Fund Management and Systemic Risk – Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis

Fund managers play an important role in increasing efficiency and stability in financial markets. But research also indicates that fund management in certain circumstances may contribute to the buildup of systemic risk and severity of financial crises. The global financial crisis provided a number of new experiences on the contribution of fund managers to systemic risk. In this article, we focus on these lessons from the crisis. We distinguish between three sources of systemic risk in the financial system that may arise from fund management: insufficient credit risk transfer to fund managers; runs on funds that cause sudden reductions in funding to banks and other financial entities; and contagion through business ties between fund managers and their sponsors. Our discussion relates to the current intense debate on the role the so‐called shadow banking system played in the global financial crisis. Several regulatory initiatives have been launched or suggested to reduce the systemic risk arising from non‐bank financial entities, and we briefly discuss the likely impact of these on the sources of systemic risk outlined in the article.     

THE EFFECTS OF BANK CONSOLIDATION ON RISK CAPITAL ALLOCATION AND MARKET LIQUIDITY

We investigate the effects of financial market consolidation on the allocation of risk capital in a financial institution and the implications for market liquidity in dealership markets. An increase in financial market consolidation can increase liquidity in foreign exchange and government securities markets. We assume that financial institutions use risk‐management tools in the allocation of risk capital and that capital is determined at the firm level and allocated among separate business lines or divisions. The ability of market makers to supply liquidity is influenced by their risk‐bearing capacity, which is directly related to the amount of risk capital allocated to this activity.     

Determinants of corporate hedging decision: Evidence from Croatian and Slovenian companies

This paper presents the research results on determinants of corporate risk management decisions in large Croatian and Slovenian non-financial companies. Research has revealed that the explored hedging rationales have little predictive power in explaining corporate risk management decisions both in Croatian and Slovenian companies. The evidence based on both univariate and multivariate empirical relations between the decision to hedge in Croatian non-financial companies and financial distress costs, agency costs, costly external financing, taxes, managerial utility and hedge substitutes, fails to provide any support for any of the tested hypotheses but one - costly external financing measured by investment expenditures-to-assets ratio. The same analysis conducted for the Slovenian companies has shown that there is no statistically significant explanatory variable for the decision to hedge; therefore it is not dependent on any of the predicted theories of hedging.     

Bank Earnings Management and Tail Risk during the Financial Crisis

We show that a pattern of earnings management in bank financial statements has little bearing on downside risk during quiet periods, but seems to have a big impact during a financial crisis. Banks demonstrating more aggressive earnings management prior to 2007 exhibit substantially higher stock market risk once the financial crisis begins as measured by the incidence of large weekly stock price “crashes” as well as by the pattern of full‐year returns. Stock price crashes also predict future deterioration in operating performance. Bank regulators may therefore interpret them as early warning signs of impending problems.     

Corporate use of derivatives and excess value of diversification

We provide a link between diversification discount and corporate use of financial derivatives. We show that diversified firms benefit from financial risk management. Our findings are consistent with the notion that derivative usage lowers information asymmetry and thereby reduces the negative valuation effects of diversification. Our evidence complements the earlier findings of both the risk management literature and diversification discount literature and is robust to controls for endogeneity and information asymmetry levels.     

A perspective on the symptoms and causes of the financial crisis

Prior to the 2007–2008 financial crisis, banking sector profits were very high but the profitability of financial intermediation was poor. Using a novel model of banking, this article argues that the high profits were achieved through balance sheet expansion and growing default, liquidity, and term risk mismatches between assets and liabilities. As a result, large banks’ financial leverage rose as they became less liquid, setting the conditions for a systemic banking crisis. This article argues that the increase in financial leverage was possible due to misguided changes in the regulatory framework, specifically, the Basel I capital accord and reductions in reserve requirements. Finally, this article overviews and assesses the policy response in the aftermath of the crisis.     

How to Evaluate Risk Management Units in Financial Institutions?

Based on the existing Enterprise Risk Management framework and current government regulations, “banks are required to establish risk management units (RMUs) to review and evaluate their risks, monitor them, and to advise top management.” Currently an integral part of the risk governance and management process, RMUs in financial institutions have become increasingly important since the 2007–2008 financial crisis. This article details the authors' creation of an index to evaluate the performance of risk management units in financial institutions, and then examines some of their findings. The index transforms twelve parameters into a simple and convenient index that isolates the RMU's activities from the rest of the organizational risk management process, its risk preferences and the activities of the rest of the units. The index's parameters are divided into three dimensions of the RMU's performance: professionalism, organizational status and relationship with top management and the board. The authors found a positive relationship between their RMUI and some important risk governance characteristics: CROs who are among the five highest paid executives at the bank, banks with at least one independent director serving on the board's risk committee having banking and finance experience and boards with greater efficacy.     

Do independent directors cause improvements in firm transparency?

Although recent research documents a positive relation between corporate transparency and the proportion of independent directors, the direction of causality is unclear. We examine a regulatory shock that substantially increased board independence for some firms, and find that information asymmetry, and to some extent management disclosure and financial intermediation, changed at firms affected by this shock. We also examine whether these effects vary as a function of management entrenchment, information processing costs, and required changes to audit committee independence. Our results suggest that firms can alter their corporate transparency to suit the informational demands of a particular board structure.     

Market capitalization and Value-at-Risk

The potential of economic variables for financial risk measurement is an open field for research. This article studies the role of market capitalization in the estimation of Value-at-Risk (VaR). We test the performance of different VaR methodologies for portfolios with different market capitalization. We perform the analysis considering separately financial crisis periods and non-crisis periods. We find that VaR methods perform differently for portfolios with different market capitalization. For portfolios with stocks of different sizes we obtain better VaR estimates when taking market capitalization into account. We also find that it is important to consider crisis and non-crisis periods separately when estimating VaR across different sizes. This study provides evidence that market fundamentals are relevant for risk measurement.     

When more is less: Using multiple constraints to reduce tail risk

Financial institutions suffered large trading losses during the 2007–2009 global financial crisis. These losses cast doubt on the effectiveness of regulations and risk management systems based on a single Value-at-Risk (VaR) constraint. While some researchers have recommended using Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) to control tail risk, VaR remains popular among practitioners and regulators. Accordingly, our paper examines the effectiveness of multiple VaR constraints in controlling CVaR. Under certain conditions, we theoretically show that they are more effective than a single VaR constraint. Furthermore, we numerically find that the maximum CVaR permitted by the constraints is notably smaller than with a single constraint. These results suggest that regulations and risk management systems based on multiple VaR constraints are more effective in reducing tail risk than those based on a single VaR constraint.     

The role of internal corporate governance mechanisms on default risk: A systematic review for different institutional settings

Recent financial downturns, characterized by the significant failures of firms, have revealed the need to control credit risk. Latest literature has shown that weak corporate governance structures are related to high levels of default risk, leading to financial instability. In this context, we aim to summarize the literature that focuses on the role that internal corporate governance plays in the credit risk of firms, specifically considering three corporate governance components: ownership structure, board structure and financial stakeholders’ rights and relations. Additionally, we analyse whether the effectiveness of the internal mechanisms depends on particular key factors, especially the institutional setting and the type of mechanisms considered. Finally, new lines of research are identified for future research.     

Discerning the Impact of Derivatives on Asset Risk: The Case of Canadian Banks

The Canadian banks have shown remarkable resilience to the financial crisis that intensified in the late 2008. The interesting question is whether this stability is due to their prudent lending practices to limit the original risk exposures or due to effective risk management through hedging by using financial derivatives. In this paper, we implement the option‐theoretic model of Merton to calculate the implied asset risk and discern the impact of these derivatives on the aggregate risk for Canadian banks over the period 1997–2008. An algorithm of iterative procedure is developed to impute asset value and risk from bank stock prices. Our estimates show that the risk for Canadian banks is low and even decreasing till the unfolding of the recent crises in 2008. Further analyses reveal that such low risks are not due to reliance on hedging, nor is it related to trading in derivatives, after disentangling the intertwined effects of hedging and trading. These results suggest that involvements in derivatives, in and of themselves, should not be blamed for causing the bank crises; rather, it is conservatism in controlling original risk exposures that remains fundamental for safeguarding a healthy financial system.     

Does risk management matter? Evidence from the U.S. agricultural industry

This article constructs triple-difference tests around shifts in the supply of risk management instruments available to agricultural producers to reveal a positive relation between risk management and productivity. This relation is more robust when producers adopt instruments with payoffs linked to group performance and weaker when payoffs are linked to individual performance. Additionally, productivity is particularly high among risk-managing producers in counties containing high levels of bank deposits, a proxy for access to finance. Overall, this article illuminates the relation between hedging and real firm outcomes as well as the interaction between access to finance and firms' risk management choices.     

Capital management in mutual financial institutions

Capital management by mutual financial institutions (such as credit unions) provides a valuable testing ground for assessing the impact of capital regulation and theories of managerial behaviour in financial institutions. Limited access to external equity capital means that capital accumulation must be met primarily by reliance on retained earnings. To deal with shocks to the capital position and avoid breaching regulatory requirements, managers will aim to have a buffer of capital in excess of the regulatory minimum. Moreover, mutual governance arrangements and an absence of capital market discipline mean that managers have discretion to set target capital ratios which differ significantly from industry averages. This paper develops a formal model of capital management and risk management in mutual financial institutions such as credit unions which reflects these industry characteristics. The model is tested using data from larger credit unions in Australia, which have been subject to the Basel Accord Risk Weighted Capital Requirements since 1993. The data supports the hypothesis that credit unions manage their capital position by setting a short term target profit rate (return on assets) which is positively related to asset growth and which is aimed at gradually removing discrepancies between the actual and desired capital ratio. Desired capital ratios vary significantly across credit unions. There is little evidence of short run adjustments to the risk of the asset portfolio to achieve a desired capital position.     

Financial literacy and the demand for financial advice

The low level of financial literacy across households suggests that they are at risk of making suboptimal financial decisions. In this paper, we analyze the effect of investors’ financial literacy on their decision to demand professional, non-independent advice. We find that non-independent advisors are not sufficient to alleviate the problem of low financial literacy. The investors with a low level of financial literacy are less likely to consult an advisor, but they delegate their portfolio choice more often or do not invest in risky assets at all. We explain this evidence with a highly stylized model of strategic interaction between investors and better informed advisors with conflicts of interests. The advisors provide more information to knowledgeable investors, who anticipating this are more likely to consult them.     

企业股利政策与财务风险分析

股利政策是企业决定对其盈余进行分配的方案选择，股利政策的实行会给企业的生产经营带来一些有利的影响，同样也会给企业带来一定的财务风险。本将评述两种主要的股利理论，分析股利政策与企业财务风险之间的关系，并就我国上市公司股利政策的现状进行分析，阐述其原因以及其中存在的财务风险。     

The future and dynamics of global systemically important banks

The purpose of this paper is to analyse some of the issues associated with supervision and regulation of global systemically important banks, G-SIB. The paper highlights the importance of managing liquidity risk and creating a global financial system that can minimise regulatory arbitrage by large financial institutions. The paper argues that, unlike some industries such as the airline industry in which risk has been contained and yet the size and capacity of aircrafts have increased, in the banking system, less progress has been made to contain financial risk and allow large banks to expand their global activities. The paper argues that G-SIB are able to continue remaining large provided that a globally integrated financial system ensures effective global supervision of these large banks. The paper compares the US banking crises in the 19th century and the subsequent emergence of the US Federal Reserve System to the possibility of establishing a world central bank and a global supervisory board. Such new global institutions will have the capacity to reduce regulatory arbitrage, increase effective supervision, reduce systemic and liquidity risk and create a more stable global financial system.     

Generalized DEA model of fundamental analysis and its application to portfolio optimization

Fundamental analysis is used in asset selection for equity portfolio management. In this paper, a generalized data envelopment analysis (DEA) model is developed to analyze a firm’s financial statements over time in order to determine a relative financial strength indicator (RFSI) that is predictive of firm’s stock price returns. RFSI is based on maximizing the correlation between the DEA-based score of financial strength and the stock market performance. This maximization involves a difficult binary nonlinear program that requires iterative re-configuration of parameters of financial statements as inputs and outputs. We utilize a two-step heuristic algorithm that combines random sampling and local search optimization. The proposed approach is tested with 230 firms from various US technology-industries to determine optimized RFSI indicators for stock selection. Then, those selected stocks are used within portfolio optimization models to demonstrate the usefulness of the scheme for portfolio risk management.     

CORPORATE HEDGING AND SHAREHOLDER VALUE

Although theory suggests that corporate hedging can increase shareholder value in the presence of capital market imperfections, empirical studies show overall mixed support for rationales of hedging with derivatives. Although various empirical challenges and limitations advise some caution with regard to the interpretation of the existing evidence, the results are consistent with derivatives use being just one part of a broader financial strategy that considers the type and level of financial risks, the availability of risk management tools, and the operating environment of the firm. Moreover, corporations rely heavily on pass‐through, operational hedging, and foreign currency debt to manage financial risk.     

Financial Policy in Practice: Benchmarking Financial Sector Strategies Around the World

Policy makers use financial sector strategies to formulate a holistic policy for the national financial system. This article examines and rates financial sector strategies around the world on how well they formulate development targets, arrangements for systemic risk management, and implementing plans. The strategies are also rated on whether they consider policy trade-offs between financial development and systemic risk management. The rated strategies are then benchmarked against a range of country characteristics. The analysis finds that the scope and quality of national strategies for the financial sector are systematically influenced by several country characteristics. Interestingly, policy trade-offs, particularly between financial development and systemic risk management, are not adequately considered in the strategies.