现实生活中的卡特尔组织

卡特尔组织是由竞争企业所构成的共谋联盟.企业通过在商品价格、产量和市场份额等方面订立协定而形成的同盟.本文将先阐述卡特尔组织的优点及其不稳定性,并运用保洁与联合利华的例子来分析卡特尔组织在现实生活中的稳定性.     

影响出口卡特尔形成和维持的因素研究——兼论中国稀土出口战略能否成功实施

本文结合影响一般卡特尔形成原因和维持条件的因素和出口卡特尔的特点,研究了影响出口卡特尔形成和维持因素,进一步完善和发展出口卡特尔相关理论研究。并在理论研究的基础上,基于出口卡特尔的视角具体分析中国稀土出口战略成功实施的可行性,得出各因素总体来说有利于中国稀土出口战略成功实施的结论。     

影响出口卡特尔形成和维持的因素研究——兼论中国稀土出口战略能否成功实施

本文结合影响一般卡特尔形成原因和维持条件的因素和出口卡特尔的特点,研究了影响出口卡特尔形成和维持因素,进一步完善和发展出口卡特尔相关理论研究。并在理论研究的基础上,基于出口卡特尔的视角具体分析中国稀土出口战略成功实施的可行性,得出各因素总体来说有利于中国稀土出口战略成功实施的结论。     

论我国《反垄断法》对卡特尔行为法律责任的规制

卡特尔是同业竞争者之间限制竞争的联合。卡特尔的法律责任并不是指卡特尔成员违反协议而对其他成员承担的责任,而是指卡特尔的参与者对于它们所实施的违法卡特尔行为给同业竞争者以及交易相对方（包括消费者）带来损害所承担的不利法律后果。我国《反垄断法》针对卡特尔行为规定了相关的民事责任和行政责任,初步使卡特尔法律责任有法可依。但对比世界各国反垄断立法,我们不难看出,我国对于卡特尔法律责任的立法规定过于笼统和原则性,同时存在法律责任过轻等问题。     

论核心卡特尔中的宽恕制度及我国《反垄断法》对其规制和完善

核心卡特尔通过相同的定价、一致的行动、固定的份额来获取高额的利润，给竞争带来事大的危害，但是其隐蔽性强，难以为执法机关所侦破。宽恕制度，通过豁免卡特尔协议成员的方式以鼓励其对卡特尔协议的披露，成为西方国家打击卡特尔的重要武器。我国《反垄断法》虽对宽恕制度做了规制，尚且不足，仍待完善     

论核心卡特尔巾的宽恕制度及我国《反垄断法》对其规制和完善

核心卡特尔通过相同的定价、一致的行动、固定的份额来获取高额的利润,给竞争带来重大的危害,但是其隐蔽性强,难以为执法机关所侦破.宽恕制度,通过豁免卡特尔协议成员的方式以鼓励其对卡特尔协议的披露,成为西方国家打击卡特尔的重要武器.我国<反垄断法>虽对宽恕制度做了规制.尚且不足,仍待完善.     

对我国卡特尔民事责任问题的探讨

2007年我国出台了《反垄断法》,成为规制我国卡特尔等垄断行为的基本法律,其中第五十条规定使得卡特尔民事责任有法可依。但是单纯一个条款来规定民事责任显然势单力薄,我国立法采用了援引民法规定来解决民事损害赔偿问题,《反垄断法》在实施上必然存在与其他法律的协调。本文就卡特尔民事责任的作用、性质、承担责任的方式等方面进行思考,认为,卡特尔民事责任体现了反垄断立法上的私力救济,其实质上属于民事侵权责任,主要体现为补偿性的赔偿损失。     

垄断限价、代理商进入与社会福利——兼评中国民航市场价格维持政策

自从中国民航总局于 1999年实施“国内民航机票禁止打折”政策以来 ,不少民航公司仍在暗中通过机票中间代理商低价倾销机票。本文试图从社会福利角度出发 ,分析在卡特尔组织实行垄断定价政策情况下 ,中间代理商的进入对社会福利的影响 ,简要评价了中国民航市场现行价格维持政策的福利效应 ,并提出若干相应建议。     

垄断限价、代理商进入与社会福利--兼评中国民航市场价格维持政策

自从中国民航总局于1999年实施“国内民航机票禁止打折”政策以来，不少民航公司仍在暗中通过机票中间代理商低价倾销机票。本试图从社会福利角度出发，分析在卡特尔组织实行垄断定价政策情况下，中间代理商的进入对社会福利的影响，简要评价了中国民航市场现行价格维持政策的福利效应，并提出若干相应建议。     

论市场垄断和行政垄断

垄断与竞争既相互排斥,又相互依存,这是社会生产的共同规律。但长久以来,一些经济学者却明显对垄断持有偏见。认为垄断破坏了市场价格机制配置资源的作用,妨碍了技术进步和创新;处于垄断地位的企业为了占有垄断利润,通过串谋、默契等价格操纵手段,造成较低产量、较高价格,致使消费者消费成本增加,社会分配不公乃至总福利损失等等。因此,反垄断似乎天经地义。但是,产业经济运动的历史和现实却与之表现得不完全一致。微软垄断案中Bill Gates的胜利,卡特尔、托拉斯垄断企业组织的发展,全球性如火如茶的并购浪潮都不知不觉地表明政府放松管制转而支持垄断。一、垄断的划分我们将其区分为垄断结构和垄断行     

Endogenous cartel formation with heterogeneous firms

In the context of an infinitely repeated capacity‐constrained price game, we endogenize the composition of a cartel when firms are heterogeneous in their capacities. When firms are sufficiently patient, there exists a stable cartel involving the largest firms. A firm with sufficiently small capacity is not a member of any stable cartel. When a cartel is not all‐inclusive, colluding firms set a price that serves as an umbrella with non‐cartel members pricing below it and producing at capacity. Contrary to previous work, our results suggest that the most severe coordinated effects may come from mergers involving moderate‐sized firms, rather than the largest or smallest firms.     

Capital structure under collusion

We analyze the financial leverage of firms that collude to soften product market competition by forming a cartel. We find that cartel firms have lower leverage during collusion periods. This is consistent with the idea that cartel firms strategically reduce leverage to make their cartels more stable, because high leverage makes deviations from a cartel agreement more attractive. Given that cartels have a large economic footprint, their study is also relevant for the capital structure literature, which has largely ignored the role of anti-competitive behavior.     

fines,leniency, and rewards in antitrust

This article reports results from an experiment studying how FINES, LENIENCY, and REWARDS for whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices. Antitrust without LENIENCY reduces cartel formation but increases cartel prices: subjects use costly FINES as punishments. LENIENCY improves antitrust by strengthening deterrence but stabilizes surviving cartels: subjects appear to anticipate the lower postconviction prices after reports/LENIENCY. With REWARDS, prices fall at the competitive level. Overall, our results suggest a strong cartel deterrence potential for well‐run LENIENCY and REWARD schemes. These findings may also be relevant for similar white‐collar organized crimes, such as corruption and fraud.     

Illinois Walls: how barring indirect purchaser suits facilitates collusion

In its landmark ruling in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois in 1977, the U.S. Supreme Court restricted standing to sue for recovery of antitrust damages to direct purchasers. However, antitrust damages are typically (in part) passed on to intermediaries lower in the chain of production and ultimately to consumers. We show that the Illinois Brick rule facilitates collusion. It allows an upstream cartel to shield itself from private damage claims by forwarding a share of cartel profits to its direct purchasers. These benefits dissuade the direct purchasers from exercising their exclusive right to sue for private damages. The cartel can achieve this by rationing inputs at low prices. Several U.S. antitrust cases show symptoms of “Illinois Walls.”     

行业协会“权力越位”的法律反思——以“价格卡特尔”为视角

在我国经济转型时期,行业协会在履行行业“自治权”时,因责权边界不清经常出现“权力越位”（自治权滥用）的现象.其中,行业协会实施的限制竞争行为尤其是价格卡特尔便是其“权力越位”的典型样态.而在我国,行业协会价格卡特尔由于行业协会的生成途径及制度环境使然呈现出了独有的特征,加上相关法律规制的单薄和欠缺,都使此种“权力越位”行为成为可能且经常发生.因此,需要完善和细化相关法律规定,明确行业协会与政府的职能边界,衡平行业自治与公平竞争的冲突.“让权力理性回归”,如此,才能从根本上有效规制行业协会的“权力越位”行为.     

Collusion with limited product comparability

We examine the effect of limited product comparability on the viability of collusion. Firms choose messages to influence consumer product comparison. The cartel hinders transparency on the equilibrium path and seeks it for optimal punishment. Five conditions are each sufficient to ensure obfuscation aids collusion: if firms can mix over messages or commit to messages, if messages are informative, or if an individual firm or the cartel can control comparability. We also analyze the impact of message differentiation and complexity for optimal messages, and identify a key role for the convexity or concavity of comparison probabilities in these features.     

Profit sharing (with workers) facilitates collusion (among firms)

We show how profit sharing by firms with workers facilitates collusion among firms in a dynamic oligopoly environment with uncertain demand. We first show that firm profits can always be increased by tying wages to market conditions. The optimal agreement takes the form of an option and features partial sharing because increased sharing raises the expected price‐wage differential, but reduces price‐wage variability. We then show that given any cartel, there exist market conditions such that simply giving some expected profit to workers raises expected firm profits via the transfer's impact on the incentive to cheat on the cartel.     

Laboratory evidence on the effectiveness of corporate leniency programs

The number of cartels detected in the United States and in Europe has increased considerably since the introduction of corporate leniency programs in antitrust legislation. It cannot, however, be ruled out that this apparent success results in part from increased cartel activity. We explore the effects of corporate leniency programs on pricing and cartel activity by use of an experiment. We find that in the lab (i) fewer cartels are established when a leniency program is in place, and (ii) cartels that do exist are less successful in charging prices above the static Nash equilibrium price and have lower survival rates.     

International CO2 taxation and the dynamics of fossil fuel markets

International CO₂ taxation may have major implications for fossil fuel markets. These effects must be taken into account in calculating the net gain from CO₂ taxation. The paper assumes that buyers have formed an agency that applies a CO₂ tax and sellers are competitive or constitute a resource cartel. When sellers are competitive, buyers' agency may use monopsony power by applying an import tariff. At the resulting time-consistent equilibrium, the sellers lose their resource rent. In contrast, the solution where the sellers' cartel maximizes its profits is time inconsistent. At the time-consistent Nash feedback equilibrium, the seller's monopoly power vanishes asymptotically. The sellers' export fee reduces the buyers' pollution tax. At this equilibrium, the buyers' pollution tax includes an import subsidy, and the tax falls below the present value of the marginal pollution damage. In the Nash feedback equilibrium, higher pollution damage may imply higher initial producer prices, although this effect is always the reverse in the Pareto optimum.