The Timeliness of Restatement Disclosures and Financial Reporting Credibility

This study investigates whether prompt discovery and disclosure of earnings restatements is associated with greater post‐restatement financial reporting credibility. We measure the timeliness of restatement detection by the length of time between the end of the misstated period and the subsequent restatement announcement. We document that shorter detection periods are significantly associated with high‐quality corporate governance characteristics and executive and/or auditor turnover, but not with characteristics of restatements. We also find that firms with shorter detection periods exhibit a more moderate decline in the information content of earnings following restatement announcements relative to firms with longer detection periods, and that detection period length has an incremental effect on the information content of earnings relative to executive and/or auditor turnover alone. In addition, we find that restatement disclosures are more timely following the implementation of the SOX‐era reforms, and that only firms with shorter detection periods experience more moderate post‐restatement declines in the information content of earnings following the implementation of the SOX‐era reforms. The results from this study suggest that the timeliness of restatement detection and disclosure is associated with greater financial reporting credibility following restatements.     

Discretionary disclosure and the market reaction to restatements

This paper presents evidence that management’s disclosure choices related to a restatement are associated with the market reaction at the time the restatement is announced. The two aspects of pre-restatement disclosure choice we examine are the amount of disclosure, hypothesized to reduce information asymmetries, and the tone of disclosure, hypothesized to exacerbate the effect of subsequently-disconfirmed market expectations. Our results provide support for both hypothesized effects, controlling for characteristics that previous research has shown to affect market reaction to restatements—financial attributes of restatements, and concurrent disclosure choices such as prominence of the announcement. We also find that concurrent and prior disclosure characteristics have equivalent and complementary power in explaining market reaction to restatements, while interactive effects indicate that pre-restatement disclosure choices reduce the marginal market impact of concurrent disclosure characteristics.     

Information asymmetry and accounting restatement: NYSE-AMEX and NASDAQ evidence

We examine the impact of accounting restatement announcement on firms’ value and information asymmetry for both auction market (NYSE-AMEX) and dealer market (NASDAQ) using a public sample of restatement announcements from 1997 to 2005. In both markets, we document economically and significantly negative mean cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement dates. The restatements attributed to auditors are associated with more negative returns than those attributed to management and the SEC. However, there is no significant difference between market reactions arising from the core and non-core restatements. We also find a significant increase in volume, number of transactions, average order size, volatility, and various measures of spreads after the restatement announcement indicating that restatement announcements diminish company prospects and contribute to increased uncertainty and information asymmetry. Finally, we find that the information asymmetry in the NASDAQ market around the event date is less pronounced than in the NYSE-AMEX market.     

Third-party auditor liability and financial restatements

We examine whether U.S. state-level third-party auditor liability (TPAL) regimes affect firms' financial restatement decisions. Using a sample of 34,409 firm-year observations from 2003 to 2018, we find that state-level TPAL is significantly negatively related to the likelihood of firm-level financial restatements. We also observe that the negative relationship between TPAL and financial restatements persists for a subsample of firms with income-increasing financial restatements and the ‘restatement of torts standard’ (one of the more expansive subgroups of TPAL). Using a difference-in-differences regression design, we find that an increase in state-level TPAL regimes strengthens the negative relationship between TPAL and the incidence of restatements. Our main finding remains robust across several sensitivity tests. Finally, we find that the negative relationship between TPAL and restatements is more pronounced when firms are subject to greater litigation risk and when firms are audited by non-specialist auditors. Overall, we show that TPAL has important implications for client firms' financial restatements.     

The CDS market reaction to restatement announcements

I investigate the credit market's reaction to restatement announcements through changes in credit default swap (CDS) spreads. I document an overall positive association between CDS returns and restatement announcements. Specifically, I find that more positive CDS returns are associated with restatements (1) involving fraud and (2) affecting more accounts. Moreover, these reactions are sensitive to the underlying entities’ credit ratings and the market‐wide investor sentiment. Next, I compare CDS and stock market reactions and find that more negative stock returns are associated with restatements (1) involving fraud and (2) decreasing reported income.     

Exploring the Causes of Accounting Restatements by Family Firms

Prior research shows that family firms have better earnings quality than non‐family firms in common‐law countries and highly developed markets. In contrast, we do not find a significant difference in the financial reporting quality between family and non‐family firms in the context of a civil‐law system and less developed market. We show that the financial reporting quality of family firms is conditioned on: (1) the divergence between the controlling shareholders’ voting rights and their cash flow rights, and (2) the firm's reputation for integrity, while these two conditions do not explain the restatement likelihood for non‐family firms. Moreover, when accounting irregularities are detected in the case of family firms, they are associated with more serious accounting restatements. Together, these results imply that the severity of the conflict between ultimate and minority shareholders, and a lack of integrity, explain the propensity for making financial restatements among family firms in a regime characterized as having weak investor protection and concentrated ownership structures.     

Financial Restatements, Cost of Debt and Information Spillover: Evidence From the Secondary Loan Market

Abstract:  In this paper, we investigate the effect of financial restatements on the debt market. Specifically, we focus on the secondary loan market, which has become one of the largest capital markets in the US, and ask the following: (1) whether financial restatements increase restating firm's cost of debt financing and (2) whether the information about restatements arrives at the secondary loan market earlier than at the stock market? Using 176 restatement data, we find significant negative abnormal loan returns and increased bid-ask spreads around restatement announcements. Furthermore, this negative loan market reaction is more pronounced when the restatement is initiated by either the SEC or auditors, and when the primary reason for restatement is related to revenue recognition issues. Additionally, we find restatement information arrives at the secondary loan market earlier than at the equity market, and that such private information quickly flows into the equity market. We also show that stock prices begin to decline approximately 30 days prior to the restatement announcements for firms with traded loans. However, we do not find such informational leakage for firms without traded loans. Collectively, the results of this paper suggest: (1) increased cost of debt financing after restatements and (2) superior informational efficiency of the secondary loan market to the stock market.     

Board, audit committee and restatement-induced class action lawsuits

We examine the influence of monitoring provided by the board and audit committee on the probability of restatement-induced securities class action lawsuits using a sample of firms that have restated earnings in the period of 1997-2002. Logistic regression of the probability of restatement-induced class action lawsuits indicates a negative association between proportion of independent board members and the likelihood of restatement-induced class action lawsuits. We also find that when the market reacts more negatively to restatement announcements, shareholders are more likely to initiate a class action lawsuit. Finally, we document that restatement of revenues is positively associated with the likelihood of restatement-induced shareholder litigation. Our results are robust after controlling for the restatement initiator, restatements categorized as irregularities and Blue Ribbon Recommendations.     

An investigation of SEC “Speech GAAP”

This study investigates the financial reporting regulation effects of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) staff comments made during the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Annual Current SEC & Public Company Oversight Board (PCAOB) Developments Conference in Washington, D.C. (SEC Conference). At this conference, the SEC staff communicates its preferences about areas where it believes companies are misapplying GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles). We call this communication SEC Speech GAAP. One outcome of the SEC Conference may be that companies re-evaluate their previous financial reporting by restating their financial statements. We find, first, that firms with restatement issues similar to those covered at the SEC Conference experience a decrease in the association between earnings and future cash flows after the restatement. Second, we find little market reaction to the disclosure of restatements related to SEC Conference issues, but the disclosure of non-conference related restatement issues has a significantly negative affect on investors’ valuation decisions. Our findings suggest that SEC Speech GAAP is associated with financial statements that are less informative to investors and investors find the valuation consequences of restatements prompted by SEC Speech GAAP to be less important than the valuation consequences for restatements prompted for other reasons.     

重要性判断与会计信息披露——来自隐晦重述的证据

重要性是会计中的基础问题,是证券市场信息披露筛选过滤的门槛,重要性原则的不确定使得重要性概念极易被利用和操纵.然而,国内现有研究却鲜有关于重要性应用的经验证据.为此,本文以隐晦重述为研究对象,从财务报告披露环节的策略选择问题入手,揭示重要性判断在实务中的具体应用.研究发现:重要性门槛的不确定给公司战略性披露信息提供了机会,重述越重要,公司越倾向于隐晦披露,好的公司治理有助于改善重要性程度对隐晦重述的影响,提高信息披露的透明度.     

盈余重述的市场反应及其影响因素研究——基于我国2004-2010年数据的经验分析

本文以2004-2010年盈余重述为样本,检验了我国盈余重述的市场反应及其影响因素。根据重述披露的时点选择特征,首次提出聚合重述和分离重述概念。研究发现,年报的利好消息或非利好消息对盈余重述负面影响的"抵减效应"或"加剧效应"都十分显著;剔除年报影响的分离重述的市场反应显著为-3%。研究还发现,相对于被动重述,主动重述被认为是"主动说真话"的表现,具有"坦白从宽"的效果;重述追溯调整的幅度、公司盈利能力、财务风险和债务水平,都会显著影响重述公告时的市场反应程度。     

Consequences of Financial Reporting Failure for Outside Directors: Evidence from Accounting Restatements and Audit Committee Members

I use a sample of 409 companies that restated their earnings from 1997 to 2001 to examine penalties for outside directors, particularly audit committee members, when their companies experience accounting restatements. Penalties from lawsuits and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) actions are limited. However, directors experience significant labor market penalties. In the three years after the restatement, director turnover is 48% for firms that restate earnings downward, 33% for a performance‐matched sample, 28% for firms that restate upward, and only 18% for technical restatement firms. For firms that overstate earnings, the likelihood of director departure increases in restatement severity, particularly for audit committee directors. In addition, directors of these firms are no longer present in 25% of their positions on other boards. This loss is greater for audit committee members and for more severe restatements. A matched‐sample analysis confirms this result. Overall, the evidence is consistent with outside directors, especially audit committee members, bearing reputational costs for financial reporting failure.     

Equity issues when in distress

We investigate the role of financial distress in the seasoned equity market. We find that distressed firms comprise about 40% of SEOs and these distressed issuers have worse abnormal announcement returns than non‐distressed issuers. Stock return volatility is an important determinant for announcement returns for non‐distressed SEO issuers but not for distressed SEO issuers. Signals of firm quality are associated with better announcement returns, larger issues, increased investment, improved operating performance, and lower likelihood of delisting for distressed SEO firms as compared to non‐distressed firms. Our findings suggest equity finance is valuable for financially distressed firms with strong growth prospects.     

Corporate Investments: Learning from Restatements

This study analyzes the information conveyed by the restatements of financial reports. We argue that restatements contain news about the investment projects of the restating firms' competitors. This news causes competitors to revise their beliefs about the projects' value, and to modify their subsequent investment decisions. Accordingly, we hypothesize that changes in competitors' investments after restatement announcements are related to news in the restatements. Consistent with our prediction, we find that changes in competitors' investments following restatement announcements are significantly related to various proxies for news in the restatements, such as competitors' and restating firms' abnormal returns at the restatement announcements. We conclude that restatements convey information about the investment projects of restating firms' competitors.     

Do post-restatement firms care about financial credibility? Evidence from the pre- and post-SOX eras

This study examines whether negative-market-reaction firms in the year following restatement announcements adopt more conservative financial reporting to respond to their financial reporting credibility crisis, especially in the post-SOX era. Using Basu’s (1997) measure of conservatism, we find that negative-market-reaction firms in the year following restatement announcements report their financial statements more conservatively in the post-SOX era, as the market reaction following restatement announcements becomes more severe. We also find that as the negative market restatement reaction becomes more severe, negative-market-reaction firms using a Big N auditor in the year following financial restatements report their financial statements more conservatively in the post-SOX era.     

财务重述、管理层权力与股价崩盘风险：来自中国证券市场的经验证据

股市震荡引发投资者和监管层对股价崩盘风险的关注。从财务重述背后所反映的财务信息质量低下和公司治理失效出发,探讨其对股价崩盘风险的影响,结合管理层权力这一影响组织行为和产出能力的代理人特征,探讨其对财务重述与股价崩盘风险之间关系的影响。研究结果表明：相比未发生财务重述的公司,发生了财务重述的公司的股价崩盘风险明显更高;进一步纳入代理人特征———管理层权力后,发现代理人的这一特征对上述关系有明显的促进作用。     

Corporate misreporting and bank loan contracting

This paper is the first to study the effect of financial restatement on bank loan contracting. Compared with loans initiated before restatement, loans initiated after restatement have significantly higher spreads, shorter maturities, higher likelihood of being secured, and more covenant restrictions. The increase in loan spread is significantly larger for fraudulent restating firms than other restating firms. We also find that after restatement, the number of lenders per loan declines and firms pay higher upfront and annual fees. These results are consistent with banks using tighter loan contract terms to overcome risk and information problems arising from financial restatements.     

Audit firm tenure and financial restatements: An analysis of industry specialization and fee effects

This study investigates the relation between audit firm tenure and clients’ financial restatements. Specifically, we extend the audit tenure literature by assessing restatement-based reporting failures using dimensions of auditor expertise and independence previously assumed to underlie short and long audit tenure problems. Short tenure expertise and independence effects are hypothesized using audit firm industry specialization and audit fees as proxies. Long tenure independence effects are hypothesized using nonaudit fees as a proxy. Using matched-sample logistic regression and 382 companies with and without financial restatements during 2000–2004, the results support prior findings by indicating a negative relation between the length of the auditor–client relationship and the likelihood of restatement. For short tenure engagements, we find that auditor industry specialization and audit fees are negatively related to the likelihood of restatement. This result is consistent with concerns about reduced audit quality due to a lack of client-specific knowledge and low audit fees on new audit engagements. Alternatively, the long tenure results indicate an insignificant relation between nonaudit fees and the likelihood of restatement. This finding contradicts independence concerns about nonaudit fees paid to entrenched auditors.     

审计师行业专长、产品市场竞争与财务重述——来自中国证券市场的经验证据

以2007~2012年我国 A 股上市公司为样本,对审计师行业专长与财务重述的关系,以及产品市场竞争程度对两者关系的影响进行实证研究。结果表明：审计师行业专长有助于降低财务重述发生的概率;产品市场竞争则削弱了审计师行业专长对财务重述行为的抑制作用。     

The effect of restatements on analyst behavior

This paper examines how changes in the credibility of financial reporting affect analyst behavior. Using a sample of restatement firms experiencing a substantial change in credibility over 1997–2006, we document that restatements have a long‐lived effect on analyst behavior and that analysts differentiate between restatements caused by irregularities and those caused by errors. We find that while irregularity restatement firms exhibit a reduction in analyst coverage and forecast accuracy and an increase in forecast dispersion in the post‐restatement period, other restatement firms exhibit only an increase in forecast error. Finally, we find evidence to suggest that remedial actions reduce the effect of irregularity restatements on analyst behavior. Overall, these results are consistent with the notion that restatements affect analyst behavior in forming judgements regarding subsequent earnings announcements.