浅析EVA考核对企业过度投资行为的抑制效应——基于我国房地产行业的经验证据

本文选取2010-2015年134家沪深A股上市的房地产企业连续六年的财务数据作为研究样本,并进行了描述性统计分析,定量分析了EVA考核与企业过度投资行为之间的影响关系,而且研究结论表明:企业积极实施EVA绩效考核政策对我国上市的房地产企业的过度投资行为具有显著的抑制效用.此外,本文的研究结论不仅有利于厘清EVA考核与抑制企业过度投资之间的关系,而且可以为我国房地产公司进一步完善与实施EVA考核制度提供直接的经验证据.     

浅析预算软约束对EVA治理过度投资效应的影响

我国国有企业过度投资严重的问题由来已久,为缓解这一问题,国资委在国有企业中推行EVA业绩考核与评价机制.已有文献研究表明EVA业绩考核体系能够有效抑制企业的过度投资现象,但我国仍然处于经济转轨时期,一些特殊的制度因素,比如预算软约束问题会带来融资条件的差异,从而会对微观企业的过度投资产生影响.那么,预算软约束问题是否会影响EVA考核治理过度投资的有效性这一问题就值得受到关注.本文通过分析,认为EVA可以有效缓解"内部人控制"问题引起的预算软约束所产生的过度投资问题,但无法有效缓解政策性负担引起的预算软约束所产生的过度投资问题.     

EVA考核提升了企业价值吗?——来自中国国有上市公司的经验证据

国资委于2010年开始在中央企业推行EVA考核,目的就是促进企业由利润管理转向价值管理,实现企业价值不断提升。本文以2010-2012年沪深主板A股国有上市公司为样本,实证检验了EVA考核对企业价值提升的影响后果,并进一步地从管理层投资决策行为视角,探究了投资效率在EVA考核对企业价值提升中的作用。研究结果表明,EVA考核确实提升了企业价值;进一步研究发现,EVA考核目前主要是通过抑制过度投资进而影响企业价值提升的。     

绿色信贷政策与企业过度投资

本文从企业投资的角度考察绿色信贷政策的实施效果,利用双重差分模型检验绿色信贷政策对重污染企业过度投资的影响及其作用机理.研究发现:绿色信贷政策显著抑制重污染企业过度投资;相对于非国有企业、高环境规制地区企业,绿色信贷对企业过度投资的抑制效应在国有企业、低环境规制地区企业更为显著.作用机理检验表明:绿色信贷通过缓解代理问题影响企业过度投资.绿色信贷政策对企业过度投资的抑制作用呈递增的时间趋势.     

EVA在央企经营业绩考核中的应用问题及对策思考

现代企业追求股东价值最大化目标,而要实现这经营目标关键取决于如何开展价值管理(Value Based Management,VBM).要不断扩大企业价值,前提就是要做好企业经营者的价值管理绩效评价工作.在这种背景下,基于EVA的企业绩效评价体系脱颖而出,成为当前企业界广为流行的企业绩效评价体系之一.近年来国内企业也在开始探索如何使用EVA评价体系,但由于EVA评价体系对于不同企业来说,以及在不同经营环境下,其的实施效果会出现巨大的反差,央企在普及EVA评价过程中,必然会遇到一些棘手问题难以解决,这都需要在以后实践活动中不断发展和完善.本文主要分析了当前央企在使用EVA业绩评价方法存在的主要问题,并提出了有效应对措施.     

高管团队背景特征视角下的会计稳健性与投资效率关系研究

本文以2008-2011年沪深A股上市公司为研究对象,区分产权性质,实证检验了会计稳健性对投资效率的影响,以及高管团队背景特征对二者关系的影响。研究发现,会计稳健性会抑制投资过度,加剧投资不足;国有企业的会计稳健性加剧投资不足和抑制投资过度的程度要弱于非国有企业。进一步研究发现,国有企业高管团队的平均年龄、任期异质性、教育背景及其异质性显著影响会计稳健性与非效率投资的关系,非国有企业高管团队的任期及其异质性、教育背景及其异质性显著影响会计稳健性与非效率投资关系。     

环境规制、政治关联与投资效率

以"十五"到"十二五"期间的工业企业上市公司为总体研究样本,从环境规制视角,考察政治关联对企业投资效率的影响。研究表明尽管环境规制降低了企业的投资效率,而对于受环境规制越严格的企业而言,政治关联则越有助于抑制其投资过度和减少投资不足,从而提高投资效率。但政治关联的这种作用机理在环境规制较弱的"十五"期间没能发挥作用。进一步的研究发现,政治关联对受环境规制越严格的国有企业,在投资过度方面有抑制作用,而对非国有企业没有显著影响;但无论是国有还是非国有企业,政治关联均有助于减少其投资不足程度,表明政治关联对不同产权性质企业的投资影响作用机理有所不同。     

央企引入EVA业绩考核办法的理论基础

本文在EVA理论的基础上,阐述了经济增加值的核心思想及实施的现实意义,从央企的角度来剖析引人EVA前后对央企的经济价值的变化,并对央企实行的EVA考核进行一次彻底的评价,进而改进考核标准,促使央企企业价值最大化。     

电信企业固定资产投资效益管理体系设计

<正>一、研究背景和意义投资建设是电信运营商每年都在进行的一项基本工作。电信业庞大的固定资产折旧一般占到企业成本的30%,且每年的新增投资需求巨大,固定资产投资效益对企业价值的影响是十分巨大的。本体系的设计主要基于以下背景:(一)2010年起国资委在央企全面实行EVA考核企业价值(EVA)创造的主要影响因素有收入增长率、资本性支出占收比、付现成本和资本成本(WACC)等。对于电信企     

央企深入开展EVA考核与管理的探讨

2011年是国资委推行EVA考核的第二年,也是各大央企强化EVA业绩考核的一年,就我目前接触的40多家央企来说,国资委推行EVA考核应该取得了预期效果,EVA考核在一定程度上抑制了部分央企的投资冲动,非主业投资的项目有所减少,研发投入的积极性有所提升,价值创造的理念在央企得到了有效贯彻,企业管理者基本树立了资本成本的思...     

中国式经济增加值考核是否会导致投资不足

以央企控股上市公司为样本,研究发现经济增加值不仅没有导致企业投资不足,而且起到了抑制作用。研究结果表明,经济增加值为核心的业绩评价方式对当前央企构建价值投资理念和实现股东价值最大化经营目标具有重要正向作用。     

国企改革背景下的企业创新和相对绩效评价——基于中国上市国有企业的实证研究

"创新驱动战略"和"激励约束机制"成为本轮国企改革的关键词。基于此背景,本文选取2008-2018年中国上市国有企业数据,探究了企业创新和相对绩效评价(RPE)之间的关系,得到两个结论:第一,得益于我国薪酬制度改革的不断深入,RPE在上市国有企业的薪酬合同中得到广泛应用;第二,由于创新投入对企业绩效有滞后效应,当企业增加研发投入时,企业高管可能会出于自利动机而减少RPE的使用。对此,本文从政府和企业两方面提出了解决建议。     

The crowding out effect of booming real estate markets on corporate TFP: evidence from China

This paper explores the impact of housing price appreciation on corporate total factor productivity (TFP) in Chinese A‐share listed corporations. Results show that increasing real estate prices negatively affect corporate TFP. Meanwhile, we find that the deterring effect is especially significant for state‐owned enterprises (SOEs), large corporations and manufacturing corporations. This research further provides suggestive evidence that managerial myopia may be one potential explanation for the crowding out effect of increasing housing prices. When home purchase is under restriction, however, the negative impact of rising housing prices on corporate TFP declines sharply. This study illustrates the efficiency cost of China's booming real estate market.     

THE EVA REVOLUTION

Stern Stewart's EVA framework for financial management and incentive compensation is the practical application of both modern financial theory and classical economics to the problems of running a business. It is a fundamental way of measuring and motivating corporate performance that encourages managers to make decisions that make economic sense, even when conventional accounting-based measures of performance tell them to do otherwise. Moreover, EVA provides a consistent basis for a comprehensive system of corporate financial management—one that is capable of guiding all corporate decisions, from annual operating budgets to capital budgeting, strategic planning, and acquisitions and divestitures. It also provides companies with a "language" for communicating their goals and achievements to investors—a language that the market is increasingly coming to interpret as a sign of superior future performance.
The authors report that more than 300 companies have implemented Stern Stewart's EVA framework, including a growing number of converts in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. After describing significant behavioral changes at a number of EVA companies, the article focuses in detail on a single case history—that of auto parts manufacturer Federal-Mogul. Besides bringing about a dramatic change in the company's strategy and significant operating efficiencies, the adoption of EVA also led to an interesting change in Federal—Mogul's organizational structure—a combination of two large business units into a single profit center designed to achieve greater cooperation and synergies between the units.     

Corporate Governance,Product Market Competition,and the Wealth Effect of R&D Spending Changes

This article examines whether corporate governance and product market competition interact to affect the profitability of corporate research and development (R&D) investments. Firms announcing R&D spending changes experience positive and significant wealth effects, and these effects are mainly driven by good‐governance firms. Investors appear to view announcements of R&D spending changes undertaken by firms with stronger shareholder rights as evidence of value creation. Moreover, the favorable wealth effects are stronger for good‐governance firms in noncompetitive industries than in competitive industries, supporting the argument that good governance substitutes for product market competition.     

经济利润、市场竞争与企业价值

从经济利润的涵义入手,从市场竞争的角度阐述了经济利润在企业经营过程中的变化趋势。由于市场竞争最终会趋于一个相对稳定的状态,即均衡竞争,因此,企业的投资资本回报率在充分竞争下会等于资本成本,经济利润最终将趋于零。经济利润与经济利润趋于零的思想对传统的估值理念与估值方法提出了新的挑战,为此,在经济增加值(EVA)和剩余收益(RI)估值模型原有的理论基础上,探讨了如何将新的估值理念运用到这两种估值模型中。     

Tracing back to the source: Understanding the corporate governance of boards of directors in Chinese SOEs

Based on the relevant theories of corporate governance and the special institutional background of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), this paper systematically reviews the literature on the independence and governance effect of SOE boards. We find that the governance effect of SOE boards is driven by the dual characteristics of SOEs: state involvement in ownership and market incentives. With the state involved in ownership, SOEs adhere to the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC), which results in an enhanced governance effect. Under market incentives, SOEs tend to have an optimal board structure that helps mitigate both the shareholder–management agency problem (Type I agency problem) and the controlling shareholder–minority shareholder agency problem (Type II agency problem). In terms of the governance effect of boards, directors appointed by non-controlling shareholders are effective in alleviating Type I and Type II agency problems, and this highlights the importance of mixed-ownership reforms in SOEs. Independent directors, especially those with a professional background, also play a role in improving corporate governance. However, independent directors in SOEs have relatively weak incentives to monitor, which limits their governance effect. This paper shows positive implications for promoting mixed-ownership reforms and improving board governance in SOEs.     

Product Market Competition and Shareholder Rights: International Evidence

This paper examines the interaction between product market competition and international differences in shareholder rights in relation to firm performance and corporate policies. In contrast to existing literature, we provide evidence of complementarities between product market competition and country shareholder rights protections. The benefits of shareholder rights protections for firm performance are conditional on the presence of a competitive industry environment. We find that stronger shareholder rights protections are associated with better firm performance in competitive industries. However, this relation is not significant in concentrated industries. Consistent results are obtained from the analysis of key corporate policies.     

Does broadband infrastructure affect corporate mergers and acquisitions? Quasi-natural experimental evidence from China

This study investigates the relationship between broadband infrastructure and corporate M&A. Using the shock of “Broadband China” policy, we conduct difference-in-differences estimations and find that broadband infrastructure significantly increases corporate M&A, which remains robust after a series of robustness checks. Further analysis shows that the underlying mechanism is alleviating information asymmetry and increasing market competition. Finally, the heterogeneity analysis shows that our results are significant mainly in the group with high regional market segmentation, manufacturing industries, and non-state enterprises. Overall, this study enriches the research on the driving factors of M&A at the firm level and provides a micro-level evaluation of economic consequences of broadband infrastructure.     

机构投资者的治理角色——过度投资视角

本文以2007~2009年我国上市公司的过度投资行为为背景,考察机构投资者持股对过度投资的治理角色。研究结果表明,机构的期末持股比例、长线型机构投资者尤其是长线型基金与过度投资显著负相关,表现为有效监督者的角色;短线型机构投资者则缺乏公司治理的意愿和动机,表现为利益攫取者的角色。研究结果意味着,我国的机构投资者同时具备有效监督者和利益攫取者的角色,何时表现出何种角色取决于持股比例以及持股时间。