Brealey,Myers, and Allen on Real Options

Real options are valuable sources of flexibility that are either inherent in, or can be built into, corporate assets. The value of such options are generally not captured by the standard discounted cash flow (DCF) approach, but can be estimated using a variant of financial option pricing techniques. This article provides an overview of the basics of real option valuation by examining four important kinds of real options:

• 1 The option to make follow‐on investments. Companies often cite “strategic” value when taking on negative‐NPV projects. A close look at the payoffs from such projects reveals call options on follow‐on projects in addition to the immediate cash flows from the projects. Today's investments can generate tomorrow's opportunities.
• 2 The option to wait (and learn) before investing. This is equivalent to owning a call option on the investment project. The call is exercised when the firm commits to the project. But often it's better to defer a positive‐NPV project in order to keep the call alive. Deferral is most attractive when uncertainty is great and immediate project cash flows—which are lost or postponed by waiting—are small.
• 3 The option to abandon. The option to abandon a project provides partial insurance against failure. This is a put option; the put's exercise price is the value of the project's assets if sold or shifted to a more valuable use.
• 4 The option to vary the firm's output or its production methods. Companies often build flexibility into their production facilities so that they can use the cheapest raw materials or produce the most valuable set of outputs. In this case they effectively acquire the option to exchange one asset for another.

The authors also make the point that, in most applications, real‐option valuation methods are a complement to, not a substitute for, the DCF method. Indeed DCF, which is best suited to and usually sufficient for safe investments and “cash cow” assets, is typically the starting point for real‐option analyses. In such cases, DCF is used to generate the values of the “underlying assets”—that is, the projects when viewed without their options or sources of flexibility.     

Why do corporate managers misstate financial statements? The role of option compensation and other factors

We investigate the incentives that led to the rash of restated financial statements at the end of the 1990s market bubble. We find that the likelihood of a misstated financial statement increases greatly when the CEO has very sizable holdings of in-the-money stock options. Misstatements are also more likely for firms that are constrained by an interest-coverage debt covenant, that raise new debt or equity capital, or that have a CEO who serves as board chair. Our results indicate that agency costs increased [Jensen, M.C., 2005a, Agency costs of overvalued equity. Financial Management 34, 5–19] as substantially overvalued equity caused managers to take actions to support the stock price.     

Investment,consumption, and hedging under incomplete markets

Entrepreneurs often face undiversifiable idiosyncratic risks from their business investments. We extend the standard real options approach to an incomplete markets environment and analyze the joint decisions of business investments, consumption/savings, and portfolio selection. For a lump-sum investment payoff and an agent with a sufficiently strong precautionary savings motive, an increase in volatility can accelerate investment, contrary to the standard real options analysis. When the agent can trade the market portfolio to partially hedge against investment risk, the systematic volatility is compensated via the standard CAPM argument, and the idiosyncratic volatility generates a private equity premium. Finally, when the investment payoff is a series of flows, the agent's idiosyncratic risk exposure alters both the implied option value and the implied project value, causing a reversal of the results in the lump-sum payoff case.     

CAPM for estimating the cost of equity capital: Interpreting the empirical evidence

We argue that the empirical evidence against the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) based on stock returns does not invalidate its use for estimating the cost of capital for projects in making capital budgeting decisions. Because stocks are backed not only by projects in place, but also by the options to modify current projects and undertake new ones, the expected returns on stocks need not satisfy the CAPM even when expected returns of projects do. We provide empirical support for our arguments by developing a method for estimating firms' project CAPM betas and project returns. Our findings justify the continued use of the CAPM by firms in spite of the mounting evidence against it based on the cross section of stock returns.     

Product market advertising and new equity issues

We analyze the interaction between a firm's product market advertising and its corporate financing decisions. We consider a firm that faces asymmetric information in both the product and financial markets and that needs to raise external financing to fund its growth opportunity (new project). Any product market advertising undertaken by the firm is visible to the financial market as well. In equilibrium, the firm uses a combination of product market advertising, equity underpricing, and underfinancing (raising a smaller amount of external capital than the full information optimum) to convey its true product quality and the intrinsic value of its projects to consumers and investors. The following two predictions arise from our theoretical analysis for the relation between product market advertising and equity underpricing around new equity issues. First, firms choose a higher level of product market advertising when they are planning to issue new equity, compared with situations in which they have no immediate plans to do so. Second, product market advertising and equity underpricing are substitutes for a firm issuing new equity. We empirically test the above two predictions and find supporting evidence in the context of firms making initial public offerings and seasoned equity offerings.     

Are interest rate options important for the assessment of interest rate risk?

Fixed income options contain substantial information on the price of interest rate volatility risk. In this paper, we ask if those options will also provide information related to other moments of the objective distribution of interest rates. Based on dynamic term structure models within the class of affine models, we find that interest rate options are useful for the identification of interest rate quantiles. Two three-factor models are adopted and their adequacy to estimate Value at Risk of zero-coupon bonds is tested. We find significant difference on the quantitative assessment of risk when options are (or not) included in the estimation process of each of these dynamic models. Statistical backtests indicate that bond estimated risk is clearly more adequate when options are adopted, although not yet completely satisfactory.     

Convertible Securities,Employee Stock Options and the Cost of Equity

We provide a method for calculating the cost of equity and the cost of capital in the presence of convertible securities and employee stock options. We demonstrate how this approach can be applied if a company already has issued convertible claims or if it is considering doing so for the first time. We provide several numerical examples illustrating the significance of errors in estimating the cost of capital that can result when (1) employee stock options are ignored or (2) the observable stock price is used as a proxy for the unobservable underlying asset.     

Firm-specific attributes and the cross-section of momentum

This paper identifies observable firm-specific attributes that drive momentum. We find that a firm's revenues, costs, and growth options combine to determine the dynamics of its return autocorrelation. We use these insights to implement momentum strategies (buying winners and selling losers) with both numerically simulated returns and CRSP/Compustat data. In both sets of data, momentum strategies that use firms with high revenue growth volatility, low costs, or valuable growth options outperform traditional momentum strategies by approximately 5% per year.     

VOLATILITY FORECASTS,TRADING VOLUME,AND THE ARCH VERSUS OPTION‐IMPLIED VOLATILITY TRADE‐OFF

We investigate empirically the role of trading volume (1) in predicting the relative informativeness of volatility forecasts produced by autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) models versus the volatility forecasts derived from option prices, and (2) in improving volatility forecasts produced by ARCH and option models and combinations of models. Daily and monthly data are explored. We find that if trading volume was low during period t?1 relative to the recent past, ARCH is at least as important as options for forecasting future stock market volatility. Conversely, if volume was high during period t?1 relative to the recent past, option‐implied volatility is much more important than ARCH for forecasting future volatility. Considering relative trading volume as a proxy for changes in the set of information available to investors, our findings reveal an important switching role for trading volume between a volatility forecast that reflects relatively stale information (the historical ARCH estimate) and the option‐implied forward‐looking estimate.     

Diversification and cash dynamics

Why do diversified firms hold significantly less cash than focused firms? We study this question using a dynamic model of corporate investment, saving, and diversification decisions. We find that investment dynamics are more important in explaining the cash differences than financing frictions. More efficient internal capital markets increase cash differences and are especially valuable when a firm diversifies or refocuses. Contrary to static models, more diverse conglomerates have lower cash differences. Endogenous selection (diversifying firms are larger and have better growth opportunities) accounts for 68% of the cash difference, and the diversification event itself reduces cash holdings by 32%.     

The economics of conflicts of interest in financial institutions

A conflict of interest exists when a party to a transaction can gain by taking actions that are detrimental to its counterparty. This paper examines the growing empirical literature on the economics of conflicts of interest in financial institutions. Economic analysis shows that, although conflicts of interest are omnipresent when contracting is costly and parties are imperfectly informed, there are important factors that mitigate their impact and, strikingly, it is possible for customers of financial institutions to benefit from the existence of such conflicts. The empirical literature reaches conclusions that differ across types of conflicts of interest but are overall more ambivalent and certainly more benign than the conclusions drawn by journalists and politicians from mostly anecdotal evidence.     

Competition without fungibility: Evidence from alternative market structures for derivatives

In this paper, we compare option contracts from a traditional derivatives exchange to bank-issued options, also referred to as covered warrants. While bank-issued option markets and traditional derivatives exchanges exhibit significant structural differences such as the absence of a central counterparty for bank-issued options, they frequently exist side-by-side, and the empirical evidence shows that there is significant overlap in their product offerings although options are not fungible between the two markets. The empirical analysis indicates that bid-ask spreads in either market are lowered by 1–2% due to competition from the other market, providing evidence that the benefits of competing market structures are available in the absence of fungibility.     

Public private partnerships: Incentives, risk transfer and real options

Private financing of large-scale infrastructure projects through public private partnerships (PPPs) has grown in recent decades. Together with changes in conventional construction procedures, there have been changes in the project financing model. The use of PPPs raises questions as to the role of the private sector in infrastructure provision and the conditions governing the long-term contractual relationships between the private and public sectors. In some early examples of PPPs, the government guaranteed a minimum profitability over the cash flows using a set of contractual terms which transferred some of the risk of the project from the private provider back to the government. Using a large toll road project, the Melbourne CityLink Project, as a case study we show how the imposed conditions can be treated as real options, how these options affect the incentive to invest and how the public sector may be transferring considerable value to the private sector through government guarantees.     

Diversification,Refocusing and Firm Value

At any point in time a firm faces three restructuring choices: diversify, refocus, or do nothing. This study analyses the causes and the consequences of these actions in a unified framework using the appropriate methodologies. Various factors, such as firm's characteristics and multinational nature, its industry's characteristics, its exchange and index inclusion, and divested (or acquired) segment(s)' industry conditions, are considered as the determinants of the diversifying and the refocusing decisions. The estimation results from the corresponding multinomial logit model suggest that refocusing occurs generally due to firm‐specific reasons, and diversification due to outside factors, such as industry and economic conditions. Added or dropped segment's industry profitability, its relationship to the core business of the firm, and its relatedness to the businesses of the conglomerate's other segments have a nontrivial effect on either decision. In a related analysis, the paper explicitly models and estimates the valuation consequences that are sustained by the firm after it undertakes a refocusing or a diversification action. To isolate the changes in firm's value that are due to these decisions only, a 2SLS estimation is used to control for endogeneity that arises because the factors that affect a firm's value are likely to have also induced the firm to make the corresponding decision. The novelty of my approach is in its inclusion of variables measuring the consequences due to both actions, the diversification and the refocusing, in the same valuation equation. Contrary to some earlier findings, I find no evidence of ‘diversification discount’ or ‘refocusing premium.’ The choice of this paper to analyse all corporate restructuring decisions in a unified framework yields valuable business insights into the reasons for undertaking such corporate events.     

Whistleblowers and Outcomes of Financial Misrepresentation Enforcement Actions

Whistleblowers are ostensibly a valuable resource to regulators investigating securities violations, but whether there is a link between whistleblower involvement and the outcomes of enforcement actions is unclear. Using a data set of employee whistleblowing allegations obtained from the U.S. government and the universe of enforcement actions for financial misrepresentation, we find that whistleblower involvement is associated with higher monetary penalties for targeted firms and employees and with longer prison sentences for culpable executives. We also find that regulators more quickly begin enforcement proceedings when whistleblowers are involved. Our findings suggest that whistleblowers are a valuable source of information for regulators who investigate and prosecute financial misrepresentation.     

Optimal strike prices of stock options for effort-averse executives

This paper evaluates the common practice of setting the strike prices of executive option plans at-the-money. Hall and Murphy [Hall, Brian, Murphy, Kevin J., 2000. Optimal exercise prices for executive stock options. American Economic Review 90 (2), 209–214] claim this practice to be optimal since it maximizes the sensitivity of compensation to firm performance. However, they do not incorporate effort and the possibility that managers are effort-averse into their model. We revisit this question while explicitly introducing these factors and allowing the reward package to include fixed wages, options, and stock grants. We simulate the manager’s effort choice and compensation as well as the value of shareholders’ equity under alternative compensation schemes, and identify schemes that are optimal. Our simulations indicate that, when abstracting from tax considerations, it is optimal to award managers with options that will most likely be highly valuable (i.e., substantially in-the-money) on their expiration date. Prior to 2006, the tax code and financial reporting standards provided incentives to award options that are closer to the money when issued than the options that were optimal in the absence of these considerations. Recent tax and reporting changes voided these incentives and thus we predict that these changes will induce firms to issue options with lower strike prices than those that were issued prior to 2006.     

The return map: tracking product teams

With a new product, time is now more valuable than money. The costs of conceiving and designing a product are less important to its ultimate success than timeliness to market. One of the most important ways to speed up product development is through interfunctional teamwork. The "Return Map," developed at Hewlett-Packard, provides a way for people from different functions to triangulate on the product development process as a whole. It graphically represents the contributions of all team members to the moment when a project breaks even. It forces the team to estimate and re-estimate the time it will take to perform critical tasks, so that products can get out fast. It subjects the team to the only discipline that works, namely, self-discipline. The map is, in effect, a graph representing time and money, where the time line is divided into three phases: investigation, development, and manufacturing and sales. Meanwhile, costs are plotted against time--as are revenues when they are realized after manufacturing release. Within these points of reference, four novel metrics emerge: Break-Even-Time, Time-to-Market, Break-Even-After-Release, and the Return Factor. All metrics are estimated at the beginning of a project to determine its feasibility, then they are tracked carefully while the project evolves to determine its success. Missed forecasts are inevitable, but managers who punish employees for missing their marks will only encourage them to estimate conservatively, thus building slack into a system meant to eliminate slack. Estimates are a team responsibility, and deviations provide valuable information that spurs continuous investigation and improvement.     

Dual class IPOs: A theoretical analysis

We consider an incumbent who wishes to sell equity to outsiders at an IPO to implement his firm’s project. He may be talented (lower cost of effort, comparative advantage in project-implementation) or untalented. The project may have high (intrinsically more valuable, but showing less signs of success in the near-term) or low near-term uncertainty. Under a single class share structure, the incumbent has a greater chance of losing control to potential rivals if he undertakes the project with high near-term uncertainty, since outsiders may vote for the rival if they believe the project is not progressing well. A dual class share structure allows the incumbent to have enough votes to prevail against any rival, but may be misused by untalented incumbents to dissipate value. Our results help to explain firms’ choices between dual class and single class IPOs and the post-IPO operating performance of dual class versus single class firms.     

Determinants of stock option use by Japanese companies

Japanese data show a negative relation between leverage and the probability of firms' use of stock options. Such a relation is more marked for firms affiliated with specific keiretsu or main banks. This evidence reflects the fact that Japanese companies are more reliant on debt financing and that the agency cost of debt is a central issue in corporate governance. Results show that the frequency of the firms' use of stock options is positively associated with firm size. Finally, independent firms, which reveal more concern about shareholder wealth, are more likely to use stock options.     

Stochastic risk premiums,stochastic skewness in currency options,and stochastic discount factors in international economies

We develop models of stochastic discount factors in international economies that produce stochastic risk premiums and stochastic skewness in currency options. We estimate the models using time-series returns and option prices on three currency pairs that form a triangular relation. Estimation shows that the average risk premium in Japan is larger than that in the US or the UK, the global risk premium is more persistent and volatile than the country-specific risk premiums, and investors respond differently to different shocks. We also identify high-frequency jumps in each economy but find that only downside jumps are priced. Finally, our analysis shows that the risk premiums are economically compatible with movements in stock and bond market fundamentals.