The integration of bank syndicated loan and junk bond markets

This paper hypothesizes that the special role of banks as corporate quasi-insiders has been changing due to developments in informational, legal and institutional infrastructures of syndicated loan markets. We investigate the integration of intermediated and disintermediated financial markets through highly leveraged transaction (HLT) syndicated loans during the 1990s. We demonstrate that, with the emergence of traded HLT syndicated loans as an alternative high-yield asset to high-yield bonds, market integration has dramatically increased. Taking the late 1980s and 1990s together, different factors explain the movement of credit spreads of the two markets. HLT loan market’s spreads are strongly affected by bank liquidity. Bank liquidity’s effect on HLT loan spreads disappears after 1993. From 1994–1999, junk bond market liquidity factors affect bank loan pricing. We interpret these changes as evidence of the erosion of bank specialness.     

FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS IN LEVERAGED COMMERCIAL LOAN MARKETS

In the last decade, three innovations in commercial loan-based securities and derivative have enabled institutional investors to access commercial loan markets on leveraged terms : collateralized loan obligations (CLOs); loan-based total return swaps; and leveraged loan-based structured notes (LLSNs). These innovations have been driven by a combination of structural changes in the banking industry, enhanced technology for securitizations, reformed banking regulations, and the advent of credit derivatives.
Besides providing new investment opportunities for institutional investors, these recent innovations in loan markets also promise to reinforce the existing trend in banking away from financial intermediation and toward information intermediation. Such a trend, the authors argue, is helping to ensure the long-run viability of commercial banks. By transforming loan assets in the ways described in this article, banks can generate fee income instead of interest income (thus limiting their capital requirements and interest rate and credit exposures) while still exploiting their comparative advantage in credit analysis and monitoring.     

A Model of Shadow Banking

We present a model of shadow banking in which banks originate and trade loans, assemble them into diversified portfolios, and finance these portfolios externally with riskless debt. In this model: outside investor wealth drives the demand for riskless debt and indirectly for securitization, bank assets and leverage move together, banks become interconnected through markets, and banks increase their exposure to systematic risk as they reduce idiosyncratic risk through diversification. The shadow banking system is stable and welfare improving under rational expectations, but vulnerable to crises and liquidity dry‐ups when investors neglect tail risks.     

Formulaic Transparency: The Hidden Enabler of Exceptional U.S. Securitization

Why does the securitization of residential mortgages, credit cards, auto loans, and other such consumer debt in the U.S. exceed the securitization of such debt in Europe by several trillion dollars? The author points out that lemon problems do not stop the sale of used cars but they do prevent the operation of a market in which buyers place sight‐unseen bids for used cars offered by unknown sellers. Buyers prefer to know who the seller is and test‐drive vehicles. Similarly until the 1980s, creditors were willing to forgo the information they could secure in private transactions to get tradability mainly in the case of bonds issued by governments or a few blue‐chip companies. U.S. government policy encouraged the securitization of trillions of dollars of loans made to millions of borrowers. U.S. rules—rather than new financial or information technologies—have strongly encouraged originators of mortgages and other consumer loans to rely on credit scores (commonly referred to as FICO scores) produced by credit bureaus. And reliance on scores that loan originators use but don’t produce helps overcome the information asymmetry problems that would otherwise constrain securitization. The argument turns the usual concern about securitization on its head: transferring risks to investors is normally expected to discourage careful screening of borrowers, but the author’s analysis suggests that formulaic, FICO‐based screening actually enables risk transfer by reducing information asymmetry problems. Moreover, while limiting screening reduces the upfront costs of lending, it also increases loans made to uncreditworthy borrowers. And because increasing loans made to bad borrowers raises the rates good borrowers have to pay (to compensate investors for higher defaults), U.S. rules that sacrifice information for more “complete” markets may be a bad bargain.     

Competition,financial innovation and commercial bank loan portfolios

I examine how US commercial bank loan portfolios change in response to the rise of securitization markets and banking market deregulations over 1976–2003. Banks increasingly tilt their portfolios toward real-estate-backed loans. However, there are significant differences across banks. Larger banks and younger banks disproportionately shift their lending toward real-estate-backed loans, particularly commercial real-estate-backed loans, whereas smaller banks and older banks maintain greater shares of their loan portfolios in commercial and personal loans. When larger banks make more real-estate-backed loans, they charge lower interest rates, consistent with these banks lowering the costs of lending and expanding credit for borrowers. In contrast, smaller banks charge higher interest rates, consistent with these banks restricting lending to a select group of borrowers.     

THE NEW LEVERAGED LOAN SYNDICATION MARKET

Over the past ten years, commercial lending has been transformed from a one-off, bilateral "market" in which issuers maintained one or more separate banking relationships into a capital market in which one or more underwriters structure and price loans for syndication to groups of investors. This market-driven evolution has been most dramatic in the leveraged lending segment (defined as loans priced at LIBOR plus 150 basis points or more), where wide margins have attracted a large and growing field of underwriters, intermediaries, and investors.
Liquidity is the overriding theme in today's syndicated loan market, making the market a more user-friendly one for corporate borrowers and deal sponsors. As a result, a record number of corporate issuers are taking advantage of the syndicated loan market to finance strategic transactions or simply to reduce their borrowing costs. Deal sponsors, too, are tapping the market to finance leveraged buyouts, recapitalizations, and acquisitions at a pace not seen since the late 1980s. But, although acquisition pricing has reached cash flow multiples that recall those of the late '80s, equity contributions by sponsors are larger and credit structures are more conservative.
For banks and other investors, reduced loan pricing and more flexible credit structures have been balanced by much greater access to a large volume of diversified assets, as well as the ability to manage asset-specific and portfolio risk more effectively. As a result of more effective portfolio management strategies, lenders today are less vulnerable to credit problems with individual issuers or a given industry segment, and the bank market as a whole should be much less subject to disruption than it proved to be in the early 1990s.     

The anatomy of corporate securitizations and contract design

Collateralized loan obligations (CLOs), intermediaries situated between investors and traditional banks, play an increasingly central role in the provision of credit to constrained corporations, holding as much as 75% of all new institutional leveraged loans. Despite their ascendancy in the risky corporate credit market, there has been little academic research on the CLO market. This paper provides a comprehensive overview of the design and structure of the CLO market, describing the general macroeconomic milieu that has facilitated the rapid growth of the market, the mechanics therein, as well as recent risks that have emerged. Understanding the anatomy and dynamics of CLOs is paramount for developing insights into the role of non-bank financial intermediaries in financial markets.     

关于我国利率和利率传导关系的思考

当前我国银行体系利率大致可分为货币市场利率和信贷市场利率,其中由央行指定的利率主要有存贷款基准利率、再贴现率等。在货币市场上,隔夜同业拆借利率具有基准利率的地位。在信贷市场上,在特定时期,保持适当的存贷款利差具有积极意义。由于一些阻碍信贷市场与货币市场统一的制度安排的存在,这两个市场间的利率传导呈现出一定的不对称性。为推进利率市场化,进一步完善我国利率体系,下一步应逐步弥合市场分割,加强货币市场基准利率建设,培育商业银行利率定价能力。     

Value Creation through Securitization: Evidence from the CMBS Market

Despite recent volatility and constraints in secondary market funding, analysts have ascribed substantial value creation to the securitization of commercial mortgages. Such value creation likely emanates from liquidity enhancements, regulatory arbitrage, price discrimination and risk diversification by pooling and tranching, gains from specialization in origination, servicing, and holding of mortgages, and the like. Indeed, such value creation would be consistent with past accelerated growth in the mortgage- and asset-based securities markets and the sizable profits earned by secondary market intermediaries. In this paper, we estimate the pricing effects of commercial mortgage securitization. We do so by applying loan level data from 1992–2003 to compare the pricing of conduit and portfolio loans held in CMBS structures. In contrast to portfolio loans, which are held for investment by originating institutions, conduit loans are originated for the sole purpose of sale and securitization in the secondary market. If securitization creates value, it should be evidenced in the relative pricing of conduit loans sold into CMBS pools and in a lower cost of capital to loan originators. We estimate a reduced-form model, in which the interest rate spread between commercial mortgages and comparable-maturity treasury securities varies with loan characteristics, capital market conditions, and conduit loan status. Estimation results indicate that securitization of conduit loans leads to an 11 basis points reduction in commercial mortgage interest rates. We assess robustness of results via hazard model tests for omitted variables and originator-specific effects. We further estimate a simultaneous equations model that accounts for the potential endogeneity of mortgage loan terms to the mortgage-treasury rate spread. Results of that analysis suggest a larger 20 basis points reduction in loan pricing among conduit loans sold into CMBS structures.     

The rise of China's securitization market

We study the development of asset securitization markets in China. We manually collect all asset securitization projects and securities data from 2005 to 2015. Inspection of this sample combined with related policy changes reveals distinct characteristics and some potential problems. At the macro level, asset securitization market in China is policy driven, regulation‐segmented, and highly illiquid. At the micro level, the underlying assets are mainly corporate loans or assets, rather than mortgage or consumption loans as in the US and European markets. State owned commercial banks and enterprises enjoy significantly lower interest rates when issuing securitization bonds. Finally, risk‐isolation and credit enhancing techniques significantly improve the rating of asset‐backed securities.     

Securitization: The Transformation of Illiquid Financial Assets into Liquid Capital Market Securities Examples from the European Market

Since the benefits a firm can derive from securitization are universal, the discussion of a market bounded by national borders is somewhat artificial unless the focus is on constraints particular to the country which promote or inhibit the use of securitization. With the exception of the United Kingdom, regulatory constraints have been an important factor in slowing the development of a European market for asset and mortgage backed securities. In addition to the regulatory hurdles, securitization in Europe has been inhibited by segmented corporate bond markets and the relatively slow development of money market savings vehicles for households. Liquidity across credit spectrums has been enhanced since the introduction of the Euro, as has been the competition for savings. European companies are developing the ability to securitize even if the technique is not yet being widely exploited. What is the European market for mortgage and asset backed securities? Does it include the U.S. credit card banks, Citicorp, Chase, MBNA, and First USA that have refinanced U.S. credit card receivables in European currencies and in Euro? Does it include GMAC which has structured Swiss Franc and Euro ABS backed by its U.S. dealer floor plan loans? Does it include Japanese banks that have refinanced Yen denominated leases with Euro and Swiss Franc ABS? Does it include Barclays' issue of $1 billion of ABS backed by sterling credit card receivables? Of course the answer is yes. Markets are defined by both the supply and demand sides. Our analysis focuses on the supply side of the domestic European market.     

The role of private equity group reputation in LBO financing

This paper investigates whether the reputation of acquiring private equity groups (PEGs) is related to the financing structure of leveraged buyouts (LBOs). Using a sample of 180 public-to-private LBOs in the US between January 1, 1997 and August 15, 2007, we find that reputable PEGs are more active in the LBO market when credit risk spreads are low and lending standards in the credit markets are lax. We also find that reputable PEGs pay narrower bank and institutional loan spreads, have longer loan maturities, and rely more on institutional loans. In addition, while we find that PEG reputation is positively related to buyout leverage (i.e., LBO debt divided by pre-LBO earnings before interest, taxes, and amortization (EBITDA) of the target), and leverage is significantly positively related to buyout pricing, we do not find any direct relation between PEG reputation and buyout valuations. The evidence suggests that PEG reputation is related to LBO financing structure not only because reputable PEGs are more likely to take advantage of market timing in credit markets and but also because PEG reputation reduces agency costs of LBO debt.     

Bank monitoring incentives and optimal ABS

The paper examines a continuous-time delegated monitoring problem between competitive investors and an impatient bank monitoring a pool of long-term loans subject to Markovian “contagion.” Moral hazard induces a foreclosure bias unless the bank is compensated with the right incentive-compatible contract. Fees are paid when the bank’s performance is on target and liquidation arises when the bank’s performance is sufficiently poor. I show that the optimal contract can be implemented with a whole loan sale involving both credit risk retention based on ABS credit default swaps and credit enhancement in the form of a reserve account. The optimal securitization bears out rulemaking recently proposed in the wake of the Dodd-Frank Act on a number of controversial provisions. I argue that further efficiency gains could be reaped by extending the role of the “premium capture” account into a liquidity buffer capturing performance-based compensation as a way of increasing skin in the game over the life of the transaction.     

Capital Market Regimes and Bank Structure in Europe

We hypothesize that fundamental features that distinguish European capital markets have predictably influenced emerging national differences in bank capitalization and loan growth. Using bank‐level data from 13 European countries, 1998 to 2004, we find evidence of positive effects of “equity‐friendly” market features on bank capitalization and positive effects of both “equity‐friendly” and “credit‐friendly” market features on loan growth. The findings are strongest in small banks and in banks with cooperative charters. Our results suggest that ongoing and prospective integration of European banking markets is mitigated by relatively static features of the equity and credit markets on which banks rely.     

Securitization and the Declining Impact of Bank Finance on Loan Supply: Evidence from Mortgage Originations

Low-cost deposits and increased balance sheet liquidity raise banks' supply of illiquid loans more than loans easily sold or securitized. We exploit the inability of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to purchase jumbo mortgages to identify an exogenous change in liquidity. The volume of jumbo mortgage originations relative to nonjumbo originations increases with bank holdings of liquid assets and decreases with bank deposit costs. This result suggests that the increasing depth of the mortgage secondary market fostered by securitization has reduced the effect of lender's financial condition on credit supply.     

Japan’s banking crisis: An event-study perspective

We calculate abnormal stock returns for Japanese non-financial companies around major events associated with the banking crisis (1995–2000), and find that not all companies were equally sensitive to the malaise of the banking sector: the most affected were small, leveraged, low-tech companies with low credit ratings and low market to book ratios. This is consistent with “credit crunch” theories (companies with limited access to financial markets are sensitive to changes in bank lending) and with claims that innovation is rarely financed by bank debt. We do not find much evidence on the alleged misallocation of loans to support ailing bank clients.     

Price Discovery and Dissemination of Private Information by Loan Syndicate Participants

We delineate key channels through which flows of confidential information to loan syndicate participants impact the dynamics of information arrival in prices. We isolate the timing of private information flows by estimating the speed of price discovery over quarterly earnings cycles in both secondary syndicated loan and equity markets. We identify borrowers disseminating private information to lenders relatively early in the cycle with firms exhibiting relatively early price discovery in the secondary loan market, documenting that price discovery is faster for loans subject to financial covenants, particularly earnings‐based covenants; for borrowers who experience covenant violations; for borrowers with high credit risk; and for loans syndicated by relationship‐based lenders or highly reputable lead arrangers. We then ask whether early access to private information in the loan market accelerates the speed of information arrival in stock prices. We document that the stock returns of firms identified with earlier private information dissemination to lenders indeed exhibit faster price discovery in the stock market, but only when institutional investors are involved in the firm's syndicated loans. Further, the positive relation between institutional lending and the speed of stock price discovery is more pronounced in relatively weak public disclosure environments. These results are consistent with institutional lenders systematically exploiting confidential syndicate information via trading in the equity market.     

Did Structured Credit Fuel the LBO Boom?

The leveraged buyout (LBO) boom of 2004 to 2007 was fueled by growth in collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and other forms of securitization. Banks active in structured credit underwriting lent more for LBOs, indicating that bank lending policies linked LBO and CDO markets. LBO loans originated by large CDO underwriters were associated with lower spreads, weaker covenants, and greater use of bank debt in deal financing. Loans financed through structured credit markets did not lead to worse LBOs, overpayment, or riskier deal structures. Securitization markets altered banks' access to capital, affected their lending policies, and fueled the recent LBO boom.     

Asymmetric information,adverse selection,and the pricing of CMBS

We demonstrate that asymmetric information between sellers (loan originators) and purchasers (investors and securities issuers) of commercial mortgages gives rise to a standard lemons problem, whereby portfolio lenders use private information to liquidate lower quality loans in commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) markets. Conduit lenders, who originate loans for direct sale into securitization markets, mitigate problems of asymmetric information and adverse selection in loan sales. Our theory provides an explanation for the pricing puzzle observed in CMBS markets, whereby conduit CMBS loans are priced higher than portfolio loans, despite widespread belief that conduit loans are originated at lower quality. Consistent with theoretical predictions of a lemons discount, our empirical analysis of 141 CMBS deals and 16,760 CMBS loans shows that, after controlling for observable determinants of loan pricing, conduit loans enjoyed a 34 basis points pricing advantage over portfolio loans in the CMBS market.     

Exporting Liquidity: Branch Banking and Financial Integration

Using exogenous liquidity windfalls from oil and natural gas shale discoveries, we demonstrate that bank branch networks help integrate U.S. lending markets. Banks exposed to shale booms enjoy liquidity inflows, which increase their capacity to originate and hold new loans. Exposed banks increase mortgage lending in nonboom counties, but only where they have branches and only for hard‐to‐securitize mortgages. Our findings suggest that contracting frictions limit the ability of arm's length finance to integrate credit markets fully. Branch networks continue to play an important role in financial integration, despite the development of securitization markets.