Do Central Bank Forecasts Influence Private Agents? Forecasting Performance versus Signals

Focusing on a set of central banks that publish inflation forecasts in real time, this paper aims to establish whether central bank inflation forecasts influence private inflation forecasts. The response is positive in the five countries studied: Sweden, the United Kingdom, Canada, Switzerland, and Japan. Three hypotheses may explain this central bank influence: central bank forecasts are more accurate than private ones, are based on different information sets, and/or convey signals about future policy decisions and policymakers’ preferences and objectives. We provide evidence that the source of these central banks’ influence is not linked to their forecasting performance.     

Central Bank Transparency and the Crowding Out of Private Information in Financial Markets

We use an asset market model based on Diamond (1985) to demonstrate that increased central bank transparency may lead to crowding out of costly private information, which can result in a market that is less able to predict monetary policy. Consequently, for intermediate levels of public information precision, it is optimal for the central bank to actually disclose less than it knows. We show that such crowding out can occur, even in the likely scenario that public information is more precise than private information, under the plausible assumption that traders are nearly risk neutral. Central banks should be aware of possible adverse effects of transparency and take note if market participants reduce investment in information.     

Inflation targeting: What inflation rate to target?

In an economy with nominal rigidities in both an intermediate good sector and a finished good sector, and thus with a natural distinction between CPI and PPI inflation rates, a benevolent central bank faces a tradeoff between stabilizing the two measures of inflation, a final output gap and, unique to our model, a real marginal cost gap in the intermediate sector, so that optimal monetary policy is second-best. We discuss how to implement the optimal policy with minimal information requirement and evaluate the robustness of these simple rules when the central bank may not know the exact sources of shocks or nominal rigidities. A main finding is that a simple hybrid rule under which the short-term interest rate responds to CPI inflation and PPI inflation results in a welfare level close to the optimum, whereas policy rules that ignore PPI inflation or PPI sector shocks can result in significant welfare losses.     

Learning about the Term Structure and Optimal Rules for Inflation Targeting

In this paper, we incorporate the term structure of interest rates in the New Keynesian model and analyze optimal policy under uncertainty about private sector expectations and the degree of inflation persistence. The novel result of our paper is that for large deviations of inflation from its target, the active learning policy is less activist—in the sense of responding less aggressively to the state of the economy—than a myopic policy, which ignores the learning channel. Moreover, for most initial beliefs, the incentive for active learning increases as monetary policy’s leverage over the long‐term interest rate increases.     

The impact of quantitative easing (QE) on the cost of debt in project finance investments

Recession-driven low inflation and high spreads have increased the cost of debt in public sector project finance investments, therefore reducing private sector profits and bankability. This paper investigates the impact of quantitative easing by central banks, showing that it can stimulate economic growth producing shared public and private benefits.     

Financial sector development and dollarization in emerging economies

This paper discusses important features of financial dollarization and its implications for the macro economy and financial sector deepening. Despite the need to slow down the rate of inflation and keep exchange rates under control, to achieve growth and economic development, monetary policies may permit increases in the base money to keep pace with real GDP growth. In heavily dollarized economies, during periods of sharp devaluations of the domestic currency, financial assets and liabilities shift toward foreign currency, exacerbating downward pressure on the exchange rate. When central banks face pressures to keep the exchange rate steady in nominal terms, interest rates in the domestic currency are set at levels substantially higher than those on dollar assets. In such states of the world, banks prefer to lend to the government sector at these higher rates than to the private sector. Although private firms may benefit from lower rates on dollar loans, they also face significant exchange rate or currency risk due to the currency mismatch emerging from their dollar debt while their receivables may tilt toward domestic currency denominated instruments. This weakens their balance sheet, which in turn increases the exposure of the banking sector to a variety of risks.     

FOMC Forecasts as a Focal Point for Private Expectations

We explore empirically the theoretical prediction that public information acts as a focal point in the context of the U.S. monetary policy. We aim at establishing whether the publication of Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) inflation forecasts affects the cross‐sectional dispersion of private inflation expectations. Our main finding is that publishing FOMC inflation forecasts has a negative effect on the cross‐sectional dispersion of private current‐year inflation forecasts. This effect is found to be robust to another survey data set and to various macroeconomic controls. Moreover, we find that the dispersion of private inflation forecasts is not affected by the dispersion of views among FOMC members.     

Optimal Bank Transparency

Increasing transparency is recurrently offered as a centerpiece of bank regulation. We study a competitive banking sector whose illiquid assets are funded by short‐term debt that must be refinanced. We show that welfare is a nonmonotonic function of the level of transparency: Increasing transparency fosters efficient liquidation but has an adverse effect on rollover risk given the level of risk. Banks may compensate this adverse effect by taking more risk. These offsetting effects render an intermediate level of transparency optimal. Moreover, the existence of negative social externalities of bank failures calls for making banks more opaque rather than more transparent.     

Testing the transparency benefits of inflation targeting: Evidence from private sector forecasts

Using inflation forecast data for 11 IT adoption countries, IT adoption is found to promote convergence in forecast errors, suggesting that it enhances transparency. This result, which is subjected to several robustness checks and found to be robust, supports Morris and Shin's (2002) contention that better public information is most beneficial for forecasters with bad private information. However, it does not support their hypothesis that better public information could make private forecasts less accurate.     

Ownership structure,risk and performance in the European banking industry

We compare the performance and risk of a sample of 181 large banks from 15 European countries over the 1999–2004 period and evaluate the impact of alternative ownership models, together with the degree of ownership concentration, on their profitability, cost efficiency and risk. Three main results emerge. First, after controlling for bank characteristics, country and time effects, mutual banks and government-owned banks exhibit a lower profitability than privately owned banks, in spite of their lower costs. Second, public sector banks have poorer loan quality and higher insolvency risk than other types of banks while mutual banks have better loan quality and lower asset risk than both private and public sector banks. Finally, while ownership concentration does not significantly affect a bank’s profitability, a higher ownership concentration is associated with better loan quality, lower asset risk and lower insolvency risk. These differences, along with differences in asset composition and funding mix, indicate a different financial intermediation model for the different ownership forms.     

货币政策透明度与通货膨胀的关系研究——基于PVAR模型的实证检验

通过使用PVAR模型对11个发达国家1999～2009年的中央银行货币政策透明度与通货膨胀的动态关系进行的实证分析表明:11国中央银行货币政策透明度的提高显著地降低了通货膨胀水平,但这种效应存在滞后;反之,通货膨胀对于货币政策透明度没有显著影响。因此,提高货币政策透明度、加强中央银行的信息披露从长期看对治理通货膨胀具有积极的作用。     

Optimized Taylor rules for disinflation when agents are learning

When private agents learn a new policy rule, an optimal simple Taylor rule for disinflation differs substantially from that under full information. The central bank can reduce target inflation without much difficulty, but adjusting reaction coefficients on lagged inflation and output is more costly. Temporarily explosive dynamics emerge when there is substantial disagreement between perceived and actual feedback parameters, making the transition highly volatile. The bank copes by choosing reaction coefficients close to the private sector׳s prior mode, thereby sacrificing long-term performance in exchange for achieving lower transitional volatility.     

Monetary Policy Inclinations

We examine whether central banks should complement their inflation forecasts with interest rate projections. Introducing a central bank loss function that accounts for deviations from announcements, we incorporate the publication of policy inclinations into a dynamic monetary model. We show that in the presence of cost‐push shocks, the publication of interest rate forecasts tends to improve welfare.     

Financial Sector transparency and net interest margins: Should the private or public Sector lead financial Sector transparency?

This study examines the effect of private and public sector led financial sector transparency on bank interest margins across eighty-six economies. Using a two-step dynamic system generalized method of moments, least square dummy variables, fixed effects and bootstrap quantile panel models between 2005 and 2016, the findings of the two-step GMM are reported as follows. First, results reveal that financial sector transparency whether led by private or public sector reduces interest margins. Second, while no statistical evidence was found on which of the two (private or public sector led transparency) is more effective in dealing with bank interest margins, public sector-led financial transparency is found to be more consistent in reducing bank interest margins across many more economies. Third, the study shows that the effect of financial sector transparency is visible at lower and middle levels of bank interest margins implying that economies with lower and moderately high bank interest margin level can benefit more from policies targeted at improving transparency in the financial sector. These findings imply that the sampled countries must enact policies and laws that deepen and expand financial sector transparency in order to potentially reduce bank interest margins for the good of banking market participants and society at large.     

Do banks care about analysts' forecasts when designing loan contracts?

We investigate whether banks rely on the information content in equity analysts’ annual earnings forecasts when assessing the risk of potential borrowers. While a long literature finds that analysts provide useful information to market participants, it is not clear that banks, which have access to privileged information, would benefit from publicly available analysts’ forecasts. If, however, banks do rely on this information, then more precise private information in earnings forecasts may inform banks. We focus our analysis on the requirement of collateral because it is a direct measure of default risk, whereas other loan terms such as interest spread and debt covenants can also protect against other risks, such as asset misappropriation. The direct link between collateral and default risk allows us to examine whether information from analysts is relevant to banks when designing loan contracts. Consistent with our predictions, we find that higher precision of the private information in analysts’ earnings forecasts is associated with a lower likelihood of requiring collateral, and this effect is larger when a borrower does not have a prior relationship with the lender or their accounting or credit quality is low. We also find that this association disappears after the implementation of Regulation FD, consistent with this regulation reducing analysts’ access to private information.     

Heterogeneous Inflation Expectations and Learning

Using the panel component of the Michigan Survey of Consumers, we estimate a learning model of inflation expectations, allowing for heterogeneous use of private information and lifetime inflation experience. Life experience inflation has a significant impact on individual expectations, but only for 1‐year‐ahead inflation. Public information is substantially more relevant for longer horizon expectations. Even controlling for life experience inflation and public information, idiosyncratic information explains a nontrivial proportion of the inflation forecasts of agents. Women, ethnic minorities, and less educated agents have a higher degree of heterogeneity in their idiosyncratic information, and give less importance to recent movements in inflation.     

Monetary Policy in the Media

Just like private companies depend crucially on their ability to reach customers, policymakers must communicate with private agents to be successful—and much of this communication is channeled through the media. This is especially true for central banks, which need to build credibility among the general public. This paper analyses how favorably the print media report about the European Central Bank's (ECB) monetary policy decisions. Favorableness is, inter alia, influenced by the amount of information communicated by the ECB. There are, however, also indications of a critical monitoring role of the media, which reports more negatively when inflation exceeds the inflation target.     

银行信息披露制度与银行系统稳定性研究

建立商业银行信息披露制度是我国金融改革中较重要的一环,一般的认识是信息制度的建立将使金融机构运作更审慎,有利于提高整个金融系统的稳定性;但本文通过博弈模型证明:赋予我国商业银行国家信用与进行信息披露制度之间存在着一定的冲突,目前我国对金融体系的过度保护反而会降低商业银行信息披露的对银行体系稳定性的改进,合适的改革次序应是国家信用在金融机构中的先行退出也即建立一个合适的存款保险制度,其次才是规范的信息披露制度的建立.     

The impact of central bank transparency on systemic risk—Evidence from Central and Eastern Europe

The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of central bank transparency on systemic risk in emerging banking markets using a sample composed of 34 banks from Central and Eastern Europe for a period spanning from 2005 through 2012. Results indicate a positive and significant relationship between central bank transparency and financial institutions’ contribution to systemic risk. On the other side, increased central bank transparency significantly reduces the idiosyncratic risk of banks. The relationship is influenced by the restrictiveness of regulatory framework. We argue that a more transparent central bank is beneficial for the banking sector from a microprudential perspective. However, it may create incentives for financial institutions to engage in risky activities and through herd behavior may increase individual contribution to the risk of the banking system.     

Managing price and financial stability objectives in inflation targeting economies in Asia and the Pacific

Many central banks have adopted explicit objectives for financial stability, raising the possibility of trade-offs between price and financial stability objectives. Based on structural vector autoregressions that incorporate both monetary and macroprudential policy shocks for four inflation targeting economies in Asia and the Pacific, we analyse the role of each policy shock in explaining deviations from the other policy’s objective, by applying historical decompositions. The macroprudential measures used in the study affect credit extended to the private sector. We find that there are periods when macroprudential policy shocks have contributed to pushing inflation away from the central bank’s inflation target and when monetary policy shocks have contributed to buoyant credit, suggesting that there have been short-term trade-offs between price and financial stability objectives. However, we also find periods when macroprudential policy shocks helped stabilise inflation and monetary policy shocks contributed to financial stability.