Inside the “Black Box” of Sell‐Side Financial Analysts

Our objective is to penetrate the “black box” of sell‐side financial analysts by providing new insights into the inputs analysts use and the incentives they face. We survey 365 analysts and conduct 18 follow‐up interviews covering a wide range of topics, including the inputs to analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock recommendations, the value of their industry knowledge, the determinants of their compensation, the career benefits of Institutional Investor All‐Star status, and the factors they consider indicative of high‐quality earnings. One important finding is that private communication with management is a more useful input to analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock recommendations than their own primary research, recent earnings performance, and recent 10‐K and 10‐Q reports. Another notable finding is that issuing earnings forecasts and stock recommendations that are well below the consensus often leads to an increase in analysts’ credibility with their investing clients. We conduct cross‐sectional analyses that highlight the impact of analyst and brokerage characteristics on analysts’ inputs and incentives. Our findings are relevant to investors, managers, analysts, and academic researchers.     

Expectations and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns

Previous research has shown that stocks with low prices relative to book value, cash flow, earnings, or dividends (that is, value stocks) earn high returns. Value stocks may earn high returns because they are more risky. Alternatively, systematic errors in expectations may explain the high returns earned by value stocks. I test for the existence of systematic errors using survey data on forecasts by stock market analysts. I show that investment strategies that seek to exploit errors in analysts' forecasts earn superior returns because expectations about future growth in earnings are too extreme.     

Identifying Factors Consistently Related to Value Line Earnings Predictability

Earnings predictability can affect investment decisions and stock prices. An important source of earnings forecasts for a wide variety of empirical studies has been the Value Line Investment Survey. The purpose of this study is to identify factors that consistently account for cross-sectional differences in Value Line earnings predict-ability. A multivariate model consisting of four company variables and a set of industry indicator variables is used to evaluate the intertemporal consistency of factors related to earnings predictability. Quarterly and annual forecasts are used to measure earnings forecast accuracy. The results by year indicate that one factor, earnings variability, is consistently related to earnings predict-ability.     

An examination of Value Line’s long-term projections

Unlike previous papers, which have focused on the timeliness ranks, we examine Value Line’s 3–5 year projections for stock returns, earnings, sales and related measures. We find that Value Line’s stock return and earnings forecasts exhibit large positive bias, although their sales predictions do not. For stock returns, Value Line’s projections lack predictive power; for other variables predictive power may exist to some degree. Our findings suggest the spectacular past performance of the timeliness indicator reflects either close alignment with other known anomalies or data mining, and that investors and researchers should use Value Line’s long-term projections with caution.     

Underwriting relationships,analysts' earnings forecasts and investment recommendations

We examine the effect of underwriting relationships on analysts' earnings forecasts and recommendations. Lead and co-underwriter analysts' growth forecasts and recommendations are significantly more favorable than those made by unaffiliated analysts, although their earnings forecasts are not generally greater. Investors respond similarly to lead underwriter and unaffiliated `Strong buy' and `Buy' recommendations, but three-day returns to lead underwriter `Hold' recommendations are significantly more negative than those to unaffiliated `Hold' recommendations. The findings suggest investors expect lead analysts are more likely to recommend `Hold' when `Sell' is warranted. The post-announcement returns following affiliated and unaffiliated analysts' recommendations are not significantly different.     

Why are recommendations optimistic? Evidence from analysts’ coverage initiations

We examine the long-term stock performance of analyst recommendations and the properties of accompanied earnings forecasts for initiations and non-initiations to evaluate the reporting, selection, and processing explanations for analyst optimism. We find that Strong Buy and, to a lesser degree, Buy initiation recommendations underperform their non-initiation counterparts after controlling for analyst, brokerage, and firm characteristics associated with the initiation decision and expected long-term stock returns. Yet, earnings forecasts accompanying Strong Buy and Buy initiation recommendations are less optimistic and more accurate than those accompanying non-initiation recommendations. Our findings suggest that conflicts of interest (that is, the reporting explanation) are the dominant source for favorable recommendations.     

Revenue surprises and stock returns

This paper examines the relation between revenue surprises and contemporaneous and future stock returns. It also investigates whether analysts update their earnings forecasts in response to revenue surprises in a timely and unbiased fashion. Stock price reaction on the earnings announcement date is significantly related to contemporaneous as well as past revenue surprises. After controlling for earnings surprises, we find significant abnormal returns in the post-announcement period for stocks that have large revenue surprises. Although analysts revise their forecasts of future earnings in response to revenue surprises, they are slow to incorporate fully the information in revenue surprises.     

Tests of Market Reaction and Analysts' Forecast Revisions to the Disclosure of Improved Management Earnings Expectations: A Case of Concurrent Bad News Management Earnings Forecasts

This paper tests whether a negative stock market reaction, associated with a management forecast of near term bad earnings, is lessened by a concurrent management forecast of improved longer term earnings expectations. Stock market reactions depend on the creditability of management forecasts of improved earnings expectations. In this analysis, the authors examined market reactions around the time of management forecasts of bad earnings, with and without longer-term management forecasts of improved earnings expectations. The results show that the stock market reaction is significantly less negative when management forecasts of bad earnings are followed by management forecasts of improved long run earnings expectations than when management forecasts of bad earnings are not accompanied by management forecasts of improved earnings expectations. In addition, this paper examines financial analysts' reactions to management bad earnings forecasts and management forecasts of improved earnings expectations. The findings show that analysts react less negatively to management forecasts of improved earnings expectations than to management forecasts of bad earnings. An analysis of a sub-sample of observations shows that analysts consider management forecasts of improved earnings expectations to imply improved expected future performance, thus conveying that analysts give credence to management forecasts of improved earnings expectations. However, results show that the stock market and analysts are unable to distinguish management forecasts of improved earnings expectations that come true from management forecasts of improved earning expectations that do not come true.     

Common Stock Offerings and Earnings Expectations: A Test of the Release of Unfavorable Information

This paper examines the revisions of analysts' forecasts of future earnings around announcements of common stock offerings. The forecasts of the current year earnings are, on average, decreased when firms announce plans to issue additional common stock. The size of the decrease is significantly related to announcement period abnormal stock returns. In contrast, forecasts of the five-year growth rate of earnings are, on average, unchanged. We interpret these results as being consistent with the claim that equity offering announcements convey unfavorable information regarding the firm's short-term but not its long-term earnings prospects.     

EQUITY ISSUES AND TOBIN'S Q: NEW EVIDENCE REGARDING ALTERNATIVE INFORMATION RELEASE HYPOTHESES

Announcements of seasoned equity offerings are associated with a statistically significant negative market reaction. This finding is consistent with both the cash flow signaling and the free cash flow hypotheses. We test these hypotheses by examining whether revisions in analyst earnings forecasts and abnormal stock returns associated with equity offering announcements are related to the issuing firm's q-ratio. We find an inverse relation between revisions in analysts' earnings forecasts and q-ratios, and no relation between announcement-period abnormal returns and q-ratios. These findings provide direct evidence of the cash flow signaling hypothesis and, at best, indirect evidence of the free cash flow hypothesis.     

An Analysis of the Recommendations of the “Superstar” Money Managers at Barron's Annual Roundtable

We examine the performance of common stock recommendations made by prominent money managers at Barron's Annual Roundtable from 1968 to 1991. To avoid survivorship bias, we examine the performance of recommendations by all the participants. The buy recommendations earn significant abnormal returns of 1.91 percent from the recommendation day to the publication day, a period of about 14 days. However, the abnormal returns are essentially zero for one to three year postpublication day holding periods. Thus, an individual investing according to the Roundtable recommendations published in Barron's would not benefit from the advice.     

Analysts’ Momentum Recommendations

We document that the likelihood of analyst recommendations following past stock returns decreased abruptly in 2003, coinciding with the Global Settlement and other regulatory changes designed to restrain analysts’ conflicts of interest. We also document that the likelihood of recommendations following past stock returns is abnormally high for recommendations issued after negative stock returns (but not for those issued after positive stock returns), among inexperienced and inaccurate analysts, among large brokerage houses, and for companies with high share turnover. Moreover, the recommendations that are more likely to follow past stock returns are accompanied by earnings forecast revisions that are larger in magnitude and less accurate ex post. Overall, our findings suggest that analysts with conflicts of interest and limited ability are more likely to base their recommendations on past stock returns. Finally, we document that the recommendations that are more likely to follow past stock returns (especially those that were issued before 2003 and those that are issued after negative stock returns) contribute to existing price momentum by generating incrementally stronger short‐term and long‐term stock returns.     

AN EVALUATION OF THE PERFORMANCE OF PORTFOLIOS SELECTED FROM VALUE LINE RANK ONE STOCKS: 1976–1982

In this study, the performance of portfolios selected from among Value Line rank one stocks is compared with portfolios consisting of randomly selected New York Stock Exchange and American Stock Exchange stocks. Results indicate that before considering transactions costs, active traders who invest in Value Line rank one stocks can earn positive excess returns. However, after considering transaction costs, neither active traders nor passive investors in rank one stocks can earn returns that are statistically greater than returns achieved by portfolios of randomly selected stocks. These results are not sensitive to variations in portfolio size.     

ON THE INFORMATIONAL EFFECT OF SHORT‐SALES CONSTRAINTS: EVIDENCE FROM THE TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE

Using a database of stock lending fees for Japanese centralized margin transactions, I show that short‐sales constraints reduce the adjustment speed of stock prices to negative information before the announcements of revised earnings forecasts disclosed by firms in the Tokyo Stock Exchange from July 1998 to December 2001. I find that the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the stocks with high short‐sales costs are insensitive to negative information on pre‐announcement days, but the CARs of these stocks become significantly lower than the CARs of the stocks with low short‐sales costs when the announcements reveal negative information to the public.     

Long-Term Earnings Forecasts in the Electric Utility Industry: Accuracy and Valuation Implications

This paper integrates research on the accuracy of alternative long-term earnings forecasts, the gain in accuracy achievable from combining various forecasts, and the power of different long-term earnings forecasts to explain stock prices. The tests are performed on 82 electric utility firms because of the relative homogeneity of accounting data in that industry and because of the importance of the findings for the determination of the cost of capital in a regulatory proceeding. The results are consistent with earlier research findings that analyst forecasts of long-term earnings growth are more accurate than forecasts from extrapolative models. Combined forecasts applied to out-of-sample data, however, did not result in markedly improved forecasting accuracy. Finally, valuation tests of alternative forecasting techniques offered strong evidence that investors place the greatest weight on forecasts from Value Line.     

Anticipated Earnings Announcements and the Customer–Supplier Anomaly

I test whether the anticipation of earnings news stimulates acquisition of customer information and mitigates returns to the customer–supplier anomaly documented by Cohen and Frazzini (“Economic Links and Predictable Returns.” The Journal of Finance 63 (2008): 1977–2011). I find that attention to a firm's publicly disclosed customers increases shortly before the firm announces earnings, and that customer stock returns predict supplier stock returns shortly before, but not after, the supplier's earnings announcement. I further find some evidence that these predictable returns are increasing in the level of customer information acquisition. These results are unique to anticipated disclosure events and suggest that anticipation of supplier earnings announcements resolves investor limited attention to customer information and accelerates price discovery of customer news.     

The Impact of Value Line Special Situations Recommendations on Stock Prices: Evidence From the Over-the-Counter Market

The value to investors of the information provided by the Value Line Investment Service has been the subject of discussion for many years. This paper examines the information content of the recommendations made by the Value Line Special Situations Service to buy (sell) specific stock issues. The advice given by Value Line generates significant abnormal returns to shareholders near its release date. However, when the price response over longer periods is considered, the effect of the recommendations appears to be transitory. Further, there appears to be no difference in the overall price response between listed and over-the-counter securities.     

Dispersion of Financial Analysts' Earnings Forecasts and the (Option Model) Implied Standard Deviations of Stock Returns

This study examines whether the information implied by simultaneous levels of option and stock prices (specifically, the implied standard deviation of returns) reflects other contemporaneously available information. The independent contemporaneous measure considered is the observed dispersion (across several financial analysts), at a point in time, in the forecasts of earnings per share for a given firm. The results indicate that implied standard deviations clearly reflect the contemporaneous dispersion in analysts' forecasts incrementally, i.e., beyond the information contained in the historical time series of returns.     

Investor response to online value line rank changes: Foreign versus local stocks

We find that the Value Line effect is confined to U.S. stocks. U.S. listed stocks significantly outperform their benchmarks long after Value Line Timeliness rank change announcements. In contrast, we find no evidence of a Value Line effect for recommendations made for foreign stocks that list on U.S. exchanges, nor for those that list outside the U.S. For days surrounding rank change announcements, trading volume is abnormally high for U.S. listed stocks, but remains unchanged for the foreign stock sample. Our findings are unchanged after controlling for unique valuation challenges, varying market conditions, beta, firm size, book-to-market, momentum, and post earnings announcement effects.     

Information misweighting and the cross-section of stock recommendations

This paper provides evidence that analysts whose earnings forecast revisions showed signs of greater exaggeration in the past make recommendation changes that lead to lower abnormal returns than their peers. Interpreting stock recommendations as a forecast of future abnormal returns, I show that this evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that analysts who typically exaggerate or overstate the weight of their private information when issuing forecasts also do so when making recommendations. The paper also shows that past earnings forecasts provide incremental information about analysts' recommending behavior beyond that contained in past recommendations.