On relative performance,remuneration and risk taking of asset managers

We analyze the asset management problem when the manager is remunerated through a scheme based on the performance of the fund with respect to a benchmark and his/her choices are driven by a power utility function. We show that it is not the asymmetric-fulcrum type feature of the scheme that makes the difference in preventing excessive risk taking in case of a poor performance. To prevent gambling when the performance deteriorates, it is important not to provide a fixed fee to the asset manager, and that remuneration is sensitive to a very poor relative performance as in the case of a capital stake or of a management fee with flow funds. We provide empirical evidence on the mutual fund industry showing excessive risk taking in case of a very poor performance and limited risk taking in case of overperformance with respect to the benchmark. These results agree with a remuneration scheme including a fixed fee and a cap.     

Dynamic portfolio strategy by loss-averse fund managers facing performance-induced fund flows

In a continuous-time framework, we establish an optimal dynamic portfolio strategy for a loss-averse fund manager facing performance-induced fund flows. Using the martingale approach, we derive closed-form solutions to both the optimal terminal value and optimal dynamic strategy of the fund under management. The model shows that the loss-averse manager strives to earn high returns in good market conditions at the risk of losing all investments at the terminal date in bad market conditions. The prospect of higher fund inflows induced by superior performance motivates fund managers to take more aggressive investment strategies, increasing the fund's risk exposure, whereas the prospect of fund outflows due to underperformance has no impact on the fund manager's investment decision. While the prospect of higher fund inflows increases dynamic optimal wealth as well as optimal terminal wealth in good market conditions, in bad market conditions, it reduces dynamic optimal wealth and results in a higher chance of a complete loss at the terminal date. Finally, a manager with a higher degree of loss aversion tends to take a conservative investment strategy with a lower risk exposure especially in bad market conditions, leading to a lower dynamic and terminal wealth in good market conditions and also a lower chance of a complete loss in bad market conditions.     

Rewarding risk-taking or skill? The case of private equity fund managers

We examine whether typical private equity fund compensation contracts reward excessive risk-taking rather than managerial skill. Our analysis is based on a novel model of investment value, cash flows, and fee dynamics of private equity funds. Given the embedded option-like fee components, our results demonstrate that fund managers indeed have an incentive for excessive risk-taking when only fee income from the current fund is considered. However, when managers also consider potential compensation from follow-on funds, their risk-taking incentives depend on their individual skill levels, and skilled managers will have an incentive to reduce fund risk. We also show that managers must generate substantial abnormal returns in order to compensate investors for the given fee components.     

Pension funds with a minimum guarantee: a stochastic control approach

In this paper we propose and study a continuous-time stochastic model of optimal allocation for a defined contribution pension fund with a minimum guarantee. We adopt the point of view of a fund manager maximizing the expected utility from the fund wealth over an infinite horizon. In our model the dynamics of wealth takes directly into account the flows of contributions and benefits, and the level of wealth is constrained to stay above a “solvency level.” The fund manager can invest in a riskless asset and in a risky asset, but borrowing and short selling are prohibited. We concentrate the analysis on the effect of the solvency constraint, analyzing in particular what happens when the fund wealth reaches the allowed minimum value represented by the solvency level.     

Optimal Carried Interest: Adverse Selection in Islamic and Conventional Venture Capital and Private-Equity Funds

In an optimal carried interest model with adverse selection, the optimal profit-loss sharing ratio (PSR) explains how the risk aversion of the two parties can affect their bargaining powers by allowing investors to detect the true risk aversion of fund managers and not their true skills. The higher the management fee, the higher is the PSR. Our simulation exercise shows that when the fund manager is more risk averse than the investor for a higher invested capital and weaker expected net profit, the optimal negotiated profit-sharing ratio will be higher.     

Management of Portfolio Depletion Risk through Optimal Life Cycle Asset Allocation

Members of defined contribution (DC) pension plans must take on additional responsibilities for their investments, compared to participants in defined benefit (DB) pension plans. The transition from DB to DC plans means that more employees are faced with these responsibilities. We explore the extent to which DC plan members can follow financial strategies that have a high chance of resulting in a retirement scenario that is fairly close to that provided by DB plans. Retirees in DC plans typically must fund spending from accumulated savings. This leads to the risk of depleting these savings, that is, portfolio depletion risk. We analyze the management of this risk through life cycle optimal dynamic asset allocation, including the accumulation and decumulation phases. We pose the asset allocation strategy as an optimal stochastic control problem. Several objective functions are tested and compared. We focus on the risk of portfolio depletion at the terminal date, using such measures as conditional value at risk (CVAR) and probability of ruin. A secondary consideration is the median terminal portfolio value. The control problem is solved using a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman formulation, based on a parametric model of the financial market. Monte Carlo simulations that use the optimal controls are presented to evaluate the performance metrics. These simulations are based on both the parametric model and bootstrap resampling of 91 years of historical data. The resampling tests suggest that target-based approaches that seek to establish a safety margin of wealth at the end of the decumulation period appear to be superior to strategies that directly attempt to minimize risk measures such as the probability of portfolio depletion or CVAR. The target-based approaches result in a reasonably close approximation to the retirement spending available in a DB plan. There is a small risk of depleting the retiree’s funds, but there is also a good chance of accumulating a buffer that can be used to manage unplanned longevity risk or left as a bequest.     

The performance of female hedge fund managers

Using data for the period 1994–2013, we examine the return and risk-taking behavior of hedge funds having at least one female portfolio manager and funds that have all female portfolio managers. Funds with all female managers perform no differently than all male-managed funds and have similar risk profiles. For single-style funds, those with mixed teams of both genders underperform male-only funds on both a raw and risk-adjusted basis, although mixed funds incur less risk and their Sharpe ratios do not differ. For funds of funds, both all-female and mixed funds have similar performance to male-managed funds. We then consider the failure rate across all fund styles. Funds with at least one female manager fail at higher rates, driven by difficulty in raising capital—these funds are smaller and are less likely to be closed to new investment. Surviving funds with at least one female manager have better performance than male-managed surviving funds, consistent with the idea that female managers need to perform better for their funds to survive. Yet, female-managed surviving funds have fewer assets under management than surviving male-managed funds. Using media mentions as a proxy for investor interest, female-managed funds receive proportionately less attention. Our results suggest that there are no inherent differences in skill between female and male managers, but that only the best performing female managers manage to survive.     

Risk-taking and performance of government bond mutual funds

This paper investigates the risk exposures of government bond mutual funds and how risk-taking behavior affects fund performance. Government bond mutual funds often outperform their respective benchmark bond indexes before but not after adjusting for bond market risk factors. We show that the risk-taking behavior of fund managers helps to explain the different performances of government bond funds with and without controlling for the risk factors. Our results suggest that risk-taking leads to higher returns relative to benchmarks in normal risk periods but lower returns in high risk periods, suggesting that fund managers consistently take risky bets in fund management. We further show that the risk-taking of government bond funds is persistent and that investors typically have no ability to differentiate between the skill and risk components of fund performance. These findings suggest why fund managers have incentives to take consistently risky positions.     

固定费用结构下基金经理管理费激励研究

基于经理的努力水平和风险规避程度是基金经理费设计的关键因素,构建固定费率结构下基金经理努力及风险选择的模型,结合我国基金样本数据进行了实证研究结果表明:管理费与基金业绩无显著正相关性,且低业绩的基金体现出较高的管理费率;管理费与基金风险具有显著的正相关关系。     

Carrot and stick: A role for benchmark-adjusted compensation in active fund management

Investors delegating their wealth to privately informed managers face not only an intrinsic asymmetric information problem but also a potential misalignment in risk preferences. In this setting, we show that by tying fees symmetrically to the appropriate benchmark investors can tilt a fund portfolio toward their optimal risk exposure and realize nearly all the value of managers’ information. They attain these benefits despite an inherent inefficiency in the choice of the benchmark, and at no extra cost of compensating managers for exposure to relative-performance risk. Under certain conditions, benchmark-adjusted performance fees are necessary to prevent passive alternatives from dominating active management. Our results shed light on a recent debate on the appropriate fee structure of active funds in contexts of high competition from passive funds.     

On the Asset Allocation of a Default Pension Fund

We characterize the optimal default fund in a defined contribution (DC) pension plan. Using detailed data on individuals' holdings inside and outside the pension system, we find substantial heterogeneity within and between passive and active investors in terms of labor income, financial wealth, and stock market participation. We build a life‐cycle consumption‐savings model, with a DC pension account and an opt‐out/default choice, that produces realistic investor heterogeneity. Relative to a common age‐based allocation, implementing the optimal default asset allocation implies a welfare gain of 1.5% during retirement. Much of the gain is attainable with a simple rule of thumb.     

Termination Risk, Multiple Managers and Mutual Fund Tournaments

This study analyzes the risk-taking behavior of mutual funds in response to their relative performance over the 1992 to 1999 period. Our results show that managers of funds whose performance is closer to that of the top performing funds have greater incentives to increase their portfolios' risk than managers at the top who exhibit a tendency to lock in their positions. The evidence suggests that termination risk imposes a constraint on the risk taking behavior of under-performing fund managers and the winner takes all phenomenon generates a strong incentive for the fund managers to be the top manager. We also analyze the difference in the risk taking behavior of funds managed by multiple managers and single managers.     

Pension fund manager skills over the economic cycle: the (non-)specialization cost

We study whether pension fund managers, as professionals of important social and financial products, are able to add value for their clients and adapt to economic changes. To this end, we analyze the performance and skills (market timing and stock picking) over the economic cycle from both pension fund and manager perspectives. This double analysis allows examining whether skills reside in managers and/or funds and control for manager substitutions. Despite the long-term nature of pension funds, we find that both fund and manager skills vary with market conditions, showing better evidence of stock-picking in booms, and of market timing in recessions. Nonetheless, top (bottom) funds and managers exhibit both (incorrect) skills in booms and in recessions. Some of the top (bottom) funds and managers are the best (worst) in both abilities in the same periods, but not in different periods, showing that not all managers have the ability to adapt to market conditions. Additionally, managers with limited skills tend to specialize because diversification requires multi-task skills and the non-specialization of these managers usually results in incorrect skills.     

What determines corporate pension fund risk-taking strategy?

Corporate sponsors of defined benefit pension plans generally assume low investment risk when they have low funding ratios and high default risk, consistent with the risk management hypothesis. However, for financially distressed sponsors and sponsors that freeze, terminate, or convert defined benefit to defined contribution plans, the risk-shifting incentive (moral hazard) dominates. Pension fund risk-taking is also affected by labor unionization and sponsor incentives to maximize tax benefits, restore financial slack, and justify the accounting choices of pension assumptions. Sponsors shift toward an aggressive risk strategy when their pension plans emerge from underfunding, bankruptcy risk is reduced, or marginal tax rate decreases. Overall, we show that corporate sponsors adopt a dynamic risk-taking strategy in their pension fund investments.     

Pension Fund Manager Tournaments and Attitudes Towards Corporate Characteristics

Abstract:  This paper explores the relationship between the tournament incentives of pension fund managers and the characteristics of equities they choose to hold. Using a comprehensive data set on pension fund portfolio holdings, we determine the intensity of fund manager tournaments by sorting pension funds into portfolios based on the number of concurrent managers each pension fund employs. We then investigate which corporate characteristics are preferred by each of these portfolios by estimating share selection models that include a range of corporate characteristics that are expected to shape the returns to investment in stocks over the short and long run. We find that the intensity of the tournament faced by fund managers plays a significant role in shaping preferences over corporate characteristics. Managers facing more intense tournaments exhibit significantly weaker preferences for attributes associated with long run payoffs, such as social performance and growth potential, and significantly stronger preferences for short term attributes, such as operational efficiency, when compared to managers that face weak or no tournament incentives.     

Dynamic preferences for popular investment strategies in pension funds

In this paper, we characterize dynamic investment strategies that are consistent with the expected utility setting and more generally with the forward utility setting. Two popular dynamic strategies in the pension funds industry are used to illustrate our results: a constant proportion portfolio insurance (CPPI) strategy and a life-cycle strategy. For the CPPI strategy, we are able to infer preferences of the pension fund’s manager from her investment strategy, and to exhibit the specific expected utility maximization that makes this strategy optimal at any given time horizon. In the Black–Scholes market with deterministic parameters, we are able to show that traditional life-cycle funds are not optimal to any expected utility maximizers. We also prove that a CPPI strategy is optimal for a fund manager with HARA utility function, while an investor with a SAHARA utility function will choose a time-decreasing allocation to risky assets in the same spirit as the life-cycle funds strategy. Finally, we suggest how to modify these strategies if the financial market follows a more general diffusion process than in the Black–Scholes market.     

What impact does a change of fund manager have on mutual fund performance?

Using a unique database of UK fund manager changes over the period from 1997 to 2011, we examine the impact of such changes on fund performance. We find clear evidence to suggest that a manager change does affect the benchmark-adjusted performance of UK mutual funds. In particular we find a significant deterioration in the benchmark-adjusted returns of funds that were top performers before the manager exit and, conversely, a significant improvement in the average benchmark-adjusted returns of funds that were poor performers before the manager exit. Our use of the Carhart's (1997) four-factor model reveals that the improvement in average post manager exit performance is accompanied by a reduction in market risk, a slight reduction in exposure to small cap stocks, and an increase in exposure to value and momentum stocks. Overall, our results suggest that UK fund management companies have been relatively successful in replacing bad managers with better managers, but relatively unsuccessful at finding equivalent replacements for their top performing managers. We believe that regulators should therefore try to ensure that all efforts are made by fund management companies to inform all of their investors about a change in management.     

Termination Risk, Multiple Managers and Mutual Fund Tournaments

This study analyzes the risk-taking behavior of mutual fundsin response to their relative performance over the 1992 to 1999period. Our results show that managers of funds whose performanceis closer to that of the top performing funds have greater incentivesto increase their portfolios' risk than managers at the topwho exhibit a tendency to lock in their positions. The evidencesuggests that termination risk imposes a constraint on the risktaking behavior of underperforming fund managers and the winnertakes all phenomenon generates a strong incentive for the fundmanagers to be the top manager. We also analyze the differencein the risk taking behavior of funds managed by multiple managersand single managers. JEL Classification codes: G2 L2     

Indirect Incentives of Hedge Fund Managers

Indirect incentives exist in the money management industry when good current performance increases future inflows of capital, leading to higher future fees. For the average hedge fund, indirect incentives are at least 1.4 times as large as direct incentives from incentive fees and managers’ personal stakes in the fund. Combining direct and indirect incentives, manager wealth increases by at least $0.39 for a $1 increase in investor wealth. Younger and more scalable hedge funds have stronger flow‐performance relations, leading to stronger indirect incentives. These results have a number of implications for our understanding of incentives in the asset management industry.     

High-Water Marks and Hedge Fund Management Contracts

Incentive fees for money managers are frequently accompanied by high‐water mark provisions that condition the payment of the performance fee upon exceeding the previously achieved maximum share value. In this paper, we show that hedge fund performance fees are valuable to money managers, and conversely, represent a claim on a significant proportion of investor wealth. The high‐water mark provisions in these contracts limit the value of the performance fees. We provide a closed‐form solution to the cost of the high‐water mark contract under certain conditions. Our results provide a framework for valuation of a hedge fund management company.