地下保险市场利益主体的博弈分析

"地下保单"已经成为我国地下金融市场的一种主要的非法金融活动。从宏观方面看,地下保险严重地冲击着我国的保险行业,扰乱了我国保险市场正常的秩序。从微观看,购买地下保险个人存在着各种风险,这些风险构成了对投保人的潜在危害。地下保险市场中的利益主体有四个:内地投保人、境外保险公司代理人、境外保险公司和监管者。通过对这四个利益主体之间的博弈关系分析可以看出,"地下保单"的存在就是博弈各方的利益均衡结果。解决"地下保单"问题就要打破这种博弈格局,改变每个利益主体的支付收益,从而达到一种新的博弈关系,实现新的均衡。     

保险营销员市场发展研究分析

保险代理制度的存在对完善保险市场、沟通保险供求、促进保险业发展都发挥着十分重要的作用,其作用触及保险人、投保人、保险市场和全社会。我国营销员市场发展迅速,潜力巨大。由于我国保险市场尚未完全成熟,对营销员的监管力度不足,营销员市场的发展不平衡,市场行为具有不规范性。合理整顿完善保险营销员市场是我国新时期保险业发展的重要环节。本文从建立保险营销员制度必要性分析入手,通过对我国保险代理人市场数据分析,进而提出完善我国保险营销员制度的思路框架和政策建议。     

保险表见代理制度分析

我国新保险法128条增加了对表见代理的规定。即“保险代理人为保险人代为办理保险业务，有超越代理权限行为，投保人有理由相信其有代理权，并已订立保险合同的，保险人应当承担保险责任；但是保险人可以依法追究越权的保险代理人的责任”。这一规定，加重了保险公司对代理人越权代理行为的法律贵任，促使保险公司进一步加强对代理人的培训和管理，维护保险市场良好秩序，保护被保险人利益。本文试图对此制度做如下分析，以使新保险法这一制度的实施能够符合保险市场发展的需要。     

保险中介机构违规经营现象及对策分析

保险市场中介既包括活动于保险人与投保人之间,充当保险供需双方的媒介,把保险人和投保人联系起来并建立保险合同关系的保险代理和保险经纪人也包括独立于保险人与投保人之外,     

保单“跳槽”,莫听信代理人“忽悠”

近年来,随着新的保险机构不断成立,保险市场的竞争日趋激烈,在这种情况下,保险代理人也呈现出频繁流动之势。为了在新公司树立业绩,更因为拓展新保单比较困难,一些保险代理人在营销过程中就采用一些蒙蔽性说辞,忽悠投保人改投新的保单。那么,当自己的代理人跳槽后,投保人是否应该听     

有关保险人明确说明义务的类型化分析与完善

一、问题提出背景在一个保险关系发生之时,会产生投保人如实告知义务、保险人明确说明义务等责任,但是由于目前我国保险行业发展得并不是很完善,尤其是保险代理人的自身素养有待提高,由此导致的保险纠纷数量居高不下。2020年底,中国银保监会《关于发展独立个人保险代理人有关事项的通知》的出台便是基于此背景。个人保险代理人体系自1992年被引入中国大陆保险市场.     

县域保险市场的风险隐患——以河北为例

近年来,河北省县域保险市场发展迅速,机构网络格局初步形成,保险产品日益丰富,保费规模持续较快增长,保险覆盖面不断扩大,农民保险意识发生着前所未有的巨大变化。保险的损失补偿作用得到有效发挥,资金杠杆效应日益明显,对保障县域经济发展和民生起到了一定作用。但河北省县域保险市场尚处于发展初期,保险机构、保险代理人以及投保人等多方面仍存在一些风险隐患,应引起高度关注并加以逐步完善。     

加快发避孕药我国保险经纪业的思考

保险市场与其它市场一样，包括买方和卖方，还有为保险服务的中间人，保险中间人，也称保险中介，是指向保险人和投保人提供仍关保险知识，最后保险人和投保人达成保险契约并提供相关服务，一般包括保险代理人、保险经纪人和保险公估人。《保险经纪人管理规定（试行）》第二条指出：“保险经纪人是指基于投保人的利益，为投保人与保险人订立保险合同提供中介服务，并依法收取佣金的有限责任公司。”     

加快发展我国保险经纪业的思考

一、保险经纪人 保险市场与其它市场一样,包括买方和卖方,还有为保险服务的中间人.保险中间人,也称保险中介,是指向保险人和投保人提供有关保险知识,最后保险人和投保人达成保险契约并提供相关服务,一般包括保险代理人、保险经纪人和保险公估人.<保险经纪人管理规定(试行)>第二条指出:"保险经纪人是指基于投保人的利益,为投保人与保险人订立保险合同提供中介服务,并依法收取佣金的有限责任公司."     

保单“跳槽”，莫听代理人“忽悠”

近年来,随着新的保险机构不断成立,保险市场的竞争日趋激烈,在这种情况下,保险代理人也呈现出频繁流动之势。为了在新公司短时间内作出成绩,更因为拓展新保单比较困难,一些保险代理人在营销过程中就采用一些“蒙蔽性说辞”,“忽悠”投保人改投新的保单。那么,当保险代理人跳槽后,投保人是否应该听从这些代理人的建议,让自己原有的保单也跟着“跳槽”呢？专家提醒：保单“跳槽”切莫听从保险代理人的“忽悠”。     

基于Agent的保险系统非对称信息博弈研究

本文基于保险系统复杂性特征和复杂性科学在解决系统非线性和复杂性交互行为方面的优势,针对保险系统中非对称信息的特点,运用博弈数学模型系统分析保险系统非对称信息,通过CAS理论构建了基于Agent的保险系统仿真模型并在swarm平台上实现了关于保险系统逆向选择问题的经典模型的动态仿真。结果表明：信息不对称产生了保险逆向选择和道德风险,妨碍了保险机制顺利运行,使保险系统资源配置效率严重降低。     

Die Arglistanfechtung des Versicherungsvertrags bei fehlender textförmiger Nachfrage nach Gefahrumständen

The article treats the issue of disputing an insurance contract for reasons of malice in the event of an insurance company failing to comply with the requirements pertaining to the risk-issue-conversation provided by the VVG. According to §19 Abs. 1 VVG, the policy holder is merely required to answer questions about risk issues that are presented to him in writing and timewise before the policy holder has submitted his offer respectively in the time frame between submission of the offer by the policy holder and the acceptance by the insurance company. It is contentious whether an insurance company that has violated §19 Abs. 1 VVG may nevertheless dispute the insurance contract for reasons of malice in case of misrepresentation or omission of information on part of the policy holder. The article argues for an application of §241 Abs. 2 BGB in conjunction with §123 Abs. 1 BGB in addition to §19 Abs. 1 VVG—and thus in favor of an insurance company’s possibility to dispute the insurance contract. The protection of the policy holder’s rights is not an issue in the problem of applying the correct provision. They must rather be considered when determining the requirements of the contract dispute.     

农业保险市场利益相关者的博弈分析

本文运用博弈理论,分析了农业保险各主体——农民、保险公司、政府三者在不同风险情形下的行为对农业保险发展的影响,并据此提出切实可行的解决措施。     

保险"理赔难"的原因及解决对策

探讨保险“理赔难”的原因所在,并从保监会、投保人和保险人以及行业发展方向等各方面入手,思考如何解决保险“理赔难”的问题。     

费率市场化对车险市场影响的经济学模型分析

为了解决车险市场长期以来高回扣、高代理费的混乱局面,我国在2003年1月1日推行费率市场化,但随之而来的是,不仅各保险公司仍然采用高代理费争夺市场,而且还出现了过低费率的非理性定价以及费率的频繁调整。本文将以事实为基础,通过分析代理人的经营情况和保险公司保费收入最大化的行为模式,建立一个保险需求函数的模型,来解释费率改革如何影响车险市场,并提出了反思和建议。     

Die Marktabgrenzung im Versicherungskartellrecht am Beispiel der Berufshaftpflichtversicherungen

The definition of the relevant market is crucial to the application of European and German competition law and especially difficult when dealing with insurance markets. Generally, the product and geographic market comprises all products or services that are regarded as substitutable by consumers. In addition, the supply-side substitutability can be taken into consideration. In defining insurance product markets, the supply-side substitutability is decisive, because insurance products are seldom interchangeable from a policy holder’s point of view. Applying the concept of supply-side substitutability to professional indemnity insurances leads to product markets correlating with the different professional groups: Indemnity insurances for physicians constitute a product market; insurances for lawyers, notary publics, tax advisers and public accountants form another market and insurances for architects and construction engineers another one. These product markets are still national markets. Professional indemnity insurances are extensively shaped by the differing legal systems, namely by national insurance contract law, by liability provisions and by a legal obligation to insure. Consequently, policy holders cannot substitute their indemnity insurance with foreign insurance products and insurers are confronted with market entry barriers. However, the proposed directive on services on the internal market and the adopted directive on insurance mediation could result in community-wide markets in the near future.     

农业保险属性与政府补贴理论探析

作为准公共物品的农业保险的外部性导致市场机制不能对农业保险资源进行有效配置,保障农业保险的有效供求,从而导致我国农业保险目前的发展困境。农业保险市场机制失灵为政府干预,建立政府补贴型的政策型农业保险制度提供了理论依据,但过度的政府干预和高额政策补贴不仅不能解决市场失灵,反而会产生一系列的负面效应,扭曲市场机制的资源配置功能,降低资源配置效率。因而单纯地依靠市场机制的自发作用或政府干预都不能有效解决目前我国农业保险所面临的问题,关键还在于能否有效地把市场调节和政府干预有机地结合起来,合理界定两者的关系,使二者能达到最优配置,更加公平并富有效率。     

制度视角下保险市场秩序问题研究

本文从经济体制转轨背景下的主体行为冲突、"粗放"运作机制中的发展质与量冲突和制度体系中正式规则、非正式约束及其实施三方面对保险市场问题产生原因、机理进行了分析.以此为背景,讨论了制度冲突条件下影响监管效能的相关因素.针对问题成因和机理,提出规范市场的思路:一方面,逐步将法律法规、监管政策嵌入市场运行规则、公司内部制度,...     

Self‐Insurance and Self‐Protection as Public Goods

Many public goods provide utility by insuring against hazardous events. Those public goods can have self‐insurance and self‐protection character. For both situations we analyze the efficient public provision level and the provision level resulting from Nash behavior in a private provision game. We consider the interaction of public goods as insurance devices with market insurance. The availability of market insurance reduces the provision level of the public good for both public and private provision, regardless of whether we consider self‐insurance or self‐protection. Moreover, we show that Nash behavior has always a larger impact than the availability of market insurance.     

Optimal investment of an insurer with regime-switching and risk constraint

We investigate an optimal investment problem of an insurance company in the presence of risk constraint and regime-switching using a game theoretic approach. A dynamic risk constraint is considered where we constrain the uncertainty aversion to the ‘true’ model for financial risk at a given level. We describe the surplus of an insurance company using a general jump process, namely, a Markov-modulated random measure. The insurance company invests the surplus in a risky financial asset whose dynamics are modeled by a regime-switching geometric Brownian motion. To incorporate model uncertainty, we consider a robust approach, where a family of probability measures is cosidered and the insurance company maximizes the expected utility of terminal wealth in the ‘worst-case’ probability scenario. The optimal investment problem is then formulated as a constrained two-player, zero-sum, stochastic differential game between the insurance company and the market. Different from the other works in the literature, our technique is to transform the problem into a deterministic differential game first, in order to obtain the optimal strategy of the game problem explicitly.