Responses by Australian auditors to the global financial crisis

We examine the impact of the global financial crisis (GFC) on auditor behaviour in Australia. Using a sample of listed companies, we examine whether the GFC impacted the propensity of auditors to issue going concern modifications and increased audit effort as reflected in audit fees and audit reporting lag. Controlling for client characteristics, we find an increase in the propensity to issue going concern opinions during the period 2008–2009 compared with the period 2005–2007 and that Big N auditors responded to the GFC earlier than non‐Big N auditors. In relation to audit effort, we find evidence of increased audit fees during the period 2008–2009 compared with the period 2005–2007. There is, however, no evidence of increased audit reporting lags during the GFC.     

The changing relationship between audit firm size and going concern reporting

As a result of gradual shifts in the market for audit services, we expect financially stressed public companies to be increasingly audited by regional firms, who, in turn, will be increasingly likely to issue going concern reports to their financially stressed public companies. Our expectations challenge the view that larger audit firms, in order to avoid exposure to litigation, report more conservatively. To address these issues, we examine the 22 years between 1989 and 2010, which we classify into four ERAs (e.g., 1989–1994, 1995–2001, 2002–2005, and 2006–2010). We initially document that over time, financially stressed public companies are shifting to regional audit firms, partly due to the actions of larger audit firms shedding these clients, which represent ex-ante conservatism. In contrast, audit firm reporting represents ex-post conservatism. We next show that over time, for their financially stressed public clients, regional audit firms are increasingly more likely to issue going concern reports, and BigN audit firms are increasingly less likely to issue going concern reports. We also show that in more recent ERAs, regional audit firms have been more likely than BigN and national audit firms to issue a going concern report to their financially stressed pubic clients. Overall, our evidence suggests that more recently, larger audit firms, relative to regional audit firms, acted more proactively to lessen their litigation risks through increasing centralization of client selection and acceptance processes. However, our evidence suggests that more recently, to lessen their litigation risks, regional audit firms, relative to BigN and national audit firms, acted more conservatively by issuing more going concern reports to their financially stressed public clients.     

Determinants of going concern opinions and audit fees for development stage enterprises

Startup entities have been the focus of much political and academic interest recently. Development stage enterprises (DSEs), as defined by SFAS 7, are startup entities for which some publicly available information exists. New accounting standards have removed the DSE designation and related extra reporting requirements, and placed more responsibility on owners and managers to assess the ability of entities to continue as a going concern. We examined information from financial statements and audit reports of companies previously reporting as DSEs to investigate what increases the likelihood of receiving a going concern modification in auditors' opinions (GCO) and what affects audit fees. Our overall analyses indicate that the asset size of DSEs, negative working capital, and prior-year going concern modifications consistently influence going concern modifications to auditors' opinions. Managers should clearly consider these conditions when making their assessment of their companies' future going concern status. Our results indicate that the size of the audit firm did not influence the going concern modification decision, but Big4 auditors charge significantly higher fees than other auditors. Thus, managers/owners of DSEs should weigh the benefits of having a Big4 firm audit on their financial statements against the higher fees charged by those firms.     

Audit Reports in Australia during the Global Financial Crisis

The Global Financial Crisis reduced economic growth, impacted equity and credit markets, and increased business risk. To the extent that this increased risk translates into greater uncertainty of companies’ ability to continue as going concerns, this should be reflected in audit reports. This paper investigates how the crisis impacted auditor reporting in Australia by examining the period 2005–2009. It finds that the main reason for audit report modification is going concern and that modification rates increased from 12% in 2005–2007 to 18% in 2008 and 22% in 2009. Serious audit report qualification rates remain around 3%.     

Auditors’ going‐concern‐modified opinions after 2001: measuring reporting accuracy

An important change in auditors’ reporting behaviour in the period after the high‐profile corporate collapses in 2001 is that auditors were more likely to issue going‐concern (GC)‐modified audit opinions. Comparing company failure rates subsequent to receiving a first‐time going‐concern (FTGC)‐modified audit opinion in the pre‐ and post‐2001 periods, we find a consistent type 1 error (misclassification) rate (the rate of survival among companies issued an FTGC opinion). Results are indicative of auditors maintaining GC reporting accuracy when comparing the 1995–1996 and 2004–2005 periods. This conclusion is supported after considering the impact of mitigating circumstances surrounding companies that received an FTGC‐modified audit report and survived.     

Does sharing the same network auditor in group affiliated firms affect audit quality?

We contribute to the literature on audit quality by examining whether sharing the same network auditor among group affiliated firms is related to lower or higher audit quality in China. We find that choosing the same network audit firm among group affiliated firms is associated with more sanctions by regulators regarding fraudulent financial reporting, higher abnormal accruals, larger standard deviation of abnormal accruals, higher likelihood of a downward restatement in earnings, and lower likelihood of receiving a going concern modified opinion. We further identify contexts that moderate audit quality. Higher audit quality is associated with the use of a specialist auditor and firms that operate in more homogeneous industries. Lower audit quality is associated with longer auditor tenure (more than five years), greater geographic distance between a parent company and its subsidiaries, and greater control by a parent company over its subsidiaries.     

Addressing Issues Relating To Going-Gongern Audit Qualifications And Corporate Failure

This study examines the incidence of going-concern audit qualifications and of corporate failure for Australian publicly listed companies over the period 1980-90. The analysis includes a review of annual reports for companies that attracted going-concern qualifications but did not subsequently fail, in order to identify potential indicators of survival. The differences between the indicators noted for failed companies that had their last accounts qualified on the basis of going concern, and those of failed companies not qualified, was also examined. Other issues of interest include a comparison of going-concern qualifications by Big Eight (Six) and other audit firms, and the extent and location of disclosure of going-concern problems in the annual report.     

An Empirical Investigation of Determinants of Audit Reports in the UK

Prior studies of audit reporting in the UK only analyse either very small, private companies, or large listed companies. In addition, these studies focus on narrowly defined types of modified audit reports, respectively the 'small company' audit qualification, and going‐concern related modifications. In contrast, this paper employs a multinomial logit model to analyse the determinants of both going‐concern and non going‐concern related audit modifications, including modifications for disagreements and limitations on scope. Furthermore, this paper analyses reports over a wide range of both private and public (listed and non‐listed) companies. The determinants of audit reports are shown to differ between different types of audit modification. In addition, subsidiary companies hiring large auditors are significantly less likely to receive non going‐concern related modifications, whereas non‐subsidiary companies hiring large auditors are significantly more likely to receive going‐concern related modifications.     

Explaining auditors’ propensity to issue going‐concern opinions in Australia after the global financial crisis

We document an increase in auditors issuing going‐concern opinions in Australia over a prolonged period since the Global Financial Crisis that is not fully explained by changes in client risk. Overall, our evidence is consistent with auditors reporting more conservatively with the increased level of scrutiny from Australian Securities and Investments Commission inspections and other increased regulation, and in particular, the negative attention following the 2011–2012 inspections. As a result, auditor reports with reference to going‐concern issues have become less informative regarding future corporate failure.     

Do the Big 4 and the Second-tier firms provide audits of similar quality?

In this paper, we examine audit quality for Big 4 and Second-tier auditors during 2003–2006. We utilize the auditor’s propensity to issue a going concern audit report for distressed clients as a measure of audit quality. In addition, since the purpose of an audit is to improve financial reporting quality, we utilize abnormal accruals as an observable proxy for audit quality. Further, we utilize the client- and year-specific ex ante equity risk premium as a proxy for audit quality as perceived by investors. We control for auditor self-selection bias using the matched-pairs sample approach discussed by Francis and Lennox (2008). We find weak evidence that the Big 4 have a higher propensity to issue going concern audit opinions for distressed companies. However, the level of performance-adjusted abnormal accruals for Big 4 and Second-tier audit firm clients appears to be similar. With respect to investor perceptions, we find the client-specific ex ante equity risk premium to be lower for Big 4 clients than for Second-tier audit firm clients. Overall, our findings suggest little difference in actual audit quality but a more pronounced difference in perceived audit quality. Collectively, the evidence we provide informs the current discourse on audit quality, auditor choice, and the viability of Second-tier auditors as an alternative to the Big 4.     

Do Non–Audit Service Fees Impair Auditor Independence? Evidence from Going Concern Audit Opinions

We find no significant association between non–audit service fees and impaired auditor independence, where auditor independence is surrogated by auditors' propensity to issue going concern audit opinions. We also find no association between going concern opinions and either total fees or audit fees. In addition, our findings are robust to controlling for unexpected fees, to controlling for endogeneity among our variables, and to several alternative research design specifications. Our results are consistent with market–based incentives, such as loss of reputation and litigation costs, dominating the expected benefits from compromising auditor independence.     

PCAOB inspection reports and audit quality

With the creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), audit firm oversight shifted away from self-regulation to independent regulation. The inspections program is the central feature of the PCAOB. We examine whether PCAOB inspections are able to distinguish actual audit quality (as opposed to perceived) during the period inspected to better understand this important regulatory tool. We use three measures that proxy for actual audit quality: abnormal accruals, restatements, and the propensity to issue a going concern opinion. For triennially inspected auditors, we find that PCAOB inspections are associated with lower audit quality when the reports are seriously deficient (weaker results for deficient reports). More specifically, we find clients of triennially inspected auditors that receive a deficient or seriously deficient report are associated with significantly higher abnormal current accruals and clients of auditors that receive a seriously deficient report are associated with a greater propensity to restate. Our evidence is subject to the caveat that PCAOB reports for triennially inspected auditors do not capture the going concern aspect of audit quality. For annually inspected auditors, the results are conflicting and suggest PCAOB inspection reports do not distinguish audit quality during the period inspected for annually inspected auditors.     

Auditor reporting and earnings management: some additional evidence

This paper investigates the reasons that lead to modification of auditors’ opinions. We revisit the conclusions of prior US‐based research on whether a modification highlights likely earnings management activities. Extending this research, we consider an alternate explanation that managers adjust accruals to report earnings that better predict future firm performance, which has the side‐effect of placing them in conflict with their auditors. Our study sample comprises all firms listed on the Australian Stock Exchange over the period 1999–2003. Consistent with prior research, there is no evidence of earnings management leading to an audit opinion modification. However, we do show that firms receiving inherent uncertainty modifications (other than going concern) have greater persistence of earnings (accruals) relative to other firms. This is consistent with the proposition that managers have made policy choices in reporting current earnings, with which their auditors disagree, that will likely result in a greater ability to forecast the firm's future earnings.     

Group audits: Are audit quality and price associated with the Lead auditor’s decision to accept responsibility?

Lead auditors frequently rely on work performed by Other auditors, especially when auditing clients with operations in multiple countries. The PCAOB has expressed concern that the quality of such group audits may differ depending on whether the Lead auditor accepts or declines responsibility for work done by Other auditors. The PCAOB also has been concerned with the venue through which Lead auditors and Other auditors disclose their participation in group audits, including disclosure of whether Lead auditors accept or decline responsibility. To investigate these issues, we employ a sample consisting entirely of group audit engagements. We identify Lead auditors taking responsibility from PCAOB Form 2, filed by Other auditors of U.S. registrants for fiscal years 2009 to 2017. We identify Lead auditors not accepting responsibility from audit report disclosures during the same period. The results suggest that Lead auditors accepting responsibility charge higher audit fees but provide audits of no higher quality, and possibly of even lower quality. These results are robust to various additional analyses. Our research contributes to the ongoing debate over how the participation of Other auditors affects audit quality.     

Business Continuity in the Face of Fraud and Organisational Change

We examine business continuity in the context of fraud and accounting for an organisation as a going concern. The issues addressed are timely and focus on two points. First, fraudulent activities in business are increasing worldwide with related costs reaching trillions of US dollars. Second, the conventional accounting concept of a going concern that typically signifies business continuity is arguably formed on a static view of business. As such, this view does not help mitigate opportunities for fraudulent statements of account. We contribute to the accounting literature by emphasising the dynamic nature of business and in doing so extend the discussion on Type 1 and Type 2 going concern errors. In that context we provide evidence of a possible Type 3 going concern error in an organisation's financial reporting. Drawing on an international fraud case involving an Indian company, Satyam, we illustrate the adaptive behaviour of resilient business organisations. The findings of our study show that even in the face of fraud dynamic, adaptive organisations can achieve business continuity.     

The effects of problem severity and recovery strategy on managers’ going concern judgments and decisions

Accounting standards now require management (as preparers of the financial statements) to assess and disclose going concern problems to stakeholders. However, important questions exist about managers’ ability and willingness to provide credible going concern assessments given their role as financial statement preparers and incentives to avoid self-reporting problems. The objective of this study is to investigate the effects of problem severity and recovery strategy on managers’ going concern disclosure judgments and decisions. We conduct an experiment with 84 experienced managers involved with financial reporting and find they are most likely to recommend going concern disclosure when financial distress is high and the recovery plan focuses on debt and equity. The results also suggest that managers have higher “substantial doubt” thresholds than auditors, and their perceptions regarding the fairness of the going concern standard also influence their decisions about disclosures of going concern issues.     

Audit report information content and the provision of non-audit services: Evidence from Spanish lending decisions

This study examines whether auditor economic independence affects the information content of going concern audit reports in the European setting. We conduct an experiment where 80 experienced Spanish loan officers from the second largest European commercial bank review a loan request under two lending scenarios: (1) a potential borrower receiving an unqualified but modified going concern opinion, and (2) a potential borrower receiving a qualified going concern opinion. Auditor economic independence, measured by the provision of non-audit services (NAS), is manipulated (absence vs. presence of significant NAS). We find that a qualified going concern audit report is interpreted as a primary warning signal (death penalty). However, the provision of NAS acts as a second order mechanism that only activates loan officers’ professional skepticism in the case of an unqualified but modified going concern report scenario. Therefore, we find evidence suggesting that the potential negative impact of a perceived lack of auditor independence depends on the nature of the audit report. Our findings have important implications for the European regulator, which is currently considering establishing an auditor independence regulation framework similar to that in the United States of America.     

Audit opinions and information asymmetry in the stock market

This study analyses the relationship between the content of the audit reports and information asymmetry levels in the stock market for a sample of Spanish firms. By implementing an association study, we document (1) that firms with audit qualifications show higher information asymmetry levels than those with unqualified opinions; (2) firms with non‐quantified qualifications show higher informational asymmetry than firms with quantified qualifications; and (3) we find a stronger effect on the level of informational asymmetry in the case of going concern qualifications. Our findings suggest that audit qualifications reporting more uncertainty on firm accounting statements result in higher adverse selection risk.     

U.S. Audit partner identification and auditor reporting

After a lengthy and protracted debate, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) adopted new rules requiring disclosure of the engagement partner’s name and information about other accounting firms on the new PCAOB Form AP, Auditor Reporting of Certain Audit Participants. We investigate the impact of this regulation on auditor behavior in the context of the auditor’s going concern report modification propensity. We document an increase in the propensity to issue a going concern report modification in the disclosure regime, accompanied by a corresponding increase in the Type I (‘false positives’) error rate. Thus, an unintended consequence of Rule 3211 is the potential reduction in the audit report's informativeness. Conceivably, a more significant repercussion is that going concern modifications can hasten bankruptcy for firms since financial institutions may be reluctant to lend money to firms with modified audit reports. An unjustified increase in the going concern modification rate as evinced in our paper may make U.S. capital markets potentially less attractive to young, upstart, albeit financially-distressed, companies.     

Empirical Evidence on the Implicit Determinants of Compensation in Big 4 Audit Partnerships

This study investigates the implicit financial incentives of individual Big 4 audit partners by examining the association between a partner's compensation and characteristics of the audit firm, audit partner, and individual partner clientele for Big 4 firms in Sweden. Using tax and financial data for individual audit partners and clients, our empirical findings indicate that there is significant variation in the implicit determinants that are associated with compensation across the Big 4. We find that audit partners’ compensation is positively associated with the size of their clientele or the number of publicly traded clients, both of which represent revenue‐generating opportunities. Similarly, compensation and developing an industry specialization are positively related. In three firms, gaining clients is clearly related to an increase in compensation, while losing a client is associated with a reduction in partner income in only one firm. We find that audit partner income is more sensitive to performance‐related incentives, such as attracting new clients, as partners progress in their career. Finally, we find evidence that audit failures, proxied by reporting errors related to issuing a going concern opinion, are associated with lower compensation. These results should be of interest to the auditing profession, audit firms, and regulators when they consider the effects of implicit incentives of partner compensation on audit quality.