The value of ongoing venture capital investment to newly listed firms

We examine whether the market values continuing venture capital (VC) investor involvement in firms post-IPO. Compared to the US, Australian VC investors exit their investments post-IPO by on-market sales rather than distribution of holdings to their investors. Lockup periods tend to be longer and ownership thresholds for reporting trades lower. We find that the market responds positively to buy transactions, negatively to sell transactions of VC investors and negatively to the resignation of VC directors. These results are consistent with VC investors in the firm having a positive influence and creating value from which the VCs and other shareholders benefit.     

Cross‐border mergers and acquisitions: The role of private equity firms

Research summary: We show that private equity ownership (“PE backing”) of the acquirer is a signal of deal quality in cross‐border takeovers. As such, PE‐backed acquirers experience higher announcement returns in cross‐border takeovers, but only if targets are in poor information environments. We show that PE backing is a positive market signal because of PE firms' experience and networks that result from prior deals in target countries. We document that the market correctly anticipates that operating performance of PE‐backed acquirers increases as a result of cross‐border mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Managerial summary: We study cross‐border acquisitions by acquirers that are partially owned by private equity firms (“PE backing”). Cross‐border acquisitions are challenging as acquirers often have little information about targets. We document that investors react positively to cross‐border deals of PE‐backed acquirers—their stock prices increase upon deal announcements. However, this is only the case if targets are in countries with poor information environments. This is because PE backing allows acquirers to access PE firms' deal experience and networks. This makes it easier to identify and evaluate good targets, making it more (less) likely that a deal eventually creates (destroys) value. Consistent with this, we find that earnings of PE‐backed acquirers increase after buying targets in poor information environments. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Corporate environmental marketing: An environmental marketing action model

A model of environmental marketing action and success is proposed, which includes a range of variables and examines the relationship between them. Environmental success is partly determined by the level of Environmental Marketing Action which varies between level 0 and level 8 and which directly determines the extent of environmental marketing success. Perceptions of environmental consciousness, the subjective norm and net total risk determine the level of environmental marketing action. Beliefs with regard to stakeholders and events and the motivation to comply with these beliefs combine to form the subjective norm.     

Poverty measures and definitions

In this article an attempt is made to explain what poverty means and how it is measured. Absolute income measures are discussed with reference to England, America, Australia and South Africa. These encompass the poverty line, the social security administration measure, the Henderson poverty line, the South African poverty datum line and the poverty gap. Relative income measures of poverty used in England, America and Australia are described. Absolute measures of poverty, the income‐net worth approach, a definition that includes other resources and a balance sheet method are explained. Socio‐economic measures are dealt with. These include the sociological concept of poverty, socio‐economic status measures and the culture of poverty view. Other measures described are public dependency and residential measures, mortality measures, a normative measure and subjective poverty.     

Corporate Governance and the Cost of Capital: Evidence from Australian Companies

The authors examine a sample of large Australian companies over a 10‐year period with the aim of analyzing the role that firm‐level corporate governance mechanisms such as insider ownership and independent boards play in explaining a company's cost of capital. The Australian corporate system offers a unique environment for assessing the impact of corporate governance mechanisms. Australian companies have board structures and mechanisms that are similar in design to Anglo‐Saxon boards while offering a striking contrast to those of German and Japanese boards. At the same time, however, the Australian market for corporate control is much less active as a corrective mechanism against management entrenchment than its U.S. and U.K. counterparts, making the role of internal governance mechanisms potentially more important in Australia than elsewhere. The authors report that greater insider ownership, the presence of institutional blockholders, and independent boards are all associated with reductions in the perceived risk of a firm, thereby leading investors to demand lower rates of return on capital. In so doing, the study provides evidence of the important role of corporate governance in increasing corporate values.     

Poverty within a black township in Johannesburg

Conclusion This paper attempts to do no more than identify the different types of programs that should be carried out. No attempt has been made here to discuss their implementation, origanizational requirements, methods, or procedures as well as the finances.     

The impact of venture capital backing on the corporate governance of Australian initial public offerings

This study explores the role of venture capitalists on investee boards at the time of listing for 552 initial public offerings. Australian board structures and mechanisms are more similar to those in the US and the United Kingdom, but market activity characteristics are more similar to Japanese and German systems. Further, the Australian private equity market is relatively young compared to US and European markets. IPOs backed by venture capital have more independent boards, similar to US IPOs. Venture capitalists improve governance by using their networks to recruit specialist independent directors with industry experience.