对新股破发现象的分析

2010年以来,我国新股上市首日遭遇破发的情况频繁发生,舆论界对新股破发是否是常态持有相反的意见。本文以2010年至今的83只破发股票为样本,通过统计分析和实证研究,试图回答这个问题。本文认为,破发是市场自发的、对新股发行定价过程中产生的泡沫进行调整和消化的一种行为。从这个角度而言,破发是一种正常的现象,且能够说明新股发行制度改革初见成效。     

新股发行定价策略分析研究

本文在简要回顾新股发行制度变迁的基础上．指出新股破发的主要原因在于发行价过高、发行速度过快以及货币政策紧缩，并分析了新股频频破发对证券市场的影响，然后对影响新股定价的主要因素进行了深入的剖析，最后得出本文的结论及启示。     

浅析我国A股IPO破发的原因

关于IPO抑价的研究,一直是国内外的热门话题,然而,随着我国股票市场的发展,出现了新情况、新问题,特别是进入2011年以来,新股上市首日破发的现象极为频繁。由于新股定价及其上市后的价格表现,关系着发行公司、政府、承销商、投资者等利益相关主体的利益。因此,本文从发行公司、政府、承销商、投资者四个维度去探究本轮新股破发潮的原因,并提出相应的政策建议。     

浅析我国A股IPO破发的原因

关于IPO抑价的研究,一直是国内外的热门话题,然而,随着我国股票市场的发展,出现了新情况、新问题,特别是进入2011年以来,新股上市首日破发的现象极为频繁。由于新股定价及其上市后的价格表现,关系着发行公司、政府、承销商、投资者等利益相关主体的利益。因此,本文从发行公司、政府、承销商、投资者四个维度去探究本轮新股破发潮的原因,并提出相应的政策建议。     

我国IPO定价的实证分析

新股发行(IPO, Initial PublicOffering)定价是股票发行业务中的核心环节,定价是否合理不仅关系到发行人、投资者与承销商的切身利益,而且关系到股票市场资源配置功能的发挥。判断发行定价是否合理的主要标准是,发行价的确定是否以预期的二级市场价格作为定价基础。新股发行抑价是指新股发行定价存在低估现象(Underpricing),一般证券市场上都存在这一现象,根据一个对32个国家(地区)样本区间的统计,股票上市首日平均收益率达27.86%,这说明新股发行价格和新股上市价格本身还是有所不同。从统计数据看,欧美发达国家成熟市场的新股发行抑价程…     

上市首日“破发”股票长期表现更差吗？

以2009年7月至2012年5月间上市发行股票为样本,采用随机前沿模型进行定价分析,以新股发行定价类型,首日发行抑价率正负进行分类.选取折价发行且上市首日"破发"(即首日收盘价低于发行价)公司样本,将其与溢价发行且上市首日未"破发"公司样本,按照"行业-收入规模"标准进行样本配对,计算两组公司上市后1~5年买入与持有收益(BHAR)并进行差异性检验.结果表明:新股上市后前三年均表现不佳,折价发行且首日"破发"的股票在上市后前两年表现更差.这为新股定价与长期表现相关研究提供了新的实证.     

IPO限价发行与新股二级市场价格泡沫——论股票市场“弹簧效应”

本文通过对比2009年7月1日至2014年6月30日IPO市场化定价发行阶段与2014年7月1日至2018年6月30日IPO限价发行阶段共1950个IPO样本,发现IPO限价发行对于新股在二级市场股价表现具有“弹簧效应”:即抑制股票一级市场发行价格会造成新股在二级市场价格短期内超涨,限价发行新股的二级市场定价显著高于市场化定价发行新股的二级市场定价。限价发行引起的过高二级市场定价最终导致股票长期回报率低下。另外,创业板公司“弹簧效应”显著强于主板公司。这些实证结果都可以被本文提出的一级市场价格压抑造成二级市场非理性投资者上涨预期一致、盲目追涨的理论模型所解释。本文的研究指出抑制股票一级市场定价虽然形式上可以解决新股发行价过高问题,但是却造成二级市场更大的价格扭曲。这一发现为进一步完善我国IPO发行定价机制提供了依据。     

新股破发的原因探究

本文以近期证券市场出现的新股上市接连跌破发行价("破发")的现象为切入点,分析了新股破发现象的相关原因,并针对破发现象提出了较为合理的政策建议。     

新股破发的原因探究

本文以近期证券市场出现的新股上市接连跌破发行价("破发")的现象为切入点,分析了新股破发现象的相关原因,并针对破发现象提出了较为合理的政策建议.     

新股投资人情况调查

“打新股”曾是中国老百姓所熟悉的投资方式之一,而“新股不败”也是股民谈论最多的“神话”。 然而,随着2010年和2011年新股“破发潮”的出现,“新股不败神话”成为了历史。据统计,按上市首日最低价低于发行价计算,2010年上市新股的破发率为9．22％,2011年则高达29．89％．     

Global equity offerings and access to domestic loan market: U.S. evidence

This study examines whether and to what extend global equity offerings at the IPO stage may affect issuing firms' ability to borrow in the domestic debt market. Tracking bank loans taken by U.S. IPO firms in the domestic syndicated loan market, we observe that global equity offering firms experience more favorable loan price than that offered to their domestic counterparts. This finding holds for a set of robustness tests of endogeneity issues. We also find that, compared with their domestic counterparts, global equity offering firms are less likely to have financial distress, engage more in international diversification, and are more likely to wait a longer time to apply for syndicated loans.     

The Impact of the Corporate Control Market on IPO Decisions

Entrepreneurs who take their firm public during an active corporate control market face an increased risk of losing control through a takeover. I examine the extent to which the threat of takeover impacts IPO firms’ decisions and find that an active takeover market in an IPO firm's industry increases the probability that the firm incorporates in a state with state‐level antitakeover provisions. IPO firms backed by venture capital investors and reputable underwriters are less likely to incorporate in a state offering antitakeover provisions. A closer examination of equity carve‐outs suggests that control is not a first‐order consideration for some IPO firms.     

Valuing and pricing IPOs

This paper investigates how underwriters set the IPO firm’s fair value, an ex-ante estimate of the market value, using a unique dataset of 228 reports from French underwriters. These reports are issued before the IPO shares start trading on the stock market and detail how underwriters determined fair value. We document that underwriters often employ multiples valuation, dividend discount models and discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis to determine fair value but that all of these valuation methods suffer from a positive bias with respect to equilibrium market value. We also analyze how this fair value estimate is subsequently used as a basis for IPO pricing. We report that underwriters deliberately discount the fair value estimate when setting the preliminary offer price. Part of the intentional price discount can be recovered by higher price updates. We find that, controlling for other factors such as investor demand, part of underpricing stems from this intentional price discount.     

Do Expert Informational Intermediaries Add Value? Evidence from Auditors in Microcap Initial Public Offerings

Do expert informational intermediaries add value? We address this question by examining the informativeness of the audit report contained in the prospectus associated with a firm's initial public offering (IPO). At the time of the IPO, there is a relative lack of information to facilitate the establishment of equity values, suggesting that the information provided by outside “experts” (e.g., auditors, underwriters) is particularly important. In this article we study small, non‐venture‐backed IPOs, a segment of the market with the poorest long‐run performance and where the prestigious audit firm is often the sole (if any) expert present. We find that the pre‐IPO opinions of larger auditors are more predictive of post‐IPO negative stock delistings. Of particular note, the opinions of the national‐tiered firms are comparably predictive to those of the Big 6, though this finding emerges only after we consider the selectivity‐based differences in the clients that hire these national firms. Our findings also indicate that, for larger auditors the presence of a pre‐IPO going‐concern opinion is more strongly associated with first‐year stock returns and that larger auditors are more likely to give such opinions to their distressed clients. Overall, we address a deficiency in the literature relating to “the paucity of evidence on the value of auditor opinions to investors” (Healy and Palepu [ 2001 p. 415]).     

Does aggressiveness help? Evidence from IPO corruption and pricing in China

Using a unique database of Chinese firms bribing initial public offering (IPO) regulators, we examine the impact of bribing on IPO pricing. Our findings suggest that bribing firms are younger, smaller, more volatile in their operating activities, and more generous in compensating underwriters and management. Most important, bribing firms price their IPO shares more aggressively than non-bribing firms and exhibit a higher price-to-earnings ratio, lower first-day return, and poorer post-IPO stock performance. Additional analyses suggest that both bribing and non-bribing firms exhibit negative announcement returns after the arrest of corrupt officials. However, the effect is stronger for bribing firms. Overall, bribing firms are systematically more aggressive than their non-bribing counterparts. They concede less to IPO investors and reward underwriters and management for helping them access the capital market.     

Securities regulation and implicit penalties

The extant literature offers extensive support for the significant role played by institutions in financial markets, but implicit regulation and monitoring have yet to be examined. This study fills this void in the literature by employing unique Chinese datasets to explore the implicit regulation and penalties imposed by the Chinese government in regulating the initial public offering (IPO) market. Of particular interest are the economic consequences of underwriting IPO deals for client firms that violate regulatory rules in China’s capital market. We provide evidence to show that the associated underwriters’ reputations are impaired and their market share declines. We further explore whether such negative consequences result from a market disciplinary mechanism or a penalty imposed by the government. To analyze the possibility of a market disciplinary mechanism at work, we investigate (1) the market reaction to other client firms whose IPO deals were underwritten by underwriters associated with a violation at the time the violation was publicly disclosed and (2) the under-pricing of IPO deals undertaken by these underwriters after such disclosure. To analyze whether the government imposes an implicit penalty, we examine the application processing time for future IPO deals underwritten by the associated underwriters and find it to be significantly longer than for IPO deals underwritten by other underwriters. Overall, there is little evidence to suggest that the market penalizes underwriters for the rule-violating behavior of their client firms in China. Instead, the Chinese government implicitly penalizes them by imposing more stringent criteria on and lengthening the processing time of the IPO deals they subsequently underwrite.     

The Economics of IPO Stabilisation,Syndicates and Naked Shorts

Stabilisation is the bidding for and purchase of securities by an underwriter immediately after an offering for the purpose of preventing or retarding a fall in price. Stabilisation is price manipulation, but regulators allow it within strict limits – notably that stabilisation may not occur above the offer price. For legislators and market authorities, a false market is a price worth paying for an orderly market. This paper compares the rationale for regulators' allowing IPO stabilisation with its effects. It finds that stabilisation does have the intended effects, but that underwriters also seem to have other motives to stabilise, including favouring certain aftermarket sellers and enhancing their own reputation and profits. A puzzling aspect of stabilisation is why underwriters create ‘naked short’ positions which are loss‐making to cover when, as is usual, the aftermarket price rises to a premium. We set up a model to show that the lead underwriter may profit from a naked short at the expense of the rest of the syndicate given the way commissions are apportioned between them. We argue that a naked short mitigates the misalignment of interests which stabilisation causes between issuer and lead underwriter, although it does so at the expense of the non‐lead underwriters.     

VENTURE CAPITAL AND IPO LOCKUP EXPIRATION: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Most initial public offerings (IPOs) feature “lockup” agreements, which bar insiders from selling the stock for a set period following the IPO, usually 180 days. We examine stock price behavior in the period surrounding lockup expiration for a sample of 2,529 firms from 1988 to 1997. We find that lockup expirations are, on average, associated with significant and negative abnormal returns, but the losses are concentrated in firms with venture capital backing. For the venture‐capital‐backed group, the largest losses occur for high‐tech firms and firms with the greatest post‐IPO stock price increases, the largest relative trading volume in the period surrounding expiration, and the highest quality underwriters. JEL classification: G14, G24     

Does the Market Incorporate Previous IPO Withdrawals When Pricing Second‐Time IPOs?

This paper examines the initial public offering (IPO) valuations of issuers that return to the IPO market successfully after withdrawing their first IPO attempt. We find that these second-time IPOs sell at a significant discount relative to similar contemporaneous IPOs that succeed in their first attempt. We also demonstrate that switching underwriters on the second IPO attempt reduces, but does not eliminate, the discount for second-time IPOs. When compared to their matched first-time IPOs, second-time IPOs have similar price revisions and post-IPO long-run stock and operating performances. Overall, these results suggest that the negative information conveyed by the withdrawal event is incorporated into the lower offer valuations for second-time IPOs. Switching investment banks can mitigate, but not eliminate, the perceived higher risk of the second-time offerings.