Financial dollarization: Short-run determinants in transition economies

This paper examines the determinants of financial dollarization in transition economies from a short-run perspective. Using aggregate monthly data of deposit and loan dollarization we study the drivers of short-term fluctuations in dollarization and test their importance at different levels of dollarization. The results provide evidence that (a) the positive (negative) short-run effects of depreciation (monetary expansion) on deposit dollarization are exacerbated in high-dollarization countries; (b) short-run loan dollarization is mainly driven by banks matching of domestic loans and deposits, currency matching of assets and liabilities, international financial integration, and institutional quality; and (c) both types of short-run dollarization are affected by interest rate differentials and deviations from desired dollarization.     

Financial dollarization and systemic risks: New empirical evidence

This paper explores the persistence of financial dollarization in a group of 79 economies with different levels of development. Our main hypothesis is that a high level of domestic debt combined with default risk explains this persistence, even after a decline in inflation rates. Using the generalized method of moments (GMM) in a panel data analysis, our results show that inflation risks caused by increasing probability of default account for financial dollarization more than inflation rate itself. After the decrease in inflation rates, the foreign currency-denominated deposits remain large because of the high debt-to-GDP ratios, particularly in speculative-grade economies. High public indebtedness leads to expectations of default. Dollarization is a rational response to the future inflation associated with investors' expectations of default observed in highly indebted economies.     

What drives credit dollarization in transition economies?

This paper provides an in-depth analysis of the use of foreign currencies in the lending activities of banks in transition economies. The impact of bank and firm variables on credit dollarization is studied in an optimal portfolio allocation model and estimated using new aggregate data for 21 transition economies for the period 1990–2003. Empirical results provide evidence that credit dollarization is the combined outcome of domestic deposit dollarization and banks’ desire for currency-matched portfolios beyond regulatory requirements. The effects of international financial factors and natural hedges are less robust across alternative specifications. The paper further discusses the role of regulations in affecting the impact of these factors on credit dollarization and calls for more developed domestic forward foreign exchange markets.     

Dollarization in Emerging Markets: Evidence from Georgia

This paper studies dollarization using the implications of three versions of a money-in-utility function model. These versions accentuate the roles of the exchange rate, the interest rates on foreign and domestic currencies time deposits, and domestic and foreign inflation. Monthly Georgian data for the period 1996-2007 are employed in the analysis. Findings indicate that the U.S. dollar is a strong substitute for the domestic currency and has a significant share in domestic liquidity services. The historical dollarization is well explained by the exchange rate model.     

Dollarization of bank deposits: Causes and consequences

This paper assesses the benefits and risks associated with dollarization of bank deposits. We provide novel empirical evidence on the determinants of deposit dollarization, its role in promoting financial development, and on whether dollarization is associated with financial instability. We find that: (a) the credibility of macroeconomic policy and the quality of institutions are both key determinants of cross-country variations in dollarization; (b) dollarization is likely to promote financial deepening only in a high inflation environment; and (c) financial instability is likely higher in dollarized economies. The implications of these findings for financial sector and monetary policies are briefly discussed.     

The Impact of Deposit Dollarization on Financial Deepening

Banks in highly dollarized economies face risks that significantly affect their ability to perform their financial intermediation role. In these economies, dollarization plays a dual role: on the one hand, it provides a hedging instrument protecting the value of savings; on the other hand, it generates a currency mismatch on banks' balance sheets and increases default risk. Through these effects deposit dollarization can affect credit extension. This paper investigates the role of deposit dollarization on the financial depth of forty-four emerging market economies. Findings suggest that deposit dollarization has a consistent and negative impact on financial deepening, except in high-inflation economies.     

Systemic Risk, Dollarization, and Interest Rates in Emerging Markets: A Panel-Based Approach

This study investigates the impact of systemic risks and financialdollarization on real interest rates in emerging economies.Higher systemic risks induce both higher real interest ratesand increased dollarization. Using appropriate instruments forthe dollarization ratio, the study overcomes the simultaneousequation problem and correctly estimates a negative coefficientfor the dollarization ratio in the interest rate equation. Itconfirms the theoretical prediction that a strategy of "dedollarizing"the economy will raise the equilibrium domestic real interestrate if the strategy fails to address fundamental macroeconomicrisks. Even so, it also finds that this effect is small, aftercontrolling for the risks of dilution and default. The resultsbring to light the systemic-risk reasons for high interest ratesin emerging economies—and contribute to evaluating thedifficulties of dedollarization policies.     

DOLLARIZATION FOR ARGENTINA

In January 1999, President Carlos Menem suggested replacing the Argentine peso with the U.S. dollar. President Menem's announcement has sparked a debate throughout Latin America and Eastern Europe about what has been termed "dollarization." That debate prompted U.S. Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin to deliver a major policy speech on alternative exchange-rate regimes on April 21, 1999 and the U.S. Senate Banking Committee to hold dollarization hearings the following day featuring Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan and Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Lawrence Summers.
This article presents a case for officially dollarizing Argentina. Dollarization is not new. Unofficial dollarization is widespread in emerging market countries; in fact, as much as 70% of the stock of U.S. dollars now circulates abroad. Twenty-eight countries and dependent territories are officially dollarized. Although official dollarization would result in Argentina losing seigniorage of about 0.22 percent of GDP, the author estimates that this cost would be more than offset by a reduction in interest rates that would increase Argentina's trend rate of GDP growth by about two percent.
After debunking the most common criticisms of dollarization, the article closes by offering recommendations about the specific form of dollarization and presenting a detailed dollarization statute for Argentina. The author proposes a competitive currency regime for Argentina, one in which all foreign money would be legal tender.     

Dollars, Debt, and International Financial Institutions: Dedollarizing Multilateral Lending

Financial dollarization is increasingly seen as a concern becauseof its tendency to contribute to financial crises and outputvolatility. As a result the debate on financial dollarizationhas shifted in favor of a more proactive stance on dedollarization.While often neglected, lending from international financialinstitutions is an important source of financial dollarizationin emerging economies and must be considered in any dedollarizationstrategy. This article revisits old and new arguments in favorof international financial institution lending in the localcurrency and argues that any such initiative should rely, atleast initially, on demand from residents seeking stable returnsin units of the local consumption basket but who are reluctantto take on sovereign risk. Superior enforcement capacity enablesinternational financial institutions to intermediate these savings,currently invested in dollarized foreign assets, back into thelocal economy. The international financial institutions canoffer investment-grade local currency bonds and use the proceedsto dedollarize their own lending to noninvestment-grade countries,thereby reducing financial dollarization and fostering the developmentof local currency markets.     

What expenditure does Anglosphere foreign borrowing fund?

This paper examines the extent to which foreign borrowing funds private investment, consumption and government expenditure in the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand (the Anglosphere), advanced economies which have been the world's largest international borrowers since 1990. Using a bivariate predictive regression model, we estimate the relative importance of these expenditure aggregates as predictors of their external deficits, and hence foreign borrowing. Overall, based on quarterly macroeconomic data for the period 1990–2011, the evidence suggests that foreign borrowing has not financed higher household consumption in these economies over recent decades, with the possible exception of the United States. While results concerning government spending are mixed due to policy reaction, business cycle and public-private saving offset effects, strong results for private investment augur well for the sustainability of this grouping's foreign borrowing.     

Following the leader? The relevance of the Fed funds rate for inflation targeting countries

In a New-Keynesian model for a small open economy, we derive a CPI inflation-based Taylor rule that implements the flexible price allocation. We conclude that, in this rule, the natural rate of interest should be linked to the foreign interest rate and to domestic productivity shocks. This rule ensures that the CPI real rate moves in order to induce movements in consumption that are coherent with the flexible price allocation. The empirical evidence shows that inflation-targeting central banks respond to movements in the Fed funds rate, besides reacting to expected CPI inflation and to the domestic output gap. This is true for developed and emerging economies. Furthermore, we find that in emerging countries the response to foreign variables is not different from zero, as suggested by theory, when domestic inflation, rather than CPI inflation, is introduced in the policy rule.     

Deposits and relationship lending

We empirically examine whether access to deposits with inelasticrates (core deposits) permits a bank to make contractual agreementswith borrowers that are infeasible if the bank must pay marketrates for funds. Such access insulates a bank's costs of fundsfrom exogenous shocks, allowing it to insulate its borrowersagainst exogenous credit shocks. We find that, controlling forloan market competition, banks funded more heavily with coredeposits provide more loan rate smoothing in response to exogenouschanges in aggregate credit risk. Thus we provide evidence fora novel channel linking bank liabilities to relationship lending.     

Measuring interest rate sensitivity of consumer depositors

The impetus for the deregulation of consumer deposits presumed that institutions need flexibility in setting rates to control deposit levels. Previous research indicated that institutions may find varying levels of sensitivity of depositors which will make it difficult to predict volume response. This study examined the timed response of interest rate changes on deposit volume changes. Using available time series techniques, it found that volume response varied with market characteristics as well as money market conditions. In some markets, deposit volume responded significantly to interest rate differentials, while in others the deposits were insensitive to small differentials. Thus, an institution is well advised to study its particular deposit market before implementing a liability rate strategy.     

Dollarization,Seigniorage, and Prices: The Case of North Korea

This study employs a general equilibrium monetary search model to examine the effects of the recent dollarization in North Korea on seigniorage and prices. Maximum seigniorage is generated at a high rate of money growth when dollarization is mild. However, under a high degree of dollarization seigniorage declines sharply when the money growth rate is high. Accordingly, seigniorage can be increased by de-dollarizing the economy through lowering the money growth rate. This finding implies that the post-2013 price stabilization may be a result of the restriction on printing of money with the aim of increasing seigniorage. This finding also recognizes that the North Korean authorities have little room for maneuver on monetary policy under the conditions of widespread dollarization.     

关于境内商业银行外币资金汇率风险管理的思考

文章试图为化解商业银行的客户外币融资需求持续旺盛与外币存款余额常年低位徘徊之间的矛盾提供办法和思路,即商业银行可以通过构建一个外汇组合提高自有外汇资金的收益,主动管理自有外币资本金汇率风险。这需要明确以下三个问题：构建此外汇组合的目的、评价此组合的标准和构建组合的方法。在此过程中,要注意兼顾风险和收益的均衡,确定收益核算口径和收益评价标准。     

The determinants of foreign banking activity in the United States

The recent rapid growth of foreign banking activity in the United States has led to major changes in the regulation of foreign banks. This paper seeks to determine the factors causing this growth of foreign banks. Empirical tests were conducted employing quarterly time series data from 1972 through 1979. It is shown that the most important factors determining foreign bank growth were (i) the size of interest differentials between U.S. and foreign deposits and loans, (ii) the falling P/E ratios for U.S. bank stocks, (iii) the increased size of (net) foreign direct investment in the U.S., (iv) the persistent depreciation in the dollar, and (v) expectations that the International Banking Act of 1978 would have a restrictive affect on foreign bank activity in the U.S.     

Co-integrating currencies and yield differentials

This study investigates the relationship between currencies and interest rates of different maturity horizons. The real exchange rate is found to depend both on short-term real domestic and foreign interest rate difference and on long-term real domestic and foreign interest rate difference. Co-integrating regressions of contemporaneous currency rates generate negative and significant coefficients for long-term rate differentials, consistent with uncovered interest parity. Therefore, the expectations hypothesis holds for long horizons. On the other hand, positive coefficients for real short-term interest rate differentials reveal the forward premium puzzle: the failure of uncovered interest parity for short-horizons. Results are partly driven by the very different risk characteristics of short-term bonds and foreign bonds.     

Monetary policy in emerging markets: Can liability dollarization explain contractionary devaluations?

In emerging markets, external debt is denominated almost entirely in large, developed country currencies such as the U.S. dollar. This liability dollarization offers a channel through which exchange rate variation can lead to business cycle instability. When firms' assets are denominated in domestic currency and liabilities are denominated in foreign currency, an exchange rate depreciation worsens firms' balance sheets, which leads to higher capital costs and contractions in capital spending. To illustrate this, I construct a quantitative, sticky price, small open economy model in which a monetary policy induced devaluation leads to a persistent contraction in output. In this model, fixed exchange rates offer greater stability than an interest rule that targets inflation.     

Foreign bank penetration and the lending channel in emerging economies: Evidence from bank-level panel data

This paper examines the main implications of recently increasing foreign bank penetration on bank lending as a channel of monetary policy transmission in emerging economies. Using a dynamic panel model of loan growth, we investigate the loan granting behavior of 1273 banks in the emerging economies of Asia, Latin America, and Central and Eastern Europe during the period from 1996 to 2003. Applying the pooled OLS, system GMM, and panel VAR estimators, we find consistent evidence that foreign banks are less responsive to monetary shocks in host countries, as they adjust their outstanding loan portfolios and interest rates to a lesser extent than domestic private banks, independent of their liquidity, capitalization, size, efficiency, and credit risk, and although there exists a bank lending channel in the emerging economies, it is declining in strength due to the increased level of foreign bank penetration. We also explore possible driving factors for the different responses of foreign and domestic banks to monetary policy shocks by investigating foreign banks’ different behavior during banking crises and tranquil periods, the effects of mode of entry to host countries, the home-country effects, and the response of foreign banks from OECD countries vs. all foreign countries including non-OECD countries. We suggest the access of foreign banks to funding from parent banks through internal capital markets as the most convincing explanation.     

Capital flows to emerging market economies: A brave new world?

We examine the determinants of net private capital inflows to emerging market economies (EMEs) since 2002. Our main findings are: First, growth and interest rate differentials between EMEs and advanced economies and global risk appetite are statistically and economically important determinants of net private capital inflows. Second, there have been significant changes in the behavior of net inflows from the period before the recent global financial crisis to the post-crisis period, especially for portfolio inflows, partly explained by the greater sensitivity of such flows to interest rate differentials since the crisis. Third, capital controls introduced in recent years do appear to have discouraged both total and portfolio net inflows. Finally, we find positive effects of unconventional U.S. monetary policy on EME inflows, especially portfolio inflows. Even so, U.S. unconventional policy is one among several important factors influencing flows.