Auditor Independence,Non‐Audit Services,and Restatements: Was the U.S. Government Right?*

Do fees for non‐audit services compromise auditor's independence and result in reduced quality of financial reporting? The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 presumes that some fees do and bans these services for audit clients. Also, some registrants voluntarily restrict their audit firms from providing legally permitted non‐audit services. Assuming that restatements of previously issued financial statements reflect low‐quality financial reporting, we investigate detailed fees for restating registrants for 1995 to 2000 and for similar nonrestating registrants. We do not find a statistically significant positive association between fees for either financial information systems design and implementation or internal audit services and restatements, but we do find some such association for unspecified non‐audit services and restatements. We find a significant negative association between tax services fees and restatements, consistent with net benefits from acquiring tax services from a registrant's audit firm. The significant associations are driven primarily by larger registrants.     

IFRS and U.S. GAAP: Assessing the impact of reporting incentives on firm restatements in foreign and U.S. markets

This study examines the impact of reporting incentives on firm restatements in foreign and U.S. markets. We investigate whether financial reporting, using International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) results in quality disclosures, given differences in institutional and market forces. This study examines the quality of financial statements prepared in accordance with IFRS and U.S. GAAP by concentrating on firm restatements as a measure of earnings management. Our results indicate that there is no significant difference in the value of restatements due to differences in accounting standards when the rule of law is high in the international market. Furthermore, firms with better law enforcement and higher traditions of law and order, tend to have smaller restatement amounts or less earnings manipulation. This study contributes to the literature by providing evidence of the quality of financial information prepared under IFRS and its dependency on the institutional factors and market forces of a country.     

The effect of controlling shareholders’ excess board seats control on financial restatements: evidence from Taiwan

This study examines the relation between controlling shareholders’ excess board seats control and financial restatements. An analysis of a sample comprising 106 Taiwanese listed firms (53 restating firms vs. 53 non-restating control firms) shows that financial restatements are more likely to occur when there is a greater divergence between controlling shareholders’ board seats control rights and ownership rights. We also find that the excess board seats control of controlling shareholders is positively associated with the materiality and pervasiveness of financial restatements. Overall, these results suggest that the entrenchment incentive from controlling shareholders’ excess control motivates firms to adopt aggressive accounting policies.

Audit committee quality indices,reporting quality and firm value

We investigate the relation between audit committee (AC) quality indices, financial reporting, internal control quality and firm value using a US dataset for the period 2002–12. The indices are developed by linking firm value with principal component analysis (PCA) factors based on a broad set of 82 AC variables, some of which influence the quality of the AC, but are not addressed in prior literature. Significant AC factors include ‘overlapping directors’, ‘busyness’ and ‘foreign director’, and we use these factors to develop ‘high’ and ‘low’ AC quality indices. We show that low AC quality firms are more likely to manage earnings, be external auditor dependent with respect to non‐audit tax services, and switch to a lower quality auditor. Low AC quality firms are also more likely to have internal control concerns disclosed by predecessor auditors, including accounting issues, financial restatements, audit opinion concerns and deficiencies that undermine internal control effectiveness. Further, they are more likely to receive an audit report containing additional explanatory notes. Conversely, high AC quality firms are significantly less likely to have these concerns. Our findings highlight the value of using AC quality indices in delivering greater oversight of the financial reporting process.     

Relationship Between Controlling Shareholders’ Participation in Share Pledging and Accounting Conservatism in China

This study examines the relationship between controlling shareholders’ participation in share pledging and accounting conservatism in the Chinese stock market. Share pledging introduces risks to controlling shareholders and leads to severe information asymmetry between controlling shareholders and outside minority shareholders. This, in turn, results in competing incentives with regard to financial reporting. We find that controlling shareholders’ participation in share pledging negatively affects accounting conservatism, especially for firms located in regions with weak legal enforcement and poor investor protection. Our study shows that controlling shareholders’ share‐pledging behaviour negatively influences firms’ reporting quality, especially in areas with weak legal systems.     

Individual Large Shareholders,Earnings Management,and Capital‐Market Consequences

Using a large hand‐collected sample of all blockholders (ownership ≥ 5%) of S&P 1500 firms for the years 2002–2009, we first document significant individual blockholder effects on earnings management (accrual‐based earnings management, real earnings management, and restatements). This association is driven primarily by these large shareholders influencing rather than selecting firms’ financial reporting practices. Second, the market's reaction to earnings announcements suggests that investors recognize the heterogeneity in blockholders’ influence on earnings management. The results highlight the highly individualized effects of blockholders and a mechanism through which shareholders impact reported earnings.     

Non‐Audit Service Fees and Financial Reporting Quality: A Meta‐Analysis

Auditing as a corporate governance mechanism has attracted considerable research attention. Because of the information asymmetry between corporate managers and outside shareholders, auditors are hired to provide independent assurance that financial statements are prepared following generally accepted accounting principles. The credibility of such assurance depends on the independence, both in fact and in appearance, of the auditor. Over the years, however, the independence of auditors has come under increased scrutiny because of their joint provision of both audit and non‐audit services. A sizable literature on the impact of non‐audit fees on financial reporting quality has developed. The evidence from this literature, however, remains inconclusive. This paper provides a meta‐analysis of the available literature by assessing (a) the net effect of non‐audit fees on financial reporting quality, and (b) whether there is homogeneity in the financial reporting quality proxies used in the extant literature. Findings suggest that the level of client‐specific non‐audit fees is associated with reduced financial reporting quality. However, the underlying studies used to conduct this meta‐analysis are not homogenous.     

International Accounting Standards and Accounting Quality

We examine whether application of International Accounting Standards (IAS) is associated with higher accounting quality. The application of IAS reflects combined effects of features of the financial reporting system, including standards, their interpretation, enforcement, and litigation. We find that firms applying IAS from 21 countries generally evidence less earnings management, more timely loss recognition, and more value relevance of accounting amounts than do matched sample firms applying non‐U.S. domestic standards. Differences in accounting quality between the two groups of firms in the period before the IAS firms adopt IAS do not account for the postadoption differences. Firms applying IAS generally evidence an improvement in accounting quality between the pre‐ and postadoption periods. Although we cannot be sure our findings are attributable to the change in the financial reporting system rather than to changes in firms' incentives and the economic environment, we include research design features to mitigate effects of both.     

Firm Accrual Quality Following Restatements: A Signaling View

We consider whether and how firms improve their financial reporting credibility following a restatement by comparing two alternative views. The compliance view predicts that firms simply correct errors to comply with regulations; the signaling view predicts that improvements are broader to allow firms to signal higher reporting quality and thereby reduce information uncertainty. We find that accrual quality improves significantly following the restatement and that this improvement is observed for both earnings and non‐earnings error restatements. We also find that the extent of real earnings’ management decreases significantly. Further, we find that improvements in accrual quality are higher for firms with CEO turnover and higher incentives to improve, but lower for firms switching to an auditor of lower quality. Collectively, our findings suggest that firms signal improved reporting credibility following a restatement through higher accruals quality and lower real earnings management.     

Accounting and litigation risk: evidence from Directors’ and Officers’ insurance pricing

We study whether and how financial reporting concerns are priced by insurers that sell Directors’ and Officers’ (D&O) insurance to public firms. As D&O insurers typically assume the liabilities arising from shareholder litigation, the premiums they charge for D&O coverage reflect their assessment of a company’s litigation risk. Using a sample of public firms in the 2001–2004 Tillinghast D&O insurance surveys, we document that firms with lower earnings quality or prior accounting restatements pay higher premiums after controlling for other factors impacting litigation risk. In addition, insurers’ concerns about financial reporting are most evident for firms with restatements that are not revenue or expense related, are greater in the period following the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, and are greater for firms with financial reporting problems that linger. Our results are consistent with past restatements being viewed as evidence of chronic problems with a firm’s financial statements. By analyzing archival data, we can also quantify the effects of other determinants of D&O premiums (such as business risk, corporate governance, etc.) identified by Baker and Griffith (Univ Chic Law Rev 74(2):487–544, 2007a) through interviews regarding the D&O underwriting process.     

The Timeliness of Restatement Disclosures and Financial Reporting Credibility

This study investigates whether prompt discovery and disclosure of earnings restatements is associated with greater post‐restatement financial reporting credibility. We measure the timeliness of restatement detection by the length of time between the end of the misstated period and the subsequent restatement announcement. We document that shorter detection periods are significantly associated with high‐quality corporate governance characteristics and executive and/or auditor turnover, but not with characteristics of restatements. We also find that firms with shorter detection periods exhibit a more moderate decline in the information content of earnings following restatement announcements relative to firms with longer detection periods, and that detection period length has an incremental effect on the information content of earnings relative to executive and/or auditor turnover alone. In addition, we find that restatement disclosures are more timely following the implementation of the SOX‐era reforms, and that only firms with shorter detection periods experience more moderate post‐restatement declines in the information content of earnings following the implementation of the SOX‐era reforms. The results from this study suggest that the timeliness of restatement detection and disclosure is associated with greater financial reporting credibility following restatements.     

How Effective Is Internal Control Reporting under SOX 404? Determinants of the (Non‐)Disclosure of Existing Material Weaknesses

We study determinants of internal control reporting decisions under Section 404 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX 404) using a sample of restating firms whose original misstatements are linked to underlying control weaknesses. We find that only a minority of these firms acknowledge their existing control weaknesses during their misstatement periods, and that this proportion has declined over time. Further, the probability of reporting existing weaknesses is negatively associated with external capital needs, firm size, non‐audit fees, and the presence of a large audit firm; it is positively associated with financial distress, auditor effort, previously reported control weaknesses and restatements, and recent auditor and management changes. These results provide evidence that detection and disclosure incentives play a role in whether existing material weaknesses are reported, which has implications for the effectiveness of SOX 404 in providing investors with advance warning of potential accounting problems.     

Material weakness disclosures and restatement announcements: The joint and order effects

We examine differences in stock price, option volatility, and litigation reactions to restatement announcements that are associated with a material weakness (MW) disclosure. Contrasted with restatements that are not associated with any MW disclosure, our analyses reveal that firms that announce both a restatement and an associated MW experience significantly more negative market returns, greater implied volatility, and higher likelihood of class action lawsuits. Separating the restatements into timely reporters, where the MW precedes the restatement, and non‐timely reporters, where the MW is concurrent with or follows the restatement, we find that timely reporters experience more negative returns at the time of the restatement, relative to non‐timely reporters, suggesting that investors perceive the early MW disclosure to signal more pervasive control‐related problems. Interestingly, we find that timely and non‐timely reporters are equally likely to be sued, consistent with the argument that wrongdoing (through either a timely or non‐timely MW disclosure) provides stronger grounds for establishing scienter. However, timely reporters appear to secure more favorable litigation outcomes: they face higher likelihood of lawsuit dismissals and pay much lower settlements, compared to non‐timely reporters. Overall, our evidence provides new insights into how market participants incorporate information about internal control weaknesses into their perceptions regarding the economic implications of financial restatements, and financial reporting quality.     

Problem directors on the audit committee and financial reporting quality

The objective of this paper is to examine empirically the consequences for financial reporting quality of having audit committees that include problem directors, that is, directors with prior involvement in corporate bankruptcies, major accounting restatements, or other accounting scandals. An ordinary least squares regression model is used to examine the association between problem directors on the audit committee and financial reporting quality as proxied by accruals and real earnings management. Results reveal that there is a positive association between the presence of problem directors on the audit committee and real earnings management, and this association is more pronounced in cases where those problem directors have been involved in prior instances of accounting restatements and fraudulent reporting practices.     

Characteristics of non-audit services and financial restatements in Malaysia

Various types of purchased non-audit services (NAS) and their recurring nature affect the likelihood of financial statement restatements in Malaysia. Based on 953 firm-year observations during the period 2007–2009, evidence of a negative relationship between non-audit fees and financial statement restatements is provided. The purchase of both tax-related and audit-related NAS decreases the likelihood of restatements. Recurring (as opposed to non-recurring) tax-related and audit-related NAS are negatively and significantly related to the likelihood of restatements. These findings support our hypothesis that both types of NAS and their recurrence provide knowledge spillover, which enhances audit and financial reporting quality. When considering institutional settings, we find that politically connected firms are more likely to require financial restatements than non-politically connected firms, while audit committee independence and the purchase of tax-related, recurring tax-related and other NAS decrease this likelihood. The purchase of audit-related and recurring audit-related NAS and non-recurring other NAS decreases the likelihood of restatements for non-politically connected firms.     

Can Management Turnover Restore the Financial Statement Credibility of Restating Firms? Further Evidence

This paper investigates the association between management turnover following financial restatements and the probability of subsequent restatements. We find that restating firms that replace management (CEO and/or CFO) are more likely to restate their financial statements again. We also find that subsequent restatements are mainly attributable to the new management. Overall, our results suggest that management turnover following restatements may not be an effective mechanism to remediate financial restatements, but the change to a new management results in a greater possibility of lower earnings quality (i.e., higher probability of subsequent financial restatements and accruals‐based earnings management). Our study supports prior literature's findings that the change in the top management leads to organizational instability and higher accounting information risk. Our findings have implications for internal decisionmaking with regard to top executive replacement.     

Financial reporting quality and dividend policy: New evidence from an international level

This study examines the link between financial reporting quality and dividend payout across 76 countries. We find that financial reporting quality increases dividend payout after controlling for firm and country specifics. We also investigate different channels that moderate the relation between financial reporting quality and dividend payout. We find that the positive association between high-quality financial reporting and dividend payout is more pronounced when firms have free cash flow problems, face severe information asymmetry, and are located in countries with weaker minority shareholder protection rights. Interestingly, we find evidence that high reporting quality enhances firms' payment of dividend even when these firms already overpaying their shareholders. However, the relation becomes weaker when firms overpass the optimal level of dividend payout. The findings remain consistent after several robustness checks, thus highlighting the effectiveness of more transparent disclosure of financial information in reducing information asymmetry related to firms' internal agency costs and their relationships with external parties.     

An empirical investigation of earnings restatements by Australian firms

From 1970 to 2003, we document earnings restatements for the top 500 Australian firms, examine the characteristics of restating firms, and test whether restatements are value relevant. Of the 195 earnings restatements, 49 per cent decrease prior‐period earnings (negative restatements). Negative restatements are relatively larger than positive restatements. We identify three reasons for earnings restatements; namely, accounting policy changes, revision of estimates, and errors and unknown, and they comprise 49, 40 and 11 per cent of the sample, respectively. Restatement firms have higher growth opportunities and are smaller than non‐restating firms from the same industry. Restatements are generally negatively associated with market and non‐market value.     

控制权、媒介功用与市场治理效应:基于财务报告重述的实证研究

本文以财务报告重述为研究视角,实证检验了我国转轨市场环境下媒介功用改善对大股东控制权治理的效应。研究表明,财务报告重述导致市场风险与不确定性的增加,但与控制权的负相关性并不显著,彰显近年来控制权治理缺陷纠偏的动态成效初见。同时,控制权治理效应受媒介机制作用,在媒介功用发挥弱的市场环境下,控制权提升加剧了低质量会计信息引致的资源错配,体现为显著的负市场治理效应;而随着媒介环境改善和监督功用的增强,控制权治理效应得以修正,表明媒体对约束大股东行为起到积极的治理功能。此外,审计委员会、审计意见和重述及时性同样具有显著影响。本文结论为监管机构倡导和加强媒体在资本市场上的作用提供了初步证据支持。     

The quality of financial reporting in China: An examination from an accounting restatement perspective

This study uses restatements to reveal the poor quality of past accounting information reported within China’s capital market. We show that up to a quarter of listed firms in mainland China explicitly admitted the poor quality of their financial information by restating their previous financial reports between 1999 and 2005. Many of these firms managed their earnings mainly via below-the-line items to avoid losses and promote survival, rather than to support refinancing goals. Such poor-quality financial reporting is more likely among firms that have weaker profitability and a shareholder base that is state-controlled, with diffused ownership and a relatively low proportion of shares held by institutional investors. Furthermore, we find the market to be relatively insensitive to such admissions. Investors’ reactions capture only the earnings information of the current reported year, rather than also reflecting the concurrently revealed correction of past financial reporting. However, the equity market does not completely ignore the earnings information. Investors’ reliance on earnings is merely low relative to the mature US market. These findings demonstrate that accounting credibility in China has low value; providing poor-quality financial information bears little cost because various market mechanisms fail to deter such behavior. Nevertheless, regulators’ ongoing efforts to enhance the quality of financial information and disclosure among listed firms are still fruitful. The frequency of restatements decreased over our sample period, which reinforces the current regulatory prospects and strategies for further improving China’s capital markets.