Model Uncertainty, Limited Market Participation, and Asset Prices

We demonstrate that limited participation can arise endogenouslyin the presence of model uncertainty and heterogeneous uncertainty-averseinvestors. When uncertainty dispersion among investors is small,full participation prevails in equilibrium. Equity premium isrelated to the average uncertainty among investors and a conglomeratetrades at a price equal to the sum of its single-segment components.When uncertainty dispersion is large, investors with high uncertaintychoose not to participate in the stock market, resulting inlimited market participation. When limited participation occurs,participation rate and equity premium can decrease in uncertaintydispersion and a conglomerate trades at a discount.     

Political uncertainty and cross-border equity portfolio allocation decisions: International evidence

Political risk models highlight that political uncertainty matters for corporate investment decisions. However, how political uncertainty matters for investment allocation decisions is relatively under-explored. In this study, we examine the impact of political uncertainty associated with national elections on foreign equity portfolio in 48 countries. Our results indicate that political uncertainty reduces international equity allocations to the host country and such reduction appears more pronounced in the election year. Further analysis shows that the interaction between political uncertainty and institutional quality has a positive and significant effect on international equity portfolio flow, suggesting that the value of institutional quality outweighs the negative effects of political uncertainty. Lastly, we find equity home bias to be negative and significant; however, the interaction between political uncertainty and equity home bias appears insignificant.     

Costs of Equity Capital and Model Mispricing

Costs of equity for individual firms are estimated in a Bayesian framework using several factor-based pricing models. Substantial prior uncertainty about mispricing often produces an estimated cost of equity close to that obtained with mispricing precluded, even for a stock whose average return departs significantly from the pricing model's prediction. Uncertainty about which pricing model to use is less important, on average, than within-model parameter uncertainty. In the absence of mispricing uncertainty, uncertainty about factor premiums is generally the largest source of overall uncertainty about a firm's cost of equity, although uncertainty about betas is nearly as important.     

Banks Increase Welfare

This paper examines the relative degrees of risk sharing provided by demand deposit contracts and equity contracts. It is shown that in a framework in which individuals have smooth preferences and there exists some type of aggregate uncertainty (interest rate risk), the allocations obtained with a financial intermediary allow in general for greater risk sharing than those achieved in an equity economy. However, the interest rate is essential in order to determine the superiority of demand deposit contracts over equity contracts. The results of the paper contradict the ones obtained by Jacklin [1987] and Hellwig [1994], where demand deposit and equity contracts are always equivalent risk sharing instruments.     

State uncertainty in stock markets: How big is the impact on the cost of equity?

We propose a novel Bayesian framework to incorporate uncertainty about the state of the market. Among others, one advantage of the framework is the ability to model a large collection of time-varying parameters simultaneously. When we apply the framework to estimate the cost of equity we find economically significant effects of state uncertainty. A state-independent pricing model overestimates the cost of equity by about 4% per annum for a utility firm and by as much as 3% for industries. We also observe that the expected return, volatility, risk loading, and pricing error all display state-dependent dynamics that coincide with the business cycle. More interestingly, the forecasted market and Fama–French factor risk premiums can predict the future real GDP growth rate even though the model does not use any macroeconomic variables, which suggests that the proposed Bayesian framework captures the state-dependent dynamics well.     

Does managerial ownership influence corporate social responsibility (CSR)? The role of economic policy uncertainty

To explore the drivers of corporate social responsibility (CSR), we investigate how managerial ownership influences CSR in the presence of economic policy uncertainty. Our results demonstrate that, when facing more economic policy uncertainty (EPU), firms with larger managerial ownership invest significantly more in CSR. This is in agreement with the risk mitigation hypothesis, where CSR offers insurance‐like protection against adverse events. When economic policy uncertainty is not considered, however, we find that managers with higher ownership stakes invest significantly less in CSR, suggesting that CSR is driven by the agency conflict. As managers own more equity, they are subject to greater costs of CSR. Additional analyses confirm the results, including dynamic GMM, propensity score matching and instrumental‐variable analysis.     

Policy uncertainty and seasoned equity offerings methods

Based on a sample of U.S. seasoned equity offering (SEO) during the period 2002–2017, we examine how the choice of equity issuance method changes in response to policy uncertainty. We find that firms subject to high policy uncertainty are less likely to use accelerated offerings rather than other types of traditional seasoned equity offerings. Our results are robust to alternative variable specifications, propensity score matching method, IV approach, and the inclusion of additional controls. Also, the effect of policy uncertainty on accelerated offering decision is weaker for firms with better information environment, earnings quality, and governance structures. Further, policy uncertainty increases the cost of funds and lowers long-run abnormal returns after SEOs for firms subject to high levels of policy uncertainty.     

Types of investor uncertainty and the cost of equity capital

We jointly test the effects of two types of investor uncertainty, one related to future firm performance and unrelated to accruals (cash flow uncertainty) and one directly related to accrual estimation errors (accounting quality uncertainty). Distinct from prior studies, our uncertainty estimates are based on a matched‐firm design that minimizes the mechanical relationship between the two uncertainty variables. We find a strong negative relationship between cash flow uncertainty and multiple estimates of the cost of equity capital. With respect to accounting quality uncertainty, we find a strong positive association with both expected stock returns and implied costs of equity, but only in settings that control for cash flow uncertainty. Collectively, our results suggest the need to consider different types of investor uncertainty when examining how investor uncertainty affects the cost of equity capital.     

Impact of macroeconomic policy uncertainty on opportunistic insider trading

The macroeconomic policy environment affects the internal governance of microenterprises, which may provide opportunities for management to benefit from stock sales while decreasing its motivation to manipulate stock transactions. Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2018, we study the impact of macroeconomic policy uncertainty on opportunistic insider trading. The results show that macroeconomic policy uncertainty helps restrain the opportunistic trading of shares held by management. When macroeconomic policies are uncertain, enterprises improve their internal governance. Furthermore, strengthening equity governance helps reduce management’s opportunistic use of the uncertainty of the policy environment, highlighting the advantageous effect of macroeconomic policy uncertainty and helping regulators standardize managerial behavior and promote the governance effect of macroeconomic policy.     

Inflation and the stock market: Understanding the “Fed Model”

The so-called Fed model postulates that the dividend or earnings yield on stocks should equal the yield on nominal Treasury bonds, or at least that the two should be highly correlated. In US data there is indeed a strikingly high time series correlation between the yield on nominal bonds and the dividend yield on equities. This positive correlation is often attributed to the fact that both bond and equity yields comove strongly and positively with expected inflation. Contrary to some of the extant literature, we show that this effect is consistent with modern asset pricing theory incorporating uncertainty about real growth prospects and habit-based risk aversion. In the US, high expected inflation has tended to coincide with periods of heightened uncertainty about real economic growth and unusually high risk aversion, both of which rationally raise equity yields.     

Robust general equilibrium under stochastic volatility model

This paper studies the implications of model uncertainty under stochastic volatility model for equilibrium asset pricing. We derive the equilibrium equity premium and risk-free rate in a pure-exchange economy with one representative agent who is averse not only to risk but also to model uncertainty. The results show that robustness increases the equilibrium equity premium while lowers the risk-free rate.     

Liquidity uncertainty and intermediation

The paper performs a welfare comparison between demand deposit and equity contracts in the presence of intrinsic aggregate uncertainty. In this framework, the welfare dominance of deposit contracts emerges under corner preferences. It is shown that aggregate uncertainty creates high price volatility of ex-dividend equity claims traded in a secondary market and the resulting consumption allocations offer less risk-sharing opportunities to risk-averse consumers than tailor-made deposit contracts. The contingency of early payoffs on depositors’ withdrawal order reinforces the welfare performance of deposit contracts, whereas costly liquidation of productive long-term investments deteriorates their welfare performance relative to equity contracts.     

Information flow between the stock and option markets: Where do informed traders trade?

This paper investigates the flow of information between the equity and options markets. We argue that informed traders, in deciding where to place their trades, are not entirely indifferent to option moneyness, degree of information asymmetry, and option liquidity. Unlike some previous studies that find information to flow unilaterally from equity to options markets, we control for the above factors and discover feedback relations between trades in out-of-the-money (OTM) options and the underlying equities. The finding is consistent with the pooling equilibrium hypothesis, which asserts that informed traders trade in both the equity and options markets. Some informed traders are probably attracted to the out-of-the money options because of their higher liquidity, lower premiums, and higher delta-to-premium ratios, hence, lending support to the liquidity and leverage hypothesis.     

Model Misspecification, the Equilibrium Natural Interest Rate, and the Equity Premium

This paper analyzes the natural rate of interest and the equity premium in a nonlinear model where agents are uncertain over both future technology growth and the future course of monetary policy. I show that model uncertainty, and notably uncertainty on the future course of monetary policy, can give rise to a sizable precautionary savings motive. This result is potentially problematic for both the estimation of the natural rate and its use as a policy indicator. Monetary uncertainty can also contribute to amplify the equity premium, and to account for its apparent, positive link with inflation.     

Privatization under incomplete information and bankruptcy risk

We study privatization under moral hazard and adverse selection. We show that if the fraction of efficient investors is either insignificant or productivity differences between efficient and inefficient investors are negligible, the government would offer a pooling contract and sell the same fraction of equity to both types of investors. The lower the productivity difference, the greater the equity stake offered to investors. On the other hand, if the fraction of efficient investors is significant or productivity differentials are large, the optimal policy consists of a dual method of privatization in which it offers two methods of privatization to outside investors. The first method consists of a sale of 100% equity together with a subsidy and charges higher price. Under the second option, the investor pays a smaller price but buys less than 100% equity without any subsidy. Efficient investors opt for the first method while inefficient investors prefer the second. The dual privatization method screens investors and provides them with maximum incentives to invest while minimizing the risk of post-privatization bankruptcy.     

Dynamics and Heterogeneity of Inter‐ and Intranational Risk Sharing

This study extends the empirical model of incomplete risk sharing developed by Crucini ( 1999 ) by allowing unequal income pooling and explores the implications of using an alternative measure for aggregate risk. Based on samples from Canadian provinces, G‐7, and OECD countries spanning the years 1961–2008, we show that the empirical procedure used by Crucini tends to overstate the average degree of risk sharing and understate the dispersion of risk sharing, when compared to our unequal income pooling model. The empirical results from our unequal pooling model show that (i) the degree and dispersion of risk sharing across Canadian provinces, G‐7 countries, and OECD countries remain stable over time; (ii) the degree of risk sharing across Canadian provinces is higher than that across the G‐7 and OECD countries; and (iii) the degree of risk sharing seems positively related to equity and trade diversification.     

Debt and Taxes and Uncertainty

With a graduated personal tax schedule, Miller showed that there could be an equilibrium debt supply for the corporate sector as a whole. In the presence of uncertainty there is also a unique debt/equity ratio for each individual firm, and this ratio is related to the firm's operational risk characteristics. However, if firms merge and spin off in response to tax incentives, the identity of firms is ambiguous and only the corporate sector is a meaningful construct. These arguments are developed in both discrete and continuous models that employ extensions of the arbitrage-free pricing theory.     

Comovements in Stock Prices and Comovements in Dividends

The comovements in real stock prices between the U.K. and the U.S. appear to be too large to be accounted for in terms of the comovements of real dividends between the countries even after consideration of the possibility of information pooling. When consideration is made of the comovements of real interest rates between the countries, there is weaker evidence of excess comovement of price.     

Payout taxes and the allocation of investment

When corporate payout is taxed, internal equity (retained earnings) is cheaper than external equity (share issues). If there are no perfect substitutes for equity finance, payout taxes may therefore have an effect on the investment of firms. High taxes will favor investment by firms who can finance internally. Using an international panel with many changes in payout taxes, we show that this prediction holds well. Payout taxes have a large impact on the dynamics of corporate investment and growth. Investment is “locked in” in profitable firms when payout is heavily taxed. Thus, apart from any level effects, payout taxes change the allocation of capital.     

Productive Signaling Equilibria and Over-Maintenance: An Application to Real Estate Markets

When there is asymmetric information regarding the quality of a traded durable asset, the informed seller might signal asset quality to prospective uninformed buyers by investing in improvements and maintenance. In contrast to Spence (1973), however, this signal may be productive. We derive conditions of signal productivity under which signaling separating, signaling pooling, and no-signaling pooling equilibria persist. We examine welfare implications of the model and identify the over-investment in maintenance effect that persists in efficient markets with asymmetric information and productive signaling. Furthermore, we conduct comparative statics analysis of the results and show the range of parameter values in which a particular equilibrium is attained. While the model and its outcomes apply to various durable assets, we particularly refer in the analysis to real estate markets.