上市公司违规处罚与审计师更换——基于“一会两所”处罚案例的分析

本文以2002-2009年被中国证券监督委员会及上海和深圳证券交易所处罚且违规行为与审计师相关的上市公司为样本,研究上市公司被处罚后审计师更换的选择行为以及更换审计师对避免再次处罚的效果。结果表明,相对于未受处罚的公司,被处罚公司更倾向于更换审计师;相对于上一年被出具非标审计意见的被处罚公司,上一年被出具标准审计意见的被处罚公司更倾向于更换审计师;上一年被出具标准审计意见的被处罚公司,更换审计师的行为能够有效抑制再次被处罚事件的发生。     

审计师变更与盈余管理关系的实证研究--来自中国A股市场的经验证据

通过对2001～2003年A股上市公司的实证研究发现:审计师变更与公司可操纵应计利润的增长具有显著正相关关系,且两者关系在不同年度、不同前期审计意见的情况下有所不同.这表明,一方面审计师变更影响到后任审计师的独立性,即公司能够通过更换审计师实现盈余管理的目标;另一方面,对前期非标审计意见的公司,审计师采取了较为谨慎的做法,且伴随着监管政策的逐渐强化,后任审计师的独立性逐年提高.     

审计师质量对上市公司融资方式选择的影响——来自中国资本市场的经验证据

高质量审计能够降低信息不对称、约束管理层的机会主义行为,而权益融资和债务融资对信息不对称的敏感性是不同的,这两类资财提供者对外部审计的依赖程度也不同,因此,审计质量可能会对公司融资方式的选择产生影响。本文利用我国2008-2012年沪深两市A股上市公司及其审计师数据,分别以行业专长和事务所规模作为审计师质量的替代变量,并用控制函数方法解决审计师的自选择问题,考察了审计师质量对上市公司融资方式选择的影响。结果发现,选择高质量审计师的公司,更倾向于进行权益融资。进一步研究发现,在信息不对称问题更为严重的小规模公司中,审计师质量对权益融资的促进作用更为明显。     

成本费用粘性对审计师行为的影响研究

成本费用粘性影响企业生存发展，而目前关于成本费用粘性的研究大多探讨其前置影响因素，对成本费用粘性经济后果关注较少。以2012-2021年沪深两市A股非金融上市公司为研究样本，本文检验成本费用粘性对审计师行为的影响。研究表明，成本费用粘性显著增加了审计师对被审计单位的审计收费，并且增强了审计师的谨慎性，审计师更加倾向于出具非标准审计意见。经过更换样本检验、自变量滞后一期检验、工具变量检验以及Heckman两阶段检验，结果保持稳健。进一步研究发现，较高的行业竞争程度和较低的内部控制质量，增强了成本费用粘性与审计师行为之间的显著关系。研究结论拓展了成本费用粘性经济后果的文献，填补了成本费用粘性与审计师行为关系的研究空缺，对审计监管部门规范引导审计市场发展、上市公司完善成本管理以及审计师优化审计程序提供了借鉴。     

审计轮换方式对审计质量的影响研究——基于我国上市公司2006-2010年的经验数据分析

本文以2006-2010年在沪、深上市的上市公司数据为样本,并根据企业产权性质的不同将样本数据分为国有企业和非国有企业样本数据,用审计师发表的非标准审计意见衡量审计质量,全面研究强制、自愿条件下轮换审计师或者会计师事务所对审计质量的影响.实证研究结果表明,自愿轮换会计师事务所与审计质量显著正相关,并且这一相关关系在非国有企业中更显著;在非国有企业中,自愿轮换审计师与审计质量显著负相关,而在国有企业中,自愿轮换审计师与审计质量不相关;强制条件下的轮换,无论是审计师层面还是事务所层面,与审计质量均无显著的相关关系.     

媒体负面报道、审计师风险感知与审计质量

本文以我国2014—2017年的A股上市公司为研究对象,运用多元线性回归的方法,实证检验了媒体负面报道、审计师风险感知对审计质量的影响。研究发现:审计师风险感知对审计质量产生正向影响,即审计师感知的风险越大,审计服务的质量越高;媒体负面报道的增多对审计质量的提高有促进作用,即媒体负面报道有利于市场监督以及公司的治理。进一步研究显示,不同媒体报道的情形下,审计师风险感知对审计质量的影响存在差异,这是审计师自身掌握的风险信息与外部环境的风险感知信息的共同作用。     

制度环境、审计供求与审计治理——基于我国证券市场中审计师变更问题的实证分析

本文基于我国证券市场中审计师变更问题这一动态视角考察了制度环境对外部审计治理的影响。通过研究,我们发现:首先,在制度环境发展相对落后的地区,上市公司频繁更换审计师的现象更严重;其次,在制度环境发展相对较好的地区,上市公司更可能发生审计师升级变更,表明其对高质量审计服务的需求;第三,在制度环境发展较差的地区,由于诉讼风险和诉讼成本较低,继任审计师为了获得审计客户更容易发生变通审计意见的行为,说明审计师难以发挥其外部治理的功能进而弥补制度环境的缺陷。本文的研究发现说明制度环境同时影响审计需求和审计供给两方面的行为表现,并支持了制度环境与外部审计治理是相互促进的关系。     

上市公司与审计师的权力均衡及其意义

独立性是注册会计师审计的灵魂。我国注册会计师经济上不独立以及涉及与上市公司各方的利益冲突，使其经常受到来自上市公司的诱感和威胁，难以保持独立。通过加强上市公司更换其审计师的相关信息披露、构建审计师的声誉机制、强化有关的监管制度等措施，使上市公司与审计师的权力达到均衡，是保证注册会计师独立性的关键。     

戴“好面具”的上市公司变更审计师的动因研究——基于九发股份的案例证据

一、引言"面具人"起源于心理学中的人格面具理论(Persona),人们以此表示为了得到社会承认,某一个人公开展示的一面。在资本市场上,社会公众通过审计师出具的审计意见来判断上市公司的会计信息质量是否可靠,因此,人们普遍认为,当审计师为上市公司出具了非标的审计意见,上市公司就戴上了"丑面具",当审计师为上市公司出具了标准的审计意见,上市公司就拥有了"好面具"。     

国外对审计师辞聘真实动机研究

国内外关于审计师变更的研究文献非常多。审计师变更根据发起方的不同,可以分为公司发起的审计师更换即解聘,以及审计师发起的审计师更换即辞聘。绝大多数文献在研究审计师更换时一般并不区分这两种不同性质的更换。但也有部分文献区分了辞聘和解聘,本文较为系统地回顾了国外关于审计师辞聘真实动机的研究文献。这些文献表明,在关注中国上市公司披露的审计师变更事项时,应注意区分辞聘与解聘的不同;同时也应关注披露的辞聘动机是否真实。     

The impact of financial reporting flexibility on auditor risk judgement: Evidence from the implementation of FIN 46R

This paper investigates how auditors respond, in terms of their pricing and audit work, to a reduction of clients’ financial reporting discretion upon the implementation of FIN 46R, which requires firms to consolidate the variable interest entities (VIE) under their control. Using a difference-in-differences research design, we find that auditors charge relatively fewer audit fees and have shorter audit report lags for firms that are significantly affected by FIN 46R, compared to a group of control firms. This result concurs with the view that auditors react favorably to the reduction of clients’ financial reporting discretion. Our finding is concentrated among clients with higher accrual earnings management constraints, auditors with less client-specific knowledge, and auditors who have no recent experience of audit failures (e.g., severe client restatements). Our results are robust to alternative identifications of treatment and control samples, and our conclusion remains valid after controlling for the contemporaneous adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act. We also show that the relatively reduced audit fees and audit effort do not lead to the deterioration of audit quality.     

Top executive gender diversity and financial reporting quality

We examine whether gender diversity of chief executive and chief financial officers (CEOs and CFOs) is associated with financial reporting quality. The CEOs and CFOs of publicly traded companies are both required to certify the appropriateness of their financial statements and annual disclosures. We argue that gender diverse dyads (groups) of executives can bring different perspectives and professional skepticism to financial reporting. Using a sample of different CEO/CFO gender dyads during 2006–2019, we postulate and find evidence of higher accruals quality among firms led by gender-diverse dyads compared to accruals quality reported by firms led by all-male CEO/CFO pairs. Additional analyses reveal that the auditors of firms with gender-diverse executive dyads issue audit reports later, charge higher audit fees, and are more likely to be one of the Big 4 firms. These findings support the view that top executive gender diversity enhances financial reporting quality, which has important implications for corporate governance mechanisms.     

Determinants and implications of long audit reporting lags: evidence from China

Audit reporting lag is the single most important determinant influencing the timeliness of the release of financial statements. In this study, we first explore the determinants of audit reporting lags in China where the audit market for listed firms is dominated by non-Big 4 auditors. We then examine the implications of long audit reporting lags in subsequent years. We find that selected measures of audit risk and complexity, and auditor expertise are all associated with the length of audit reporting lags in China. Firms with long audit reporting lags are more likely to have the receipt of non-standard opinions in subsequent periods. There is also evidence that firms with extremely long audit reporting lags tend to have more restatements in the subsequent year. As prior research has not specifically investigated the consequences of long audit reporting lags in subsequent years, this study makes an important contribution to the literature in this area.     

The effect of external audits of internal control over financial reporting on financial reporting for clients of Big 4, Second-tier,and small audit firms

The external audit of internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) is a very expensive and contentious aspect of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX). Larger public firms were first required to file a management report on and have an external audit of ICFR in 2004. Smaller public firms were first required to file a management report on ICFR in 2007 but are exempt from the audit requirement. Whereas most related prior research investigates the combined effect of management and auditor reports on financial reporting, this study examines the distinct effect of auditor reports on reporting quality. For companies audited by small auditors, we find evidence that financial reporting quality improves with an auditor report on ICFR. We find no evidence that auditor ICFR reports improve reporting quality for clients of Big 4 or Second-tier audit firms. Our study adds to the debate on the applicability of SOX Section 404 to smaller firms.     

中注协约谈部分证券资格事务所负责人及注册会计师 提示上市公司年报审计风险

为深入贯彻落实会计师事务所执业质量检查制度改革精神和《上市公司年报审计监管工作规程》要求,中注协在系统总结2010年年报审计监管约谈经验的基础上,通过创新约谈工作思路、健全约谈工作机制、加强约谈工作技术支持力量,进一步加大年报审计事前事中监管力度,有效抵制不正当低价竞争,更好地引导和帮助事务所防范审计风险。2012年,中注协先后约谈了9次(其中,当面约谈6次,书面约谈3次)、共20家证券资格事务所,就部分上市公司2011年年报审计风险进行提示,引起社会各界的高度关注和积极反响。为帮助广大读者深入了解中注协年报审计监管约谈机制和全面把握风险提示内涵,现接上期,继续将有关约谈的情况予以刊发。     

How do auditors respond to low annual report readability?

We show that increased audit effort is associated with lower annual report readability to compensate for a perceived increase in the risk of financial misstatement for United States (US) firms. In particular, we find that lower annual report readability is associated with longer audit delays and higher audit fees for Form 10-K for US auditors, suggesting that auditors spend more effort auditing clients when annual reports have lower readability. We also find that low readability increases the likelihood of auditors using more explanatory language in unqualified audit reports.     

Do management reports on internal control over financial reporting improve financial reporting?

Sections 404a and 404b of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act require management and external auditors, respectively, to report on the adequacy of a company’s internal control over financial reporting (ICFR). Larger public firms were first required to file a management report and have an external audit of ICFR in 2004. Smaller public firms were first required to file a management report on ICFR in 2007 but are exempt from the attestation requirement. We investigate the distinct effect of management reports on financial reporting quality. We find that management reports on ICFR improve reporting quality and demonstrate that there are financial reporting benefits from the management report requirement on its own without attestation.     

Busy auditors,financial reporting timeliness and quality

We investigate whether audit partners with multiple clients are able to complete their audits in a timely fashion, an important but largely unexplored area of academic research. One view is that having multiple clients increases the knowledge and experience of the audit partner resulting in a more efficient and therefore, quicker audit. On the other hand, having multiple clients may over-burden an audit partner resulting in a slower audit process and longer completion times. We find that audit partners with multiple clients take longer to complete their annual audit. More importantly, we also find that companies with busy auditors who take longer to complete their audits also have poorer levels of financial reporting quality. Additionally, in terms of consequences for busy auditors, firms with lengthy audit report lag switched their auditors the next year suggesting that busy audit partners may lose clients if their workload is excessive and they are not able to maintain audit quality. Our results are robust to alternative measures for both audit report lag and audit partner busyness and a range of endogeneity tests. We also undertake simultaneous quantile regression to assess changes in audit report lag depending on the number of audit clients per partner where we find preliminary evidence of a knowledge spill-over effect. Consequently, our results have implications for companies, audit firms, regulators and other key stakeholders.     

Institutional Ownership and the Selection of Industry Specialist Auditors

This study provides evidence linking corporate governance mechanisms to the choice of auditor, namely industry specialists. Given that institutional investors are likely to prefer higher quality financial reports to lower quality reports, we theorize that institutional investors will influence managers of companies in which they invest to improve reporting quality by using higher quality, industry specialist auditors. Our findings indicate that firms having relatively greater levels of institutional ownership tend to employ industry specialist audit firms. The results of this study contribute to an understanding of an important facet of corporate governance, the selection of a high quality audit firm.     

Late for a very important date: financial reporting and audit implications of late 10-K filings

Delays in financial reports often reflect issues related to period-end accounting and audit processes. We investigate the impact of filing delays in connection with auditor characteristics on the quality of financial statements in a sample of firms that filed Form 10-K after the statutory due date. We find that late filing firms are associated with lower financial reporting quality compared to timely filing firms matched by propensity scores, where financial reporting quality is measured by the absolute value of performance-matched discretionary accruals and the probability of a late filing being restated in subsequent periods. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the adverse consequences of late filings can be largely mitigated by having a Big 4 auditor. The differential audit quality stems primarily from Big 4 auditors in large offices and is more pronounced when an auditor may need to draw on additional resources in a limited period.