客户声誉与审计收费北大核心

本文运用企业集团内有成员公司违规而造成客户声誉受损的外在冲击,研究了客户声誉对审计收费的影响。研究发现,客户声誉受损后审计收费上升。进一步研究表明,“十大”会计师事务所、负面传闻以及客户处于高社会信任水平的地区均提高了客户声誉受损的审计收费上升效应,而国有股权、分析师跟踪以及机构投资者持股等,都能够抑制客户声誉受损的审计收费上升效应。同时,我们并没有发现客户声誉受损对审计投入、审计质量和关键审计事项具有显著影响的证据,也没有发现声誉受损公司的基本面与财务报告质量发生明显变化的证据。     

审计收费信息强制披露与审计环境的改善——来自中国审计市场的证据

2001年开始实施的审计收费信息强制披露规定，是改善了我国审计环境还是恶化了审计环境？本文采用三种相互补充的研究设计具体考察2001年开始实施的审计收费信息强制披露政策对我国审计环境的影响，结果发现强制披露规定颁布日国内会计师事务所主审的上市公司的累计异常回报高于中外合作会计师事务所主审的上市公司，进一步研究发现，在审计收费信息首次披露后年度（2002-2003），国内会计师事务所的审计收费与中外合作会计师事务所的审计收费的差异显著缩小、审计质量显著提高。而且上述发现在国内小会计师事务所表现更为明显。这基本上支持审计环境改善的假说。     

审计投入的产出效应北大核心CSSCI

本文运用我国上市公司数据,研究了审计投入的产出效应问题。研究发现,审计投入与审计质量和审计收费都存在正相关关系,表明审计投入的增加能够提高审计质量,也能够带来审计费用的提高。进一步研究发现,审计投入对审计质量的影响程度在不同会计师事务所之间不存在显著的差异,但审计投入增加所带来的审计收费的提升效应,在国际"四大"和国内"十大"会计师事务所比在国内小所更明显。同时,审计投入的产出效应在不同股权性质及不同规模的公司中也存在差异。本文首次为审计投入与产出的关系问题提供直接的证据,同时也表明已有文献将审计费用作为审计投入的替代变量可能不是一个合适的方法(Gong等,2016)。本文的研究结论对于审计市场效率提升具有重要的启示作用。     

审计委员会特征与会计师事务所变更的经验研究

本文以会计师事务所变更为视角,探讨具备怎样特征的审计委员会才能有效履行其职责。研究表明:审计委员会的独立性和专业性与会计师事务所变更显著负相关;审计委员会的开会次数与会计师事务所变更没有显著关系,说明审计委员会的存在有助于减少会计师事务所变更。但在对会计师事务所变更的进一步研究中,我们并没有发现会计师事务所变是为了追求更高审计质量的进一步证据,也说明审计委员会对会计师事务所变更的影响仍然有限。这些研究结论为完善我国审计委员会制度提供了经验证据。     

行政处罚对事务所审计质量影响研究

本文以被证监会处罚的会计师事务所审计的上市公司为研究样本,检验了审计处罚对事务所审计意见的影响。研究结论发现,在证监会行政处罚后,会计师事务所和注册会计师个人所审计上市公司出具非标准意见的概率并没有显著上升,这些证据表明对审计处罚对事务所审计质量的改善作用并不明显。进一步,为了验证结论的正确性,本文还选取了配对样本,试图减少时间变化对审计意见的影响。结论表明行政处罚对审计质量没有显著影响因此,本文结论认为行政处罚并不能显著影响审计质量。我们的研究丰富了政府监管与审计质量的研究。     

会计师事务所审计质量传染效应研究

审计质量传染效应,是指在会计师事务所开展审计工作时,如果某次审计工作的质量非常低,就会使整个会计师事物所的审计工作质量偏低.会计师事务所的主要业务,是对外部企业的财务工作和经营状况进行审计.所以,要重视对事务所内部的管理,以提高审计质量.本文对会计师事务所审计质量传染效应的研究设计进行分析,并对研究结论进行探讨.     

客户重要性与审计质量初探——基于A股市场2010-2014年的证据

审计质量是注册会计师发现并报告出财务报告错误或舞弊行为的联合概率,主要取决于注册会计师的专业胜任能力和独立性,本文从注册会计师独立性的角度出发,探究了客户重要性对审计质量的影响以及"四大"会计师事务所对两者关系的不同影响。文章以沪深两市A股上市公司2010-2014年的数据为样本进行实证检验,结果发现,客户重要性与审计质量间无显著的统计关系。进一步将上市公司的审计事务所按"四大"和"非四大"分组进行检验,结果发现,在"四大"样本组,客户重要性与审计质量有着显著的负向关系,而在"非四大"样本组,客户重要性与审计质量没有显著的统计关系。     

地理因素对会计师事务所审计质量影响的研究

会计师事务所审计质量的影响因素是多方面的,但从地理因素这一外部环境因素研究其对审计质量的影响较少。本文以深市主板A股2012年228家由会计师事务所分所审计的上市公司为研究样本,以上市公司的可操纵性应计利润的绝对值作为审计质量的代理变量,采用多元线性回归模型,分析会计师事务所与被审计单位地理接近度、会计师事务所所在地理位置以及被审计单位所在地理位置与审计质量的关系。研究结果发现,会计师事务所与被审计单位地理接近程度与审计质量正相关,会计师事务所所在地理位置与审计质量不相关,被审计单位所在地理位置与审计质量负相关。     

审计意见的决定因素：来自中国上市公司的证据

利用中国上市公司和相应会计师事务所2001—2003年的综列数据,本文研究了审计意见和会计师事务所规模、上市公司的风险和盈余管理等因素之间的关系。本文发现有破产风险的、进行盈余管理的或小规模的上市公司更可能得到非标准审计意见。如果它们又是大会计师事务所的客户,则得到非标意见的概率更大。本文不支持合资会计师事务所的审计质量更高的结论。     

会计师事务所转制对审计质量的影响

2010以来,国家相关部门颁布了一系列政策,鼓励大中型会计师事务所转制为特殊普通合伙组织形式。为了检验事务所转制对审计质量的影响,本文以2009—2011年已转制的9家国内大中型会计师事务所审计的沪深A股上市公司为样本,试图探索事务所转制对审计质量的影响。研究发现,在控制了影响审计质量的审计主体、审计客体及审计环境等相关因素的情况下,事务所转制与盈余管理程度显著负相关,即事务所转制完成后确实更能对审计客户的盈余管理起到抑制作用,从而提高审计质量。进一步研究发现,首批事务所转制与盈余管理程度关系不显著,而随着第二批事务所转制完成,审计质量显著提高。     

Audit committee composition and the use of an industry specialist audit firm

Independent, competent boards of directors and audit committees are said to be important mechanisms of corporate governance. The purpose of the present study is to empirically examine the association between audit committee composition and audit quality. Specifically, the link between the proportion of non‐executive directors on an audit committee, financial qualifications of directors and the number of audit committee meetings held in a year are investigated and expected to have a positive association with the quality of the audit firm used. Audit quality is proxied by industry specialization. The results support the link between a higher proportion of non‐executive directors on an audit committee and use of an industry specialist audit firm. Other measures of audit committee quality (those with a higher proportion of directors with financial qualifications and those that meet more frequently) are not significantly associated with the use of an industry specialist audit firm. Sensitivity analysis shows that the presence of an audit committee is linked to use of an industry specialist audit firm.     

Audit committees’ oversight of bank risk-taking

This study examines whether audit committee effectiveness affects bank risk-taking and risk management effectiveness. We find that banks with long board tenure audit committees have lower total risk and idiosyncratic risk, and banks with busy directors on their audit committees have higher total risk and idiosyncratic risk. These suggest that high audit committee effectiveness may constrain bank risk-taking activities. We also find that firm performance is more positively associated with bank risk for banks with long board tenure, more female audit committee members, or large size audit committees than for other banks, consistent with the notion that audit committee effectiveness may increase risk management effectiveness. However, this finding should be interpreted cautiously as it is contrary to the results on audit committee busyness.     

Independent audit committee members’ board tenure and audit fees

An independent audit committee is an audit committee on which all members are independent directors. This study examines whether independent audit committee members’ board tenure affects audit fees. On the basis of the prior literature, we formulate an unsigned hypothesis. This is because on the one hand, long board tenure audit committee members (defined as members with board tenure of 10 or more years) have greater incentives to protect their reputational capitals by purchasing increased audit effort, which positively affects audit fees. On the other hand, audit pricing reflects audit committee quality. Long board tenure audit committee members may have less need for increased audit effort because they can effectively oversee the financial reporting process themselves, which negatively affects audit fees. We find that audit fees are negatively associated with the proportion of long board tenure directors on the independent audit committee, consistent with the notion that audit committee members’ long board tenure results in lower audit effort.     

Are Audit Committees Red Herrings?

The common expectation of committees established in the wake of the corporate debacles during 1980s in the English-speaking world is that the audit committee device will raise the standards of corporate accountability and governance by improving the quality of financial reporting. That expectation is based on the prevalent belief that by strengthening the independence of auditors and non-executive directors audit committee members will monitor the financial reporting process in an independent manner. Unless accounting practices are reformed so that financial statements can be authenticated by recourse to reliable commercial evidence, audit committees are red herrings. Such reforms are essential if audit committee members are to keep under vigilant appraisal matters pertaining to the financial governance of, and reporting by, firms: the raison d'être of their appointment.     

On the effort-saving effect of audit committee–auditor interlocking

Using unique data on audit hours from China, this paper investigates the effort-saving effect of the audit committee–auditor interlocking (AClk). We find that AClk is negatively associated with audit effort without any deterioration in audit quality. The results suggest that AClk has an effort-saving effect through information sharing between interlocked audit committee members and auditors. However, auditors retain the effort-saving benefits of AClk without sharing them with their client firms. Further analysis shows that the effort-saving effect of AClk is more pronounced for client firms whose auditors have industry expertise, for client firms that share the same individual auditor, or for client firms that share audit committee members with financial expertise.     

The Composition and Effectiveness of Audit Committees in the Presence of Large Controlling Shareholders

The authors' study of audit committees in 450 large East Asian companies (150 each in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia) finds a strong positive correlation between the “cash flow” ownership (as opposed to just the voting rights) of large shareholders and the percentage of independent audit committee members. The study also reports a strong positive correlation between the “cash flow” ownership of large shareholders and the percentage of audit committee members with financial expertise and experience. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that larger cash flow ownership provides large shareholders with strong incentives for more effective governance. Conversely, the lower percentages of independent or professional audit directors at companies with large disparities between cash ownership and voting rights is consistent with the authors' hypothesis that entrenched large shareholders prefer inferior governance structures that pose fewer obstacles to their tendency to exploit the wealth of minority shareholders. Furthermore, the authors find higher valuations (market‐to‐book ratios) for companies with audit committees that consist entirely of independent directors and have larger percentage of members with financial expertise. And when viewed as a whole, the authors' findings provide support for the argument that ownership structure affects the composition of audit committees, and that independent and professional audit committees can help increase firm value.     

Overlapping Membership on Audit and Compensation Committees and Financial Reporting Quality

This paper examines whether the audit committee members of a board improve financial reporting quality if they are also on their organisation's compensation committee. Audit committees are responsible for overseeing the financial reporting process of organisations and have been urged to broaden their understanding of business risk and of the incentives provided by their firms’ executive compensation structures. Acknowledging the interrelationships among executive compensation, risk‐taking and financial reporting quality, members of audit and compensation committees have been advocating more information sharing between the two committees. Using archival data from a sample of Australian Stock Exchange listed companies, and discretionary accruals as a proxy for financial reporting quality, this study finds that firms with overlapping committees have better quality financial reporting than those without such an overlap. Our evidence for this is stronger in cases where managers tend to manage earnings upwards in order to meet or beat earnings benchmarks. We also find that the beneficial effect of the existence of overlapping committees is adversely affected by the equity holdings of directors with overlapping memberships.     

Board and Monitoring Committee Independence

This study focuses on the composition of boards of directors and their monitoring committees (audit and compensation) for large Australian companies. For firms whose boards use a committee structure, much of the monitoring responsibility of the board is expected to rest with the independent committee members. We document a positive association between the proportion of independent directors on the full board and its monitoring committees, and a greater proportion of independent directors on both audit and compensation committees than the full board. Our hypotheses tests involve an examination of the impact of other mechanisms used to control agency conflicts on full board and committee independence, and the association between this independence and firm value. We find that full board independence is associated with low management ownership and an absence of substantial shareholders. Audit committee independence is associated with reduced monitoring by debtholders when leverage is low. While we predict a positive relationship between board and monitoring committee independence and firm value, our results do not support this conjecture.     

An Investigation of Audit Committees' Oversight Responsibilities

Audit committee performance has come under close scrutiny in recent years from a variety of policy-makers, interest groups and researchers. In particular, the adequacy of audit committee oversight has been challenged. At the same time, audit committees are under pressure to increase the scope of their oversight work. This study examines audit committee oversight from the internal perspective of active U.S. audit committee members. A two-part survey used Wolnizer's (1995) list of seventeen prescribed audit committee objectives related to accounting and reporting, auditors and auditing, and corporate governance in general as a basis to assess audit committee members' abilities to recognize their assigned objectives and explore their perceptions of the key tasks and issues currently addressed by audit committees. The results indicate that audit committee members appreciate the importance of all audit committee members having sufficient expertise in oversight areas related to accounting, auditing and the law. However, some respondents agreed they lacked sufficient expertise in many or all of these areas. In addition, the findings indicate that audit committee members tend not to recognize their assigned responsibilities, but agree with the proposed expansion of committee responsibilities. Using a multimethod approach, internal control evaluation was consistently listed and ranked as the most important oversight responsibility. These findings provide insight into the priority perceived by audit committee members as to their oversight responsibilities, and the adequacy of U.S. reporting disclosures as signals of audit committee work.     

Earnings conservatism and audit committee financial expertise

Using an Australian sample of 494 firm‐year observations, this study finds that accounting financial expertise is the primary type of expertise that influences earnings conservatism, rather than nonaccounting financial expertise. The association between accounting financial expertise and conservatism holds only when the accounting financial expert(s) on audit committees is (are) independent. Overall, results suggest that audit committee accounting financial expertise is important in recognising the asymmetrical timeliness of losses. Findings provide a better understanding of the dynamics between audit committee financial expertise and earnings conservatism and demonstrate the importance of accounting financial expertise in improving financial reporting quality.