Financial Distress and Bank Lending Relationships

We use a unique data set of bank loans to examine the wealth effects on lead lending banks when their borrowers suffer financial distress. We find a significant negative announcement return for the lead lending bank when a major corporate borrower announces default or bankruptcy. Banks with higher exposure to the distressed firm have larger negative announcement-period returns. The existence of a past lending relationship with the distressed firm results in larger wealth declines for the bank shareholders. Finally, financial distress also has a significant negative effect on borrower's returns.     

Consequences of Debt Forgiveness: Strategic Default Contagion and Lender Learning

I use a unique data set of loans to small business owners to examine whether lenders face adverse consequences when they grant debt forgiveness to borrowers. I provide evidence consistent with borrowers communicating their debt forgiveness to other borrowers, who then more frequently strategically default on their own obligations. This strategic default contagion is economically large. When the lender doubles debt forgiveness, the default rate increases by 10.9% on average. Using an exogenous shock to the lender's forgiveness policy, my findings suggest that as the lender learns about the extent of borrower communication the lender tightens its debt forgiveness policy to mitigate default contagion.     

Implications of Debt Renegotiation for Optimal Bank Policy and Firm Behavior

This paper analyzes the problems associated with the renegotiation of debt contracts involving a bank (the lender) and a firm (the borrower) when the latter is operated by a risk averse manager. Firms undertake risky projects with loan capital borrowed from the bank. When a firm cannot pay off a loan it is technically bankrupt. Both the borrower and the lender may however experience a Pareto-improvement in their positions by renegotiating the loan. By renegotiating the terms of the debt the financially distressed firm can avoid the stigmatization of bankruptcy and the bank can avoid the costs of seizing the borrower's assets. However, our main finding is that, from the bank's point of view, renegotiating as a policy of recovering loan payments may be inefficient in practice because of false bankruptcy claims and moral hazard problems associated with exposure of the borrowing firm to the risk of default. We present a solution to the false bankruptcy claim problem that involves a mixe d strategy between asset seizure by the bank and debt renegotiation.     

Incomplete Financial Contracts and Non-contractual Legal Rules: The Case of Debt Capacity and Fraudulent Conveyance Law

This paper illustrates how non-contractual legal rules sometimes alleviate contractual incompleteness. A serious incompleteness in debt contracts is the borrower's ability to fraudulently transfer assets to third parties, rendering the borrower insolvent. The incompleteness arises because contractual remedies are ineffective against third-party transferees who are not bound by the debt contract, while the borrower has no assets to recover. Fraudulent conveyance law is a non-contractual legal rule allowing recovery against these transferees. This increases debt capacity most dramatically for borrowers with highly liquid assets. Without non-contractual legal rules, high liquidation value implies low debt capacity. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G32; G38.     

A Valuation Model for Developing-Country Debt with Endogenous Rescheduling

Creditors have little recourse if a sovereign state repudiatesits external debt obligations. They can, however, threaten toimpose penalties if such action occurs which results in deadweightlosses to the system as a whole. A preferred alternative forboth borrower and lender is to recontract debt obligations.Reschedulings are a device that creditors can use to structurethe incentives faced by borrowers such that repudiation is nevera rational action. This article develops a numerical method of valuing the optionto reschedule. The model shows why fees are preferred to higherinterest spreads during a rescheduling exercise; why maturitiesget shorter prior to a debt crisis but are lengthened in therescheduling; why tougher supervision by regulatory authoritiescould be damaging to renewed voluntary loans; and why littlehas been done to attempt to seize the assets of countries thathave not repaid any interest or principal for extended periodsof time. The model shows that lenders are willing to commit greater amountsif reschedulings are possible than if they are not, and thatprecommitment to provide additional funds at rescheduling canraise the market value of existing debt and should not be construedas concessions by commercial lenders. Alternately, the modelcan be used to improve systems for ranking country creditworthiness,to assess the degree of adjustment required to spark a fullresumption of spontaneous lending, or to estimate by how muchinterest rates would have to fall to restore a country's creditworthiness.     

Mortgage Default with Asymmetric Information

This article analyzes mortgage-market equilibrium when borrower default costs are private information. By applying the approach of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), it is shown that asymmetric information regarding default costs distorts the contract choices available in the mortgage market, preventing safe borrowers (those with high default costs) from fully satisfying their demand for mortgage debt. Large loans are available for a substantial interest-rate premium, but only risky borrowers find this premium worth paying. The article builds on an empirical literature designed to test the ruthless-default principle from option-based models of mortgage pricing. That literature provides evidence against ruthless behavior, suggesting that default costs play an important role in borrower decisions. The article takes a further step by arguing that such costs are private information, which has important implications for market equilibrium.     

What is different about international lending?

An attempt is made to explain how enforceability is achievedin international debt contracts. Each bank announces the policyof denying credit to borrowers who default and chooses to adhereto it to maintain its reputation of being a tough bank to disciplineits other borrowers. Loans are made by syndicates of banks inorder to make the penalty for default severe enough so borrowerswould choose not to default voluntarily. The model predictsthat the interest rate charges on loans is smaller for the largerborrowers. Also, for any given borrower, the interest rate mayfall after each successive default.     

Differences in the Cost of Mortgage Credit Implications for Discrimination

This paper estimates the mortgage interest rate differences paid by Asian, Hispanic, and African–American borrowers to a national home mortgage lender in the years 1988–1989. Controlling for differences in market rates, rate lock protection, and borrower risk factors, conventional loan interest rates are almost perfectly race-neutral. The single deviation from race-neutrality is that when interest rates fall during the borrower's rate-lock period, only African–American borrowers are unable to capture a share of this decline. Government (FHA and VA) credit models show small premia paid by African–American borrowers of about $1.80 per month on average. In government lending, Hispanic borrowers alone are unable to capture rate declines occurring during the borrower's rate-lock period.     

Delinquency and Default in Arms: The Effects of Protected Equity and Loss Aversion

This paper extends the extant literature in understanding the effects of equity and debt on delinquency and default by focusing on a variant of borrower equity where part of equity is “protected”. The CPF scheme in Singapore stipulates that the refund of borrower’s retirement funds utilized for property purchase prior to September 2002 takes priority over loan obligations. A decision to utilize CPF for property purchase actually increases ex post delinquency and default risk as it effectively reduces cash equity commitment. In particular, any erosion in house value that places protected equity at risk translates into potential wealth reduction or financial liability for the borrower. While loss aversion is evident for non-distressed sellers, the effect of equity losses for distressed borrowers is not as clear. Our research suggests that averting losses in committed equity may be a secondary consideration for borrower subject to income shocks, recognizing that delinquency and default are precursors to foreclosure. Interestingly, we find that the borrowers are strongly averse to incurring protected equity-induced wealth loss or financial liability. This study suggests that the first-lien “anomaly” associated with CPF refund may reduce delinquency and default risks for mortgage backed securities.

P2P借款人的定价偏差与被动违约风险——基于“人人贷”数据的分析

本文主要通过行为资产定价理论和"人人贷"2014-2018年的数据,研究网络借贷(P2P)借款人定价偏差的影响因素及其与被动违约风险之间的关系。定价偏差是将P2P借贷利率分解为效率部分和无效率部分,并通过成本随机前沿模型得到。结果表明:借款人定价存在显著偏差且在不同群体间有所差异;借款人的粉饰行为未能起到减小定价偏差的作用,甚至会起到反效果;当借款人的声誉成本高于还款成本时,此时的违约主要表现为被动违约;即使借款人主观还款意愿强烈,但定价偏差越大,借款人剩余收入就越吃紧,还款过程中逾期次数和欠债比例增加的可能性就越大,进而引发被动违约风险。     

Bank Loans, Bonds, and Information Monopolies across the Business Cycle

Theory suggests that banks' private information about borrowers lets them hold up borrowers for higher interest rates. Since hold-up power increases with borrower risk, banks with exploitable information should be able to raise their rates in recessions by more than is justified by borrower risk alone. We test this hypothesis by comparing the pricing of loans for bank-dependent borrowers with the pricing of loans for borrowers with access to public debt markets, controlling for risk factors. Loan spreads rise in recessions, but firms with public debt market access pay lower spreads and their spreads rise significantly less in recessions.     

Strategic loan defaults and coordination: An experimental analysis

This paper experimentally studies the impact of bank and borrower fundamentals on loan repayment. We find that solvent borrowers are more likely to default strategically when the bank’s expected strength is low, although loan repayment is a Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium. Borrowers are also less likely to repay when other borrowers’ expected repayment capacity is low, regardless of banks’ fundamentals. We show that changes in expectations about bank and borrower fundamentals change the risk dominance properties of the borrowers’ coordination problem, and that these changes subsequently explain strategic defaults. For the individual borrower, loss aversion and negative past experiences reduce repayment, suggesting that bank failure can be contagious in times of distress.     

Are Commercial Mortgage Defaults Affected by Tax Considerations?

We study whether tax considerations are an important determinant of commercial mortgage default. We also study whether large lenders are better informed, or better at interpreting information for lending purposes, and hence have lower foreclosure rates; whether lenders have more information on larger borrowers than smaller borrowers, and hence have lower foreclosure rates on larger loans; and whether commercial mortgage defaults are related to debt service coverage and loan-to-values, both initial and contemporaneous. The paper’s main findings are fourfold. First, holding all else equal, there is evidence that tax considerations influence investors’ decisions about when to “put” assets to lenders. The results are consistent with the argument of Constantinides (J Financ Econ 13:65–89, 1984). Second, the evidence suggests that large lenders are especially knowledgeable about commercial mortgage borrowers and commercial property markets, in that they have lower foreclosure rates than smaller lenders. Third, on the question of whether lenders have more information on larger borrowers than smaller borrowers, we find that larger loans have, on average, lower default rates than smaller loans. Fourth, the findings suggest that lower default rates are associated with higher debt service coverage ratios, both initial and contemporaneous.     

The Role of Collateral in the Credit Acquisition Process: Evidence from SME Lending

This study tests the simultaneous impact of observed characteristics and private information on debt term contracts in a multi‐period setting, using a dataset of 12,666 credit approvals by one major Portuguese commercial bank during 2007–2010. The main results show that borrowers with good credit scores that know they have a high probability of success and are unlikely to default are more willing to pledge collateral in return for a lower interest rate premium (IRP). Furthermore, lenders tailor the specific terms of the contract, increasing both collateral requirements and the IRP from observed risk, for borrowers operating in riskier industries and with less credit availability. The results are robust to controls for joint debt terms negotiation and the degree of collateralization offered by the borrower.     

Institutional Differences and International Private Debt Markets: A Test Using Mandatory IFRS Adoption

Institutional differences between countries result in additional information risks between borrowers and lenders in cross‐border private loans. This study examines the effect of these information risks on the structure of optimal debt contracts in international (cross‐border) versus domestic private debt markets. Using mandatory IFRS adoption as an indicator for institutional changes that reduced differences between countries, I compare attributes of international versus domestic loans before and after IFRS adoption. I find that, in the pre‐IFRS period, international loans are associated with a higher credit spread, a weaker relationship between the bank and the borrower, a more diffuse loan syndicate, and less reliance on accounting‐based covenants than domestic loans. These results are consistent with incremental information risks in international debt markets that make it more costly for lenders to screen and monitor borrower credit quality, resulting in a more arm's‐length relationship between borrowers and lenders. Many of these associations attenuate after IFRS adoption, suggesting that the pre‐IFRS differences in contract terms are driven by incremental information risks related to institutional differences between countries. My findings imply that incremental information risks result in a different optimal contract in international debt contracts compared to domestic debt contracts.     

Optimal Stopping and Losses on Subprime Mortgages

Lender losses on mortgage loans arise from a two-stage process. In the first stage, the borrower stops making payments if and when default is optimal. The second stage is a lengthy and costly period during which the lender employs legal remedies to obtain possession and execute a sale of the collateral. This research uses data on subprime mortgage losses to explore the role of borrower and collateral characteristics, and local legal requirements, as well as traditional option variables in the decisions of borrowers and lenders. Although subprime borrowers default earlier, which should reduce lender losses, these borrowers, nevertheless, impose greater realized losses on mortgage lenders.     

The Maturity Rat Race

Why do some firms, especially financial institutions, finance themselves so short‐term? We show that extreme reliance on short‐term financing may be the outcome of a maturity rat race: a borrower may have an incentive to shorten the maturity of an individual creditor's debt contract because this dilutes other creditors. In response, other creditors opt for shorter maturity contracts as well. This dynamic toward short maturities is present whenever interim information is mostly about the probability of default rather than the recovery in default. For borrowers that cannot commit to a maturity structure, equilibrium financing is inefficiently short‐term.     

Termination of distressed residential mortgages: An empirical analysis

A sample of 209 distressed mortgages is used to analyze the terminations of distressed mortgages. An option-based model is compared to a traditional default model. Results show that the traditional model is statistically superior. However, the model's ability to identify a default is similar to that of the simpler option-based model. Alternative measures of borrower's equity are compared. Measuring borrower's equity using total debt more accurately explains default than using either the mortgage balance or the mortgage value.     

The Influence of Foreclosure Delays on Borrowers' Default Behavior

This paper conducts loan‐level analysis to investigate the influence of expected foreclosure delay on a borrower's default propensity. We include the actual foreclosure times in the analysis to capture the dynamic nature of foreclosure duration. Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find a statistically and economically significant impact of foreclosure delay on borrower default behavior. In the current market condition where many borrowers have negative equity, the increase in delay may make default an optimal choice for more borrowers. The negative effect of increased foreclosure delay may need to be considered when devising policies to aid troubled borrowers.     

How does working in a finance profession affect mortgage delinquency?

This paper uses a dataset from a leading American subprime lender, which contains detailed information on borrower and loan characteristics. We find that financial professionals are less likely to become delinquent. This effect cannot be explained by borrower characteristics, such as income, education, loan terms, property characteristics, geographic effects, or strategic default. We also find variation in the effect of working in a financial profession across borrowers of different ages and income levels. We discuss explanations for these results.