The dark side of marital leadership: Evidence from China

Using a unique dataset of Chinese private firms, we find that marital leadership is associated with higher propensity for financial fraud. We examine the potential economic mechanisms that lead to this result, finding that weak internal supervision and inefficient decision-making provide crucial linkages between marital leadership and financial fraud. However, well-functioning corporate governance mechanisms reduce the negative effects of marital leadership. Our findings provide important empirical evidence for the effect of family involvement in corporate governance and contribute to the literature on the determinants of financial fraud in listed firms.     

Evaluating corporate credit risks in emerging markets

Corporate leverage among emerging market firms went up considerably after the 2007–09 Global Financial Crisis (GFC). We investigate how the increased emerging market corporate leverage in the post-GFC period (2010–15) impacted the underlying credit risk, compared to the pre-GFC (2002–2006) and GFC (2007–09) periods. Using firm-level credit risk, financial, and balance sheet data for 350 firms in 23 emerging markets, we find that leverage growth leads to a significant increase in corporate credit default swap (CDS) spreads only in the post-GFC period, and the incremental effect is mainly evident among risky firms (firms with high leverage and idiosyncratic volatility). In contrast, emerging market CDS spreads during the GFC period are mainly driven by global market risk factors. The post-GFC corporate debt vulnerability is mitigated for high growth prospect firms and firms domiciled in countries with high net capital inflows and superior governance. While corporate leverage growth impacts aggregate corporate credit risk, there is no evidence that it increases sovereign credit risk. Our paper contributes to the recent literature on potential sources of default risk in emerging markets.     

我国证券公司治理绩效的因子分析

证券公司是资本市场最重要的行为主体之一,我国证券公司虽已建立了董事会、监事会、独立董事等现代公司治理框架,但在实际运作中其职能行使上存在许多不规范的地方。2008年金融危机告诫我们,不仅需要提高证券公司的风险防范机制,更需要建立完善的公司治理结构,促使证券公司风险防范机制作用顺利发挥。通过因子分析法将证券公司内部治理变量综合成为四个因子,即规模激励因子、结构因子、监管因子和独立性因子,进而分析内部治理因子对证券公司经营绩效的影响。     

Performance and governance in microfinance institutions

We examine the relationship between firm performance and corporate governance in microfinance institutions (MFI) using a self-constructed global dataset on MFIs collected from third-party rating agencies. Using random effects panel data estimations, we study the effects of board and CEO characteristics, firm ownership type, customer-firm relationship, and competition and regulation on an MFI’s financial performance and outreach to poor clients. We find that financial performance improves with local rather than international directors, an internal board auditor, and a female CEO. The number of credit clients increase with CEO/chairman duality. Outreach is lower in the case of lending to individuals than in the case of group lending. We find no difference between non-profit organisations and shareholder firms in financial performance and outreach, and we find that bank regulation has no effect. The results underline the need for an industry specific approach to MFI governance.     

Are small family firms financially sophisticated?

We study the drivers of financial sophistication in small family firms. Sophistication is defined as the use of non-basic financial products such as options, swaps, debt restructuring, and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) advisory services. Our analysis is based on a unique dataset with detailed information on 187 Italian family firms. We find that the main drivers of financial sophistication are: (1) the generation that currently owns the firm; (2) the presence of a non-family CFO; and (3) the existence of a non-family shareholder. We analyze the impact of these factors on the following four classes of non-basic financial products: corporate finance, cash management, corporate lending and risk management. Our results can be used to determine the characteristics of financially sophisticated family firms and whether their corporate governance and ownership structure increase the use of non-basic financial products.     

Do Family Firms’ Specific Governance Mechanisms Moderate the Cost of Debt?

This study considers whether the specific governance mechanisms of Spanish family firms decrease their debt cost. We explore the idea of reducing debt costs through specific governance mechanisms of family firms, such as the business succession plan, the family council, as well as other traditional mechanisms like the board of directors. Because most corporate governance research has focused on larger firms, more research on smaller privately held family firms is necessary. For this empirical research, we used a sample of 281 small and medium‐sized family firms. The results show that the implementation of a business succession plan not only serves to solve family conflicts and to plan the business succession but also moderates the cost of financing. Our results confirm that credit institutions receive a positive signal when family firms implement business succession plans as governance mechanisms, reducing both family opportunism and asymmetries of information, influencing risk analysts in their decision‐making processes.     

Sovereign to Corporate Risk Spillovers

The first Greek bailout on April 11, 2010 triggered a significant reevaluation of sovereign credit risk across Europe. We exploit this event to examine the transmission of sovereign to corporate credit risk. A 10% increase in sovereign credit risk raises corporate credit risk on average by 1.1% after the bailout. The evidence is suggestive of risk spillovers from sovereign to corporate credit risk through a financial and a fiscal channel, as the effects are more pronounced for firms that are bank or government dependent. We find no support for indirect risk transmission through a deterioration of macroeconomic fundamentals.     

Credit refinancing and corporate tax avoidance

This study examines the disciplining effects of credit markets on firms’ corporate tax avoidance strategies. We show that, during adverse credit market conditions, firms with refinancing needs prefer to limit the after-tax cash flow benefits of tax avoidance to regain access to traditionally risk-averse credit markets. Our results show that firms increase their cash effective tax rate by two percentage points when facing refinancing constraints, and this effect is more pronounced for firms with lower asset redeployability and higher default probability. However, corporate governance mechanisms mitigate the relationship between tax avoidance and credit refinancing. Moreover, we show that firms decrease their tax avoidance strategies while leaving their leverage and debt shield unchanged. Overall, our findings are consistent with the observation that credit markets put pressure on tax-avoiding firms and contribute to the policy debate on disciplining tax avoiders.     

Directors' and officers' liability insurance and loan spreads

We analyze the effect of directors' and officers' liability insurance (D&O insurance) on the spreads charged on bank loans. We find that higher levels of D&O insurance coverage are associated with higher loan spreads and that this relation depends on loan characteristics in economically sensible ways and is attenuated by monitoring mechanisms. This association between loan spreads and D&O insurance coverage is robust to controlling for endogeneity (because both could be related to firm risk). Our evidence suggests that lenders view D&O insurance coverage as increasing credit risk (potentially via moral hazard or information asymmetry). Further analyses show that higher levels of D&O insurance coverage are associated with greater risk taking and higher probabilities of financial restatement due to aggressive financial reporting. While greater use of D&O insurance increases the cost of debt, we find some evidence that D&O insurance coverage appears to improve the value of large increases in capital expenditure for firms with better internal and external governance.     

Credit supply and corporate capital structure: Evidence from Japan

In this paper we examine how financial constraints, especially fluctuations in the supply of credit, affect the capital structure of 1537 publicly listed Japanese firms from 1980 to 2007, in a data set with 33,000 observations. It is one of the first studies to do so and is inspired by the recent studies of Leary (2009) and Faulkender and Petersen (2006). Japan was selected due to the extreme credit supply fluctuations observed during the last 30 years. It thus offers an ideal natural experiment to test the impact of credit supply on corporate capital structure. In particular, in our panel data study we investigated the impact of the asset bubble in the 1980s and the credit crunch of the late 1990s on corporate capital structure decisions. The results of this paper show, among other findings, that financial policy decisions are indeed influenced by monetary conditions and the supply of credit. In particular, smaller sized firms face financial constraints, especially during economic downturns.     

Financial constraints,board governance standards,and corporate cash holdings

This study examines whether financial constraints and board governance play substitution roles in lowering agency concerns in corporate cash holdings. Using four firm-specific characteristics of financial constraints and 28 forward-looking board governance standards, we find that board governance mitigates agency concerns in cash holdings more significantly for financially less-constrained firms. Consistently, financially less-constrained firms increase the level of board governance and adopt more board governance standards. A natural experiment with the 2007 financial crisis provides robustness to our findings. Our evidence suggests that financial constraints interrelate with the effectiveness of board governance on corporate cash holdings.     

A cross-country comparison of corporate governance and firm performance: Do financial structure and the legal system matter?

We blend the corporate governance and the financial structure/legal system literature streams to study whether firm performance is enhanced when its governance structure embodies the demands of the host country’s financial structure and legal system. Using a sample of 1736 unique firms representing 22 countries, we find that the joint effect of a country’s financial structure and legal system does matter when explaining the relationship between performance and the overall level of corporate governance in a given country. The results also suggest that firms operating in the market/common combination countries tend to command higher market valuations than firms with a comparable level of corporate governance that operate in the bank/civil combination countries.     

Internal liquidity risk in corporate bond yield spreads

The recent global financial crisis reveals the important role of internal liquidity risk in corporate credit risk. However, few existing studies investigate its effects on bond yield spreads. Panel data for the period from year 1993 through 2008 show that corporate internal liquidity risk significantly impacts bond yield spreads (and changes) when controlling for well-known bond yield determinant variables, traditional accounting measures of corporate debt servicing ability, cash flow volatility, credit ratings, and state variables. This finding indicates that internal liquidity risk should therefore be incorporated into bond yield spread modeling.     

Bank connections,corporate investment and crisis

Against the backdrop of a severe financial crisis and extensive restructuring of the financial sector, we investigate the evolution and determinants of connections between firms and banks, and the impact of bank connections on corporate investment. Our study examines Thai non-financial companies during 1995–2000, a period straddling the East Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–1998. Before the crisis, bank-connections are common and associated with significantly lower sensitivity of corporate investment to internal cash flow. After the crisis, and following substantial changes in bank ownership and governance due to financial-sector reforms and restructuring, far fewer firms are bank-connected and connections no longer affect investment–cash flow sensitivity.     

Risk management,corporate governance,and bank performance in the financial crisis

The recent financial crisis has raised several questions with respect to the corporate governance of financial institutions. This paper investigates whether risk management-related corporate governance mechanisms, such as for example the presence of a chief risk officer (CRO) in a bank’s executive board and whether the CRO reports to the CEO or directly to the board of directors, are associated with a better bank performance during the financial crisis of 2007/2008. We measure bank performance by buy-and-hold returns and ROE and we control for standard corporate governance variables such as CEO ownership, board size, and board independence. Most importantly, our results indicate that banks, in which the CRO directly reports to the board of directors and not to the CEO (or other corporate entities), exhibit significantly higher (i.e., less negative) stock returns and ROE during the crisis. In contrast, standard corporate governance variables are mostly insignificantly or even negatively related to the banks’ performance during the crisis.     

Tradeoffs between Internal and External Governance: Evidence from Exogenous Regulatory Shocks

We use the 2002 NYSE and NASDAQ listing requirements mandating firms have a majority of independent directors on the board as an exogenous shock to examine the interaction between internal and external governance. Relative to compliant firms, noncompliant firms significantly reduced exposure to three external governance mechanisms: the market for corporate control, shareholder activism, and credit markets, by adding antitakeover provisions, adopting officer and director protection provisions, and reducing debt levels, respectively. The results are stronger in firms with greater exposure to the relevant external governance mechanism. The evidence suggests that firms treat internal and external governance as substitutes.     

内部控制与异质机构持股的治理效应

本文实证检验了不同内部控制水平下,异质机构持股在抑制管理层盈余操纵方面的公司治理效应。研究发现,相比外地或短期机构持股,本地或长期机构持股更有助于提升应计质量和降低盈余噪音;当公司存在实质性内部控制缺陷时,本地或长期机构持股在抑制管理层盈余操纵方面的治理效应显著降低;相比国有控股,异质机构持股治理效应的发挥在非国有控股公司中受内部控制的影响更大;当公司存在财务报告实质性内控缺陷时,异质机构持股发挥的治理效应明显更弱。这些结果表明,异质机构持股治理效应的发挥离不开公司内部控制机制,二者之间是互补而非替代关系,这种互补关系主要由财务报告内部控制缺陷驱动。本研究有助于深化理解异质机构持股影响公司治理的具体作用机理,为实务界和监管机构改善公司治理、加强投资者保护提供经验参考。     

Directors’ and Officers’ liability insurance and bond credit spreads: Evidence from China

Using hand-collected data on purchases of D&O insurance by Chinese listed firms for the period from 2008 to 2019, we empirically find that D&O insurance negatively associates with credit spreads. The negative relationship still holds after conducting a series of robustness tests and is not driven by the eyeball effect. We also show that D&O insurance can reduce credit spreads via the channels of internal controls, external monitoring, information asymmetry and default risk. Moreover, the negative effect of D&O insurance on credit spreads is more pronounced for non-state-owned firms, those located in regions with a low level of marketization or that employ rating agencies with a bad reputation. Our study complements the literature on the credit spreads and corporate governance.