Does Say‐on‐Pay Matter? Evidence from Say‐on‐Pay Proposals in the United States

We investigate the effect of say‐on‐pay (SOP) proposals on changes in executive and director compensation. Relative to non‐SOP firms, SOP firms’ total compensation to CEOs does not significantly change after the proposal. However, the mix of compensation does change—companies move away from using cash compensation toward more incentive compensation, offsetting the reduction in bonus. Further, the mix of compensation of non‐CEO executives changes similarly to that of CEOs. Compensation to directors of SOP firms increases less than non‐SOP firms. Firms whose CEOs are well compensated, especially with cash‐based compensation, are most likely to receive a proposal.     

Marking‐to‐Market: Panacea or Pandora's Box?

Financial institutions have been at the forefront of the debate on the controversial shift in international standards from historical cost accounting to mark‐to‐market accounting. We show that the trade‐offs at stake in this debate are far from one‐sided. While the historical cost regime leads to some inefficiencies, marking‐to‐market may lead to other types of inefficiencies by injecting artificial risk that degrades the information value of prices, and induces suboptimal real decisions. We construct a framework that can weigh the pros and cons. We find that the damage done by marking‐to‐market is greatest when claims are (1) long–lived, (2) illiquid, and (3) senior. These are precisely the attributes of the key balance sheet items of banks and insurance companies. Our results therefore shed light on why banks and insurance companies have been the most vocal opponents of the shift to marking‐to‐market.     

When Is a Treasury Security On‐the‐Run?

The literature contains two conflicting definitions of the on‐the‐run period for Treasury securities. We address the conflict by empirically examining the implications of the two definitions. We conclude that it is important that researchers clearly understand the implications of each definition. Our results suggest that on‐the‐run activity spans different auction calendar time in T‐notes and T‐bills.     

Do Not‐For‐Profits Need Their Own Conceptual Framework?

This paper raises the issue of whether not‐for‐profit (NFP) oganisations require a conceptual framework that acknowledges their mission imperative and enables them to discharge their broader accountability. Relying on publicly available documentation and literature, it suggests the current Conceptual Frameworks for the for‐profit and public sectors are inadequate in meeting the accountability needs of NFPs. A NFP‐specific conceptual framework would allow the demonstration of broader NFP‐specific accountability and the formulation of NFP‐appropriate reporting practice, including the provision of financial and non‐financial reporting. The paper thus theoretically challenges existing financial reporting arrangements and invites debate on their future direction.     

How Do Quasi‐Random Option Grants Affect CEO Risk‐Taking?

We examine how an increase in stock option grants affects CEO risk‐taking. The overall net effect of option grants is theoretically ambiguous for risk‐averse CEOs. To overcome the endogeneity of option grants, we exploit institutional features of multiyear compensation plans, which generate two distinct types of variation in the timing of when large increases in new at‐the‐money options are granted. We find that, given average grant levels during our sample period, a 10% increase in new options granted leads to a 2.8% to 4.2% increase in equity volatility. This increase in risk is driven largely by increased leverage.     

Are Stock‐for‐Stock Acquirers of Unlisted Targets Really Less Overvalued?

Extant studies assume that targets’ private ownership mitigates acquirers’ incentives and opportunities to finance acquisitions with inflated stocks. This view stems from the observation that, although the average stock‐for‐stock acquirer's merger announcement return is negative when the target is listed, it is positive when the target is unlisted. Accordingly, extant studies often suggest that announcements of stock‐for‐stock acquisitions of unlisted targets convey favorable private information about the acquirers. However, an analysis of stock‐for‐stock acquirers’ stock performance, abnormal accruals, net operating assets, and insider trading suggests the opposite. Acquirers of unlisted targets are generally more overvalued than acquirers of listed targets.     

What Drives Sell‐Side Analyst Compensation at High‐Status Investment Banks?

We use proprietary data from a major investment bank to investigate factors associated with analysts’ annual compensation. We find compensation to be positively related to “All‐Star” recognition, investment‐banking contributions, the size of analysts’ portfolios, and whether an analyst is identified as a top stock picker by the Wall Street Journal. We find no evidence that compensation is related to earnings forecast accuracy. But consistent with prior studies, we find analyst turnover to be related to forecast accuracy, suggesting that analyst forecasting incentives are primarily termination based. Additional analyses indicate that “All‐Star” recognition proxies for buy‐side client votes on analyst research quality used to allocate commissions across banks and analysts. Taken as a whole, our evidence is consistent with analyst compensation being designed to reward actions that increase brokerage and investment‐banking revenues. To assess the generality of our findings, we test the same relations using compensation data from a second high‐status bank and obtain similar results.     

Can Interest‐Bearing Money Circulate? A Small‐Denomination Arkansan Experiment, 1861–63

Legal restrictions theory suggests that dominance of non-interest-bearing currency is possible only because legal impediments prevent financial institutions from offering interest-bearing alternatives. A viable interest-bearing medium must be issued in denominations low enough for day-to-day use, however, and without historical examples of small-denomination interest-bearing issues we cannot properly test whether interest-bearing currency will circulate as legal restrictions theory predicts. Civil War Arkansas offers a rare instance where large quantities of small-denomination interest-bearing money were actually issued, mostly below $5. The results of this Arkansan experiment show that small-denomination interest-bearing issues can indeed function as the primary medium of exchange.     

Risk‐Sharing or Risk‐Taking? Counterparty Risk,Incentives, and Margins

Derivatives activity, motivated by risk‐sharing, can breed risk‐taking. Bad news about the risk of an asset underlying a derivative increases protection sellers' expected liability and undermines their risk‐prevention incentives. This limits risk‐sharing, creates endogenous counterparty risk, and can lead to contagion from news about the hedged risk to the balance sheet of protection sellers. Margin calls after bad news can improve protection sellers' incentives and in turn enhance risk‐sharing. Central clearing can provide insurance against counterparty risk but must be designed to preserve risk‐prevention incentives.     

Stock Return Predictability of Residual‐Income‐Based Valuation: Risk or Mispricing?

In an influential paper, Frankel and Lee (1998) conclude that the stock return predictability of the value‐to‐price ratio (V/P) results from market mispricing. This paper confirms whether the V/P reflects the rational risk premiums associated with the V/P factor or is better explained by market inefficiency. Following Daniel and Titman (1997), this paper examines whether the V/P characteristics or the V/P factor loadings predict stock returns. The findings show that the V/P loadings are positively associated with average returns even after controlling for the V/P characteristics in both time series and cross‐sectional tests. The overall results suggest that the mispricing explanation of the V/P effect is premature.     

Do the Investment and Return‐on‐Equity Factors Proxy for Economic Risks?

We study the information content of two new return factors, the investment factor (IA) and the return‐on‐equity factor (ROE), as proposed by Chen, Novy‐Marx, and Zhang in 2011. First, IA is a strong predictor for future gross domestic product (GDP) growth despite the presence of other financial and economic variables. IA subsumes the pricing power of the GDP factor for the cross section of asset returns. Second, ROE is closely related to innovations in dividend yield and term spread. When modeled together with innovations in state variables that forecast future investment opportunities, IA and ROE lose their explanatory power.     

Bank credit constraints for women‐led SMEs: Self‐restraint or lender bias?

We test the existence of possible gender biases affecting firm behavior in demanding and obtaining bank credit using a cross‐country sample of European small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs). We show consistent evidence that female‐led firms are more likely than their male counterparts to refrain from applying for loans. When they apply, female‐led enterprises do not seem to face gender discrimination from the lender. Interestingly, however, signs of gender bias appear to arise during the upside phase of the economy. Overall, our study provides support for policy actions aimed at reducing the frictions faced by women‐led SMEs when accessing credit markets.     

The Puzzle of Persistently Negative Interest‐Rate–Growth Differentials: Financial Repression or Income Catch‐Up?

The interest‐rate–growth differential (IRGD) plays a critical role in determining the sustainability of government debt. Yet it is striking that IRGDs are correlated with income levels, and are generally negative in emerging and developing economies, which contradicts standard economic theory. Negative IRGDs constitute a powerful debt‐stabilising force, driving down debt ratios or keeping them stable even in the presence of persistent primary deficits. Motivated by the puzzling facts, this paper examines the IRGDs for a large panel of advanced and non‐advanced economies by utilising a newly assembled data set. The evidence shows that large negative IRGDs in emerging and developing economies are largely due to real interest rates well below market equilibrium – stemming from financial repression and captive and distorted markets – whereas the income catch‐up process plays a relatively modest role. Therefore, the IRGD in non‐advanced economies is likely to rise with financial market development and financial global integration, perhaps even before their GDP per capita converges to advanced‐economy levels.     

Do Low‐Priced Stocks Drive Long‐Term Contrarian Performance on the London Stock Exchange?

We investigate whether low‐priced stocks drive long‐term contrarian performance on the U.K. market. We find that contrarian performance at low, middle, and high price levels is positive. On the Fama‐French risk adjusted basis, we find both low‐priced and middle‐priced losers have significantly positive returns. When we adjust returns by market and liquidity risk, only middle‐priced losers maintain their positive returns. Our results reveal that low‐priced stocks are not fully responsible for contrarian performance. Our empirical evidence is generally consistent with the overreaction hypothesis and behavioral models of value investing.     

Are Trade Size‐Based Inferences About Traders Reliable? Evidence from Institutional Earnings‐Related Trading

The use of observed transaction sizes to differentiate between “small” and “large” investor trading patterns is widespread. A significant concern in such studies is spurious effects attributable to misclassification of transactions, particularly those originating from large investors. Such effects can arise unintentionally, strategically, or endogenously. We examine comprehensive records of a sample of institutional investors (i.e., “large” traders), including their order sizes and overall position changes, to assess the degree to which such misclassifications give rise to spurious inferences about “small” and “large” investor trading activities. Our analysis shows that these institutions are heavily involved in small transaction activity. It also shows that they increase their order sizes substantially in announcement periods relative to nonannouncement periods, presumably as an endogenous response to earnings news. In the immediate earnings announcement period, transaction size‐based inferences about directional trading are quite misleading—producing spurious “small trader” effects and, more surprisingly, erroneous inferences about “large trader” activity.     

Overreaction to Intra‐industry Information Transfers?

Prior research has documented that earnings announcements provide information not only about the announcing firm but also about other firms in the same industry. We document a stock market anomaly associated with this phenomenon of intra-industry information transfers by showing that the stock price movements of late announcers in response to earnings reported by early announcers are negatively related to subsequent price responses of late announcers to their own earnings reports. Apparently, the stock market overestimates the intra-industry implications of early announcers' earnings for late announcers' earnings, and that overestimation is corrected when late announcers disclose their earnings.     

Can you get what you pay for? Pay‐for‐performance and the quality of healthcare providers

Despite the popularity of pay-for-performance (P4P) among health policymakers and private insurers as a tool for improving quality of care, there is little empirical basis for its effectiveness. We use data from published performance reports of physician medical groups contracting with a large network HMO to compare clinical quality before and after the implementation of P4P, relative to a control group. We consider the effect of P4P on both rewarded and unrewarded dimensions of quality. In the end, we fail to find evidence that a large P4P initiative either resulted in major improvement in quality or notable disruption in care.     

Front‐Running Scalping Strategies and Market Manipulation: Why Does High‐Frequency Trading Need Stricter Regulation?

Regulators continue to debate whether high‐frequency trading (HFT) is beneficial to market quality. Using Strongly Typed Genetic Programming (STGP) trading algorithm, we develop several artificial stock markets populated with HFT scalpers and strategic informed traders. We simulate real‐life trading in the millisecond time frame by applying STGP to real‐time and historical data from Apple, Exxon Mobil, and Google. We observe that HFT scalpers front‐run the order flow, resulting in damage to market quality and long‐term investors. To mitigate these negative implications, we propose batch auctions every 30 milliseconds of trading.     

Do Analyst Stock Recommendations Piggyback on Recent Corporate News? An Analysis of Regular‐Hour and After‐Hours Revisions

Analysts often update their recommendations following corporate news. Questions have been raised regarding analysts’ ability to generate new information beyond recent corporate events. Employing a comprehensive database on corporate news, we show that only a small minority, or 27.9%, of all recommendation revisions directionally confirm the information in the preceding corporate events and even these “confirming revisions” facilitate the information discovery of corporate events and thus cannot simply be dismissed as “piggybacking.” Our analysis further shows that analysts not only facilitate price discovery to corporate news through issuing trending revisions but also help reverse prevailing market sentiments following corporate news by issuing contrarian revisions. Our study is the first to investigate short‐window intraday market reactions to revisions issued after hours, which account for 70% of all recommendation revisions in our sample period. Analysts’ incentives to issue revisions after hours appear to reflect demands from large institutional clients, who dominate after‐hours trading. More importantly, we show that the after‐hours revisions are associated with significantly greater price reactions and different price reaction patterns than revisions issued during regular trading hours. Collectively, our evidence indicates that analysts are a significant source of new information beyond recent corporate news and they also help shape the market's assessment of corporate disclosures.