International Environmental Agreements under Endogenous Uncertainty

This paper explores the implications of the possibility of a shift in environmental damages on the participation in environmental treaties. Using a two‐period model where the probability of a regime shift increases in the first‐period pollution stock, we examine the issue of coalition formation under both fixed and dynamic membership. Our analysis suggests that endogenous uncertainty may increase participation. We find that full cooperation may be sustained, but only in the presence of endogenous uncertainty. Interestingly, when the shift in the environmental damage is large enough, the model provides a way to solve the “puzzle of small coalitions” found in the literature related to international environmental agreements. We also find that in period 1 (period 2) endogenous uncertainty leads to a lower (higher) pollution stock under dynamic membership as compared to the fixed membership case.     

The Distribution of Daily Stock Returns and Settlement Procedures: The Paris Bourse

In many countries settlements take place a fixed number of business days after the transaction (U.S., Japan). In other countries settlements take place periodically on a fixed date when all transactions performed before this date are settled (U.K., France, Italy). In both cases settlement procedures should cause returns not to be identically distributed over all days. The effect is likely to be the largest on markets where all trades are settled only once a month. An empirical investigation of the largest of those markets, the Paris Bourse, demonstrates the importance of the settlement procedure on the distribution of daily returns.     

The Relation between Stock Prices and Inflationary Expectations: The International Evidence

This paper provides empirical evidence on the relation between stock returns and inflationary expectations for nine countries over the period 1971–80. The Fisherian assumption that real returns are independent of inflationary expectations is soundly rejected for each major stock market of the world. Using interest rates as a proxy for expected inflation, our data provide consistent support for the Geske and Roll model whose basic hypothesis is that stock price movements signal (negative) revisions in inflationary expectations. Finally, a weak real interest rate effect was found for some of these countries.     

Observing and Shaping the Market: The Dilemma of Central Banks

While the central bank observes market activity to assess economic fundamentals, it shapes the market outcome through the conduct of monetary policy. A dilemma arises from this dual role because the more the central bank shapes the market, the more it influences the informational content of market outcomes. This paper analyzes how accounting for the endogeneity of information affects optimal monetary policy. By reducing the accuracy of central bank information, endogenous information calls for a higher degree of opacity, weakens accommodation policy to shocks, and broadens the range of parameters for which taking a signaling action is detrimental to welfare.     

WHY DO UNDERGROUND REDUCING POLICIES OFTEN FAIL THEIR SCOPE? SOME ANSWERS FROM THE ITALIAN EXPERIENCE

Several European countries, facing a sizeable underground economy, often adopt underground reducing policies mainly based on incentives in the tax-benefit system. Since empirical evidence manifests a substantial failure of such policies, we construct a simple model to indicate the crucial aspects of this failure. To this end we consider a tax-evading firm, allocating work in the official and underground sector, where it is not taxed. With a view to reducing underground employment, the government may decide to launch an amnesty for past social security non-compliance, while providing fiscal incentives for new hiring in order to encourage a process of worker regularization. Allowing for endogenous enforcement, we find that the reputation of policy-makers in combating tax evasion proves crucial in determining the success of such a policy.