Business ties and proxy voting by mutual funds

The magnitude of mutual funds’ business ties with their portfolio firms is documented and is linked to funds’ proxy votes at specific firms and to overall voting practices. Aggregate votes at the fund family level indicate a positive relation between business ties and the propensity to vote with management. Votes at specific firms, however, reveal that funds are no more likely to vote with management of client firms than of non-clients. Because the votes took place when funds knew their votes would be publicly scrutinized, fund families with a larger client base may have adopted voting policies that led to less frequent opposition to management at all firms.     

Mutual funds' capital gains lock-in and earnings management

Capital gains taxation creates a lock-in effect, increasing investors' incentives to monitor and decreasing portfolio firms' incentives to cater to short-term investors. We show a negative relation between lock-in and portfolio firms' earnings management, and this relation is stronger for capital gains held by tax-sensitive investors. Further, the relation between lock-in and earnings management is stronger when the capital gains tax rate is higher. We show that locked-in funds vote against management and against audit committee members' reappointment following earnings management. Locked-in funds are less likely to exit a position following disappointing earnings announcements, reducing firms' incentive to manage earnings.     

The impact of the Arab Spring and the Ebola outbreak on African equity mutual fund investor decisions

Financial development and stock markets have been widely considered to be key factors in economic growth. Among institutional investors, mutual funds play a key role in providing financial resources to stock markets, particularly in developing countries. Different from other investments, mutual fund flows could be affected by retail investors’ behavior and their overreaction to specific events. We considered 78 equity mutual funds that are geographically specialized in African countries and observed monthly flows and performance for the period of 2006–2015. We find that two major events, Ebola and the Arab Spring, significantly affected the fund flows, controlling for fund performance, expenses and market returns. Retail investors over-reacted to these major events, withdrawing their savings from the African mutual funds. This result is particularly strong when connected to the media coverage of these events: the higher the number of articles about Arab Spring and Ebola, the higher the withdrawals. These irrational investors’ behavior damaged the funds’ managers market timing ability, and reduced the equity capital injection into African stock markets. Our results have several implications for both holders of frontier market mutual funds and the overall asset management industry.     

Mutual funds as monitors: Evidence from mutual fund voting

We address how mutual funds vote on shareholder proposals and identify factors that help determine support of wealth-increasing shareholder proposals. We examine 213,579 voting decisions made by 1799 mutual funds from 94 fund families for 1047 shareholder proposals voted on between July 2003 and June 2005. In an analysis of voting across funds within the same fund family, we find significant divergence in voting within families, emphasizing the importance of focusing on voting by individual funds. We also find that, in general, mutual funds vote more affirmatively for potentially wealth-increasing proposals and funds' voting approval rates for these beneficial resolutions are significantly higher than those of other investors. Our results suggest that funds tend to support proposals targeting firms with weaker governance. We also find that funds with lower turnover ratios and social funds are more likely to support shareholder proposals. Finally, fund voting approval rates significantly impact whether a proposal passes and whether one is implemented.     

Selling winners, holding losers: Effect on fund flows and survival of disposition-prone mutual funds

Recent studies suggest that presence of a disposition effect in a large subset of investors can create stock mispricings, which has serious implications for market efficiency. We examine whether US equity mutual funds are disposition-prone, how that effect influences performance, investor flows and fund survival, and whether the disposition orientation of mutual funds affects stock prices in a sustained manner.We find that about 30% of all funds exhibit some degree of disposition behavior and that such funds underperform funds that are not disposition-prone by 4-6% per year. Moreover, after controlling for performance, tax overhang and other factors that potentially affect flows, disposition-prone funds attract significantly smaller flows than other funds. The results suggest that mutual fund investors are smart enough to minimize investment in disposition-prone funds. Consequently, disposition-prone funds have significantly higher rates of failure than other funds, thereby reducing the impact of such trading behavior on security prices.     

The liquidity risk of liquid hedge funds

This paper evaluates hedge funds that grant favorable redemption terms to investors. Within this group of purportedly liquid funds, high net inflow funds subsequently outperform low net inflow funds by 4.79% per year after adjusting for risk. The return impact of fund flows is stronger when funds embrace liquidity risk, when market liquidity is low, and when funding liquidity, as measured by the Treasury-Eurodollar spread, aggregate hedge fund flows, and prime broker stock returns, is tight. In keeping with an agency explanation, funds with strong incentives to raise capital, low manager option deltas, and no manager capital co-invested are more likely to take on excessive liquidity risk. These results resonate with the theory of funding liquidity by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009).     

The Impact of Corporate Governance on Closed‐end Funds

This study uses a large sample of UK‐listed closed‐end funds to examine whether governance has an impact on two indicators of fund performance: the level of fund‐management fees and the discount at which a fund trades. Fees are under the control of the directors, and we find that they are inversely related to fund returns, even after allowing for differences across investment sectors. Fees are, on average, higher if a fund has a large board, few directors from outside the fund‐family, many directors from within the fund‐family, and low ownership by the management company. Discounts for funds are wider if the management company or any blockholder has a significant long‐term stake, suggesting that investors are wary of entrenched management. The results suggest that boards are frequently compromised in their duty to shareholders by their dependence on fund‐management companies.     

Firm balance sheets and monetary policy transmission

The functioning of internal capital markets in financial conglomerates facilitates a novel identification strategy of the balance sheet channel of monetary policy. We look at small subsidiary banks that are affiliated with the same holding company but operate in different geographical areas. These banks face the same marginal cost of funds due to internal capital markets, but face different borrowers as they concentrate their lending with small local businesses. Exploring cross-sectional variation in local economic conditions across these subsidiaries, we investigate whether borrower creditworthiness influences the response of bank lending to monetary policy. Our results are consistent with a demand-driven transmission mechanism that works through firm balance sheets and is independent from the bank lending channel.     

Is it the Law or the Lawyers? Investment Covenants around the World*

This paper introduces a new dataset from 50 private investment funds from 17 countries around the world. We analyse the frequency of use of investment covenants imposed by institutional investors governing the activities of private investment fund managers in areas pertaining to investment decisions, investment powers, types of investments, fund operations and limitations on liability. While the data indicate a role for country legality in affecting the frequency of use of fund covenants, the data further indicate that the presence of legally trained managers has a more pronounced role in affecting the use of covenants. As private equity and venture capital investment increases across Europe and elsewhere, our results indicate that legal practice factors will matter more than the legal setting for the establishment of covenants governing new funds.     

Fund ownership and stock price informativeness of Chinese listed firms

We examine the impact of mutual fund ownership on stock price informativeness in China. Existing evidence shows that stock price informativeness is low in China, and attributes this to firms’ lack of disclosure incentives under the weak investor protection institutional environment. Mutual funds are more sophisticated and influential than individual investors to monitor firms, and thus serve as an external governance mechanism to improve corporate transparency. However, the impact of mutual funds in China can also be moderated by state ownership of listed firms, which reduces firms’ dependence on outside investors for capital. Indeed, we find that mutual fund ownership is positively related to share price informativeness, but this effect is less pronounced among state-controlled firms. The main policy implication from our findings is that mutual funds contribute to the corporate information environment of emerging economies but further privatization of listed firms would be needed to realize greater benefit.     

Venture capital funds: Flow-performance relationship and performance persistence

This paper finds that venture capital funds that are expected to be backed by more skilled investors show no performance persistence but a significant flow-performance relationship. In contrast, funds that are expected to be backed by less skilled investors show performance predictability and have a non-significant flow-performance relationship. These results suggest that only skilled investors use all available information to adjust their capital allocation and, as a result, eliminate performance predictability as argued theoretically by Berk and Green (2004). Results also show that Kaplan and Schoar (2005) overstate the persistence in fund performance by not using an ex ante measure of the performance of earlier funds. Whether or not an ex ante measure is used, however, the persistence is largely due to unsophisticated investors. When investors are sophisticated, the performance of earlier funds, sequence and fund size do not help predict the performance of the focal fund.     

Higher risk,lower returns: What hedge fund investors really earn

The returns of hedge fund investors depend not only on the returns of the funds they hold but also on the timing and magnitude of their capital flows in and out of these funds. We use dollar-weighted returns (a form of Internal Rate of Return (IRR)) to assess the properties of actual investor returns on hedge funds and compare them to buy-and-hold fund returns. Our main finding is that annualized dollar-weighted returns are on the magnitude of 3% to 7% lower than corresponding buy-and-hold fund returns. Using factor models of risk and the estimated dollar-weighted performance gap, we find that the real alpha of hedge fund investors is close to zero. In absolute terms, dollar-weighted returns are reliably lower than the return on the Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500 index, and are only marginally higher than the risk-free rate as of the end of 2008. The combined impression from these results is that the return experience of hedge fund investors is much worse than previously thought.     

Can investors time their exposure to private equity?

Private equity performance, both for buyouts and venture capital, has been highly cyclical: periods of high fundraising have been followed by periods of low performance. Despite this seemingly predictable variation, we find modest gains, at best, to pursuing realistic, investable strategies that time capital commitments to private equity. This occurs, in part, because investors can only time their commitments to funds; they cannot time when commitments are called or when investments are exited. There is a high degree of time-series correlation in net cash flows even across commitment strategies that allocate capital in a very different manner over time.     

Hedge fund activism,CEO turnover and compensation

This paper examines the governance role of hedge fund activists by analyzing the impact of these activists on CEO turnover, CEO pay, and CEO pay-performance link in targeted companies. Using the difference-in-difference approach, we first find significantly higher CEO turnover following hedge fund activism. After we split target companies into the CEO-turnover and non-CEO-turnover sub-samples, we find that only new CEOs in targeted companies get more compensation following hedge fund activism while incumbent CEO pay does not significantly change. The relationship between CEO bonuses and return on assets following hedge fund activism also differs across the subsamples split by CEO turnover. Pay-performance relationship is enhanced by hedge fund activism for new CEOs, but not for incumbent CEOs. In additional analyses, we document that CEO turnover is positively associated with Tobin’s Q and shareholder votes on Say on Pay in target companies after hedge fund activism.     

How smart is money? An investigation into investor behaviour in the Australian managed fund industry

Gruber [Gruber, M., 1996. Another puzzle: the growth in actively managed mutual funds. Journal of Finance 51, 783–810] and Zheng [Zheng, L., 1999. Is money smart? A study of mutual fund investors’ fund selection ability. Journal of Finance 54, 901–933] document that managed fund investors demonstrate fund selection ability as they invest in funds whose subsequent performance is greater than that of funds from which they divest. This phenomenon has been since been termed the ‘smart money effect’. In contrast, Sapp and Tiwari [Sapp, T., Tiwari, A., 2004. Does stock return momentum explain the ‘smart money’ effect? Journal of Finance 59, 2605–2622] find that after controlling for stock return momentum, there is no evidence of a smart money effect. In this paper, we investigate whether a smart money effect exists in the Australian managed funds industry. The key findings of our paper are that there is a smart money effect in Australia and that stock return momentum does not explain this effect. We also find that the effect is not conditional on fund size. Our cross-sectional analysis indicates that investors are chasing funds that have performed well in the past and that cash flows to funds are persistent. However, we do not find any evidence that investors are pursuing funds that employ momentum trading strategies.     

基于国外经验借鉴的越南证券投资基金业发展策略探讨

证券投资基金是资本市场的重要组成部分,也是资本市场中最为重要的机构投资者之一,基金已经成为投资者参与证券投资的重要工具,以基金为代表的资产管理已经成为金融市场上与银行、证券、保险同等重要的金融服务业。本文通过对国外证券投资基金行业发展的借鉴回顾和分析了越南基金行业的发展历程,揭示越南基金行业所存在的问题并采取措施予以有效的解决,并对比中国、美国、英国的经验针对所存在的问题提出了政策措施建议。     

The Optimal Size of Hedge Funds: Conflict between Investors and Fund Managers

This study examines whether the standard compensation contract in the hedge fund industry aligns managers’ incentives with investors’ interests. I show empirically that managers’ compensation increases when fund assets grow, even when diseconomies of scale in fund performance exist. Thus, managers’ compensation is maximized at a much larger fund size than is optimal for fund performance. However, to avoid capital outflows, managers are also motivated to restrict fund growth to maintain style‐average performance. Similarly, fund management firms have incentives to collect more capital for all funds under management, including their flagship funds, even at the expense of fund performance.     

Mutual fund flows and investor returns: An empirical examination of fund investor timing ability

We examine the timing ability of mutual fund investors using cash flow data at the individual fund level. Over 1991–2004 equity fund investor timing decisions reduce fund investor average returns by 1.56% annually. Underperformance due to poor timing is greater in load funds and funds with relatively large risk-adjusted returns. In particular, the magnitude of investor underperformance due to poor timing largely offsets the risk-adjusted alpha gains offered by good-performing funds. Investors in both actively managed funds and index funds exhibit poor investment timing. We demonstrate that our empirical results are consistent with investor return-chasing behavior.     

Regulation And The Rise In Asset-Based Mutual Fund Management Fees

In this article I explain why asset‐based fees are common for mutual fund management companies and why the average fee has increased recently. I argue that Securities and Exchange Commission fee regulations make alternative fee types illegal or unattractive. Management companies can maintain higher fees because regulations and brand‐name capital partly insulate them from competition and because investors cannot easily distinguish between performance‐oriented and marketing‐oriented fund companies. Index funds and unit investment trusts may offer competition to mutual funds in the future because they are designed to minimize management fees.     

Gains to Mutual Fund Sponsors Offering Multiple Share Class Funds

Although the number of mutual funds grew during the 1990s, much of the growth is attributable to the introduction of multiple share class (MS) funds. Proponents argue that the MS structure leads to cost savings, which can be passed onto investors as lower expenses. However, if the structure lowers costs, sponsors are likely to profit from it. Though investors are concerned about the base expense ratio, the sum of administrative and management fees, fund sponsors generate profits from the management fees. As such, they would prefer to increase the management fee if they can simultaneously lower administrative fees. Our results indicate that MS fund investors pay lower administrative fees, but management fees are approximately 7 basis points higher than single-class funds. Overall, base expense ratios are higher than for single-class funds, suggesting fund sponsors capture the cost benefits the MS structure provides. Our results are robust to different model specifications and different estimation techniques.