Financial Markets and Economic Growth*

In this reprinting of the Nobel Prize‐winning financial economist's classic statement about the origins of financial crises, the Southeast Asian crisis of the late 1990s is attributed “not to too much reliance on financial markets, but to too little.” Like the U.S. economy a century ago, the emerging Asian economies did not then—and do not now—have well‐developed capital markets and remain heavily dependent on their banking systems to finance growth. But for all its benefits, banking is not only basically 19th‐century technology, but disaster‐prone technology. And in the summer of 1997, a banking‐driven disaster struck in East Asia, just as it had struck so many times before in U.S. history. During the 20th century, the author argues, the U.S. economy reduced its dependence on banks by developing “dispersed and decentralized” financial markets. In so doing, it increased the efficiency of the capital allocation process and reduced the economy's vulnerability to the credit crunches that have recurred throughout U.S. history. By contrast, Japan has not reduced its economy's dependence on banks, and its efforts to deal with its banking problems during the crisis of the late'90s served only to destabilize itself as well as its neighbors. Developing countries in Asia and elsewhere are urged not to follow the Japanese example, but to take measures aimed at developing financial markets and institutions that will either substitute for or, in some cases, complement bank products and services.     

The Squam Lake Report: Fixing the Financial System*

In these excerpts from The Squam Lake Report, fifteen distinguished economists analyze where the global financial system failed, and how such failures might be prevented (or at least their damage better contained) in the future. Although there were many contributing factors to the crisis—including “agency” problems throughout the financial system and a bankruptcy code poorly suited for reorganizing financial firms—at the core of the problem is a potential conflict between the risk-taking proclivity of financial institutions and the interests of the economy at large that must be managed at least in part through more effective regulation. The Squam Lake Report provides a nonpartisan plan to transform the regulation of financial markets in ways designed to limit systemic risk while preserving—to the extent possible and prudent—the economies of scale and scope that justify the existence of today's large financial institutions. To reduce the risks that large banks will fail, the authors call for higher capital requirements based on more effective assessments of the risks of bank assets and liabilities, as well as a new systemic regulator that should be part of the central bank. To reduce the costs of failure when it occurs, the authors propose that banks be required to create “living wills” laying out their plan to sell assets or shut down operations in the event of financial trouble. As part of that plan, regulators are urged to “aggressively encourage” banks to issue “contingent” debt capital securities that convert into equity.     

Impact of FDICIA internal controls on bank risk taking

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 was designed, among other things, to introduce risk-based deposit insurance, increase capital requirements, and improve banks’ internal controls. Of particular interest in this study are the requirements for annual audit and reporting of management’s and auditor’s assessment of the effectiveness of internal control for banks with $500 million or more in total assets (raised to $1 billion in 2005). We study the impact of these requirements on banks’ risk-taking behavior prior to the recent financial crisis and the consequent implications for bank failure and financial trouble during the crisis period. Using a sample of 1138 banks, we provide evidence that banks required to comply with the FDICIA internal control requirements have lower risk taking in the pre-crisis period. Specifically, the volatility of net interest margin, the volatility of earnings, and Z score show less risk-taking behavior. Furthermore, these banks are less likely to experience failure and financial trouble during the crisis period.     

How to Promote Fed Independence: Perspectives from Political Economy and History

In two short histories of the independence of the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank since its creation in 1913—the first with respect to the Fed's monetary policymaking, the second focused on its regulatory policymaking—the author shows that the range of the Fed's powers has varied greatly over time, and that changes in those powers have had major effects on the extent of Fed independence. Moreover, the shifts over time in Fed powers reflect, to a significant degree, conscious trade‐offs by Fed leaders. A large number of somewhat surprising Fed positions on important regulatory matters can be explained as more or less deliberate attempts to preserve the Fed's monetary powers from political interference by yielding some of its independence in exercising its regulatory authority. In a case involving one of the most destructive U.S. financial regulatory policies, the Fed's effective neutrality on, and thus failure to support, the elimination of restrictions on interstate branch banking is seen as contributing to the chronic instability of the U.S. banking system, which has suffered some 20 major crises since the early 1800s (as compared to the crisis‐free Canadian system, with its nationwide banking from its inception). The Fed's reluctance to intervene is attributed to its unwillingness to antagonize powerful Congressional supporters of state banking interests and, more generally, to a “game of bank bargains” that can be seen at work in the political economy of virtually all countries. In more recent times, the most costly episode in this time‐honored game features a series of implicit or, in some cases, explicit agreements between large U.S. banks and urban activist groups—under the aegis of the Community Reinvestment Act, and with the oversight and implicit blessing of the Fed—to make on the order of $4.6 trillion loans to “subprime” borrowers in exchange for the activists’ (and the Fed's) support in Congressional merger hearings. The resulting nationwide debasement of mortgage underwriting standards and sheer volume of “toxic assets,” in combination with clearly inadequate capital requirements (which the Fed also failed to correct), are viewed as if not the principal cause of the crisis, a far bigger contributor than, say, the Fed's widely criticized unwillingness to tighten monetary policy in the early 2000s. To prevent the Fed from continuing to sacrifice its independence in regulatory matters to preserve its freedom to conduct monetary policy, the author proposes that authority for regulatory and monetary policy be vested in two separate regulatory bodies. If carried out, such a policy change would enact a proposal made by then Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson in 2008, just before the global financial crisis hit.     

A Look Back at Merton Miller's “Financial Markets and Economic Growth”

The author begins by agreeing with Miller's characterization of the fragility of U.S. banks and of the shortcomings of the Asian model of bank finance‐driven growth. The article also expresses “emphatic agreement” with Miller's arguments that the protection of banks through deposit insurance, regulatory forbearance, and other forms of “bailout” have created costly moral‐hazard problems that encourage excessive risk‐taking. And the author endorses, at least in principle, Miller's main argument that the development of capital markets that do not require the direct involvement of banks should make economies if not less prone to financial crises, then at least more resilient in recovering from them. But having acknowledged the limitations of bank‐centered systems and the value of developing non‐bank alternatives for savers and corporate borrowers, the author goes on to point to the surprising durability of some banking systems outside the U.S.—notably Canada's, which has not experienced major problems since the 1830s. And even more important, the author views banks and capital markets not as “substitutes” for one another, but as mutually dependent “complements” whose interdependencies and interactions must be recognized by market participants and regulators alike.     

Shadow Banking,Risk Transfer,and Financial Stability

Shadow banking is the process by which banks raise funds from and transfer risks to entities outside the traditional commercial banking system. Many observers blamed the sudden expansion in 2007 of U.S. sub‐prime mortgage market disruptions into a global financial crisis on a “liquidity run” that originated in the shadow banking system and spread to commercial banks. In response, national and international regulators have called for tighter and new regulations on shadow banking products and participants. Preferring the term “market‐based finance” to the term “shadow banking,” the authors explore the primary financial instruments and participants that comprise the shadow banking system. The authors review the 2007–2009 period and explain how runs on shadow banks resulted in a liquidity crisis that spilled over to commercial banks, but also emphasize that the economic purpose of shadow banking is to enable commercial banks to raise funds from and transfer risks to non‐bank institutions. In that sense, the shadow banking system is a shock absorber for risks that arise within the commercial banking system and are transferred to a more diverse pool of non‐bank capital instead of remaining concentrated among commercial banks. The article also reviews post‐crisis regulatory initiatives aimed at shadow banking and concludes that most such regulations could result in a less stable financial system to the extent that higher regulatory costs on shadow banks like insurance companies and asset managers could discourage them from participating in shadow banking. And the net effect of this regulation, by limiting the amount of market‐based capital available for non‐bank risk transfer, may well be to increase the concentrations of risk in the banking and overall financial system.     

CHOOSING THE RIGHT FINANCIAL SYSTEM FOR GROWTH

Well‐functioning financial systems promote economic growth by channeling funds from those who save to those who invest in the productive capacity of economies. What are the main features of a well functioning system? Are well developed capital markets essential to the process? Or are commercial banks and other “private” sources of capital capable of bringing about the same levels of growth and prosperity? In this article, the authors use information about the financial systems of a large number of both developed and developing countries to examine various relationships between a country's financial structure and its overall economic performance. Perhaps most important, the authors report a significantly positive correlation, using data for 34 countries, between the size of a country's financial system—measured by the total of commercial bank assets, equity market capitalization, and bonds outstanding—and economic development (as measured by GDP per capita). At the same time, the authors also provide evidence that banks (or loans) and capital markets (or securities) are complements, not substitutes, in promoting economic development, and that the presence of foreign‐owned banks (though not state‐owned banks) has a positive association with growth. In other words, both private banks and capital markets are likely to play important, though different roles in channeling funds from savers to investors.     

Deleveraging Corporate America: Job and Business Recovery Through Debt Restructuring

When the Great Recession roiled capital and labor markets in early 2009, up to a third of U.S. public corporations, and nearly 60% of privately owned companies, reported high levels of financial distress resulting from frozen credit markets. And the problems of “debt overhang” and corporate underinvestment were clearly in evidence as the combination of default risk and a relatively new provision of the tax code restricted the ability of distressed companies to deleverage their capital structures. But as described in this article, at least 110 U.S. companies used a little known provision in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 to defer taxes on the cancellation of debt income (CODI) resulting from exchanges or repurchases of significant amounts of debt. This suspension of tax policy gave many distressed U.S. companies the flexibility to cut costs, shore up balance sheets, and boost liquidity, thereby keeping themselves in business and their workers employed throughout the economic crisis. The 110 companies examined either repurchased or exchanged a total of $32.5 billion of corporate debt. The deleveraging of these companies, which represented more than $2.2 trillion in total assets and $520 billion in market capitalization, helped them to remain solvent throughout the downturn and retain their collective 2.2 million employees. The resulting tax savings are estimated to have saved (or in some cases created) almost 90,000 jobs, while contributing $3.2 billion to total corporate earnings and $10.7 billion of output to the national gross domestic product. Although this approach could be criticized as adding to the federal budget deficit, the deferral of taxes on CODI is viewed as a targeted financial policy tool aimed directly at boosting the productive capacity and employment of corporate enterprises.     

Whither Capitalism?*

The global financial crisis and policy responses to it have led many to question their fundamental belief in market‐based capitalism. In the U.S., the epicenter of the crisis and poster child of capitalism, signs of creeping nationalization of the financial system have raised fears that the basic model is being turned inside out. In this essay, the author argues that, with more than 90% of the U.S. private sector still operating “largely as a free‐enterprise system,” concerns about nationalization and government involvement in the marketplace are greatly exaggerated. More troubling are the diminishing prospects for a prompt post‐crisis normalization of fiscal and monetary policy, and for a decisive and transparent exit strategy from the present “policies of crisis containment.” In the absence of such decisiveness and transparency, the debate over the efficacy of market‐based capitalism will continue. The longer‐run challenge is to learn from the crisis and take measures designed to limit risk‐taking to acceptable levels in today's global financial environment, with its continuous cross‐border flow of information, trade, and human as well as financial capital. Making Wall Street the villain is the path of least resistance in a politically charged environment, but any fix must be grounded in shared responsibility. As the author says in closing, “Governance, or the lack thereof—both within the private sector as well as by those charged with regulation and oversight—proved to be the weak link in the chain. Fix that, and capitalism will be just fine.”     

When time is not on our side: The costs of regulatory forbearance in the closure of insolvent banks

In this paper, we empirically estimate the costs of delay in the FDIC's closures of 433 commercial banks between 2007 and 2014 based upon a counterfactual closure regime. We find that the costs of delay could have been as high as $18.5 billion, or 37% of the FDIC's estimated costs of closure of $49.8 billion. We think that these findings call for a more aggressive stance by bank regulators with respect to the provisions for loan losses and write-downs of banks’ non-performing assets. More aggressive (and earlier) provisions and write-downs, or adoption of a capital ratio that penalizes nonperforming loans, would allow the concept of “prompt corrective action” (PCA) to play the role that it was meant to play in reducing FDIC losses from insolvent banks.     

Value Creation by Active Investors (and Its Potential for Addressing Social Problems)

A distinguished Columbia academic discusses the methods and outcomes of “active investing” with the co‐founder of a leading private equity firm and a former senior partner of a well‐known hedge fund. In the case studies used by both panelists to illustrate their investment selection and management processes, the investors provided not only capital, but oversight and expertise that helped bring about significant increases in the productivity and value of their portfolio companies. What's more, in both cases, the changes that contributed to high returns for investors also ended up having major benefits for the companies' non‐investor stakeholders, especially their consumers. In the first of the two cases, Paul Hilal explains the thinking behind Pershing Square's $1.1 billion purchase of 14% of the Canadian Pacific Railway in 2012. With the help of intensive “fundamental” analysis of the company, Hilal recognized that Canadian Pacific was substantially underperforming its rival, the Canadian National Railway, in a number of important ways. And when CP's management and board rejected his plan for changes, Hilal led a proxy battle that ended in a landslide victory for the proposed slate of directors, including Hilal himself. Then, after bringing in a new CEO, the restructured board presided over operating changes that, during Pershing's four‐year ownership, increased the market value of CP from $8 billion to $30 billion. By 2016, when Pershing sold its investment (for $4 billion), Canadian Pacific was “shipping 20% more freight … 40% faster than ever before, with record on‐time performance, 40% fewer locomotives, 35% fewer people, and 14% improved fuel efficiency—all while maintaining an industry‐leading safety record.” In the second case, Russ Carson describes the success of Welsh, Carson, Anderson, and Stowe in turning its purchase in 1998 of a single oncology practice in Denver into a publicly traded company with more than 90 outpatient cancer centers throughout the U.S. When it was sold in 2011, US Oncology was producing $4 billion in revenue while employing 1,000 oncologists, who, as significant equity owners, shared in the success of Welsh Carson. Using modern management techniques to create “enormous efficiencies out of an extraordinarily fragmented system,” Carson and his colleagues created “the single largest—and, by all accounts, most reputable—outpatient provider of cancer services in the country.” One of the keys to this success was “getting the doctors to spend their time seeing patients, not looking for records,” which contributed greatly to Welsh Carson's ability to improve “both the quantity and quality of cancer care in the 90 communities that we were operating in.”     

International Insurance Society Roundtable on Risk Management After the Crisis

In this roundtable, an adviser to several central banks and founding member of the Group of 30 discusses regulatory reform and corporate risk management strategies with senior executives from three of the world's largest insurance companies. Much of the discussion attempts to explain why insurance and reinsurance companies have proven less vulnerable to the crisis than commercial and investment banks. Part of the explanation has to do with their financial conservatism, which is attributed to a habitual tendency to decision‐making that gives heavy weight to long‐term probabilities and risks. But along with this “actuarial” cast of mind is a growing willingness to accept and make use of risk‐based capital requirements—a decision‐making framework that is, in some respects, in conflict with the accounting and regulatory capital conventions that still prevail in the industry. In particular, “Solvency II”—the risk‐based capital guidelines that are set for adoption in 2012 by insurers in the European Union—is held up as a possible model for global use.     

The Real Effects of FAS 166/167 on Banks’ Mortgage Approval and Sale Decisions

We examine the real effects of FAS 166 and FAS 167 on banks’ loan‐level mortgage approval and sale decisions. Effective in 2010, these standards tightened the accounting for securitizations and consolidation of securitization entities, respectively, causing banks to recognize an estimated $811 billion of securitized assets on balance sheet. We find that banks that recognize more securitized assets exhibit larger decreases in mortgage approval rates and larger increases in mortgage sale rates. These effects significantly exceed those of banks’ off–balance sheet securitized assets, consistent with our results being driven by the consolidation of securitization entities rather than by securitization per se. We conduct tests that help rule out the financial crisis as an alternative explanation for our results. Further analyses suggest that mechanisms underlying the results include consolidating banks’ reduced regulatory capital adequacy, increased market discipline, and consequent desire not to recognize high‐risk mortgages on balance sheet.     

Does bank capital reduce liquidity creation?

This paper investigates the relationship between bank capital and liquidity creation against the backdrop of the 2007–2008 financial crisis. Analyzing an unbalanced panel of 11,617 U.S. commercial banks from 1996 to 2016, we find a negative association between regulatory capital and on-balance-sheet liquidity creation, but positive associations for small banks and after the financial crisis. Further, we observe lower liquidity creation among banks that participated in the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). The results are largely robust to several alternate variable proxies and model specifications. Our findings suggest that “one-size-fits-all” policy may have some unintended consequences for banks.     

Transparency and Tax Evasion: Evidence from the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA)

We examine how U.S. individuals respond to regulation intended to reduce offshore tax evasion. The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) requires foreign financial institutions to report information to the U.S. government regarding U.S. account holders. We first document an average $7.8 billion to $15.3 billion decrease in equity foreign portfolio investment to the United States from tax-haven countries after FATCA implementation, consistent with a decrease in “round-tripping” investments attributable to U.S. investors’ offshore tax evasion. When testing total worldwide investment out of financial accounts in tax havens post-FATCA, we find an average decline of $56.6 billion to $78.0 billion. We next provide evidence of other important consequences of this regulation, including increased expatriations of U.S. citizens and greater investment in alternative assets not subject to FATCA reporting, such as residential real estate and artwork. Our study contributes to both the academic literature and policy analysis on regulation, tax evasion, and crime.     

Morgan Stanley Roundtable on Private Equity and Its Import for Public Companies

The role of private equity in global capital markets appears to be expanding at an extraordinary rate. Morgan Stanley estimates that there are now some 2,700 private equity funds that either have raised, or are in the process of raising, a total of $500 billion. With this abundance of available equity capital, the willingness of private equity firms to participate in “club” deals, and the leverage that can be put on top of the equity, private equity buyers now appear able and willing to pay higher prices for assets than ever before. And thanks in part to this new purchasing power, private equity transactions reportedly account for a quarter of all global M&A activity as well as a third of the high yield and IPO markets. The stock of capital now devoted to private equity reflects the demonstrated ability of at least the most reputable buyout firms to produce consistently high rates of returns for their limited partners. Although a talent for identifying and purchasing undervalued assets may be part of the story, the ability to produce such returns on a consistent basis implies an ability to add value, to improve the performance of the operating companies they invest in and control. And in this round‐table, a small group of academics and practitioners address two main questions: How does private equity add value? And are there lessons for public companies in the success of private companies? According to the panelists, the answer to the first question appears to have changed somewhat over time. The consensus was that most of the value added by the LBO firms of the‘80s was created during the initial structuring of the deals, a process described by Steve Kaplan as “financial and governance engineering,” which includes not only aggressive use of leverage and powerful equity incentives for operating managements, but active oversight by a small, intensely interested board of directors. In the past ten years, however, these standard LBO features have been complemented by increased attention to “operational engineering,” to the point where today's buyout firms feel obligated, like classic venture capitalists, to acquire and tout their own operating expertise. In response to the second of the two questions, Michael Jensen argues that much of the approach and benefits of private equity‐particularly the adjustments of financial policies and stronger managerial incentives‐can be replicated by public companies. And although some of these benefits have already been realized, much more remains to be done. Perhaps the biggest challenge, however, is finding a way to transfer to public companies the board‐level expertise, incentives, and degree of engagement that characterize companies run by private equity investors.     

Contingent Capital vs. Contingent Reverse Convertibles for Banks and Insurance Companies

During the credit and liquidity crisis in 2007 and 2008, banks found themselves largely unable to raise significant new equity quickly from parties other than sovereign wealth funds and governments. Some banks have thus recently begun to consider contingent capital as a means of pre‐arranging recapitalizations for future crises. Contingent capital is a type of put option that entitles a company to issue new securities on pre‐negotiated terms, often following the occurrence of one or more risk‐based triggering events. This article compares the economic merits of a new security—a “contingent reverse convertible” or CRC—against more traditional forms of contingent capital. In November 2009, Lloyds Banking Group plc issued “Enhanced Capital Notes”—subordinated debt that converts into common stock if Lloyds's core regulatory capital falls below 5% of its regulatory risk‐weigh ted assets. This CRC is not strictly speaking a form of contingent capital, but it does give banks the potential to recapitalize themselves quickly in the face of a crisis without having to turn to governments and taxpayers. One important limitation of CRCs is that because they do not generate new cash for a bank at the time of conversion, they are unlikely to stop a liquidity crisis once it has begun. More traditional contingent capital facilities, by contrast, do put cash in the hands of the issuer at the time the facility is drawn. But even for those inclined to use CRCs, it may be unrealistic to expect many other institutions to imitate the structure of the Lloyds offering. Persuading existing investors to take a more subordinated position in a bank's capital structure and write a put option to the bank on its own stock will be neither cheap nor easy. For this reason, the more traditional solutions used to date may have more success with banks, though arriving at a price that helps issuers and satisfies investors will be a challenge for those structures as well.     

Testing macroprudential stress tests: The risk of regulatory risk weights

We compare the capital shortfall measured by regulatory stress tests, to that of a benchmark methodology — the “V-Lab stress test” — that employs only publicly available market data. We find that when capital shortfalls are measured relative to risk-weighted assets, the ranking of financial institutions is not well correlated to the ranking of the V-Lab stress test, whereas rank correlations increase when required capitalization is a function of total assets. We show that the risk measures used in risk-weighted assets are cross-sectionally uncorrelated with market measures of risk, as they do not account for the “risk that risk will change.” Furthermore, the banks that appeared to be best capitalized relative to risk-weighted assets were no better than the rest when the European economy deteriorated into the sovereign debt crisis in 2011.     

Canadian Business Trusts: A New Organizational Structure

The focus of this paper is a subset of income trusts called business trusts, a Canadian financial innovation that has experienced remarkable success in the Canadian market, but not in the U.S. At theendof2005, there were more than 170 business trusts (most of them in Canada, but a handful in the U.S.) with an aggregate market value of over $90 billion. Like income trusts generally, which include REITs and oil & gas trusts, business trusts are designed in large part to avoid taxation at the corporate level by distributing a substantial proportion of a business's operating cash flow. The business trust structure provides investors (called “unit holders”) with what amounts to a combination of subordinated, high‐yield debt and high‐yielding equity. But unlike the subordinated debt in most highly leveraged transactions (HLTs), the “internal” debt in a business trust unit is effectively “stapled” to the equity part of the security. And this kind of “strip financing” (which was a common practice in U.S. LBOs during the‘80s) means that, besides providing stable cash‐generating companies with a tax‐minimizing way of paying out excess cash, the business unit structure also limits the “financial distress costs” associated with HLTs. In the event of financial trouble, the unit holders are likely to be much more cooperative than ordinary subordinated debt holders in restructuring interest payments since the benefits of so doing accrue to the equity portion of their units. The original income trust structure has also been used by a number of U.S.‐based companies that listed their shares on the TSX. But, in the attempt to make the securities suitable for listing on the AM EX, and in response to auditor demands intended to address potential IRS concerns, the instruments were modified in ways that sacrificed one of the important benefits of the original structure. The changes were designed to make the subordinated debt issued as part of a package with equity look more like external, third‐party debt. And in so doing, the low‐cost restructuring feature built into the Canadian version was lost, and the U.S. trusts failed to gain acceptance.     

Sizing Up Repo

To understand which short‐term debt markets experienced “runs” during the financial crisis, we analyze a novel data set of repurchase agreements (repo), that is, loans between nonbank cash lenders and dealer banks collateralized with securities. Consistent with a run, repo volume backed by private asset‐backed securities falls to near zero in the crisis. However, the reduction is only $182 billion, which is small relative to the stock of private asset‐backed securities as well as the contraction in asset‐backed commercial paper. While the repo contraction is small in aggregate, it disproportionately affected a few dealer banks.