On the Relation between Conservatism in Accounting Standards and Incentives for Earnings Management

This paper studies the role of conservative accounting standards in alleviating rational yet dysfunctional unobservable earnings manipulation. We show that when accounting numbers serve both the valuation role (in which potential investors use accounting reports to assess a firm's expected future payoff) and the stewardship role (in which current shareholders rely on the same reports to monitor their risk‐averse manager), current firm owners have incentives to engage in earnings management. Such manipulation reduces accounting numbers' stewardship value and leads to inferior risk sharing. We then show that risk sharing, and hence contract efficiency, can be improved under a conservative accounting standard where, absent earnings management, accounting earnings represent true economic earnings with a downward bias, compared with under an unbiased standard where, absent earnings management, accounting earnings represent true economic earnings without bias.     

Level of business insights in the MD&A and nonprofessional investors' judgments

This study examines how the level of business insights in a firm's MD&A interacts with its current financial performance to influence nonprofessional investors' judgments. Following the observations and guidance of the ASIC and SEC to define low‐and high‐insight MD&A, this study finds that low‐insight MD&A, when provided for a negative earnings surprise, increases investors’ judgments of the negative earnings persistence and hurts management reputation more than if no MD&A had been provided. High‐insight MD&A, when including a plausible external attribution, increases investors’ judgments of management reputation in the negative earnings surprise condition and decreases investors’ judgments of positive earnings persistence.     

Earnings Manipulation and the Cost of Capital

The widespread use of accounting information by investors and financial analysts to help value stocks creates an incentive for managers to manipulate earnings in an attempt to influence short‐term stock price performance. This paper examines the role of earnings management in affecting a firm's cost of capital. Using an agency model with multiple firms whose cash flows are correlated, we demonstrate that the extent of earnings manipulation varies across the business cycle. Depending on a firm's earnings profile, it can have stronger incentives to overstate its performance in good times or in bad times. Because of this dependence on the state of the economy, earnings manipulation can influence a firm's cost of capital despite the forces of diversification.     

Board Characteristics,Firm Profitability and Earnings Management: Evidence from India

The present paper explores the association between earnings management and specific board characteristics and the firm's profitability in the Indian context. In India, the corporate ownership model is the promoter dominated shareholders model. This is the first study based on a panel data framework that employs a fixed effect model to control for time‐invariant endogeneity. It also contributes to the literature by exploring the role of the firm's profitability in transmitting the impact of audit committee independence on earnings management. The study finds that profitability is an important variable, as it moderates the association between audit committee independence and earnings management. Managers of a profit‐making company would have little need to modify their earnings. This signifies that independent audit committees are more effective monitors of earnings management in profitable firms than in non‐profitable firms. Independent directors with multiple directorships are also found to be ineffective monitors. The findings are of material significance to policymakers in analysing board effectiveness and earnings management and improving policymaking for corporate governance by using profitability and related variables.     

Corporate Life Cycle and Earnings Benchmarks

We examine whether and how corporate life cycle significantly influences meeting or beating earnings benchmarks (MBE). We find that corporate life cycle plays a significant role in a firm's meeting or beating earnings benchmarks behaviour. Developing strategies that fit into the stage of corporate life cycle is crucial for corporate success. MBE is an important financial goal that requires strategies. In this study, we examine whether and how corporate life cycle significantly influences MBE. Specifically, we focus on the incentives of MBE in growth and mature firms. We find that corporate life cycle significantly influences a firm's tendency to meet or beat zero earnings, prior earnings and analysts’ earnings forecasts. Based on logit regressions for the period from 1988 to 2008, the results indicate that growth firms are more likely to meet or beat all three earnings benchmarks. Overall, the results of this study indicate that a firm's MBE behaviour should be examined in the context of its life cycle stage.     

Earnings Smoothing,Cash Flow Volatility,and CEO Cash Bonus

Prior studies generally relate managers’ decisions to smooth earnings to their desire to maximize their overall compensation and to smooth their consumption. However, earnings smoothing could also be driven by the firm's expected benefits from reporting a smooth earnings stream. Our paper provides empirical support for the latter explanation of earnings smoothing. Specifically, we find that while CEO bonus on average increases with earnings smoothing, the increase is larger when the firm's cash flow volatility is higher. Further, CEO bonus is shielded from the negative effects of lower earnings arising from the need to report a smoother earnings stream.     

Reliability-Relevance Trade-Offs and the Efficiency of Aggregation

This paper studies how an accountant's method of aggregating information in a financial report is affected by differences in the reliability and relevance of components of the report. We study a firm that hires an accountant to produce a report that reveals information to investors regarding the returns to the firm's past investments. In constructing the report, the accountant must combine information elicited from the firm's manager with other information directly observable to the accountant. The manager's information is assumed to be directly observable only by the manager and to be of superior quality to the other information available to the accountant. Reliability‐relevance trade‐offs arise because as the accountant places more weight on the manager's report, potentially more useful information gets included in the report, at the cost of encouraging the manager to distort his or her information to a greater extent. Capital market participants anticipate this behavior and price the firm accordingly. We show how the market's price response to the release of the firm's aggregate report, the efficiency of the firm's investment decisions, and the manager's incentives to manipulate the soft information under his or her control are all affected by—and affect—the aggregation procedure the accountant adopts. In addition, we identify a broad range of circumstances under which aggregated reports are strictly more efficient than disaggregated reports because aggregation tempers the manager's misreporting incentives. We also demonstrate that, as any given component of the aggregated accounting report becomes softer, the equilibrium level of the firm's investment diminishes and the market places greater weight on the remaining components of the report.     

Auditor reporting and earnings management: some additional evidence

This paper investigates the reasons that lead to modification of auditors’ opinions. We revisit the conclusions of prior US‐based research on whether a modification highlights likely earnings management activities. Extending this research, we consider an alternate explanation that managers adjust accruals to report earnings that better predict future firm performance, which has the side‐effect of placing them in conflict with their auditors. Our study sample comprises all firms listed on the Australian Stock Exchange over the period 1999–2003. Consistent with prior research, there is no evidence of earnings management leading to an audit opinion modification. However, we do show that firms receiving inherent uncertainty modifications (other than going concern) have greater persistence of earnings (accruals) relative to other firms. This is consistent with the proposition that managers have made policy choices in reporting current earnings, with which their auditors disagree, that will likely result in a greater ability to forecast the firm's future earnings.     

Earnings Management During Antidumping Investigations in Europe: Sample‐Wide and Cross‐Sectional Evidence

This paper examines earnings management by EU firms that initiate an antidumping investigation. We first document economically and statistically significant income‐decreasing earnings management around the initiation of an antidumping investigation. We show that earnings management increases when accounting data directly affect the magnitude of the tariffs imposed in the trade investigation. We also find that earnings management decreases as the number of petitioning firms increases or as the distance between petitioning firms increases, suggesting free‐rider and coordination problems. We find that earnings management increases when the petition is directed at a country that imports more goods from the petitioning firm's home country, suggesting that retaliation threats affect incentives. We document that raising equity or debt financing moderates income‐decreasing earnings management, consistent with the idea that sample firms trade off capital market and regulatory considerations. Our results indicate that contemporary research methods can detect accruals‐based earnings management in settings in which the incentives for earnings management can be clearly identified.     

How Much New Information Is There in Earnings?

We quantify the relative importance of earnings announcements in providing new information to the share market, using the R² in a regression of securities' calendar‐year returns on their four quarterly earnings‐announcement “window” returns. The R², which averages approximately 5% to 9%, measures the proportion of total information incorporated in share prices annually that is associated with earnings announcements. We conclude that the average quarterly announcement is associated with approximately 1% to 2% of total annual information, thus providing a modest but not overwhelming amount of incremental information to the market. The results are consistent with the view that the primary economic role of reported earnings is not to provide timely new information to the share market. By inference, that role lies elsewhere, for example, in settling debt and compensation contracts and in disciplining prior information, including more timely managerial disclosures of information originating in the firm's accounting system. The relative informativeness of earnings announcements is a concave function of size. Increased information during earnings‐announcement windows in recent years is due only in part to increased concurrent releases of management forecasts. There is no evidence of abnormal information arrival in the weeks surrounding earnings announcements. Substantial information is released in management forecasts and in analyst forecast revisions prior (but not subsequent) to earnings announcements.     

The effects of corporate name changes on firm information environment and earnings management

We study how corporate name changes affect a firm's information environment and its earnings management. We show that the stock market reacts negatively to name changes. This effect is specifically pronounced for firms that have lower visibility. We also find that firms that change their names tend to have a relatively worse information environment. Finally, we show that earnings management is positively related to firm name changes.     

UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA ROUNDTABLE ON ENTERPRISE-WIDE RISK MANAGEMENT

For many years, MBA. students were taught that there was no good reason for a company that hedged a large currency exposure to trade at a higher P/E than an otherwise identical company that chose not to hedge. Corporate stockholders, simply by holding well‐diversified portfolios, were said to neutralize any effects of interest rate and currency risk on corporate values. And thus corporate efforts to manage risk were thought to be “redundant,” a waste of corporate resources on a function that was already accomplished by investors at far lower cost. But the theory underlying this “perfect markets” framework has changed in recent years to focus on ways that corporate risk management can add value. The academics and practitioners who participated in this roundtable began by discussing in general terms how risk management can be used to support a company's strategic plan and investment policy. At Merck, for example, where R&D spending was determined as a percentage of earnings, a policy of hedging foreign currency exposure to reduce earnings volatility was viewed as adding value by “protecting” the firm's R&D. The panelists also agreed that a well executed risk management policy can increase corporate debt capacity and, in so doing, reduce the cost of capital by lowering the likelihood of financial distress. For example, companies with debt covenants might undertake a risk management program to lower earnings volatility and ensure a minimum level of earnings for debt compliance purposes. But one of the clear messages of the roundtable is that risk management and earnings management are not the same thing, and that companies that view risk management as primarily a tool for smoothing reported earnings have lost sight of its real economic functions. Moreover, in making decisions to retain or transfer risks, companies should generally be guided by the principle of comparative advantage. That is, if there is an outside firm or investor willing to bear a particular risk at a lower price than the cost to the firm of managing that risk internally, then it makes sense to lay off that risk. In addition to the cost savings and higher return on capital promised by such an approach, a number of the panelists also pointed to a less tangible benefit of an enterprise‐wide risk management program—namely, a marked improvement of the internal corporate dialogue, leading to a better understanding of all the firm's risks and how they are affected by the interactions among the firm's business units.     

The Explanatory Power of Canadian Accounting Measures of Earnings Dilution*

This paper examines the properties of the accounting measures of dilution under pre‐2001 Canadian GAAP. Fully diluted earnings per share (EPS) presents investors with a per‐share figure that attempts to capture the maximum potential dilution that would occur if all dilutive convertible securities were converted and all dilutive stock options and rights exercised. We examine how the difference between basic and fully diluted EPS, which we refer to as the dilutive adjustment, affects the ability of EPS to predict one‐period‐ahead EPS. Moreover, we address the issue of the explanatory power of changes in the dilutive adjustment for unexpected stock returns over the year and at the earnings announcement date. Surprisingly, in contrast with the traditional accounting view that increases in the dilutive adjustment present the investor with bad news due to potential dilution of the future earnings stream, the dilutive adjustment is positively related to next period's earnings and increases in the dilutive adjustment are positively correlated with contemporaneous long‐window stock returns. These results can be attributed to the relation between the dilutive adjustment and the earnings process combined with a partial resolution of the uncertainty attached to growth firms. We find no evidence that investors use information from the disclosure of fully diluted EPS at the earnings announcement date. These results are consistent with increases in the dilutive adjustment capturing the partial realization of a firm's growth potential that more than outweighs the potential dilution attached to the convertible securities; however, this information appears to be already embedded in price prior to the disclosure of fully diluted EPS.     

The association between dividend payout and firm growth: Australian evidence

We report that whereas firms with high earnings distributions tend to have low‐to‐moderate growth (consistent with conventional theory), firms with low earnings distributions run the range between high and low performers. We interpret our findings for firm growth and payout policy in relation to the firm's location on the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) matrix that combines high/low growth with high/low market share. Our findings suggest that the market has difficulty in distinguishing between these types of firms. A concern is that investor preferences as an outcome may be focussed on dividend‐paying firms at the expense of younger growing firms in need of retained earnings.     

Do Managers Always Know Better? The Relative Accuracy of Management and Analyst Forecasts

We examine the relative accuracy of management and analyst forecasts of annual EPS. We predict and find that analysts’ information advantage resides at the macroeconomic level. They provide more accurate earnings forecasts than management when a firm's fortunes move in concert with macroeconomic factors such as Gross Domestic Product and energy costs. In contrast, we predict and find that management's information advantage resides at the firm level. Their forecasts are more accurate than analysts’ when management's actions, which affect reported earnings, are difficult to anticipate by outsiders, such as when the firm's inventories are abnormally high or the firm has excess capacity or is experiencing a loss. Although analysts are commonly viewed as industry specialists, we fail to find evidence that analysts have an information advantage over managers at the industry level. The two have comparable abilities to forecast earnings for firms with revenues or earnings that are more synchronous with their industries.     

Does revenue-expense matching play a differential role in analysts’ earnings and revenue forecasts?

This paper investigates whether matching has differential implications for the accuracy of analysts' earnings and revenue forecasts. We construct a novel measure of firm-level matching and document that matching improves analysts' earnings forecasts to a greater extent than their revenue forecasts. We also document matching's differential impact on analysts' earnings and sales forecasts by proposing a new count metric capturing a wedge in the accuracy of earnings and revenue forecasts. In additional tests, we report that the differential impact of matching is less (more) pronounced in a situation where the balance sheet (income statement) orientation likely dominates. We also report that matching's differential role is weaker (stronger) when firms have high intangible intensity (analysts have appropriate resources or expertise). In short window tests, matching's role in analysts' forecast revisions is more pronounced for earnings than sales forecasts. Overall, these results show how analysts benefit from better revenue-expense matching.     

New debt issues and earnings management

We empirically examine the influence and effects of real earnings management (REM) procedures on the debt market by investigating the bond rating and actual market price of a firm's new debt offerings. Extant research provides conflicting representations concerning the effects of REM techniques on equity shareholders and debt market participants. Our results indicate a negative association between all three REM manipulation methods and perceived credit risk resulting in a lower bond rating, and higher market yield of the firm's debt at issuance. Additional analyses exploring the use of REM techniques to achieve analyst's earnings forecasts indicates that this negative effect is particularly significant for firms who only achieve the earnings forecast by utilizing REM methods. Our research adds to the literature by empirically describing the effects of REM techniques on new debt issuances, and contributes to the ongoing debate regarding the efficacy of engaging in real earnings management to achieve known targets.     

Expected Mispricing: The Joint Influence of Accounting Transparency and Investor Base

We examine how accounting transparency and investor base jointly affect financial analysts' expectations of mispricing (i.e., expectations of stock price deviations from fundamental value). Within a range of transparency, these two factors interactively amplify analysts' expectations of mispricing—analysts expect a larger positive deviation when a firm's disclosures more transparently reveal income‐increasing earnings management and the firm's most important investors are described as transient institutional investors with a shorter‐term horizon (low concentration in holdings, high portfolio turnover, and frequent momentum trading) rather than dedicated institutional investors with a longer‐term horizon (high concentration in holdings, low portfolio turnover, and little momentum trading). Results are consistent with analysts anticipating that transient institutional investors are more likely than dedicated institutional investors to adjust their trading strategies for near‐term factors affecting stock mispricings. Our theory and findings extend the accounting disclosure literature by identifying a boundary condition to the common supposition that disclosure transparency necessarily mitigates expected mispricing, and by providing evidence that analysts' pricing judgments are influenced by their anticipation of different investors' reactions to firm disclosures.     

Misvaluation and Insider Trading Incentives for Accrual‐based and Real Earnings Management

We investigate the incentives that misvaluation creates for: (1) insider trading; and (2) concurrent earnings management through both accruals and real activities. Managers of overvalued firms have an incentive to sustain overvaluation through income increasing earnings management and, at the same time, to sell their shares (Jensen, 2005 ). Managers of undervalued firms benefit from buying their firm's shares, however the negative effects of downward earnings management may offset incentives to enhance trading advantages. The results indicate that managers of both over‐ and under‐valued firms act opportunistically, managing earnings upward (downward) with accruals while selling (buying) shares. The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) has been largely ineffective in eliminating trading motivated earnings management. Finally, we do not find evidence of a relationship between managerial trading and real earnings management.     

Do Publicly Signalled Earnings Management Incentives Affect Analyst Forecast Accuracy?

Using a panel of listed Australian firms for the years 1999–2007, this paper investigates whether analysts' forecast efficiency is improved by the occurrence of a publicly observable event, such as a CEO appointment, which signals a firm's earnings management incentives. Two supporting hypotheses are also tested: first, that CEO appointments are associated with income‐decreasing earnings management; and second, that analyst forecast errors increase with the level of earnings management present in current period financial statements. Consistent with prior literature, we find income‐decreasing earnings management in the year of CEO appointment. Earnings management, as a general phenomenon, is found to be significantly related to analyst forecast errors in the period in which the earnings management occurs. However, we present evidence that analyst forecasts for current year earnings are significantly more accurate with respect to earnings management in cases where a CEO is appointed during the current financial period.