Why Capital Income Taxes Survive in Open Economies: The Role of Multinational Firms

This paper discusses the role of multinational firms and double taxation treaties for corporate income taxation in open economies. We show that it is optimal for a small open economy to levy positive corporate income taxes if multinational firms are taxed according to the full taxation after deduction system or the foreign tax credit system. Positive corporate taxes also occur in the asymmetric case where some countries apply the exemption system and others apply the tax credit system. If all countries apply the exemption system, the optimal corporate income tax is zero. We also show that, under tax competition, corporate income taxes are not necessarily too low from the perspective of the economy as a whole. While the undertaxation result is confirmed for the case of the exemption system, tax rates may also be inefficiently high if the deduction or the credit systems are applied.     

Cross-border shopping and the Atkinson–Stiglitz theorem

We introduce cross-border shopping and indirect tax competition into a model of optimal taxation. The Atkinson–Stiglitz result that indirect taxation cannot improve the efficiency of information-constrained tax-transfer policies, and that indirect taxes should not be differentiated across goods, is shown to hold in this case even if countries are asymmetric. However, if the tax system must contain indirect taxation, differentiated indirect tax rates arise in the equilibrium and restricting differentiated indirect taxation can be welfare-increasing.     

Poverty-decreasing indirect tax reforms: Evidence from Tunisia

This paper proposes a methodology to identify revenue-neutral directions for poverty-alleviating tax reforms. The search for such poverty-reducing tax reforms is done “robustly” over broad classes of poverty measures and poverty lines. The methodology, which is illustrated using data from Tunisia, is of significant policy interest given the widespread use of commodity subsidization and taxation in developing and developed countries alike. The results suggest that Tunisian poverty could be decreased robustly by following reform directions that are often at odds with frequently-heard views. They also highlight the importance of stating clearly under which set of ethical criteria the desirability of potential indirect tax reforms is assessed. JEL Code D12 ⋅ D63 ⋅ H53 ⋅ I32 ⋅ I38     

Household Production and the Design of the Tax Structure

This paper amalgamates two topical issues in the economics ofcommodity taxation: the general case for non-uniformity, andthe tax treatment of commodities that are either inputs to householdproduction or close substitutes for household produced goods.Assuming a redistributive objective and that the government canimplement a non-linear income tax system and linear commoditytaxes we investigate if the existence of household productiongenerates a natural case for non-uniform commodity taxation.Four main results are reported. First, when the set of commoditiesis partitioned into consumption goods and input goods, and commoditytaxes are restricted to being within-group uniform, the compositecommodity theorem can be used to characterize the optimal commoditytaxes. Secondly, sufficient conditions for within-group uniformcommodity taxes to be fully optimal are derived. Thirdly, weargue that an input good should be taxed at a higher rate thangeneral consumption if and only if the degree of complementarityin household production (between the input good and a time-input)is larger than the degree of complementarity in consumption (betweengeneral consumption and the household produced good). Finally,we show that under simple normality, a market substitute forthe household-produced good should be taxed at a lower rate thangeneral consumption. The intuition for the last two results isthat the suggested pattern of taxation discourages ``do-it-yourself'behaviour, which relaxes the self-selection problem.     

Optimal Fiscal Policy with Consumption Taxation

We characterize optimal fiscal policies in a general equilibrium model with monopolistic competition and endogenous public spending. The government can tax consumption, as alternative to labor income taxes. Consumption taxation acts as indirect taxation of profits (intratemporal gains of taxing consumption) and enables the policymaker to manage the burden of public debt more efficiently (intertemporal gains of taxing consumption). We show analytically that these two gains imply that the optimal share of government spending is higher under consumption taxation than with labor income taxation. Then, we quantify numerically each of these gains by calibrating the model on the U.S. economy.     

Education policies and optimal taxation

This paper studies the design of education policies in a setting in which optimal redistributive labor taxation is available. It is usually argued that the crucial parameter to guide education policy is the complementarity of education and ability. This is true only when labor supply is fixed or when income taxes are not allowed. I show that, if labor supply is endogenous and if the government can tax income in a nonlinear way, the crucial parameter is how the education elasticity of wage changes with ability. Taking the elasticity criterion into account, education subsidies are optimal in cases in which, under the complementarity criterion, education taxes would be optimal. To do this, I use an asymmetric information setting that motivates nonlinear taxation of income and education. JEL Classification H21 · H23 · H52 · I28     

间接税亲贫性与代内归宿——穷人从减税中获益了吗?

税收工具作为财政扶贫机制中的重要一环,在推进精准扶贫、精准脱贫上发挥着重要作用。本文基于CFPS2012入户调查数据和中国2012年投入产出表,运用微观模拟方法测算出家庭的间接税负,在此基础上,借鉴衡量经济“涓滴效应”的亲贫增长指数,构建了识别和测度税制“亲贫性”的数量方法,评估间接税的减税政策能否自发惠及穷人,进一步测算家庭不同年龄层的间接税负代内归宿。结果显示:间接税整体上不具有“亲贫性”,其中增值税的“亲富性”最强,减税能让穷人比富人获益更多;儿童、成人以及老人均是间接税的负税人,贫困家庭抚养小孩而承担的间接税负比重高于非贫困家庭,赡养老人而负担的间接税负比重低于非贫困家庭。据此本文认为,继续推动大规模的间接税减税政策、采取差别化的增值税和消费税减免策略、逐步形成以直接税为主的税制结构,是改变间接税"亲富性"和强化税收扶贫职能的有效措施。     

The theory of optimal taxation: what is the policy relevance?

The paper discusses the implications of optimal tax theory for the debates on uniform commodity taxation and neutral capital income taxation. While strong administrative and political economy arguments in favor of uniform and neutral taxation remain, recent advances in optimal tax theory suggest that the information needed to implement the differentiated taxation prescribed by optimal tax theory may be easier to obtain than previously believed. The paper also points to the strong similarity between optimal commodity tax rules and the rules for optimal source-based capital income taxation.      

Unequal wages for equal utilities

When educational policy is supplemented by a redistributive income tax, and when individuals differ in their ability to benefit from education, the optimal policy is typically rather regressive. Resources are concentrated on the most able individuals in order to get a “cake” as big as possible to share among individuals through income taxation. In this paper, we put forward another reason to push for regressive education. It is not linked to heterogeneity in innate ability but to the property that welfare may be a convex function of an individual’s wage. For simplicity, we assume a linear education technology and a given education budget. To give the equal wage outcome the best chance to emerge, we also assume that individuals have identical learning abilities. Nevertheless, it turns out that in the first-best wage inequality is always preferable to wage equality. Even more surprisingly, this conclusion remains valid in the second-best when the feasible degree of wage differentiation is sufficiently large. This is in spite of the fact that wage equalization would eliminate any need for distortionary income taxation.     

Analyzing the standard deduction as a presumptive tax

Presumptive taxes can be found in the tax system of most developing countries and make sense when the desired tax base is difficult to measure, verify, and monitor. As a substitute for the desired tax base, the presumed tax base is derived from items that can be more readily monitored. Presumed taxes can also be found in developed countries, and examples include fixed depreciation schedules in place of asset-specific measures of decline in asset value, floors on deductible expenses, and the standard deduction. The authors analyze presumptive income taxation with an ultimate goal to initiate an approach to optimal presumptive taxation. This paper begins that task by analyzing the standard deduction in the individual income tax system in the United States.     

The marginal cost of public funds is one at the optimal tax system

This paper develops a Mirrlees framework with skill and preference heterogeneity to analyze optimal linear and nonlinear redistributive taxes, optimal provision of public goods, and the marginal cost of public funds (MCF). It is shown that the MCF equals one at the optimal tax system, for both lump-sum and distortionary taxes, for linear and nonlinear taxes, and for both income and consumption taxes. By allowing for redistributional concerns, the marginal excess burden of distortionary taxes is shown to be equal to the marginal distributional gain at the optimal tax system. Consequently, the modified Samuelson rule should not be corrected for the marginal cost of public funds. Outside the optimum, the marginal cost of public funds for distortionary taxes can be either smaller or larger than one. The findings of this paper have potentially important implications for applied tax policy and social cost–benefit analysis.     

International tax competition: do public good spillovers matter?

We study the impact of public good spillovers on tax competition between two imperfectly integrated countries with different levels of productivity. We show that international public good spillovers, by reducing the tax gap between countries, strengthen the agglomeration of firms in the most productive country. Then we carry on a welfare analysis. We first assume that governments are engaged in a redistributive tax policy. At the non-cooperative equilibrium, the tax level in the high-productivity country is inefficiently high while it is inefficiently low in the other country. A different conclusion emerges when tax revenues are recycled in a public good provision: taxes are inefficiently low in both countries and public good spillovers increase the global welfare. Finally, for a given amount of total tax revenues, public good provision in the high-productivity country is inefficiently high compared to its level in the low-productivity country.     

Interregional redistribution through tax surcharge

The paper considers a utilitarian federal government that levies a tax to finance a national public good or to effect a redistributive policy. Regions differ in their incomes and in their preferences for a local public good. First, we assume that the central government observes each region's public expenditures (and, hence, local tax revenues) but cannot perfectly observe revenues and preferences. We derive the (constrained) Pareto-efficient allocation and show how it can be implemented by a surcharge on local taxes. The level of redistribution that can be achieved is limited by the fact that it may be difficult, or even impossible, to distinguish low-income regions with a high preference for the public good from high-income regions with a low preference. Then we allow for the possibility that the central government can observe incomes through a costly audit. We examine the optimal audit policy and study the impact of audits on the optimal taxation scheme. Throughout the paper we focus on the properties of average and marginal tax rates and on the resulting under- or overprovision of regional public goods.     

The Distributional Impact of the Greek Crisis in 2010*

The severe economic crisis affecting Greece is widely thought to be having a significant social impact in terms of greater inequality and increased poverty. We provide an early assessment of whether (and to what extent) this was the case in 2010, the first year of the Greek crisis. We distinguish between two interrelated factors: on the one hand, the austerity policies taken to reduce fiscal deficits; on the other hand, the wider recession. Using a tax–benefit model, we attempt to quantify the distributional implications of both. With respect to the austerity policies, we focus on the changes affecting taxation, pension benefits and public sector pay. With respect to the wider recession, we model the effects of rising unemployment and inflation, as well as of lower earnings for self-employed workers and for employees of private firms. In simulating the impact of these changes on the distribution of incomes (and in estimating how the total burden of the crisis is shared across income groups), we take into account tax evasion and benefit non-take-up. We conclude by discussing the main findings, methodological pitfalls and policy implications of our research.     

On the optimal provision of social insurance: Progressive taxation versus education subsidies in general equilibrium

In this paper we compute the optimal tax and education policy transition in an economy where progressive taxes provide social insurance against idiosyncratic wage risk, but distort the education decision of households. Optimally chosen tertiary education subsidies mitigate these distortions. We highlight the quantitative importance of general equilibrium feedback effects from policies to relative wages of skilled and unskilled workers: subsidizing higher education increases the share of workers with a college degree thereby reducing the college wage premium which has important redistributive benefits. We also argue that a full characterization of the transition path is crucial for policy evaluation. We find that optimal education policies are always characterized by generous tuition subsidies, but the optimal degree of income tax progressivity depends crucially on whether transitional costs of policies are explicitly taken into account and how strongly the college premium responds to policy changes in general equilibrium.     

我国最优宏观税负水平的实证分析及政策选择

以巴罗、斯库利模型为分析框架,通过相关分析和多元回归分析,进一步研究我国的宏观税负问题。实证研究结果表明：政府通过征税把资源从私人部门转移到公共部门使用的过程中,政府征税对经济产生的负面影响并没有被政府有效地使用税收对经济产生的正效应所抵消,而政府支出本身也对经济产生了负面的影响。从这个角度判断,我国宏观税负水平不是最优的。我国应该进一步完善相关的政策,调整财政体制,进行相应的税收改革。     

How do corporate tax bases change when corporate tax rates change? With implications for the tax rate elasticity of corporate tax revenues

We construct a new database of extensive margin changes to multiple aspects of corporate tax bases for OECD countries between 1980 and 2004. We use our data to systematically document the tendency of countries to implement policies that both lower the corporate tax rate and broaden the corporate tax base. This correlation informs our interpretation of previous estimates of the relationship between corporate tax rates and corporate tax revenues, which typically do not include comprehensive measures of the corporate tax base definition. We then re-examine the relationship between corporate tax rates and corporate tax revenues. We find that accounting for unobserved heterogeneity attenuates the relationship between corporate tax rates and corporate tax revenues, and increases the implied revenue-maximizing tax rate. Controlling for our new tax base measures does not substantively impact the magnitude of this relationship.     

Optimal Income Taxation and the Ability Distribution: Implications for Migration Equilibria

As recently argued by Diamond (1998), one of the key factors explaining the progressivity of an optimal non-linear income tax is the distribution of productivity among workers. Migration is one source of changes in the productivity distribution. How changes in the populations ability distribution affect optimal income tax schedules has received little attention. Changing the distribution generally affects both the objective function and the government budget constraint. We first consider the comparative statics of the fraction of highly-skilled workers with maximin and maximax welfare functions (so that only the second effect is present) and a quasi-linear utility function. We also present some results for a utilitarian social welfare function.We then study the interaction between mobility and redistributive taxation. We consider mobility by either the skilled or unskilled population under majority voting where governments take the population as fixed. If individuals choose to relocate independently, having identical ability distributions is always a stable equilibrium when the unskilled are the mobile group. However, this is not always the case when the skilled are mobile. If groups of individuals can choose where to locate, having identical ability distributions across regions is only an equilibrium when the mobile type has an overall majority.     

Imperfect competition,indirect tax harmonization and public goods

This paper shows that the welfare implications of indirect tax harmonization in a two-country imperfectly competitive framework, are, in general, indeterminate in the presence of public goods: Both countries can be made either worse off or better off. This holds under both the destination and origin principles of taxation and is in sharp contrast to existing results where revenue effects are not present. A consequence of this indeterminacy is that a precise evaluation of tax-harmonizing policies under both tax regimes requires an explicit consideration of the underlying preferences for private and public goods as well as the oligopolistic sectors’ relative cost structures. JEL code F15⋅ H21⋅ H41⋅ H87