Reputation concerns and herd behavior of audit committees - A corporate governance problem

This paper offers an explanation for audit committee failures within a corporate governance context. The management of a firm sets up financial statements that are possibly biased. These statements are audited/reviewed by an external auditor and by an audit committee. Both agents report the result of their work, the auditor acting first. Both use an imperfect technology that results in a privately observed signal regarding the quality of financial statements. The audit committee as well as the auditor are anxious to build up reputation in the labor market. Given this predominant goal they report on the signal in order to maximize the market’s assessment of their ability. At the end of the game the true character of the financial statements is revealed to the public with some positive probability. The market uses this information along with the agents’ reports to update beliefs about the agents’ abilities. We show that a herding equilibrium exists in which the audit committee “herds” and follows the auditor’s judgement no matter what its own insights suggest. This result holds even if the audit committee members are held liable for detected failure. However, performance based bonus payments induce truthful reporting at least in some cases.     

中期财务报告自愿审计的动机和市场反应分析——基于中国上市公司的经验数据

作为外部治理机制的审计是公司信息披露质量的重要保证,目前法规对上市公司中期财务报告的审计并无强制性法规要求,许多上市公司选择中期财务报表自愿审计,其行为是一种主动传递信息的过程。本文通过对我国上市公司2007至2010年证券市场自愿中报审计的经验数据分析,对公司自愿中报审计的动机和市场反应进行了实证研究。研究发现:公司中期财务报表自愿审计与公司的成长性和公司规模显著相关,且公司的财务状况和股权性质对公司的自愿审计有一定影响;同时,市场对上市公司中期财务报告自愿审计行为有一定的正面反应,但这种反应效力不足,且持续力较低。     

Corporate governance,capital structure and firm performance: Evidence from Thailand

We examine the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance for a panel sample of 493 firms of non-financial firms in Thailand during the period 2001–2014. We find that for the full sample, corporate governance is not associated with financial leverage and firm performance. Leverage has a positive effect on firm performance. When we split firms into small and large firm subsamples, we observe some influence of corporate governance. The negative effect of audit committee size on firm performance is evident for large firms while the effect of audit reputation on firm performance is evident for small firms only. Furthermore, financial leverage mediates the effect of audit committee size on firm performance for the large firms.     

An experimental study of users’ responses to qualified audit reports in China

This paper presents the results of an experimental study on users’ responses to the qualification of audit reports in China. By employing the type of audit report (e.g., unqualified vs. qualified auditor opinion) as a manipulated variable in the experiment, we found mixed responses from the participants towards the perceived impact of a qualified audit report on users’ understanding and use of the financial statements. In general, Chinese users, credit and loan officers in particular, perceived a qualified auditor opinion as having a somewhat negative impact on the credibility of financial statements. However, no significant difference was found in users’ investment or credit decisions with respect to their exposure to the financial statements accompanied by an unqualified or a qualified auditor opinion. The study findings suggest that the U.S.-style qualified audit reports have fairly limited “information content” to users in the present Chinese auditing environment and that there is a need to further improve Chinese auditing standards and practices. In addition, the study provides some insights into recent auditing developments in China.     

Financial Statements Insurance

The fact that auditors are paid by the companies they audit creates an inherent conflict of interest. We analyze how the provision of financial statements insurance could eliminate this conflict of interest and properly align the incentives of auditors with those of shareholders. We first show that when the benefits to obtaining funding are sufficiently large, the existing legal and regulatory regime governing financial reporting (and auditing) results in low quality financial statements. Consequently, the financial statements of firms are misleading and firms that yield a low rate‐of‐return (low fundamental value) are over‐funded relative to firms characterized by a high rate‐of‐return (high fundamental value). We present a mechanism whereby companies would purchase financial statements insurance that provides coverage to investors against losses suffered as a result of misrepresentation in financial reports. The insurance premia that companies pay for the coverage would be publicized. The insurers appoint and pay the auditors who attest to the accuracy of the financial statements of the prospective insurance clients. For a given level of coverage firms announcing lower premia would distinguish themselves in the eyes of the investors as companies with higher quality financial statements relative to those with higher premia. Every company would be eager to pay lower premia (for a given level of coverage) resulting in a flight to high audit quality. As a result, when financial statements insurance is available and the insurer hires the auditor, capital is provided to the most efficient firms.     

Audit committee characteristics and investment in internal auditing

Regulators and others recently highlighted the increasingly important role of internal auditing in supporting and interacting with the audit committee to ensure the integrity and quality of financial reporting. Likewise, one of the roles of the audit committee is to oversee the quality of monitoring mechanisms implemented by the firm, which includes the internal audit function. However, our understanding of the relationship between the audit committee and internal auditing is limited. We fill this void by providing the first empirical evidence of the association between audit committee characteristics and the investment in internal auditing. Our analyses, from a sample of 181 SEC registrants, suggest that the investment in internal auditing (internal audit budget) is negatively related to the presence of auditing experts on the committee and the average tenure of audit committee members, but positively related to the number of audit committee meetings (a proxy for audit committee diligence). These observations suggest potential complementary and substitution effects between the audit committee and internal auditing, and thus raise important implications for future research.     

The Relative Importance of Audit Quality Attributes

Corporate collapses and audit failures have threatened the credibility of the audit function, with audit quality once again being a major issue. Motivated by the significance of auditing and perceptions of audit quality in enhancing the reliability and credibility of financial statements, this article investigates the relative importance of audit team and audit firm attributes in perceptions of audit quality by users of audit services. Data are gathered from 81 users of audit services and analysed using adaptive conjoint analysis in order to measure the relative importance of audit team and audit firm attributes in perceptions of audit quality. The results show that, in general, users of audit services perceive audit team attributes as being relatively more important than audit firm attributes in perceptions of audit quality. The findings of the study have implications for regulators and the accounting profession concerned with improving confidence in corporate governance and the effectiveness and integrity of the audit process, and for audit firms in monitoring and promoting the quality of their audit services.     

Regulation of accountancy and the power of capital: some observations

In response to Briloff’s study of the regulation of fraudulent financial reporting in the USA, this paper examines the regulation of financial reporting and auditing in the UK. In common with Briloff, it reports that little effective regulatory action is taken against auditing firms implicated in audit failures and/or the publication of “defective" financial statements. Seemingly, as major fraction of international capital, auditing firms have colonised and captured the state to shield themselves from regulatory action.     

The Communicative Value of the Auditor's Report

Communicating the results of the audit is a crucial part of the audit process. This potentially enables the users of financial reports to assess the quality of the audit, which will in turn contribute to their assessments of financial reporting quality. This research reports the results of a verbal protocol study of 16 financial analysts to assess how they use an auditor's report as part of a company evaluation. Auditors’ reports perse are found to be important to analysts in that they signal a level of reliability in the financial statements. However, the content of the auditor's report, including the additional content of the recently issued longer form auditor's report (ISA 700, ASA 700), generally was not attended to by the analysts. This suggests the communicative value of the auditor's report is minimal beyond signalling the elevated reliability of the financial statements.     

Audit committee diligence around initial audit engagement

Studies focusing on governance mechanisms argue that auditor monitoring is one of several governance mechanisms that exist in the firm, and these mechanisms supplement each other. Extending this argument, I examine whether firms support auditor monitoring with audit committee monitoring when auditor oversight is deemed to be weak. Prior auditing literature argues that audit quality is affected by auditors' lack of familiarity with their clients' activities. Since lack of auditor–client familiarity exists in the first year of auditor–client tenure, I examine whether firms increase their audit committee monitoring during the year of auditor change. For a sample of firms that changed auditors between 2006 and 2012, the findings show that audit committees meet more frequently in the first year of audit engagement. Further tests show that firms' past reporting behavior play a significant role in the demand for more audit committee meetings and the increase in the audit committee meetings in the initial year of auditor engagement positively affects reporting quality.     

Some Economics of Audit Market Reform

The purpose of audit market reforms since 2001 is to restore public confidence in the institution of auditing based on two considerations: (1) ensuring audit quality; and (2) controlling the ‘adverse effect of competition’ in audit supply. Market reforms for audit quality are delivered through a package of prescribed actions motivated by an analytical relationship between audit quality and its possible determinants: (1) limiting audit tenure through a combination of mandatory firm rotation, partner rotation and re‐tendering; (2) limiting provision of non‐audit services (NAS) by the incumbent auditor; and (3) joint auditing and empowering the audit committee to enhance audit quality. This paper examines the competing independence hypothesis and expertise hypothesis that produce ambiguous theoretical relationships for audit quality–audit tenure and the independence‐provision of NAS. We then review whether the empirical literature resolves these conundrums. We also review the usefulness of joint auditing and empowering the audit committee to improve audit quality in the context of audit market reform.     

Legal Liabilities, Audit Accuracy and the Market for Audit Services

In quality-differentiated audit markets with client-firms of unknown types, insider-managers of client firms strategically select auditors who respond to legal liabilities to decide their care level. In this signaling game, uninformed-investors use the audit report and the auditors' identity for firm valuation. The analysis shows that increased legal liability increases the auditor's effort and audit accuracy but reduces the demand for high quality auditing because, apart from the increased audit costs, the adverse selection benefit of the worse type reduces with increased accuracy. Furthermore, alternative legal regimes and damage allocation rules alter informational efficiency of the financial market.     

Audit committee quality,auditor independence,and internal control weaknesses

In this paper we investigate the relation between audit committee quality, auditor independence, and the disclosure of internal control weaknesses after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. We begin with a sample of firms with internal control weaknesses and, based on industry, size, and performance, match these firms to a sample of control firms without internal control weaknesses. Our conditional logit analyses indicate that a relation exists between audit committee quality, auditor independence, and internal control weaknesses. Firms are more likely to be identified with an internal control weakness, if their audit committees have less financial expertise or, more specifically, have less accounting financial expertise and non-accounting financial expertise. They are also more likely to be identified with an internal control weakness, if their auditors are more independent. In addition, firms with recent auditor changes are more likely to have internal control weaknesses.     

审计意见的决定因素：来自中国上市公司的证据

利用中国上市公司和相应会计师事务所2001—2003年的综列数据,本文研究了审计意见和会计师事务所规模、上市公司的风险和盈余管理等因素之间的关系。本文发现有破产风险的、进行盈余管理的或小规模的上市公司更可能得到非标准审计意见。如果它们又是大会计师事务所的客户,则得到非标意见的概率更大。本文不支持合资会计师事务所的审计质量更高的结论。     

Characteristics of Organisations Using an Audit for Interim Financial Statements

This study examines the characteristics of companies that choose to have a full audit of their interim financial statements, as distinct from a review. A cross-section of 252 firms that had submitted interim financial reports to the Australian Stock Exchange were selected from the Business Review Weekly (BRW) list of top 1,000 companies. A direct logistic regression analysis was undertaken to assess whether voluntarily adopting an audit was related to size (assets), leverage, minority interest, profitability, industry, and whether the company had used a Big-6 audit firm. The results indicate that the level of leverage is a significant predictor of companies adopting a review, whereas use of a Big-6 audit firm was associated with conducting an audit. In addition, there is some evidence companies in the financial services industry were positively associated with conducting an audit.     

The Impact of Audit Committee Characteristics on CSR Disclosure: An Analysis of Australian Firms

This study examines the influence of audit committee (AC) characteristics on voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure in the corporate annual reports of Australian listed firms. It develops hypotheses about the relationship between voluntary CSR disclosure and AC characteristics such as size, frequency of meetings, independence, independent chair, financial expertise and gender diversity. Using multiple regression analysis on data collected from the corporate annual reports of 300 listed firms, the study finds that AC characteristics such as size, frequency of meetings, committee independence and gender diversity have a significant positive influence on the level of CSR disclosure. However, there is no evidence that AC characteristics such as independent chair and members’ financial expertise affect CSR disclosure in Australian firms. Based on an additional analysis, the study also sheds some light on the effect of AC characteristics on environmental disclosure. The findings of this study may be of particular interest to regulators, shareholders, investment analysts and managers in assessing CSR disclosure in annual reports, and in strengthening the monitoring and oversight role of ACs.     

Auditor Fees, Market Microstructure, and Firm Transparency

Abstract:  Auditors, as corporate insiders, have access to private information regarding the firm's financial and business opacity that is unavailable to outside investors. We test whether auditors price their knowledge of firm opacity in their audit fees by examining two competing hypotheses. The first states that higher audit fees may reflect the greater risk that the auditor faces in auditing an opaque firm. Under this hypothesis, market based measures of opacity will be positively correlated with higher fees. The second hypothesis states that firms buy reputational capital from their auditor by paying high fees in an attempt to improve the market's perception of the firm's transparency. In this case, higher audit fees are negatively correlated with market based measures of opacity. Our results are consistent with the first hypothesis, that auditors price opacity risk into their fees.     

Are Audit Committees Red Herrings?

The common expectation of committees established in the wake of the corporate debacles during 1980s in the English-speaking world is that the audit committee device will raise the standards of corporate accountability and governance by improving the quality of financial reporting. That expectation is based on the prevalent belief that by strengthening the independence of auditors and non-executive directors audit committee members will monitor the financial reporting process in an independent manner. Unless accounting practices are reformed so that financial statements can be authenticated by recourse to reliable commercial evidence, audit committees are red herrings. Such reforms are essential if audit committee members are to keep under vigilant appraisal matters pertaining to the financial governance of, and reporting by, firms: the raison d'être of their appointment.     

Relation between external audit fees, audit committee characteristics and internal audit

This study examines whether the existence of an audit committee, audit committee characteristics and the use of internal audit are associated with higher external audit fees. Higher audit fees imply increased audit testing and higher audit quality. We find that the existence of an audit committee, more frequent committee meetings and increased use of internal audit are related to higher audit fees. The expertise of audit committee members is associated with higher audit fees when meeting frequency and independence are low. These findings are consistent with an increased demand for higher quality auditing by audit committees, and by firms that make greater use of internal audit.