Exits,Performance, and Late Stage Private Equity: the Case of UK Management Buy‐outs

Using a hand‐collected dataset of 1,225 buy‐outs, we examine post buy‐out and post exit long term abnormal operating performance of UK management buy‐outs, during the period 1980–2009. Our univariate and panel data analysis of post buy‐out performance conclusively show positive changes in output. We also find strong evidence for improvements in employment and output and a lack of significant changes in efficiency and profitability following initial public offerings (IPO) exits. IPOs from the main London Stock Exchange (LSE) market outperform their counterparts from the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) only in terms of changes in output. For secondary management buy outs (SMBOs), performance declines during the first buy‐out but in the second buy‐out performance stabilises until year three, after which profitability and efficiency fall while employment increases. Although private equity (PE) backed buy‐outs do not exhibit either post buy‐out or post exit underperformance, they fail to over‐perform their non‐PE backed counterparts. In the subsample of buy‐outs exiting via IPOs on the AIM, PE firms do not outperform non‐PE buy‐outs. Our findings highlight the importance of tracing the overall performance of buy‐outs over a longer period and controlling for sample selection bias related to the provision of PE backing.     

Heterogeneous Beliefs,IPO Valuation,and the Economic Role of the Underwriter in IPOs

We empirically analyze the economic role of the underwriter in initial public offerings (IPOs), distinguishing between the “certification” and “market power” hypotheses. We find that equity in high‐reputation underwriter backed IPOs is priced higher and further away from intrinsic value than that in low‐reputation underwriter backed IPOs. Our results are robust to controlling for the endogenous selection of firms to take public by underwriters. Overall, our results support the market power hypothesis and reject the certification hypothesis, indicating that the role of underwriters is to obtain the highest possible valuation for the IPOs that they back rather than to price the equity close to intrinsic value.     

Growth Capital‐Backed IPOs

Growth capital investing is the financing of growing businesses that are investing in tangible assets and the acquisition of other companies. Growth capital is common in retailing, restaurant chains, and health care management, and represents 12% of all venture capital (VC)‐backed initial public offerings (IPOs). Since 1980, investing in growth capital‐backed IPOs has produced mean three‐year style‐adjusted buy‐and‐hold returns of +25.2%, in contrast to style‐adjusted returns of approximately zero for other VC‐backed and buyout‐backed IPOs. One‐third of growth capital‐backed IPOs are rollups and these have produced much higher returns for investors than rollups without a financial sponsor.     

What drives the valuation premium in IPOs versus acquisitions? An empirical analysis

Using a hand-collected data set of private firm acquisitions and IPOs, this paper develops the first empirical analysis in the literature of the “IPO valuation premium puzzle,” which refers to a situation where many private firms choose to be acquired rather than to go public at higher valuations. We also test several new hypotheses regarding a private firm's choice between IPOs and acquisitions. Our analysis of private firm valuations in IPOs and acquisitions indicates that IPO valuation premia disappear for larger VC backed firms after controlling for various observable factors affecting a firm's propensity to choose IPOs over acquisitions. Further, after controlling for the long-run component of the expected payoff to firm insiders from an IPO exit, we find that the IPO valuation premium vanishes even for larger non-VC backed firms and shrinks substantially for smaller firms as well. Our Heckman-style treatment effects regression analysis demonstrates that the above results are robust to controlling for the selection of exit mechanism by firm insiders based on unobservables. Our findings on private firms' choice between IPOs and acquisitions can be summarized as follows. First, firms operating in industries characterized by the absence of a dominant market player (and therefore more viable against product market competition) are more likely to go public rather than to be acquired. Second, more capital intensive firms, those operating in industries characterized by greater private benefits of control, and those which are harder to value by IPO market investors are more likely to go public rather than to be acquired. Third, the likelihood of an IPO over an acquisition is greater for venture backed firms and those characterized by higher pre-exit sales growth.     

Multiple lead underwriting syndicate and IPO pricing

This paper examines the role of multiple lead underwriters (MLUs) in pricing initial public offerings (IPOs) by considering certification and market power hypotheses. Consistent with the notion that MLUs provide certification to the issue, we find that IPOs backed by MLUs price the offer closer to the intrinsic value of the firm than firms backed by single lead underwriters. Our results also indicate that IPOs led by MLUs experience lower initial return, lower variability of initial returns and better long-run performance. The results are robust to self-selection and omitted variable biases. MLU led offerings also exhibit a lower risk of withdrawal and are more likely to conduct a larger secondary equity offering.     

IPO or SBO?: The Increasing Importance of Operational Performance for Private Equity Exits Following the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–08

The authors report the findings of their recent study of the role of portfolio company operating performance in determining the choice of exit options by private equity firms between initial public offerings (IPOs) and secondary buyouts (SBOs), and how that role may have changed since the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2008. Virtually all studies of PE exits in all countries have found that portfolio companies that exit through IPOs tend to be larger and have higher operating returns than companies that exit through SBOs or sales to other companies. After examining the exits of PE portfolio companies based in Denmark and Sweden during the period 2003–2013, the authors report that, although general market conditions continue to be a major factor, operating performance and size have become even more important requirements for IPO exits since the crisis. And thus PE firms that fail to make operating improvements in their portfolio companies are likely to find their exit options limited.     

What Happens During the Private Period?: Evidence from Public‐to‐Private Reverse LBOs

This study provides new evidence on the restructuring activities undertaken by public‐to‐private reverse leveraged buyouts (RLBOs) while owned by private equity firms. The authors' comprehensive sample of public‐to‐private LBOs that return to public ownership through IPOs enables them to observe changes in profitability, valuation, financial structure, operating structure, and cost structure from the time the firms go private through (and after) their emergence through (re‐) IPOs. With their exclusive focus on reverse LBOs involving public‐to‐private deals, the authors reach findings that contradict previous conclusions about RLBOs. At the time of the LBO, the target firms in reverse LBOs are more levered than their peers, pay higher dividends, and are more profitable than their peers. At the same time, however, they appear to have lower market valuations before the buyouts. During the private period, the target firms of reverse LBOs achieve significant increases in employee productivity, asset restructuring, and improved gross margins, while operating with substantially higher levels of debt financing, lower levels of cash and working capital, and greater concentration of equity ownership. After the companies return to public ownership through IPOs, such companies continue to operate with higher leverage and ownership concentration than their publicly traded peers while producing further increases in profitability, resulting in substantial increases in both enterprise and equity valuation. The authors' analysis also shows that higher debt levels from the buyout play an important role in increased enterprise values. The evidence suggests that possible undervaluation as well as expected efficiency gains from restructuring actions are the primary motives for such reverse LBOs.     

Equity Markets Do Not Fit All: an Analysis of Public‐to‐Private Deals in Continental Europe

Concentration of family‐based ownership and recent development of private equity companies in Continental Europe suggest that the motivations and results of public‐to‐private (PTP) deals may differ from well‐studied cases in the USA and the UK. We overview the PTP market and measure the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of 106 PTP deals concluded in Continental Europe from 2000 to 2005, introducing a model to explain the abnormal returns. Our results partially confirm findings of previous studies, namely, that undervalued and smaller firms register higher CARs. We additionally find that deals promoted by family owners register higher abnormal returns, whereas financial investors and private operating firms show no impact.     

Does IPO Pricing Reflect Public Information? New Insights from Equity Carve‐Outs

We examine the efficiency of initial public offering (IPO) pricing using a sample of over 300 equity carve‐outs from 1985 to 2009. The partial adjustment theory posits that the initial return of IPOs is predictable based on private information, but public information is fully incorporated. Prospect theory is consistent with both private and public information not being fully incorporated in the offer price. Our analysis confirms that both price update and initial return of carve‐out IPOs can be predicted based on the parent firm's returns during the prepricing and preissuing periods. Further, postissue ownership of the parent firm is associated with significantly higher price update and initial return, while IPOs where the majority of the proceeds are paid out register lower initial return. The size of the subsidiary and relative size of the offering are also significantly related to price update and initial return. These findings are consistent with prospect theory.     

The Pricing of Equity Carve-Outs

This article examines the pricing of stock for 251 equity carve‐outs during the 1986–1995 period. We document a mean initial‐day return of 5.83% and a mean one‐week return of 5.43%. Among carve‐outs, the initial underpricing is lower for issues represented by high prestige investment bankers and those that have a lower offer price. In comparison with 251 initial public offering (IPO) firms matched by size and book‐to‐market ratio of equity, carveouts exhibit significantly lower initial‐day returns, but their buy‐and‐hold returns for sixmonth and one‐year periods are not significantly different from IPOs. The IPO firms have a three‐year return of 28.82% which is significantly higher than the 21.07% return for the carve‐out firms.     

WHAT DETERMINES SEO OFFER‐DAY RETURNS?

We examine seasoned equity offering (SEO) initial‐day returns after controlling for the dilution effect from the SEO discount and new shares offered. Contrary to the existing literature that ignores the effect of dilution, we find that initial‐day returns are not consistently positive. Modeling adjusted initial‐day returns, we show that dilution‐adjusted initial‐day returns respond to partial price adjustments reflecting both private and public information. Additional determinants of SEO offer‐day returns include lockup length, discount reversal, prior operating performance, and underwriter reputation. Long‐run tests reveal that adjusted initial‐day returns are not predictive of postissuance long‐term performance.     

The impact of venture capital backing on the corporate governance of Australian initial public offerings

This study explores the role of venture capitalists on investee boards at the time of listing for 552 initial public offerings. Australian board structures and mechanisms are more similar to those in the US and the United Kingdom, but market activity characteristics are more similar to Japanese and German systems. Further, the Australian private equity market is relatively young compared to US and European markets. IPOs backed by venture capital have more independent boards, similar to US IPOs. Venture capitalists improve governance by using their networks to recruit specialist independent directors with industry experience.     

Venture capital reputation and investment performance

I propose a new measure of venture capital (VC) firm reputation and analyze its performance implications on private companies. Controlling for portfolio company quality and other VC-specific factors including experience, connectedness, syndication, industry competition, exit conditions, and investment environment, I find companies backed by more reputable VCs by initial public offering (IPO) capitalization share (based on cumulative market capitalization of IPOs backed by the VC), are more likely to exit successfully, access public markets faster, and have higher asset productivity at IPOs. Further tests suggest VCs’ IPO Capitalization share effectively captures both VC screening and monitoring expertise. My findings have financial implications for limited partners and entrepreneurs regarding their VC-sorting activities.     

Evidence on the Trade-Off between Risk and Return for IPO and SEO Firms

Do the low long‐run average returns of equity issuers reflect underperformance due to mispricing or the risk characteristics of the issuing firms? We shed new light on this question by examining how institutional lenders price loans of equity issuing firms. Accounting for standard risk factors, we find that equity issuing firms' expected debt return is equivalent to the expected debt return of nonissuing firms, implying that institutional lenders perceive equity issuers to be as risky as similar nonissuing firms. In general, institutional lenders perceive small and high book‐to‐market borrowers as systematically riskier than larger borrowers with low book‐to‐market ratios, consistent with the asset pricing approach in Fama and French (1993) . Finally, we find that firms' expected debt returns decline after equity offerings, consistent with recent theoretical arguments suggesting that firm risk should decline following an equity offering. Overall, our analysis provides novel evidence consistent with risk‐based explanations for the observed equity returns following IPOs and SEOs.     

An empirical investigation of Yankee stock offerings

This paper examines the operating and investment performance of 100 foreign firms that conduct their initial public offerings (IPOs) in the U.S. (Yankee stock offerings). The uniqueness of these firms is that the U.S. IPOs are their first public equity issue in any market, including the home market. We find significant improvement in the operating performance subsequent to these U.S. IPO events and firms from countries with poor investor protection benefit more. Compared to various benchmarks, unlike the significant underperformance of IPOs documented in many countries, these firms show no significant abnormal long-run stock market performance after 1, 3, or 5 years of seasoning. The findings are consistent with signaling and selective entry hypotheses.     

THE MARKET'S PRICING OF DEBT IPOs

Based on the authors' recent study published in the Journal of Financial Economics , this article summarizes new evidence on the first-day and aftermarket price performance of a firm's first public offer of bonds after its equity IPO. Unlike equity IPOs, such bond IPOs are not underpriced on average. However, bonds that are more equity-like (junk bonds) are underpriced at the initial offer whereas high-grade debt is actually overpriced. This finding supports the view that riskier debt issues have a larger equity component and, as a consequence, a higher degree of information asymmetry.
The authors' study also showed that less prestigious underwriters are associated with more underpriced offers, and that the issuer's stock market listing plays an important role in determining the first-day price performance of bond IPOs. The degree of underpricing is lower for bonds issued by firms whose equity is listed on NYSE/AMEX than for bonds issued by firms listed on Nasdaq. Finally, the aftermarket performance for the full sample and various subsamples is consistent with bond market efficiency in the sense that, once prices adjust after the first day of trading, there are no clearly exploitable opportunities for excess returns.     

University of Texas Roundtable on The Role of Private Equity in the Financing and Restructuring of Oil and Gas Companies

In this second of two University of Texas roundtables, four highly successful veterans of the U.S. energy industry, with considerable experience running both public and private companies, discuss recent developments in this rapidly evolving industry. Among the most remarkable—and a major focus of this discussion—is the dramatic expansion of the output and productivity of the Permian Basin of West Texas, and the role of private equity in accomplishing it. Although the Permian has been a major source of oil and gas since 1920, the combination of massive horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing has contributed to a tripling of production volumes from about 800,000 barrels per day to 2.5 million during the past ten years. In fact, the productivity gains are said to be so great that, even with the huge run‐up in the cost of acquiring acreage (to as high as $40,000 per acre), today's producers are projecting annual operating returns of 20% even if oil prices fail to rise above their current level of about $50 a barrel. What's more, there appears to have been a fairly clear division of labor between private and public companies in this recent development of the Permian. With most of the high‐priced acreage now being acquired by larger public companies, the primary role of private equity has been to identify and make good on opportunities to increase the productivity and value of smaller operations that can then be sold to public companies—companies that have the size and access to capital to benefit from the economies of scale produced by combining them with their other operations. Thanks to their earlier position in the value chain, investments by private equity groups have generally not only produced higher payoffs, on average, but involved larger operating and financial risks. And this difference in risk profile is reflected in a notable difference in hedging practices between public and private equity‐controlled companies. This difference was summed up as follows by a private equity partner who has also run several public oil and gas companies: To a much greater extent in private equity than in public companies, we think of our projects and companies as delivering value that is largely independent of changes in oil prices. Hedging is our way of saying we don't want to take oil price risk if we don't have to. We do not count on price increases to make our required returns. The returns come from operating the company successfully without the help of commodity prices.     

Characterizing the Risk of IPO Long‐Run Returns: The Impact of Momentum,Liquidity, Skewness,and Investment

We study 6,686 initial public offerings (IPOs) spanning the period 1981‐2005 and find that the new issues puzzle disappears in a Fama‐French three‐factor framework. IPOs do not underperform in the aftermarket on a risk‐adjusted basis and do not underperform a matched sample of nonissuers. IPO underperformance is concentrated in the 1980s and early 1990s, and IPOs either perform the same as the market or outperform on a risk‐adjusted basis from 1998 to 2005. We find that outperformance in the later period is driven by large firms. Factors for momentum, investment, liquidity, and skewness help to explain aftermarket returns, although size and book‐to‐market tend to proxy for skewness. IPO investors receive smaller expected returns due to negative momentum and investment exposure and in exchange for higher liquidity.     

Long-run stock performance of German initial public offerings and seasoned equity issues

We estimate the long-run stock performance after initial public offerings (IPOs) in the German capital market with a larger sample than prior studies and alternative benchmarks (the equally and the value-weighted market portfolio, size portfolios and matching stocks). In addition we present the first results on the long-run performance after seasoned equity issues (SEOs) in Germany. We conclude that size portfolios and matching stocks are better benchmarks than market portfolios. Using buy‐and-hold abnormal returns, we estimate that German stocks involved in an IPO or in a SEO, on average, underperform a portfolio consisting of stocks with a similar market capitalization by 6% in three years. This is considerably less than the underperformance after IPOs and SEOs in the US market reported by Loughran and Ritter (1995) and the underperformance after IPOs in Germany reported by Ljungqvist (1997). We also show that the apparent underperformance of the 1988–1990 IPO cohort discussed by Ljungqvist (1997) disappears when the abnormal performance estimate is based on size instead of market portfolios.     

Europe's Second Markets for Small Companies

European stock exchanges have repeatedly opened second markets to list small companies. We explain the motivation for the creation of these second markets, and the reasons why many of them have failed. We find that the average long‐run performance of initial public offerings (IPOs) on second markets is dramatically worse than for main market IPOs. However, the second markets have provided firms with the opportunity to raise funds at the IPO and in follow‐on offerings. The relative success of London's AIM, which is an exchange‐regulated market with minimal regulations, has led other European stock exchanges to establish similar non‐EU regulated second markets. Most of the IPOs on these exchange‐regulated markets are offered exclusively to institutional investors, and are equivalent to private placements. These IPOs, which frequently raise only a few million euros, rarely develop liquid trading.