Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games

This paper proposes a method to measure strategic uncertainty by eliciting certainty equivalents analogous to measuring risk attitudes in lotteries. We apply this method by conducting experiments on a class of one-shot coordination games with strategic complementarities and choices between simple lotteries and sure payoff alternatives, both framed in a similar way. Despite the multiplicity of equilibria in the coordination games, aggregate behaviour is fairly predictable. The pure or mixed Nash equilibria cannot describe subjects' behaviour. We present two global games with private information about monetary payoffs and about risk aversion. While previous literature treats the parameters of a global game as given, we estimate them and show that both models describe observed behaviour well. The global-game selection for vanishing noise of private signals offers a good recommendation for actual players, given the observed distribution of actions. We also deduce subjective beliefs and compare them with objective probabilities.     

CEO Ownership,Stock Market Performance,and Managerial Discretion

We examine the relationship between CEO ownership and stock market performance. A strategy based on public information about managerial ownership delivers annual abnormal returns of 4% to 10%. The effect is strongest among firms with weak external governance, weak product market competition, and large managerial discretion, suggesting that CEO ownership can reverse the negative impact of weak governance. Furthermore, owner‐CEOs are value increasing: they reduce empire building and run their firms more efficiently. Overall, our findings indicate that the market does not correctly price the incentive effects of managerial ownership, suggesting interesting feedback effects between corporate finance and asset pricing.     

Modesty May Pay!

Most noncooperative game theoretic models of international environmental agreements (IEAs) draw a pessimistic picture of the prospective of successful cooperation. In this paper, we consider the possibility that countries agree on modest instead of ambitious abatement targets. It is shown that this can be an explanation for higher participation and more successful treaties. Thus, modesty may well pay, though the first‐best optimum cannot be achieved. It is also demonstrated that our model extension makes it easier to relate the stylized model to actual negotiations.     

Risk‐Adjusting the Returns to Venture Capital

We adapt stochastic discount factor (SDF) valuation methods for venture capital (VC) performance evaluation. Our approach generalizes the popular Public Market Equivalent (PME) method and allows statistical inference in the presence of cross‐sectionally dependent, skewed VC payoffs. We relax SDF restrictions implicit in the PME so that the SDF can accurately reflect risk‐free rates and returns of public equity markets during the sample period. This generalized PME yields substantially different abnormal performance estimates for VC funds and start‐up investments, especially in times of strongly rising public equity markets and for investments with betas far from one.     

Social Insurance Based on Personal Savings

Many countries have reformed, or plan to reform, their pension system. The trend is to move from an entitlement based system to a system in which contributions accumulate in some form of personal savings account. In recent years proposals have been made to apply a personal savings account also to other elements of social insurance, such as unemployment insurance, social assistance, health care costs and others. This paper presents a simple model and a simulation to compare the lifetime consequences of replacing a wide range of social insurance systems with savings account based social insurance. The results indicate that savings account based social insurance can be designed to provide the same economic security as offered by a generous welfare state, and yet lower marginal taxes considerably.     

CORRUPTION AND ELECTIONS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY FOR A CROSS-SECTION OF COUNTRIES

In this paper, we study whether voters are more likely to "vote out" a corrupt incumbent than to re-elect him. Specifically, we examine whether they retract their support from political candidates who they think are corrupt by looking at changes in an index of corruption perceptions between the current and the last elections. Our results suggest that corruption in public office is effectively punished by voters. Furthermore, our findings support the idea that both the political system and the democratic experience are important determinants of the voters' reaction and control of corruption; while voters in countries with parliamentary systems or with relatively low levels of democracy react negatively to an increase in corruption, no perceptible effect of this kind was found in countries with mature democracies, and the evidence is inconclusive in the case of countries with presidential systems.