quoting behavior in the foreign exchange market

This article examines how differently the same dealer quotes in the inter-dealer and customer foreign exchange markets that have different market structures. The model first predicts that customer spreads are generally wider than inter-dealer ones due to less transparency in the customer market. The model also predicts that since customers are believed to be less informed than dealers, the differential between customer and inter-dealer spreads tends to fall with the rise in order sizes. In addition, the dealer's mid-quotes are shown to be the same in the two markets. Empirical evidence based on data collected from a FX dealer supports these theoretical findings.     

Dealer Markets Under Stress: The Performance of NASDAQ Market Makers During the November 15, 1991, Market Break

The liquidity of the NASDAQ market was seriously undermined during the crash on October 19, 1987, when bid-ask spreads widened dramatically and dealers reputedly withdrew from market making. This paper studies the liquidity of 36 NASDAQ issues on November 15, 1991, when average prices fell over 4%, representing the first major correction in the post-crash era. We find that bid-ask spreads, the percentage of dealers posting inside quotes, and trading volume remained virtually unaffected. Effective spreads were also largely unaffected, except for trades in excess of 1,000 shares among issues whose market makers avoided odd-eighth quotes. Our evidence implies that, unlike October 1987, the liquidity of the NASDAQ market did not deteriorate appreciably during this episode of unusual market stress.     

Quote revision and information flow among foreign exchange dealers

In a multi-dealer market without transaction disclosure, quote revision partially reveals the posting dealer's private information/belief and may have an impact on other dealers’ pricing decision. Using continuous quotes from three major dealers in the interbank foreign exchange market, I find significant information externality from one dealer's quotes to others. The information content of quote revision is positively related to the overall order flow to the market, as opposed to order flow to the posting dealer. At 15-min interval or above, public information becomes the dominant component that drives quote revision. Furthermore, public information appears to induce positive serial correlation and private information causes negative serial correlation in short-term quote revision.     

The dynamics of dealer markets and trading costs

In this study we examine the temporal dynamics of dealer market share and their ramification for competition and trading costs using a large sample of NASDAQ securities. Our results show that although the total market share of the top five dealers is relatively stable over time, there is significant monthly variation in the composition of the top five dealers. We show that market share turbulence among top dealers is another form of competition that narrows bid–ask spreads, especially for stocks with less competitive market structure.